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# THE PILGRIMAGE OF FAITH

## IN THE WORLD OF MODERN THOUGHT

*Stephanos Nirmalendu Lectures*

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To

CORNELIUS JOHN LIGHTHALL BATES



## FOREWORD

These eleven chapters were written after an invitation came to deliver the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures in Comparative Religion before the University of Calcutta, and nine lectures, selected from this material, were delivered there in February and March, 1928.

I wish to make grateful acknowledgment here to Professor-Emeritus Harlan P Beach, of Yale Divinity School, for calling my attention to the lectureship; to President George Howells, of Serampore College, and Professor S. Radhakrishnan, of the University of Calcutta, for courtesies extended in connection with the appointment and during my stay in Calcutta; and to my colleagues of the Faculty of the Yale Divinity School, especially Professors Kenneth S Latourette, Roland H Bainton, and Robert L. Calhoun, for cheerfully undertaking certain tasks during my absence from New Haven in fulfilling the obligations of the lectureship.

On the way to and from India as well as during my stay there, it was my good fortune to meet many former pupils and other friends, old and new, from whom I received many kindnesses for which I shall never cease to be grateful. Of these I will single out for mention by name only my friend since boyhood days, Dr. C. J. L. Bates, President of Kwansei Gakuin, Kobe, Japan, to whom it has been my pleasure to dedicate what I could wish were a worthier tribute of my admiration and affection.

D. C. M.



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# THE PILGRIMAGE OF FAITH IN THE WORLD OF MODERN THOUGHT

## I. INTRODUCTORY · THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSALITY IN RELIGION.

• It was with a peculiar sense of grateful appreciation that I received the invitation with which I was honoured by the Senate of this University to deliver in this place a series of lectures on religion. Very distinctly do I remember that when as a college student I was making choice of my life-work and it became very clear to me that I must devote myself to a consideration of the bearing of philosophy upon religion, the one possible sphere of activity which appealed to me most strongly for a time, as I contemplated a life spent in the investigation and discussion of questions in philosophy and religion, was the student-community of the University of Calcutta. Thus the opportunity afforded by this important lectureship comes to me as the fulfilment, in part at least, of one of the dreams of my youth.

It is also a distinct satisfaction to me to visit in their own land and University the two representatives of Indian philosophy who made such a strong and favourable impression at the meetings of the International Congress of Philosophy held in the United States of America a year and a half ago. I refer, as you will know, to Professors Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan.

• As I turn to my subject may I say at the outset that in preparing this series of lectures to be delivered in the intellectual center of a land which is, of all lands, I take it, the one in which



intellectual interests come most distinctly to a focus in a religious philosophy of the world and of life, I have taken the liberty of understanding the term "Comparative Religion" in a very broad sense? I do not propose to interpret the term as meaning that the lecturer must make frequent meticulous comparisons between his own and other religions. On the contrary I shall interpret my task as permitting an emphasis upon the philosophical aspect of the subject, a concentrating of attention upon religious truth as our objective, as distinct from mere extension of acquaintance with historical fact. This ought not to mean, however, as I see it, a partisan attempt to glorify one historical development and to discredit all others. The problems to be considered will be taken up, in philosophic spirit, it is hoped, as problems of universal religion, and not as problems of the triumph of any one traditionalistic system over all others.

This must not, however, be understood to mean that I am going to make an attempt to disguise the fact that it is from within a particular religious fellowship and faith—the Christian—that I have always faced for myself the facts and problems of religion. Nor can I wish that it might have been otherwise; one must, I think, have enough inner empirical acquaintance with religion to be convinced of its positive value, if he is ever to be able correctly to understand its nature and evaluate its claims; and I can only wish that my experimental acquaintance with my own traditional religion were more extended and more profound. The course marked out for me, as I see it, is simply to deal as objectively and fairly with the universal problems of religion as I can, drawing my illustrations more largely, it may be, from the religious history and experience with which I am most familiar than from any other, but expressing appreciation and criticism of traditional Christianity with much the same frankness that I should use before my own students, and trusting that the process will not be without value for those whose traditional faith has been different from mine, and whose own experiences of religion may suggest more in the way of explicit comparison than I shall attempt to indicate.

The intellectual problems of religion center for the most part in what we may call experimental religion, meaning by that term a conscious human relation to a higher Power, or what is believed to be the ultimate Reality with which we have to do. It is urged in certain quarters that religion be defined in terms of the consciousness of values simply, but, making the utmost concession that is at all reasonable to this rather positivistic point of view, I would urge that it is truer to the historic use of the term and to the facts of what is called religion to-day, to distinguish between this which we may call *fundamental religion*, that is, aspiration or devotion toward what is felt to be the supreme ideal or value, and that which we have chosen to term *experimental religion*, namely, conscious dependence and other experimental relations toward what is regarded as the Supreme Power or Reality with which man is or can be concerned. Now I have no thought of minimizing the importance of fundamental religion, devotion to a "divine" Ideal; on the contrary nothing seems to me more important. Experimental religion at its best, whatever it may be in its own right, seeks and must seek to be instrumental to fundamental religion as end. But it is precisely in the value and validity of experimental religion, conscious adjustment to superhuman Reality, that the most pressing problems of the philosophy of religion are centered. When I use the term Religion, therefore, unless there be given some indication to the contrary, let it be understood that it is experimental religion to which I refer.

Trace religion back as far as you can, you will find that it has always been experimental. It has been concerned to enter into certain adjustments to a mysterious superhuman Reality, for the sake of desired modifications of human experience. Without meaning to deny to animistic, nativistic and collectivistic theories of the genesis of religion their measure of probable truth, let me suggest experimentalism as a theory worthy of more consideration than it has commonly been given. In very crude and unsatisfactory form the theory appears in Sir James Frazer's contention that religion is a transitional stage between primitive magic and

modern science in man's attempt to exercise control over natural forces. Now if religion were fundamentally an attempt to control external nature, simply that and nothing more, it might well be expected, like magic before it, to give way and disappear before the all-conquering advance of scientific method. But it may be that religion is a kind of adjustment to Reality for the realization of values which does not necessarily involve anything essentially antagonistic to science, in which case it would seem that religion is not necessarily doomed to decrease with the increase of science. Instead of adopting Frazer's formula, then, let me suggest, in agreement with a remark made, as I chance to remember, by Professor Kirsopp Lake, that modern religion at its best is related to primitive, superstitious religion in much the same way as modern science is related to primitive magic. Religion, like magic, is experimental adjustment for the sake of desired results, but while magic and primitive religion were commonly mistaken and futile, modern science and modern religion at its best are progressively discovering the right adjustments, those which can be depended upon to lead uniformly to success. Moreover, so far is science from being qualified to displace religion, that it is in the greatest need—as recent world-events have abundantly shown—of being supplemented by religion, or rather of being itself made a supplement to true religion, if the highest well-being of humanity is to be achieved. Science aims to control the environment by direct action in accordance with natural law; religion, in so far as it has discovered its true function, aims at the elevation and strengthening of the spiritual life itself, through adjustment to "a Beyond that is within," a Nature higher than what we know as nature, a Self deeper than what we call our self.

From this point of view faith is not mere religious belief but religious adjustment, and when it proves successful, or in other words, when it is the right religious adjustment, the resulting experience, whether it be thought of as a salvation, a redemption, an emancipation, or more simply and positively as success, necessarily involves something in the way of discovery or revelation of

reality, and the reality thus revealed or discovered is naturally identified, in the thought of the man of faith, with the Object to which his religious adjustment was made.

Moreover, by a perfectly normal alternation, experimental religion tends to pass from the practical phase to one of contemplation. Adjustment is made to a religious Object as a possible means of deliverance from evil or achievement of good; when the adjustment is such that success ensues, there naturally tends to follow a period of grateful contemplation of the Object to whose participation or response the deliverance or success is ascribed. This is the worship phase of experimental religion, and from its special cultivation may emerge, under certain conditions, what is known as the mystical element in religion. And finally, when again there occurs the normal alternation in the reverse direction, from worship to work, it is natural that the work to which the mood of worship impels should be interpreted as done for, or in co-operation with, the Reality which has been the object of grateful religious contemplation.

We are ready now for a more detailed definition of religion, from the experimental point of view. Religion, presupposing and involving the pursuit of values regarded as of supreme importance, is essentially a conscious relation of dependence on and adjustment to a higher Reality or Power, upon which man's highest values are believed ultimately to depend, also, when the result of the adjustment is satisfactory, an experience of deliverance or achievement, interpreted as due to the agency of that higher Reality, or religious Object; and, finally, a more or less mystical contemplation of, and a willed co-operation with the religious Object or higher Power to which in the first place conscious adjustment was made.

Religion, being an experimental phase of life, naturally makes great use of guiding ideas. The most essential of these are ideas of the religious Object, in other words, theology. It is no doubt true that the ideational element in religion is there as a more or less symbolic expression of religious feeling and as an explanation of the various features of the cult. But religious ideas are means

of the control of religious experience, as well as means of its expression; they may not have been the primary source of inspiration to the religious attitude, but they must have some dynamic function in that direction, or they would not be instruments of the control of religious conduct. They guide to future as well as express past religious experience. In other words, theology is a means of guiding and controlling experimental religion, and since experimental religion is instrumental to fundamental religion, theology is seen to be the servant of practical life.

But theology, the ideational element in religion, can be expected to function in a satisfactory way permanently in human life, only if it represents reality truly. And this is what, in sincere religion, it always claims to do. It may be an expression of religious feeling, an explanation of the cult, and a guide to religious adjustment; but it can continue to be all this, and especially the last, only if it can be taken as true, an essentially correct representation of reality, an anticipation of a sound and rationally defensible philosophy of reality. From this point of view the goal of philosophy is to become as rational, that is, as scientific and philosophical as possible, correcting itself through the appeal to experience and logic, and combining with other assured knowledge to constitute a religious philosophy of reality. In other words, theology, as the intellectual element in faith or religious adjustment, should learn from the experiences which follow various kinds of religious adjustment. Given freedom thus to develop normally, as science has developed, experimental religion ought to become more and more scientific, that is more and more rational while remaining vitally experiential. In this way a body of verified religious knowledge might be built up such as would command the respectful attention of metaphysical thinkers in something like the way in which they recognize that their speculations are challenged by the general results of the sciences.

Theoretically all this seems plain enough; but the moment we turn to put it into practice we are confronted with enormous difficulties. In the very forefront of the obstacles which challenge

the attempt to construct a rational, universally acceptable religious philosophy is the disconcerting multiplicity of widely divergent systems of doctrine to be found in the various religions of the world. What makes the situation especially difficult is not the variety of religious beliefs alone, but the fact that these various beliefs have become traditional in the various national, racial and other social groups, with the result that some ideas come to the individual with a certain prestige over and above that which is theirs by intrinsic right. As a consequence they evoke the most loyal assent, whereas other ideas are met with a correspondingly unfair antagonistic prejudice. This traditional standardization of expressions of faith is not wholly bad; it tends to conserve for later generations the values of the particular discoveries or revelations achieved in particular historical developments of religion. But it may easily become a check on further progress, and from the point of view of interest in formulating universal religious truth, loyalty to religious tradition as such presents itself as a serious obstacle.

Thus the seeker of a sound and scientific religious philosophy finds himself plunged into the problems of "comparative religion," and the quest for objectivity, rationality, truth in religion, comes to be defined as *the quest for a universal religion*, as distinct from the particularities and relativities of the various traditional faiths. This quest for universality in religion finds partial but not full satisfaction in the easily recognized universal values of what we have called fundamental religion, the values of spiritual ideals and of the good will which would seek these ideals not only for one's self but for others as well. For the realization of the spiritual ideal of humanity, wills that are not good must be made good, and for this a religious experience of moral attainment is of the highest importance. Now this religious experience is conditioned by a certain faith, or religious adjustment, and this religious adjustment, while not inspired by ideas alone, is influenced and guided by ideas, so that even our practical interests drive us back ultimately to theology and metaphysics. With all its practical value, religion even at its best can maintain itself permanently only if it

can be believed to be universally valid and true. The individual has no right to accept any religion in its doctrinal or metaphysical aspect unless he can believe it to be valid for everybody, as valid in essence for everybody as mathematics and science are valid for everybody. I remember hearing that famous historian of philosophy, the late Professor Windelband, make the statement, "It is not to be expected that all people will come to have one religion; neither is it to be desired that they should." This may be true as far as concerns ritual and certain historic traditions and imaginative elements; but if the reference was to central experiences, ideas, and religious adjustments, we may say that the speaker was voicing the historian's interest in variety of phenomena rather than the religionist's interest in universal and eternal truth. We may concede the desirability of variety in the less essential things; but universal validity in the theological and metaphysical element in religion, while less urgent than universal validity in the ideals toward which spiritual aspiration is directed, or even in the religious adjustments and experiences of deliverance and renewal, is nevertheless logically indispensable.

We are committed, then, by our belief in the essential validity and permanent indispensable value of religion and by the fact of the extreme multiplicity of the existing forms of religious life and thought, to the quest for universal religion. How may we expect successfully to prosecute the search?

It is surely clear enough without argument to those who understand human nature that the way to arrive at anything like universal agreement in religion is not the way of hostile mutual criticism and purely partisan propaganda. The fighting instinct and its appropriate emotion tend so to cloud the judgment and raise prejudices that values which might otherwise have been easily recognized are frequently ignored, depreciated, or even rejected outright. On the other hand, the polemical attitude is in danger of leading to an unsound "rationalizing" defence of traditional elements in one's own religion, the inherent weakness of which might otherwise have been more easily detected.

But it would be an almost equally serious mistake to suppose that all we have to do is to be good-natured and liberal, and then to solve our problem either by some easy syncretism or by discovering some few fundamental points upon which all religions are already agreed. It is quite possible that some of the most valuable elements in religion are to be found only in some of the great religions. Dynamic factors may be found in the differences between religions as well as in their agreements. Making due allowance for Dr Felix Adler's seeming prejudice against the idea of a personal God, we may still find a modicum of truth in his remark that the secret of the vitality of certain monotheistic religions is not to be found in their monotheism but in features which are peculiar to each particular religion, such as the Law in Judaism, the person of Christ in Christianity, and the prophetic leadership of Mohammed in Islam. As for the unintelligent, meddling syncretism which would be content in eclectic fashion to bring together disparate ideas and practices of different religions without regard to the question whether they will live and grow together in the same life, it is comparable to plucking the blossoms off one tree and tying them to the branches of another in the expectation that they will grow into their customary fruit. And as for the Laissez Faire policy that would trust all to the accidental syncretisms of history, that is like letting a garden grow to weeds, leaving the choicest flowers and fruits to take their chances in the struggle for existence without special care or assistance.

How then shall we proceed in our quest for universality in religion? Briefly, what we must seek is the most vital and most spiritual religious experience that is to be found, and then we must see that it is set forth in as rational and universally acceptable a form as is possible. This is in accord with Thöeltsch's principle of seeking validity in religion, as elsewhere, not in a one-sided empiricism and not in a one-sided rationalism, but in Kantian fashion in a critical synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, a harmony of the *a priori* and the actual, of the rational with the extra-rational, of the universal with the unique. We are to seek



universal religion as vital historical, possibly mystical, religion in thoroughly moral, aesthetic and rational form; and if no such ideal religion is to be found, we must seek to develop it; not as a new creative product of mere speculative reason, but in vital continuity with historical experiential religion at its best. But in following Troeltsch we shall not necessarily agree with him that this ideal of rational experiential religion in vital continuity with history will lead ultimately to many essentially different religions rather than to one world religion. That there will always be variety as regards ritual, institutions, names and historical and literary associations, is only to be expected; but it is surely not too much to demand that the experiential element in all ultimate religion be not only vital but in accord with moral and other spiritual ideals, and that its theology and philosophy be universally valid and true.

When vitality of religious experience is set up as a criterion of universally valid religion, our thoughts naturally and rightly turn to mystical religion. And here one is struck at once with the remarkable resemblance not only between the experiences of mystics in widely different historical religions, but also in the doctrinal statements in which they tend to express themselves whenever they are free enough from the influence of particular theological traditions to follow out the suggestions of their mystical experiences. The remarkable resemblances between the experiences and ideas of Eckhart the German, and those of Shankara the Indian, for instance, have been recently discussed by Professors Otto and Radhakrishnan. But other instances might easily be added, the Greek Plotinus, the Chinese Lao-Tse, various Mohammedan Sufis, and many others. There is a remarkable unanimity among mystics in affirming not only the reality, unity, accessibility and religious sufficiency of the religious Object, the Absolute or God; but also a tendency to agree in discounting the reality, ultimately, of the physical world, of time and space, of finite individuality, and of all evil. This agreement on the basis of a common experience is impressive, but it may not be out of place to utter a word

of caution against taking it as conclusive for the truth\* of the mystical philosophy in all its details, negative as well as positive. Even if we would not deny that the mystic in his religious experience is in immediate contact with divine Reality, still in view of the resemblance, psychologically speaking, between the mystic state and certain forms of autohypnosis, may it not be well to insist that the subjective assurances of the mystic be submitted not only to the philosophical test of rational self-consistency but also to the scientific and common-sense tests of workability in the experiences of practical religion and common every-day life? When this is done, no doubt a certain positive element or good essence of mystical assurance will remain, but the danger of drawing erroneous conclusions through uncritical following of the first suggestions of extreme mysticism may be happily avoided.

Another test which may be regarded as valid but as also needing to be used with discretion is the test of moral and social value. If we are religious and our religion is of the optimistic type, we will scarcely believe that what is utterly false will ultimately prove to be good for humanity, or that what is unmistakably and always bad for humanity can be wholly true, and a moderate, optimistic pragmatism of this type is no doubt theoretically permissible and itself pragmatically justifiable. "By their fruits ye shall know them" may be applied to faiths and principles as well as to acts and agents. But religious pragmatism has been too often used by different groups as an apologetic for mutually contradictory doctrines for there to be much excuse for concluding, if *some* good practical consequences sometimes follow the adoption of a religious system, that the system as a whole is finally true. And on the other hand, it is very important to note that the seeming failure of a religious system may sometimes be due to the failure of its professed votaries to put it faithfully into practice.

Exaltation of the ethical content of religion, it may be remarked, is one of the most effective means of arriving at universal validity and agreement in religion, and that in spite of the relativity of moral codes and folkways. There is more agreement between

the great world-religions in their ethics than in their theologies, and unity in aspiration after spiritual ends will eventually bring together those religions which are made instrumental to such ends. It is a good omen for the ultimate unity of religion that the so-called Golden Rule has been found emerging independently in so many widely separated religious movements.

Another favorite method of seeking to bring about universal agreement in religion is to commend to all mankind the religious leadership of some outstanding world-figure in the history of religion. This method is seen at its best when liberty is given the individual to penetrate beneath the dogmatic interpretations which religious tradition has placed upon the leader in question, and to start with the actual historical figure himself and evaluate his person and life and teaching afresh in the light of their worth for the solution of the religious problems of the present. In the new day that is dawning in the history of religion, we may expect a constantly growing appreciation of the outstanding spiritual leaders in religions other than one's own. We are learning in many instances to take the heroes of other religious faiths as our heroes too, to gain from their experiences and achievements instruction and inspiration. There are many Christians to-day who gladly recognize Mohammed as a great prophet of the one true God, and who would go beyond original Buddhism itself in evaluating the compassionate Gautama Buddha as a man in whose life the unselfish love of God was immanent and revealed. And it is fairly safe, I think, to predict that before the end of the present century large numbers of the intellectual and spiritual leaders of India and other Oriental countries will have taken the historic Jesus more or less explicitly as their spiritual leader, their *guru*, without necessarily taking over in wholesale fashion the particular forms of traditional Christianity, and that many of them will freely acknowledge that they find in him the Life and Light and Love of God. Theoretically the question of historicity comes up in this connection, but while much is in doubt and always will be, for practical purposes we can be sure enough as to the kind of person

he was and what he stands for in the life of the spirit. With Professor Weinel we can say, "As for Jesus, we know him very well."

From the point of view just expressed it must be a matter for regret that early Buddhism, justified although it was in reacting against the crude polytheism and perhaps too abstract speculative metaphysics of the older religion and religious philosophy, went so far as to abandon as unessential the whole idea of a spiritual divine Being. Was it not this, more than anything else, which made Buddhism all but disappear from the land of its birth? Its negative attitude toward what had always been the central feature of experimental religion was too great a departure from the religious interests and habits of thought—from the religious genius, one might almost say—of the Indian people for it to be permanently satisfactory to any large section of the population of India, and that too in spite of the great spiritual beauty of the personality and character of its founder. If primitive Buddhism had included along with its moral earnestness and kindly humanitarianism, a vital faith in a God great enough to be the trustworthy object of absolute dependence for man as he contemplates the fate of his highest values in the welter of natural and social forces, and at the same time good enough to be an object of supreme worship to a spirit so noble and so gently compassionate as Prince Siddhartha, it might have swept all India and possibly the farther East into its following. The later history of the religion in the farther East is deeply significant in this connection. But what I wish particularly to say at this point is that if and when the human race attains to universality in religion, I believe it will be to trust and worship the God who could have been the object of adoration to the spiritual consciousness of a Buddha. And such a God, at once the transcendent Ideal Being, worthy of a Gautama's worship, and the immanent Presence, revealed to the eye of faith in the spirit of unselfish love and the humanitarian service of a Gautama, would have been—nay, *is*—the very same God as many bearing another name have come to think of as essentially the God of the religious

consciousness of Jesus, ideal, spiritual, and at the same time cosmic, transcendent, but immanent and to the eye of faith revealed in the spirit of unselfish love and the humanitarian service of Jesus himself. And surely from such a point of view the outlook for the ultimate religious unity of mankind is full of promise.

But on the experiential side the crucial test of validity and therefore of universality in religion is the test as to whether religious men and women can, by means of any definite religious adjustment, dependably obtain results that are worth obtaining in this religious way. Let every one who is interested in arriving at universal validity in religion (in continuity as far as is reasonably possible with the religion which seems to him to have the best claim to be empirically sound, whether it be his own traditional religion or another) cultivate the most approved religious adjustment and note the results for life and for belief as to the value and validity of religion.

These criteria and methods which are here recommended for the discovery or development of universal religion have intentionally stressed the empirical or experiential side in the two-fold requirement of the critical philosophy of values, in which in the main we follow Kant and Troeltsch. But the last suggestion, reminiscent as it is of scientific procedure, involves the rational quite as distinctly as the empirical element. To the rational criteria of universality in religion, then, let us now definitely turn.

It will be sufficient merely to mention the consideration that universal religion must be logical, self-consistent, in its theology and philosophy. But in addition to such internal consistency, it is essential that there be eliminated from religion all that contradicts the assured and valid results of scientific investigation. In the main, science is and has been, especially at first, a negative teacher of religion, a friend in disguise, removing—often under bitter protest—the lingering remains of magic and superstition. But in the end the operation will prove good for religion; science in relation to the various religions of the world, will be found to have been a unifying factor. Let those who are interested in a pros-

perous future for religion expedite the work of true science; and true science, let it be added, is methodical and accurate empirical investigation, adequately aware of its own limitations. There is still an altogether inexcusable amount of bad metaphysics put forth as if it were the teaching of science, and this applies to more than crude materialism. It was not science, but a very questionable philosophy, which led Spencer to give religion nothing to deal with but the Unknowable, and it is an echo of this same philosophy which we hear in Höffding's contention that religious interpretation can never have any knowledge-value.

But while philosophy may do mischief when it undertakes to present its theories as the authoritative conclusions of science, it would be vain to deny it any legitimate function in connection with religion. Philosophy may be expected, indeed, to be one of the most important factors in the discovery or development of universal validity in religion. I know that the influence of philosophy on religion is sometimes decried; it is said that it undermines and devitalizes religion, that it makes religious faith psychologically impossible. The answer to this is that all depends upon the kind of philosophy and the kind of religion. There are some forms and manifestations of religion which deserve to be undermined that they may give place to something better, and there are some kinds of philosophy which, if accepted, would undermine all that is most vital and helpful in religion. "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit;" it is possible, for it has been done. There are other kinds of philosophy, however, and of some of them we shall have much to say in the sequel. But for the present be it remembered that what the truly philosophical mind, the lover of wisdom, aims at is universal truth and universally valid value. I should be very loath, indeed, to admit at the outset that there is no philosophy but such as will inevitably undercut and devitalize what is fairest and best in the life of religion. We are familiar with the rejection of the metaphysical element in theology, as being dangerous to the doctrinal content and inner certitude of religion. But it is a fair question whether

it is not equally dangerous to refuse to submit the beliefs and assurances of religion to the test of philosophical examination. There are situations in which "Live dangerously" is a safer motto than "Safety first."

Of course we must be severely critical of the proffered donations of philosophy to religion. Well may we fear the Greeks offering philosophical gifts—and the Germans, and French, and English, and Indians, and Americans! There is dynamite in philosophy, and it is none the less dynamic in its effect upon religion for its being itself so largely a religious product. In most if not all metaphysics, there is a religious element, positive or negative, good or bad, not ultimately indifferent. With all our attempts to be objective, there "is a reign of religion in contemporary philosophy"—to use the striking phrase of one of your own number. Is there any significant movement in the history of philosophy from which it has been entirely absent? Let us not quarrel with inevitable fact, but by all means let us recognize it, and critically evaluate the religious element which we are pretty sure to find not far from the heart of each and every philosophical system. Let the question be asked: To what extent has there been a false "rationalisation" of unsound religious beliefs, positive or negative? Let us be suspicious of all views which would make philosophy only the beneficiary of religion, and not its benefactor; but let us be equally suspicious of all views which would make religion the beneficiary of philosophy, and not its benefactor.

I know it is possible for religion to turn upon philosophy with the retort, Physician, heal thyself. It has been notoriously difficult for metaphysics itself to arrive at anything that looks like universality; how then shall metaphysics impart universality to religion? The difficulty is a real one; but perhaps one of the reasons why metaphysics has found it so hard to arrive at universality has been its tendency either to be guided by a dogmatic and no doubt largely erroneous theology, or else to despise or ignore altogether the knowledge-value of religious experience. There will be much to say about this, but for the present, if we may anticipate,

let me suggest that metaphysics has possible value for universal religion when interpreted as the rational synthesis of the general results of the recognized sciences with whatever religious knowledge there may be, formulated in as scientific a way as possible, and with whatever metaphysical inferences may be legitimately drawn from critically established universal values.

Here then our program for seeking universality through rationality would seem to bring us back again to the last point made in connection with our statement of the empirical tests of universal validity, namely, that in the interests of the quest for universal religion we should exploit the possibilities of religious experience itself. Putting aside all prejudice, let us take up an open-minded scientific attitude toward the possible knowledge-value of religious experience. A scientific attitude in this connection will not mean prejudging the case and studiously avoiding the religious path to further experience, but neither can it mean, for any individual, trying all religions at once,—for this reason, if for no other, that religious experimentation can be real only when it is sincere. And just here is where the differentiation of historical and contemporary religion into a multiplicity of religions and sects and individual manifestations, which has threatened to be such an obstacle to the attainment of universality in religion, may prove ultimately to be the greatest help. The history of religion is the record of a prolonged empirical investigation, and the differentiated religions are all so many different experiments in religious adjustment. Well begun is half done, and we may well supplement what history has accomplished by encouraging further original investigation as to what are the dependable results of the most effective, helpful and reasonable religious adjustment.

Here then we have indicated what we take to be the true syncretism of religions; a syncretism in experience, and not *a priori*; not an eclectic assortment of odds and ends arbitrarily selected from widely diverging historic formations, but the scientific discovery or development of vital empirical religion in its most rational possible form. By the methods suggested we may expect



to discover, as the good essence of religions and of religion, something vital, spiritual, rational, and we may add, presumably unitary. Will the world-religion be Christianity? Some of us may like to think so. Will it be Hinduism? Or Buddhism? Or Mohammedanism? There are those who would like to answer one or another of these questions in the affirmative. But by the method indicated facts and values must decide. *A priori* we can scarcely deny that the world-religion may seem essentially Christian to the person of Christian antecedents, essentially Hindu to the Hindu, essentially Buddhist to the Buddhist, essentially Mohammedan to the Mohammedan, essentially Jewish to the Jew. There are contradictions, of course, between these religions as they stand. But the good essence of each of these religions cannot be in contradiction with the good essence of any of the others, if there ought to be one religion for all the world. And as for that question, surely none but the best possible is ultimately good enough for any.

The rigorous pursuit of the empirical-rational, or scientific path to universality in religion will mean for all religionists of whatever name a candid criticism of their own traditional religion. There is no reason why one should not also criticise the traditional elements of religions other than his own, if he is equipped in knowledge and in spirit for so delicate and difficult a task; but all the major religions now number among their adherents scholars and philosophers who are well qualified to render this service to their own traditional religions, and no one wishes to be charged with carrying coals to Newcastle. It is true that the outsider is often able to detect in a religious system weaknesses which custom, loyalty and affection have caused its votaries to overlook. But on the other hand we know our own religion, generally speaking, so much better than we know any other that, if we have not been embittered against it, we ought to be able to make our criticisms of it more constructive and helpful than we could be expected to make our criticisms, however well-intentioned, of religions other than our own. Self-criticisms are more likely to be the proverbially faithful wounds of a friend; and when they are candidly

expressed in the presence of intellectually honest votaries of other faiths, they ought to be particularly conducive to the discovery of what is universally valid in religion. It is to be hoped and expected that those who listen will be induced to undertake a similar friendly criticism of their own traditional faiths, and that thus movements may be started or expedited in all religions toward the goal of universality. The dissolution of traditionalism as such will set free the genuine values of tradition, so that, with partisan prejudice overcome, they may be the more available for universal religion.

What I am proposing to do, then, in this series of lectures is to consider with you *the pilgrimage of faith in the world of modern thought*. Assuming a relatively constant religious impulse and interest, with enough of religious experience to support the feeling that in religion in its higher forms, or at its best, there are values of tremendous human import, let us see the effect upon faith of its contact with one system of philosophy after another. Let us see how the impulse to faith, checked by the necessity of honest doubt, maintains the struggle not only for room for a positive religious belief in the world of modern knowledge and opinion, but even for a universally valid and acceptable formulation of the vital essentials of historic experimental religion. In pursuing in these lectures the course indicated, I shall—of necessity in large part, but also from choice—direct my steps toward the goal of universality along the pathway of my own religion, trusting my hearers to do the same thing for themselves along the lines of their own several faiths, in the hope that thus we may be brought appreciably nearer to each other and to our common destination.

## II. THE HOUSE OF BONDAGE . TRADITIONALISM.

In attempting to trace the pilgrimage of faith in the world of modern thought I shall from time to time make some slight use, although for illustrative and literary purposes only, of an analogy which I have no right to assume will be as familiar to certain of my audience as it will be, or would have been, to hearers of Jewish, of Christian, or possibly of Mohammedan training. And yet it will prove to be, I have no doubt, in its general features at least, sufficiently familiar to most of you for the purposes I have in mind. I refer to the story, partly legendary, partly historical, of the pilgrimage of the Hebrew people from the Egypt of their bondage through the wilderness to the promised land, and then their being carried away captive into a foreign country, and finally their return and re-establishment in their ancestral home. These stages of national pilgrimage will serve to point the outstanding features of what I have styled the pilgrimage of faith.

Let us begin with faith as we find it in the Egypt of *traditionalism*. Dogmatism in the religious teacher and traditionalism in the religious learner have been well-nigh universal phenomena of historic religion. It is true that some religions, such as the Greek, and, as Professor Radhakrishnan quite justifiably points out in his recent lectures on *The Hindu View of Life*, the Indian, have shown on the whole much more tolerance of variety in religious belief than has often been true of certain other religions, of Semitic origin,\* in which intolerance and at times active persecution were fostered by a variety of factors. the interpretation of the highest recognized moral standard as being the law of God; the extreme dualistic distinction, largely of Persian and thus of Aryan origin, between the future lot of the wicked and

\* *The Hindu View of Life*, London, 1927, pp 37-40

that of the righteous ; and finally, in Western Christianity particularly, the influence of the Roman legal and authoritarian mind, changing the metaphysical conclusions of the Greeks into arbitrary legal enactments, to be obediently accepted and believed, whether understood or not, the penalty for unbelief being to "perish everlastingly." But, speaking for Christianity at least, I think the unfavourable showing in this regard is to be charged very largely against extraneous elements which found their way into the religion in its historic development, rather than against the original and essential nature of Christianity itself. Paul, after his conversion to the Christian faith, was no mere traditionalist, but a radical free thinker, and we get much the same impression of the Jesus of the Gospels. He could break away from the absolute authority not only of scribal traditions, but of recognized sacred Scripture, substituting for the traditional law of retaliation (Ex. 21 .24 and Deut. 19 .21) his own law of the return of good for evil (Matt. 5 43-48), and dispensing with the rigid traditional distinction between things "clean" and "unclean," when such a course was demanded by practical necessity and common sense (Mark 7 . 18, 19). Still, I am quite ready to believe that if it had happened that the religion of Jesus and Paul had won its greatest following in India instead of in the busy, practical West, it would have developed into something more philosophical, less authoritarian and traditionalistic, more tolerant, less given to persecution and heresy-hunting, than that which has often borne the Christian name since Christianity was first adopted by the Emperor of Rome.

Still, as I have said, traditionalism in religion, in one degree of rigidity or another, is or has been until comparatively recently well-nigh universal. Everywhere is to be found the habit or attitude of mind which tends to yield assent to propositions on the authority of some teacher or teachers, without waiting to see for one's self whether there is sufficient logical basis or evidence of experience to make the teaching reasonably believable apart from any knowledge of who its sponsors may be. Nor are the causes of

this wide prevalence of the traditionalistic temper far to seek. It was famine that first brought Israel to Egypt. There is the obvious value of much of the content of tradition, and on the other hand there is the constant arrival of new individuals needing to be taught. Ideally, the learner will come to appreciate for himself the value of what has been taught him, and as skill in teaching develops, mere dogmatic telling will have less and less place in the educational process. But the fault is not all on the side of the teacher. We recognize the place, temporarily, of pedagogical authority and implicit acceptance of truths and matters of fact conveyed by the recognized expert. But while the normal and reasonable course would seem to be for this necessary juvenile traditionalism to give place to a more independent attitude and habit of mind, it is probably a fact that on almost all important points the great majority of individuals become more and more confirmed in their traditionalism. This is not difficult to understand. Mental inertia is the principal cause. As the teacher becomes a dogmatist because he is not a good teacher, so the learner becomes a traditionalist because he is not a good learner. It is easier to dogmatize than to explain, and it is easier to remember the conclusion than to follow the argument. Thus dogmatism in the teacher and implicit faith on the part of the learner commonly keep pace with each other, each being at once cause and effect of the other.

But besides this universal tendency toward the production of a traditionalistic frame of mind, there are sometimes special factors which make in the same general direction. An undue dogmatism is often what is known in psychology as a defence-reaction; it is a way of escape from what would otherwise be the torment of unresolved doubt. I have on my shelves at home two very bulky volumes which bear on their backs the high-sounding, if somewhat forbidding title, "Dogmatic Theology." I often think, when I look at them, of the story told me some years ago by an aged minister who had been a student in the classes of the author of this treatise, at that time a well-known theological professor. At the

close of a lecture in which the venerable theologian had been, if anything, more positive and dogmatic than usual, to the student's question, "Do you never have any doubts, Professor?" he replied, with perhaps unexpected frankness, "There are times when I doubt everything!" There is such a thing as whistling to keep one's courage up, and there are many who have started a fight because they were afraid. But like dogmatist, like traditionalist As undue dogmatism is very likely to be the defence-reaction of those who are afraid to think their doubts through, so a pronounced traditionalism often affords a welcome refuge from the storm and stress of independent thought on matters of moment. This is the only explanation of that historic phenomenon at which independent minds must always stop to marvel, the conversion of John Henry Newman to the Roman Church, and its sequel in his inner experience. His own words on the subject are well known, but it may not be out of place to quote them here.

From the time that I became a Catholic of course I have no further history of my religious opinions to narrate. I have had no variations to record, and have had no anxiety of heart whatever. I have been in perfect peace and contentment. I never have had one doubt. My conversion was like coming into port after a rough sea, and my happiness on that score remains to this day without interruption.

Nor had I any trouble about receiving those additional articles which are not found in the Anglican creed. I made a profession of them with the greatest ease, and I have the same ease in believing them now. People say that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is difficult to believe; I did not believe the doctrine till I was a Catholic. I had no difficulty in believing it as soon as I believed that the Catholic Church was the oracle of God, and that she had declared this doctrine to be a part of the original revelation.\*

His was the peace of the defeated mind that had finally abandoned the attempt to find reasonableness in traditional beliefs.

\* *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, 1908 edition, pp. 238-9

some of which, at least, were hopelessly unreasonable. He had, however, found what our modern psychologists call a "rationalization" for a course which was calculated to afford him relief from the acute suffering which doubt and incertitude had occasioned in his sensitive and deeply religious mind.

Something must also be credited, in cases like this of Newman, to what Hoffding calls "expansion of feeling."

It lies in the nature of feeling that once aroused by any particular event, it tends to spread over the whole life of consciousness and seeks to impart its own colouring to all other elements of this life, indifferent as to whether they are or are not connected with the event in question. Inevitable and significant though this expansion of feeling may be, yet it contains sources of error which we must not forget in estimating the contributions of experience.\*

An excellent illustration of such an expansion of feeling in the interest of an unthinking traditionalism is found in the case of the converted sceptic who proclaims his belief of the Bible "from cover to cover," although much of its contents he has never read.

The history of religion in general and, I am free to confess, of the Christian religion in particular abounds in remarkable illustrations of the length to which the traditionalist will sometimes go. The Roman Church has a remarkable record in this connection. It will be sufficient for purposes of illustration merely to refer to a few well-known and typical historic facts. In 1546 the Council of Trent anathematized all who might refuse to receive as of divine authority not only the Old and New Testaments and Apocrypha, but the "unwritten traditions" alleged to have been received from Christ and the apostles.† In 1870 the Vatican Council declared that the Pope of Rome, speaking *ex cathedra*, is possessed of infallibility "for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals."‡ Highly significant for an understanding of the Catholic mind are

\* *Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, 1906, pp. 97-98.

† Fourth Session, April 8.

‡ Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council, Concerning the Church of Christ, Ch. IV.

the comments made by Newman shortly before this decree was issued :

If it be God's will that some definition in favor of the Pope's infallibility is passed, I then should at once submit—but up to that very moment I shall pray most earnestly against it. Anyhow I cannot bear to think of the tyrannousness and cruelty of its advocates—for tyrannousness and cruelty it will be, though it is successful.

I look with anxiety at the prospect of having to defend decisions which may not be difficult to my private judgment, but may be most difficult to defend logically in the face of historical facts \*

In 1885 Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Immortali Dei* declared that “in what is called ‘modern liberties’ each believer is bound to believe.. what the Holy See itself thinks,”† and in accordance with this every convert to Catholicism is now required, as I understand, to swear to the following declaration “I believe all the articles the church proposes to my belief, and I reject and condemn all that she rejects and condemns, and I am ready to observe all that she commands me ”

In 1907 Pope Pius X issued a decree containing statements to the effect that the Church can exact internal assent to its judgments, and that all parts of the Scriptures are free from all error. This was followed in the same year by the famous encyclical, providing for the suppression of all modernism in the Roman Church. I often think in this connection of a bright young Roman Catholic who had been studying theology in Paris, with whom I was a fellow-traveller in 1911. In our conversations he talked with intelligence and apparent interest on such topics of the day

\* W. Ward's *Life of J. H. Newman* Vol II, pp 288, 289

† Pope Leo furnished, it is said, a beautiful illustration of what this might mean, when he signed a document declaring that the passage about the three witnesses in First John was authentic, and later, on learning that the scholarly world, as well as the early Fathers rejected the text as spurious, blamed Cardinal Mazella for telling him that the disputed text was in the Fathers. See *The Independent*, Jan 28, 1904, p 198, and G. B. Foster *Finality of the Christian Religion*, 1906, p 63.



as pragmatism and the philosophy of Bergson, but when I ventured to ask him whether he could accept any of the recent theories of which he had been speaking, his reply was immediate, "On, well, you know the Holy Father has condemned all that." Apparently there was nothing more to be said.

It is difficult for the modern mind to understand such an attitude, and one cannot but wonder how long such a system of intellectual slavery can last. It is bad enough to be required, on threat of eternal punishment for refusal, to believe what can neither be proved nor disproved, it is an intolerable outrage when the teaching in question is obviously erroneous. It would not be difficult, indeed, to match the "Papal Syllabus of Errors" issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864 with a *Syllabus of Papal Errors*, drawn largely from that document and from the above-mentioned decree of Pius X, sometimes called the "Papal Syllabus of Errors of 1907." The former condemns the principles of civil and religious liberty and of the separation of Church and State, and asserts the exclusive right of Romanism to be recognized by the civil government and to exercise supreme control over education, science, and literature. The latter defends the right of the Church to pass final judgment in all matters of science and Biblical scholarship, and contains what Roman liberals regarded as a grotesque misrepresentation of their principles and point of view.

But the history of Protestant Christianity has its own share of undue dogmatism and traditionalism to show. The characteristic attitude of the older Protestantism was well expressed by Chillingworth:

The Bible, I say, the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants. Propose me anything out of this book, I will subscribe it with hand and heart \*

Martin Luther had broken with a certain expression of traditionalism and could hold up to ridicule the charcoal man who said he believed what the Church believed, but could not say what that

\* *The Religion of Protestants*, 1658

was ; furthermore, in his first zeal as a Reformer, he took up a very independent attitude toward the traditional Scriptures ; but a little later, under the exigencies of controversy, this same Martin Luther could write, " I will not waste a word in arguing with one who does not consider that the Scriptures are the Word of God."\* According to Calvin, the primary reason why we should believe whatever we find in the Bible is that God, who cannot lie, is the speaker.† In early Protestantism the commonly accepted view was that Scripture is infallible truth, free from all error, the Biblical writers being, in the language of Calovius, only " living and writing pens."‡ The consequences of this common assumption were sometimes unfortunate. The immortal Bunyan, for

\* Quoted by W. P. Paterson, *The Rule of Faith*, 1902, p. 405.

† *Institutes*, I, 7, 4.

‡ Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*, English translation, 1871, II, p. 128.

A few more illustrations may be added. The Westminster Confession says of the Bible, " Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts " (I, v). It was the opinion of Quenstedt, the famous Lutheran theologian, that " Scripture is infallible truth, free from all error, each and every thing contained in it is absolute truth, be it doctrine, morals, history, chronology, topography, proper names " Similarly, according to Turretin, " the sacred writers were so moved and inspired by the Holy Ghost, both in respect to thought (*res ipsas*) and language, that they were kept from all error, and their writings are truly authentic and divine " According to the New England theologian, Samuel Hopkins, the Bible is " a sufficient, perfect and unerring rule for his (God's) church to the end of the world, and every way adapted to answer all the desired ends of a divine revelation, attended with all the evidence that can be reasonably desired that it is from God, and the whole that he will ever give " (*Works*, 1852, Vol. I, p. 14). Nathaniel Emmons is still more explicit. He quotes with approval the statement that " the natural faculties of the sacred penmen were superseded, and God spake directly to their minds, making such discoveries to them as they could not have otherwise obtained, and dictating the very words in which such discoveries were to be communicated," and then he goes on to explain " the supposed mistakes and contradictions to be found in the Scriptures " in this *a priori* fashion : " The merely apparent errors must be placed to our own ignorance, and all the real contradictions and mistakes must be imputed to the ignorance or inattention or unfaithfulness of transcribers and of translators " As compared with the Bible " there is no other standard of superior authority to which we can appeal " (*Works*, Boston, 1842, Vol. IV, pp. 75, 81, 85). The principle of the *a priori* harmonizing method of Biblical exegesis is well stated in this compact argument of the Princeton theologian, Charles Hodge : " The Scriptures are the work of one mind, and that mind divine. From this it follows that Scripture cannot contradict Scripture " (*Systematic Theology*, New York,

instance, was kept in doubt and misery for years in his early life by the conviction that he ought to accept as God's truth a certain passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews.\* Milton, too, in his posthumous *Treatise on the Christian Doctrine*, referring to such statements as "It repented Jehovah that he had made man" (Gen 6 : 6), God "rested and was refreshed" (Ex. 31 : 17), and "he feared the wrath of the enemy" (Deut. 32 : 27), says rather bluntly, "God either is, or is not such as he represents himself to be. If he be really such, why should we think otherwise of him? If he be not such, on what authority do we say what God has not said? If it be his will that we should think thus of him, why does our imagination wander into some other conception? Why should we hesitate to conceive of God according to what he has not hesitated to declare explicitly respecting himself?"† Nor has this authoritarian traditionalism been confined to the early generations of Protestantism. But little over a century ago an honoured president of Yale University could write

The Scriptures are a Law. They are the Word of Him who cannot mistake, deceive nor injure. We are bound not to question the truth and

1893 edition, Vol I, p 187) The strain this principle must put upon intellectual honesty can be easily imagined. It is only a few years since ex-President Patton, of Princeton Theological Seminary, made this amazing statement at the hundredth anniversary of the founding of that institution: "I do not for a moment deny that there may be a place in the world for an institution the professors of which work in the unhampered exercise of their judgment in the search for theological truth, but in the nature of the case the seminary which is ecclesiastical in its origin and relationships and which does its work under the rubric of confessional standards cannot have that sort of freedom. Princeton Theological Seminary, as you all know, is the creature of the Presbyterian General Assembly, and is committed by the terms of its constitution to the propagation and defence of the Reformed Theology. Princeton's boast, if she have reason to boast at all, is her unswerving fidelity to the theology of the Reformation. *Semper eadem* is a motto that would well befit her. The theological position of Princeton Seminary is exactly the same to-day as it was a hundred years ago" (*Centennial Celebration of the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America at Princeton, New Jersey*, 1912, pp 344, 350). Essentially similar was the attitude of the head of a denominational university whom the present writer heard say, some twenty-five years ago, "This university stands for the teaching, not for the pursuit of truth."

\* Hebrews 6 : 4-6. See *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*.

† Milton's *Prose Works*, Bohn's Standard Library, Vol IV, p 19.

not to dispute the wisdom and goodness of that which is revealed. All things which this Sacred Book contains are to be received as they are. Our own opinions are implicitly to bow before them \*

At the present day this point of view is represented by the movement known as "Fundamentalism," the first of whose "fundamentals" is the proposition "that the Holy Spirit did so inspire, guide, and move the writers of the Holy Scriptures as to keep them from error." With these words, taken from the records of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, may be compared the first article of the Doctrinal Statement of the Christian Fundamentals Association. "We believe in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as verbally inspired of God and inerrant in the original writings, and that they are of supreme and final authority in faith and life"†. These statements surely meet the specifications of dogma as given by a certain Bampton Lecturer who undertook to defend what he called "the dogmatic faith": a proposition presented for acceptance but not for discussion‡. But it would be an easy task to compile from the Bible a list of unscientific statements embodying relics of magical and superstitious religion; of declarations many times refuted by experience, including certain unfulfilled and unfulfillable predictions; and of mutual inconsistency and contradiction, such, for example, as that between many Biblical statements, particularly in the Old Testament, and the New Testament idea of God as the morally perfect God of love. All of this is matter of common acknowledgment in liberal Protestant Christianity.§

\* T. Dwight's *Theology*, 12th edition, 1846, Vol. IV, p. 76.

† The following words of a well-known Fundamentalist leader are also typical.

"The Bible writers 'taught the truth and nothing but the truth,' their teachings were absolutely without error," "Whatever the Bible says on any subject is true and sure," all its teachings are "as infallible as God" (R. A. Torrey, *The Fundamental Doctrines of the Christian Faith*, New York, 1918, pp. 12, 24, 287).

‡ E. Garbett *The Dogmatic Faith*, 1869, p. 13.

§ A few samples may be appended of the plagues of Egypt which it would seem, ought to make life a burden to the old-school believer in the inerrancy of the Bible. In I John 4:8 we are told that God is love, and in Matthew 5:48 we have the teaching of

Unuly narrow traditionalism outside of Christianity I wish to pass over with only the briefest reference, not because of any dearth of facts which might be cited, but because it seems to me

Jesus, "Thou Father in heaven is perfect" How do these statements agree with the record that God commanded the Israelites to destroy the Canaanites utterly and show them no mercy (Deuteronomy 7 3)? Or that he commanded Saul to spare none of the Amalekites, but to slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass (I Samuel 15 3)? Or that he instructed soldiers to kill captive women who were not virgins, and to keep the virgins for their own use (Numbers 31 13-18)? Or that through his power Elijah was enabled to call down fire from heaven and consume two captains and one hundred men sent by King Ahaziah to get him to do what later, we are told, he was directed to do by an angel of the Lord (II Kings 1 9-15)? Can we think that the words, "Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rock" (Psalm 137 9), was inspired by the same divine Spirit as "Love your enemies" (Matthew 5 44)?

Can we ascribe to the morally perfect God of love such laws as "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live" (Exodus 22 18)? Or those which require the stoning to death of a disobedient son on the accusation of his parents (Deuteronomy 21 18 21), and of an old man for gathering sticks on the Sabbath (Numbers 15 32 6)? Was that a law expressing the will of the God of perfect love, which permitted a man to sell his daughter into slavery (Exodus 21 7), or the one which provided that a slaveholder should not be punished for beating his slave to death unless the death took place within a day of the time of the beating (Exodus 21 20, 21)?

Is it true that the God whose name is Love and whom Jesus called our perfect Father met Moses and sought to kill him, and was appeased only when Moses had been touched with blood from the circumcision of his son (Exodus 4)? Was it the morally perfect Father-God who, in anger at the worshipping of the golden calf, was for having every man slay his brother and companion and neighbour, and who was only persuaded to repent of this evil he had intended to do when Moses reminded him of his promises to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Exodus 32)? Would a morally perfect Father-God slay "seventy men"—fifty thousand men is the number given parenthetically—for looking into the ark (I Samuel, 6 19, 20)? If we believe the scriptural teaching that there is but one God, a morally perfect God of love, can we believe that when Uzzah put his hand on the ark to keep it from falling from the cart, "God smote him for his error, and he died there by the ark of God" (II Samuel 6 7-9)? Can we believe that God smote the good King Uzziah with leprosy as a punishment for burning incense in the Temple (II Chronicles 26 16-21)? Or, to cite one more instance, can we believe that a morally perfect God moved David to number the people because he was angry with Israel, and that he then regarded this act as a sin on the part of David, in punishment whereof he slew seventy thousand of the populace in a pestilence (II Samuel 24)? Or, if Scripture cannot contradict Scripture, can we believe both this story and the version given by the Chronicler, to the effect that it was Satan who moved David to take a census of the people (I Chronicles 21 1)?

Can we believe the universal negative that no one can see Jehovah face to face and live (Exodus 33 20) and at the same time the stories which describe how he was seen face to face without any fatal or otherwise injurious effects (Genesis 18 1; Exodus 33 11;

that it is the duty of the more open-minded votaries of the faiths concerned to make acknowledgment that such facts have existed and still exist. It may be interesting, however, to note in passing

Numbers 14 14)? Can we believe both the declaration that God will not lie nor repent (I Samuel 15 29), and the statement made in the very same chapter, that God repented that he had made Saul king (I Samuel 15 35)? And who was it that killed Goliath? David, as I Samuel, 17, tells us, or Elhanan, as we would understand from II Samuel, 21? (The words, "brother of," as applying to Goliath in the latter passage are supplied by the translator.) Or are we to believe I Chronicles 20 as against II Samuel 21, and hold that it was the brother of Goliath that Elhanan slew? Or, to refer to an instance which can now be considered in the light of history was Isaiah correct in predicting that not one of the stakes of Zion's tabernacle should ever be removed nor any of its cords be broken (Isaiah 38 20)? Or was it his contemporary Micah who was right when he declared that Zion should be ploughed as a field, that Jerusalem should become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest (Micah 3 12)?

If these passages do not supply the dogmatist and the traditionalist with plagues enough, let them investigate in a rational and scientific spirit the question whether we can reasonably believe that the sun, moon, and stars were created not only after the earth and light, but even after grass and herbs and fruit trees had appeared on the earth (Genesis 1 11-16). Let them calculate whether an ark 525 feet by 87½ feet by 52½ feet could have accommodated two or more of all the species of land animals, with food to last them all a year, and whether eight persons could have taken care of them all (Genesis 6-8). Let them investigate the question whether the hare chews its cud (Deuteronomy 14 7) or only seems to do so. And let them ask themselves whether it is reasonable or just to undertake to detect adultery by means of the ordeal of drinking the sacred bitter water mixed with dust from the floor of the tabernacle and ink with which curses had been written (Numbers 5 11-31).

These are surely plagues enough for the ordinary Catholic or Protestant (or, we may add, Jewish) traditionalist, who would regard the whole Old Testament as divinely inspired and infallible. But in case anyone should suggest a modified Christian traditionalism, according to which the claims of infallibility and inerrancy are made for the New Testament alone, let us look into the facts a little further.

Is there a completely harmonious doctrine throughout the New Testament concerning the sovereignty of God and the free agency and responsibility of man? Let us take together these passages from the generally undisputed writings of Paul, "Foreordained according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his will" (Ephesians 1 11), "Whom he foreordained, them he also called, and whom he called, them he also justified" (Romans 8 30), "He hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth" (Romans 9 18). Such passages clearly teach the absolute sovereignty of God, absolute predetermination and election. But on the other hand, let us consider some other New Testament passages, such as "He will have all men to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth" (I Timothy 2 4), and "He is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" (II Peter 3 9). Are these two verses reconcilable with the other three? If God works all things after the counsel of his will, and is not willing that any should perish, but will have all men to be saved, why does he harden any?

that many of the newest religions seem to be among the most rigidly traditionalistic. This is particularly true of such American religious inventions as Mormonism and Christian Science "Bahai

There is a similar difficulty as to the New Testament teaching on final perseverance in the Christian life. Calvinists have appealed to such passages as, "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life" (John 3:36), "I give unto them eternal life and they shall never perish" (John 10:28), "He which hath begun a good work in you will perfect it" (Philippians 1:6), and "They went out from us, but they were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would have continued with us, but they went out that they might be made manifest that they all are not of us" (I John 2:19). Arminians on the contrary have had their favourite passages, as "Keep yourselves in the love of God" (Jude 21), "Ye are fallen from grace" (Galatians 5:4), and "I keep my body under and bring it into subjection, lest by any means when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway" (I Corinthians 9:27). Now it is not easy to see how these two groups of passages can be regarded as completely harmonious with each other and even if this could be shown, there would remain at least one passage which neither the Calvinist nor the Arminian can logically accept since it contradicts the teachings of both. "As touching those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and tasted the good word of God, and the power of the world to come and then fell away, it is impossible to renew them again to repentance" (Hebrews 6:4-6).

Another notorious difficulty is in connection with the expected visible return of Christ. Let us take together the following passages from the gospels. "Verily I say unto you, There are some of them that stand here who shall in nowise taste of death till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom" (Matthew 16:28), "They shall see the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. This generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled" (Matthew 24:30, 34), "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son of Man be ashamed, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels. And he said unto them. Verily I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, who shall not taste of death till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power" (Mark 8:38, 9:1). Obviously the teaching of these passages is that Jesus was to return visibly, on the clouds of heaven and with the holy angels, within the lifetime of some of those who were with him during his earthly ministry. Did he do so? It is now 1928 A.D., and if what is meant by the second coming of Christ be a visible, physical return, we may repeat in all seriousness and without irreverence the sceptical query "Where is the promise of his coming?" For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation" (II Peter 3:4).

The Biblical mode or better modes of dealing with the problem of evil must make a plague of "darkness which can be felt" for those who regard the Scriptures in all their parts as equally inspired and infallible. Must we believe that the Lord sent a lying spirit into all his prophets that they might deceive King Ahab to his death (I Kings 22:20-23) or may we rest assured that God hates all falsehood (Zechariah 8:16-17) and never tempts anyone to evil (James 1:13)? What are we to think of the many passages in which we are told that the Lord repented of the evil which he had intended to do (Exodus 32:14, II Samuel 24:16, I Chronicles 21:15, Joel 2:13, Jonah 3:10; 4:2)?

and Theosophy illustrate the tendency to combine with independence of judgment as regards the older traditions a most docile and uncritical attitude towards recent alleged prophets and revealers.\* Modern self-styled "Theosophy" is of special interest in that while it strongly favours Oriental traditions, it introduces certain modifications into them which are calculated to make Eastern thought more acceptable to Western minds, as, for example, if

And what of the statements, "I, the Lord, create evil" (Isaiah 45 7), and "Shall there be evil in a city and the Lord hath not done it" (Amos 3 6)? As for the later doctrine of a Satanic power as the source of all evil and temptation, is there not a question as to God's relation to such an absolutely evil being? If God is great enough and good enough to meet our religious need, why should he allow any absolutely evil being to exist? Can we be sure that no evil shall befall those who have made the Lord their habitation (Psalm 91 9, 10), that no evil shall happen to the just (Proverbs 12 21)? Were the prophets right in explaining national calamities as God's punishment of national sins, or was Job right in protesting against the doctrine that he who was suffering most must be the greatest sinner? Moreover, if as both Old and New Testaments narrate, miracle was used as a method of overcoming evil from time to time, why has it not been used oftener? Have there not been greater evils than the thirst of the wedding guests at Cana and the hunger of the multitudes by the Sea of Galilee, to call for miraculous intervention, if that method is ever justified for the meeting of man's physical needs?

\* The Bahai religion, it is interesting to note, may be regarded as the latest illustration of a series of progressive movements which have arisen within Mohammedanism, none of which, however, have gone so far as to break with the traditionalistic principle. As against the ultra-conservative Sunnis who recognized only Mohammed's own writings and the traditions of his sayings as authoritative, the Shi'ahs recognized also the authority of the Imam of the age, that is, the authorized spiritual Head of Islam. Now the twelfth Imam is said to have appeared only at the funeral of the eleventh, and the belief gained credence that he was in hiding, and would reappear in some later age. With this as their presupposition, there arose among the Shi'ahs a progressive group, the Shaykhis, who claimed that during this period of the hiding of the twelfth Imam there was and would always be a "perfect Shi'ah" in direct spiritual communication with the hidden Imam, and therefore able to give new teachings with absolute authority. The next progressive movement was that of the Babis, in the early nineteenth century, who claimed that Mirza Ali Mohammed ("The Bab," or Gate) was the long expected twelfth Imam, returned to earth, and hence the authoritative teacher for the future. But among the Babis arose the Bahais who maintained that Mirza Ali Mohammed was only the forerunner of the supreme Revealer, Mirza Hussayn Ali, or "Baha u'llah" ("the Glory of God"), as he was called. Even among the Bahais there occurred a similar cleavage between the conservatives and the progressives, the latter group being made up of those who recognize Abbas Effendi called "Abdul Baha," as the authoritative interpreter of the revelations given by Baha u'llah. Thus while each progressive movement represents the recognition of new teaching, all of this new teaching, like the old, comes with a claim to absolute, infallible authority.



I am not misinformed, the confining of transmigration to reincarnation in human bodies, and presenting reincarnation optimistically as involved in the ultimate goal, not as necessarily an ultimate evil from which emancipation is to be sought. With reference to traditionalism in Hindu religion I will let your own scholar, Professor Dasgupta, speak. In his recent lectures on Hindu Mysticism he says:

The authority which this system of Vedic injunctions and prohibitions was supposed to possess was so high as to demand the entire submission of one's will and thought. Their claims did not stand in need of any justification by reason or logic, for they were supposed to be guides in a sphere where reason and experience were utterly helpless. The only fruitful way in which reason could be employed with regard to these Vedic commands was by accepting their authority and then trying to explain them in such a way that their mysterious nature might be reconciled to us. The commands are taken as eternal truths, beginningless and immortal, revealing themselves to man and demanding man's submission to them. Nevertheless they are not spiritual or inner truths revealed from within man himself, they are eternal and impersonal commands which contain within themselves the inscrutable secrets of nature and of the happiness of man. Even in somewhat later days of the evolution of Vedic culture, when there grew up a school of thinkers who held that there were at least some particular portions of the Vedas which dealt with the eternal truths of spiritual facts and experiences of reality, the belief remained unshaken that what the Vedas gave one as truths were unshakable and unchallengeable by reason or by experience. This means a definite lowering or degradation of reason in its capacity as truth-finder. It is surprising that reason has continued to remain in this subordinate position throughout the development of Indian religions and philosophical thought almost to our own days. No change, no new idea could be considered to be right or could be believed by the people, unless it could also be shown that it had the sanction of the Vedas. Reason was never trusted as the only true and safe guide.\*

With regard to the present situation in Hinduism I will allow myself to make in this connection a single suggestion, and I make this suggestion in all deference to those who have much more

\* *Hindu Mysticism*, Chicago, 1927, pp. 14, 15, 16

familiarity with the facts than I am in a position to have. But while it is undoubtedly true, as Professor Radhakrishnan points out, that "heresy-hunting is singularly absent from Hinduism,"\* there is a possible danger, it seems to me, that the readily understood present tendency to evaluate ideas and institutions by the criterion of their being "Indian" or not, may lead on the one hand to the overlooking of real defects in the content of Indian religious tradition, and on the other hand to an inadequate appreciation of genuine values which might, if it were not for this, be more readily recognized in other traditions and forms of experience besides those of the native faiths of India.

There is something to be said for the Egypt of traditionalism. It is a place of plenty; one may eat there bread to the full. There are important truths and other values for us in our best traditions. And together with the inspiration and guidance which may come from the best elements of a spiritual tradition, there is experienced comparative security from the injurious influence of less noble principles and examples. If one can be content to abide under the shadow of traditionalism, he can have, in many instances at least, peace of mind and an abundance of doctrinal ideas for the guidance of his daily living.

But, as we have seen, there is another element in the situation. Egypt is a land of safety, satiety, and—slavery! Tradition, it is soon recognized by those who think at all, contains error as well as truth. Intellectual servitude is sure to become increasingly intolerable for the thoughtful Travellers who have been in Abyssinia tell us that in that land of strange customs it is not uncommon to see an insolvent debtor being led through the streets, tethered to the wrist of his creditor, to whom the law allows this doubtful privilege. Something like this is the situation of the traditionalist in relation to the dogmatist in religion, and it happens not infrequently that the dogmatist is hampered in the exercise of his mental freedom almost as much by the implicit faith of his

followers as is the traditionalist by the authoritativeness of his masters. "Oh, unhappy age," exclaims Hegel, "which must content itself merely with being told that there is a God!"\*

The too long tarrying of traditionalism, under conditions of increasing information and diminishing assurance, is unfavourable to intellectual honesty. The prestige not only of theology but of religion itself tends to be seriously impaired. Probably the principal reason why positive religion, even in its freer modern development, still so commonly lies under the suspicion of scientists and philosophers is that these critics are still judging it by its old authoritarian method, to which, unfortunately, many of the spokesmen of religion still cling.

The mind of man is so constituted that, if allowed free development, it tends to come to the point where it is ready to cast off external authority as such as naturally and normally as the growing crustacean sheds its no longer adequate shell. This is particularly true in those matters which are of keen individual concern, such as one's own special field of investigation or activity, and principles which fundamentally and constantly affect one's life decisions, notably the principles of morality and religion. Religious earnestness tends toward religious independence; he who cares enough about religion to think much about it will naturally want to be religious in his own way. And on the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that the abandonment of external authority will ultimately tend to make religion a more direct and fundamental concern to every earnest and responsible soul. Emancipation from the shackles of traditionalism is not necessarily sought for the sake of ignoble self-indulgence. It is often sought as a means of ridding one's self of the besetting temptation to insincerity, as an opportunity for the higher development and fuller expression of the religious consciousness, and as a means of learning and following the truth and realizing ultimately, it may be, the ideal of a rational knowledge of Reality.

\* *Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, Vol. I, p. 229,

The dilemma of traditionalism which has been pointed out oftener than once, is this. If we are to be independent enough to choose our authority, that is, to select whom we will believe, why can we not be independent enough to judge concerning what we will believe? In the words of John Cand, "An authority proving by reason its right to teach irrationally is an impossible conception"\* If, on the other hand, our authority is to be chosen for us by authority, by what authority shall the authority for each individual be determined? Ought it to be determined by whatever the traditional authority in our family or community may happen to have been? If so, contradictory propositions ought to be believed by different people, which is logically absurd. The only position logically tenable is that which looks forward with complacency to the individual's choice of his teacher, with full right to criticize the opinions of his teacher as soon as he has developed sufficiently to do so.

There may be unknown dangers ahead of him who would break with traditionalism, but there are the plagues of Egypt for those who linger beyond their time in the land of bondage. Moreover, the longer the final break with the principle of external authority is delayed, the more violent the reaction is likely to be when it does come. The total religious scepticism and consequent lowering of moral standards which sometimes ensue when mere traditionalists are finally disillusioned are both chargeable in large part, many times at least, to the undue prolonging of the period of irresponsible traditionalism itself. Religious education should definitely prepare the individual for the time of his to-be-expected declaration of religious independence, when, using his own best judgment, he will seek by the pathway of his own experience the goal of universally valid religion. And what the expert religious teacher may do for the individual learner, representatives of different religions may attempt to do in some small measure for each other. As Christian scholars helped Jews to understand the Old Testament, and as

\* *An Introduction to a Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow, 1904 edition, p. 64.

Jewish scholars are helping Christians to understand the New, so perchance may we all, Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, Hindus, Buddhists, and others, unite to deliver ourselves and each other from the prison-house of traditionalism and the galling chains and fetters of arbitrary external authority. For, whether we like to think of it or not, the time is no doubt coming when for people in general or at any rate for all but the very young and the mentally deficient, there will be nothing left of Christianity or Mohammedanism, of Hinduism or Buddhism, or of ideas of gods or devils, hell, purgatory, or heaven, of karma, samsara, mokhsa or nirvana, except such elements as can be maintained without any appeal to traditional external authority.\*

\* There are those who think that Mohammedanism would not be able to endure the surrender of the claim to absolute external authority for the Koran. But there are indications of a consciousness on the part of certain Moslems of modern education, of the distinction between Islam as a whole and a certain critically defensible good essence of Mohammedanism, and this would seem to imply that not even the letter of the Koran is to be exempted from criticism in the light of universally valid intellectual, moral, and other spiritual norms. Mohammedanism must learn to do without the appeal to an infallible Koran, just as the Confucianists in China are learning, since the Revolution, to take in critical fashion the reputed teachings of the venerated Confucius.

### III. ESCAPE TO THE WILDERNESS . EMPIRICISM AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

Let us break definitively, then, not indeed with all tradition, but with traditionalism. Let us abandon for ever the principle of absolute external authority, and make our appeal to experience and thought. In the light of the facts let us investigate the truth of whatever we find in our sacred books. Let Jews and Christians do this for the Bible, Mohammedans for the Koran; Hindus for the Vedas; and Buddhists, Confucianists, Shintoists, and all others for the classical documents of their several faiths. We shall never make much headway in our quest for universality in religion so long as that can be said of us which Plato's Socrates charged against Phaedrus, "You seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes."\* Even to our most sacred scriptures we must learn to apply the principle so well stated—in another connection, to be sure—by the good Thomas à Kempis "Let not the authority of the writer be a stumbling block, . . . but let the love of pure truth draw thee to read Enquire not who spoke this or that, but mark what is spoken"†

The break with traditionalism does not necessarily imply an abandonment of faith. On the contrary there may well be more faith in venturing into the wilderness of free inquiry and possible doubt than in resolving to remain, for safety's sake, in the bondage of traditionalism. It takes more faith, generally speaking, to follow up an honest doubt, than it does to subscribe to a traditional creed, particularly if it be the creed of one's social group. There is a tradition at Yale that Nathaniel Taylor, who taught theology there a hundred years ago, used to say to his students . . . "Follow

\* *Phaedrus*, 275

† *Imitatio Christi*, I 5.1.

the truth even if takes you over Niagara Falls!" The days of adventure are not past, and the opportunities for heroic adventure are nowhere greater or more inviting than in the realm of the spirit. The religionist is called to a high and holy quest, to a spiritual pilgrimage requiring that he leave the shelter of his ancestral traditionalism with no very definite idea of where in the world of thought he may finally find an abode,—even if he may believe that in his capacities for experience and powers of thought he has the promise of at last knowing for himself what he most imperatively needs to know. For freedom, then, and the hope of a religious home which will be no mere borrowed shelter but his own possession, the pilgrim must venture forth to face the privations and possible perils of his wilderness journey. And he must go forth expecting never to return. He will still be in large part what traditional religion has made him, but he must break with traditionalism and be done with it as fully and finally as the germinating seed is done with the husk, or the newly-hatched chick with the shell that protected but confined it. If we would be truly free we must be boldly radical, accepting finally as valid only that for which we can find sufficient basis apart from any appeal to external authority.

The dogmatists may sally forth and try to retake their escaping bondsmen, as did the hosts of Pharaoh in the Jewish legend. Let us not be deterred by their dire threats or specious arguments. They may appeal to stories of miracle as establishing some particular external authority on a supernatural basis. Now we may well hesitate in the present state of scientific knowledge, to give any complete list of stories of wonderful happenings which are scientifically incredible. But miracle in the sense in which the dogmatic traditionalist is interested in it is itself a part of what has been believed primarily on external authority, so that in breaking with external authority we have already broken with all that has ever made traditional miracle (in the sense of a supernatural upsetting of the natural order) seem other than extremely doubtful. Let us not fear the pursuing dogmatists; they cannot retake us if we

still choose to be free. The waters of the Red Sea roll between us and them, the wheels of their chariots drag heavily, and in the morning of the new day upon which we are entering we shall view their lifeless bodies cast up on the shore.

If now we may assume that in our quest for universality in religion we are free from the bondage of traditionalism, let us look about us and see just where we are and what our lot is likely to be. In breaking with external authority our purpose was to appeal to experience, to examine the facts for ourselves. So be it; but let us recognize at once that we of today are not the first to tread this empirical pathway. The history of modern intellectual progress shows us not only a developing body of empirical science, but a philosophy of empiricism from which it is natural to suppose that we may be able to receive some guidance as we turn expectantly to experience in our quest for universally valid religious beliefs, freely arrived at and adequately assured. Most encouraging is the word of that pioneer empiricist, Francis Bacon: "True unanimity is that which proceeds from a free judgment arriving at the same conclusion after an investigation of the fact"\* Let us begin, then, by exploiting the resources of philosophical empiricism in the interest of universality in religion.

From the point of view of what has borne the name of empiricism historically, the mind has certain contents, or, to adopt a more favoured mode of speaking, consciousness is made up of a succession of more or less complete states. These contents of consciousness are of two principal sorts, namely, first, impressions (sometimes called perceptions, sometimes sensations, and sometimes used as including ideas), and secondly, ideas, or images. Sensations are the impressions received by the mind when particular sense organs are stimulated. Ideas are of two principal sorts: simple ideas of sensation, which are vestiges or faint copies of sensations, either remaining after the external stimulation has ceased, or recovered at a later time by recollection; and complex

\**Novum Organum*, Book I, Aph 77.



ideas, which result from the combination of two or more simple ideas of sensation. In some instances as a result of a process of "mental chemistry," the complex idea does not exhibit the characteristics of the simple ideas which entered into the combination.\*

From the empiricist point of view all the materials of knowledge come from experience, and in the reception of these materials consciousness is regarded as passive. In Locke's phraseology the mind is like "white paper, void of all characters," waiting to be written upon, like a mirror which cannot but receive the images which objects before it produce upon it, or like a dark room with only some little openings left through which pictures of external things may be thrust.† James Mill tried to reduce all connection of ideas, even resemblance, to the effect of association in past experience, but most empiricists would probably have agreed with the younger Mill that consciousness of similarity is not explained by mere conjunction in the past ‡ Hume and the two Mills are

\* We have been forced to make a somewhat arbitrary selection from the various terms employed by the historic empiricists. The contents of consciousness, as such, Locke called ideas, Hume, perceptions, Hartley, internal feelings, James Mill, feelings, John Stuart Mill, feelings or states of consciousness, and Bain, states of consciousness, in which the last-mentioned was followed by William James and other psychologists of his generation. Locke divided "ideas" into simple and complex, and into ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection, or internal sensation. Hume divided "perceptions" according as they were lively or faint into impressions and ideas thus correcting what he regarded as a too broad use of the latter term by Locke. Hartley divided "internal feelings" into sensations, arising from impressions made on the body by external objects, and ideas, further divisible into ideas of sensation which resemble sensations and intellectual ideas, which do not. James Mill followed Hartley in dividing what he called simply "feelings" into sensations and ideas, while John Stuart Mill divided "feelings" or "states of consciousness" into sensations, emotions, and thoughts. Bain divided "states of consciousness" into sensations and ideas. The conception of "mental chemistry," introduced by Hartley, was favourably regarded by James Mill, Bain, and Clifford (John Locke *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *passim*, D. Hume *Treatise of Human Nature* (1738), Selby-Bigge's edition, 1896, pp. 1, 2, 1, 72, 163, D. Hartley *Observations on Man* (1749), 5th edition, 1819, Introduction, pp. 1, II, and p. 58, James Mill *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 1869 edition, Vol. I, p. 52, John Stuart Mill *Logic*, 1900 edition, pp. 48, 49, Alexander Bain notes in above-mentioned edition of James Mill, Vol. I, pp. 62-65; W. K. Clifford *Lectures and Essays*, 2nd edition, 1886, p. 197.)

† *Essay*, Book II, Ch. I, Sections 2, 25, Ch. XI, S. 17.

‡ James Mill, *Analysis*, 1869 edition, pp. 107, 111, etc.

generally taken to represent empiricism in its most characteristic expression ; but it was not until our own day, in the philosophy of William James, that this point of view and doctrine found what we may regard as their final form. Before James empiricists had thought of consciousness as made up of feelings in various relations to each other, but it was suggested only vaguely if at all that the relations between sensations and feelings are themselves feelings. Locke held that ideas of relation are made up of simple ideas and Hume went further and said that relations are themselves complex ideas resulting from association \* But according to James a mind or personal consciousness is simply a series of experiences run together by certain transitions or relations, which are themselves immediately given experiences, members of the sensational flux. There is a feeling of " of," a feeling of " but," and a feeling of " and," and this feeling is what the relation really is or, at any rate, all we can know about it This is what James calls " radical empiricism." †

It is a characteristic statement of the empiricist doctrine that the immediate object of perception is simply the passing show of sense-impressions and ideas, or in other words the states or processes of consciousness itself. Already in Hobbes we find this doctrine enunciated in the proposition that the immediate objects of the senses are " phantasms in the sentient." ‡ On the basis of Locke's doctrine that the idea is the object of consciousness, §

\* J Locke, *Essay*, Book II, Ch XXV, Section 11

D Hume, *op cit.*, p 13

† *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp 279, 280, *The Meaning of Truth*, pp xii, xiii; *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp ix-xii, 42-44, 80 James distinguishes his radical empiricism from the " ordinary empiricism," with its " tendency to do away with the connections of things, and to insist on the disjunctions " As examples of what he means he cites " Berkeley's nominalism, Hume's statement that whatever things we distinguish are as ' loose and separate ' as if they had ' no manner of connection,' James Mill's denial that similars have anything really in common, the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John Mill's account of both physical things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities and the general pulverization of all experience by association and the mind-dust theory " (p 43)

‡ *Works*, 1840 edition, I, pp 391-2

§ *Essay*, Book II, Ch I, Section 1

Bishop Berkeley, to forestall a threatened scepticism as to the possibility of knowing material things, and still more to cut the ground from under materialism, made bold to condemn as self-contradictory the prevalent opinion that sensible objects, such as houses, mountains and rivers, have a real existence distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. "For what are the forementioned objects," he asks, "but the things we perceive by sense? And what do we perceive besides our own sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of *these*, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?"\* "The object and the sensation are the same thing," he declares, "and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other." Everything, all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, has its entire being in its being perceived or known.† Hume agrees with Berkeley that all ideas of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with names attached thereto.‡ In his opinion, "Nothing is ever really present to the mind but perceptions, or impressions and ideas," so that "it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions."§ The opinion that bodies continue to exist when unperceived was for Hume a baseless figment of the imagination. Thus did Hume outstrip Berkeley himself in reducing entities to perceptions.|| A self or person was for him "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an incredible rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement."¶ John Stuart Mill, agreeing with James Mill that our idea of an object is an idea of a group of possibilities of sensation,\*\* goes on to define matter as "a permanent possibility of sensation" and the self as "the permanent possibility of feeling"†† The basis for belief in

\* *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710, Part I, Section 4

† *Ibid.*, Sections 5, 6

‡ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1738, Selby Bigge's edition, 1896, p. 16

§ *Ibid.*, p. 66

|| *Ibid.*, p. 198

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 262

\*\* James Mill, *Analysis*, Vol. I, p. 414.

†† *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 248, 258.

the external existence of the world is that "the world of possible sensations succeeding one another according to laws is as much in other beings as in me," and thus, it would seem, is the only basis for saying that it "has an existence outside me."\* Closely similar to this subjective phenomenalism of Hume and the two Mills is the position of the later English Empiricists,† and of some others, such as Mach‡ and William James §

\* *Ibid.*, p. 242

† Alexander Bain, exploiting in the interests of subjectivism what has been called in our day "the egocentric predicament," insisted that we are incapable even of discussing the existence of an independent material world, since we can speak or think only of what is presented to our own minds (*The Senses and the Intellect*, 3rd edition, 1885, p. 375). The externality of the world is simply the result of our recognizing what is presented through the senses as being an actual or possible occasion for the putting forth of active energy (*Ibid.*, p. 377). Subjective empiricism is given equally frank expression by George Henry Lewes: "An object only is to us what we feel it to be. Fifty spectators see fifty different rainbows in the sky, and all believe they see the same one. The objective world is to each man the sum of his visionary experience. The world is the sum-total of phenomena, and phenomena are affections of consciousness" (*Problems of Life and Mind*, Vol. I, pp. 193, 201, 202). According to W. K. Clifford we do not see the physical object which we think we see. What we really see is two distinct pictures upon the retinas of our eyes, exactly as we do when we look at two slightly different pictures placed in a stereoscope and get the illusion of depth and solidity. Or, more accurately, since we move our eyes about, what we really see is a succession of small pictures very rapidly changed. "The utmost I can really see is a panorama painted in mosaic and shown in a wheel of life" (*Lectures and Essays*, 1886 edition, pp. 181-183). And according to Shadworth Hodgson, even when we infer from consciousness something which is not consciousness, the whole whatness, meaning or content of the thing inferred is consciousness, since it is included in the inference, which is obviously consciousness (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. II, No. 1, Part II, 1892, p. 57).

‡ Ernest Mach, influenced by Kant and soon rejecting the "thing-in-itself" as superfluous, arrived at a point of view which has much in common with that of the English empiricists. All bodies are for him "thought-symbols for complexes of sensations," or, otherwise expressed, "complexes of colours, sounds, pressures and so forth, connected in time and space," and given special names by us. "The world does not consist of mysterious entities, which by their interaction with another equally mysterious entity, the ego, produce sensations, which alone are accessible. Colours, sounds, spaces, times, are the ultimate elements whose given connection it is our business to investigate." "All theoretical conceptions of physics—caloric, electricity, light-waves, molecules, atoms and energy—must be regarded as mere helps or expedients to facilitate our consideration of things" (*Analysis of Sensations*, Eng. trans., Chicago, 1910, p. 2, 22, 23, 187).

§ In the view of William James, as expressed in his *Psychology*, realities are simply those contents of our consciousness which we are interested in. "The object of your thought is really its entire content or deliverance, neither more nor less. The object of every thought is neither more nor less than all that the thought thinks, exactly as the

If now we adopt, however tentatively, the presuppositions and main conclusions of empiricism, what will it mean for our problem of the possibility of knowledge in general and of religious knowledge in particular? Here we are confronted with a serious dilemma. If all the reality we can know is the immediate content of our consciousness, we are obviously shut up to a choice between subjectivism and agnosticism. Some empiricists, as we have seen, have chosen the subjective horn of the dilemma. But there are others who cannot bring themselves to dispense with the idea of an independent reality, and these are the ones who have been troubled by the problem of knowledge. Going back to Locke, for instance, we find that he frankly recognizes that "having the idea of anything in our mind no more proves the existence of that thing than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world." To the consideration that all our experiences may be but "the deluding appearances of a long dream whereof there is no reality," he makes the not very effective rejoinder that in that case the doubt itself would be only part of the dream.\* He thinks that he has given us assurance enough of the existence of things without us, at least for practical purposes;† but this offering of God as a copula to bring together subject and predicate, reality and idea, only thinly veils the fact that as a theory of even the possibility of knowledge Locke's philosophy has broken completely down. How the collapse of the Lockian realistic empiricism as a theory of knowledge led first to the subjective idealism of Berkeley and then to the scepticism of Hume is a familiar chapter of the history of modern philosophy. In the doctrine of Hume and later in that of Mill we see most clearly and characteristically the consequences of the older empiricism

thought thinks it." "Everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object," but "the mere fact of appearing as an object is not enough to constitute reality." To have "practical reality, reality for ourselves an object must appear both *interesting* and *important*. Whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real." The thinker's "dominant habits of attention . . . practically elect from among the various worlds some one to be for him the world of ultimate realities" (*Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 275-6, Vol. II, pp. 298-6).

\* *Essay*, Book IV, Ch. XI, Sections 1, 8.

† *Ibid.*, Sections 4, 8, 10.

Holding that reason is a mere derivative of sensation, and that sensation gives us only subjective impressions passively received, Hume confesses that sceptical doubt is for him a malady which can never be radically cured. "'Tis impossible," he thinks, "to defend either our understanding or our senses.. Scepticism increases the farther we carry our reflections. Carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy."\* For Stuart Mill there was no knowable subject or object beyond the permanent possibility of feeling and sensation, and any assumed independently existing body could only be defined as "the unknown external cause to which we refer our sensations," while mind itself was the "unknown recipient or percipient of them and of all our feelings."†

In the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, however, we see empiricism swinging back from subjectivism to a "transfigured" or agnostic realism. "Though internal feeling habitually depends on external agent, yet there is no likeness between them either in kind or degree." "Not a step can be taken towards the truth that our states of consciousness are the only things we can know, without tacitly or avowedly postulating an unknown something beyond consciousness."‡ As a typical illustration of the characteristic empiricist oscillation between agnosticism and subjectivism, let me recall the position taken by Karl Pearson in his *Grammar of Science*. Interpreting what is called an external object as "a combination of immediate with past or stored sense-impressions," he goes beyond ordinary agnosticism, which assumes independent realities and then says that all we can know of them is a capacity for producing sense-impressions. Pearson confesses absolute

\* *Op. cit.*, p. 218. Auguste Comte came under the empiricist influence sufficiently to conclude that human knowledge is limited to the laws of phenomena. The productive causes of phenomena he held to be totally beyond our discovery. See *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, trans. by Harriet Martineau, London, 1853, pp. 2, 5, 6.

† *Logic*, 1900 edition, p. 56.

‡ *Principles of Psychology*, sections 78, 88, cf. *First Principles*, *passim*. G. H. Lewes, while trying to overcome the conception of the Unknowable and insisting that "within the region of the knowable we do know things as they are," has to admit "a vast extra-sensible" for possible science, and is not able to deny a "super-sensible" to us inaccessible. *Op. cit.*, pp. 192-195, 264, 270.

agnosticism as to whether sense-impressions are produced by unknowable things-in-themselves, or whether beyond them there may not be simply something more of their own nature. In relation to any hypothetical independent world we are, he suggests, like the clerk in a central telephone exchange, who projects outside his office those sounds which are really inside it and speaks of them as the external world.\*

These quotations from well-known empiricists may serve to show us what may possibly happen to those who venture to throw off the shackles of traditionalism and appeal to experience for themselves. If we have followed our empiricist guides we have gained our freedom at least, and for that let us be thankful. But there is no disguising the fact that in following them we are being led into the wilderness. In an earlier generation, when the influence of Hume and Mill was at its height in England, Lord Neaves penned these satirical lines:

Against a stone you strike your toe,  
 You feel 'tis sore, it makes a clatter,  
 But what you feel is all you know  
 Of toe, or stone, or mind, or matter †

If this is the best we can do in the way of independent philosophical thinking, what is it going to mean for religion? If we cannot know mind or matter, what prospect is there of knowing God? And how are we to gain sustenance for the religious life, if we can find no religious truth of which we can be assured? We are free; but what advantage have we in being free, if we are about to die? Have we been brought out into the desert to perish with hunger and thirst? Have our empirical leaders given us liberty to give us death? In the privations of the wilderness we cannot but think of how in the days of our servitude we could at least eat bread to the full. If we persist in our pilgrim journey through these wilds of empiricism we are surely going to be faced with the problem of a religious *modus vivendi*. How can we maintain a

\* *Grammar of Science*, 2nd edition, 1900, pp. 61, 62, 64, 68

† Quoted by A. H. Strong, *Philosophy and Religion*, 1888, p. 11

positive religious belief if there is nothing of which we can have knowledge except fleeting subjective impressions and faint copies of the same?

Let us see whether any of our empirical guides have any crumbs of comfort for us. Perchance we may find manna in the wilderness and water springing from the flinty rock, or collected in some other unexpected place. Even should the manna seem but light food and the water be bitter to our taste, they may serve, perhaps, to keep our souls alive until our minds can arrive at a more satisfactory resting place. "What you feel is all you know." Possibly, but it is not necessarily all we may believe. "We have but faith, we cannot know, for knowledge is of things we see"—phenomena. This may be so; we may have but faith, but *we may have faith*. Some fugitive suggestions from the empiricists may have value for us in this connection.

"How vain it is," we read in Locke's *Essay*, "to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it, and refuse to assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident as to surmount every the last pretence of doubting. He that in the ordinary affairs of life would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world but of perishing quickly."\* Wise words, which may possibly find application in the sphere of religion. And even out of the depths of Hume's scepticism come these words: "There is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility."† In similar spirit Stuart Mill takes Comte to task for never allowing of open questions, and as against atheistic positivism he suggests that it is quite compatible with a scientific understanding of nature "to believe that the universe was created, and even that it is continuously governed by an Intelligence."‡

\* *Essay*, Book IV, Ch. XI, section 10

† *Treatise* (Selby-Bigge's edition), p. 135

‡ *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, 3rd edition, 1882, p. 15. As for Comte himself, in view of his doctrine that man must be content to gain such a limited knowledge of the world and of human life as will enable him to make use of nature for the perfecting of human society, one is led to raise the question whether positive experimental



"We believe a thing," wrote the empiricist, Clifford, "when we are prepared to act as if it were true"\* In this view he was anticipated by Bain, who not only had pointed out that the practical test of a man's belief in anything was his acting upon it, but had gone on to make the statement that "in its essential character Belief is a phase of our active nature,—otherwise called the Will."† This idea finds its consummate expression in the well-known essays of William James on "The Sentiment of Rationality" and "The Will to Believe" Of two conceptions equally permissible so far as strict logic is concerned, we always tend, he points out, to regard that one as the more reasonable which best accords with our active impulses and other æsthetic demands Furthermore, understanding by a "living option" a choice between two alternatives both of which appeal to us as real possibilities, it is contended by James that where knowledge in the strict sense of the word is impossible but where an option between hypotheses is forced, "living," and momentous, we have the right to adopt our working belief voluntarily and abide by the consequences The religious question, in the opinion of James, presents such a genuine option.‡ This is the famous doctrine of "the will to believe," and in view of the fact that it is very frequently a caricature of the original that is held up to philosophical ridicule, we would insist that James's own precise statement of the principle be always carefully kept in mind.

It is now thirty years and more since James's doctrine on this subject was given to the world, and while much use has been made of it in the promotion and encouragement of religious faith,§ there is still much controversy about it, and the doctrine itself seems frequently to be seriously misunderstood It is easy to start with

religion may not be necessary for the perfecting of society, and if so, whether a place may not be found for religious faith, at least in the sense of honestly acting upon the religious hypothesis

\* *Lectures and Essays*, 2nd edition, p 209

† See James Mill *Analysis*, p 394

‡ *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, pp 2, 3, 11, 29, 75-6, 90.

§ "I think I shall be justified in saying that James's 'Will to Believe' has been one of the greatest influences for genuine religious faith that have appeared in the last half century" (J. B Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?* 1909, p 194)

the phrase, "the will to believe," or even with the less exceptionable term, "the right to believe,"\* and to interpret it in such a way as to make it seem either absurd or downright immoral. Is it possible to produce belief to the will's order? And if it were possible, would it be morally right to do it? Could an auditor justifiably follow his will to believe in examining the books of an accountant, or a jury in deciding upon a verdict? In any given situation in the light of all the available evidence and after the most painstakingly logical thought, we have the right to believe what we honestly think, neither more nor less. Would it not be perverse to resolve to believe what you would like to believe, if you suspected that a more thorough investigation of the matter might make a continuation of such belief impossible? Would not such a procedure be that stopping of critical thought by an act of will which Descartes denounced as the root of all erroneous judgment? Until the evidence in the case is all in, why should we not remain, as Huxley recommended, with judgment in suspense?

Now it cannot be denied that it is often our duty to doubt a proposition even when we may wish we could believe it.† If the will to believe is to be exercised as a right before the evidence is in so fully as to make it possible to know, the situation must, of course, be such that belief is both psychologically possible and logically and morally permissible. As a matter of fact what makes belief possible when knowledge is impossible is not the mere impossibility or absence of knowing, neither is it any mere arbitrary freedom of the will. Feeling and imagination must participate in the activity of will whereby effective choice is made between theoretically permissible beliefs, and as is well known, what is at any moment possible for the individual in the way of feeling and imagination is largely determined by what he has experienced and done in the past ‡ But assuming that the evidence is not too un-

\* See J. Seelye Bixler, *Religion in the Philosophy of William James*, 1926, p. 92

† Cf. Dickinson S. Miller, "The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt," *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1899

‡ Cf. H. Scholz, "Ueber das Verhältniss des Willens zur Weltanschauung," in *Festschrift für Julius Kaftan*, Tübingen, 1920, pp. 327, 340-2, etc

favourable, that the will is sufficiently free, and that the life-history and fundamental nature of the individual, as expressed in his imagination and feelings, are sufficiently favourable for some sort of voluntary belief to be psychologically possible, under what conditions can it be exercised as a right? This is the crucial question.

Clearly, voluntary belief cannot be excised as a moral right when it would mean a mere false "rationalization" of immoral desires. No motive but a morally good one can transform mere psychological possibility of belief into actual belief exercised as a moral right. But since the religious situation is one in which not to act upon the positive hypothesis is to act upon the negative, why have we not the right to throw the weight of our decision, "I will," or "I do," upon the side of belief, provided that belief is logically permissible and psychologically possible, and on condition that we honestly believe the particular belief in question to be conducive to the highest ultimate well-being of mankind? Why should we not begin to act or continue to act upon the positive hypothesis in religion, as far as we honestly can, resolved always to deal honestly with all further evidence as it becomes available, but meanwhile cultivating in ourselves, under the rational and moral conditions already mentioned, the habit of belief? It was for liberty that we left the traditionalistic house of bondage. Now that we have gained our liberty, are we to be free only when the wind is in certain directions? Are we to be free only to deny traditional beliefs, and not free to adopt an unrefuted and valuable faith as our life-hypothesis, particularly when we have to act either as if it were true or as if it were false? No one who is neither a fool nor a knave would contend that we have the universal right to believe as we wish, but are there not situations in which and conditions under which we have the right to believe as we hope? Essentially this, if I understand him, is what William James meant by the will to believe. It is the right to believe as we ought to hope.\*

\* Miss Eleanor H. Rowland's book, *The Right to Believe*, Boston, 1909, is suggestive in this connection, although her statements are not always as carefully guarded as one could wish.

More especially it asserts the moral right of the religious individual to act upon the unrefuted and permissible hypothesis that God is and is the Rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. It is no act of arbitrary choice; it is an expression of one of the deepest, truest and noblest impulses of the human heart, and it points to a relationship and a way of life that seem to be necessary for the highest well-being of man, individually and socially considered.

In referring to the danger of a false "rationalization" we recognize what is perhaps the chief weakness of the "will-to-believe," "we-have-but-faith-and-cannot-know" doctrine. Unless formulated and employed with great circumspection it may lend itself to the forces of reaction and superstition. There was little danger of this in James's own use of the principle, habituated as he was to the scientific method.\* But not all exponents of the right in religion to believe voluntarily have been equally discreet in the application of their useful but dangerous principle. We cannot altogether exempt from criticism in this connection even so keen a thinker as Earl Balfour, whose *Foundations of Belief* William James is known to have read with enthusiastic approval shortly before his own first delivery of the address on "The Will to Believe."† There are no adequate reasons which can be given for our fundamental beliefs, either in the realm of religion or in the realm of science, according to Balfour, but only adequate causes.‡ In both cases we believe in our creed merely because of a subjective need for it § These are very extreme statements, and it is by no means necessary to go so far as this in order to agree with the eminent statesman in his contention that if we have due regard to our need of an inspiring and ennobling faith, we will

\* A few years before the preparation of his paper on "The Will to Believe," James had written thus in the spirit of Huxley "The greatest proof that a man is *suus compos* is his ability to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally exciting idea. To give this power is the highest result of education" (*Psychology*, 1890, Vol II, p 308)

† *The Letters of William James*, Vol II, p 20

‡ *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, pp 28, 34, 71, 260, 263; *Foundations of Belief*, Amer edition, 1895, p 366

§ *A Defence*, pp 320-1.

reject every materialistic and non-religious view of the world.\* Moreover, when, after maintaining that certitude is the child of Custom and not of Reason,† Balfour goes on to suggest that we use the term Authority for all non-rational causes of belief,‡ he is playing directly into the hands of those who call for a return not only to tradition but to traditionalism

This pointing to what is called Authority as the source of religious certitude, coupled with the advocacy of voluntary belief on confessedly practical grounds, is strongly reminiscent of some of those plausible but dangerous half-truths which are to be found so plentifully in the writings of John Henry Newman. "When we are not personally concerned," writes Newman, "even the highest evidence does not move us, when we are concerned, the very slightest is enough." § "It surely cannot be meant," he says in another connection, "that we should be undecided all our days. We were made for action and for right action—for thought and for true thought. Let us live while we live, let us be alive and doing; let us act on what we have since we cannot have what we wish. Let us believe what we do not see and know. Let us forestall knowledge by faith. Let us maintain before we have demonstrated. This seeming paradox is the secret of happiness."||

Is not the trouble with such advice simply this, that while we can heartily endorse it as a defence of *some* positive religious faith, and of our own faith in particular, we draw back when we hear it used as an argument for a form of belief which we regard as superstition, and which we cannot accept with self-respect? We cannot forget that the words we have quoted were written in defence of the most abject traditionalism in religion, in advocacy, indeed, of unconditional surrender to the external authority of the Church of Rome, and to the Pope in particular as its recognized head. The inadequacy of Newman's argument to justify a course so repugnant

\* *Foundations*, pp. 4, 77, 81

† *Ibid.*, pp. 171-2

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 236

§ *Via Media*, Vol. I, pp. 86-7

|| *Discussions and Arguments*, p. 214.

to the emancipated modern intelligence becomes more evident as he proceeds. "Why should we be unwilling to go by faith?" he asks. "We do all things in this world by faith in the word of others. By faith only we know our position in the world, our circumstances, our rights and privileges, our fortunes, our parents, our brothers and sisters, our age, our mortality. Why should religion be an exception? Why should we be unwilling to use for heavenly objects what we daily use for earthly?"\* To this the obvious and sufficient reply is that if we were to be as credulous in everyday affairs as Newman was in religion, we should not only endanger our reputation for sanity but also no doubt soon bring our earthly existence to an untimely end. In no realm but the religious has any sane man been found ready to say with Tertullian: "I believe it because it is impossible, I believe it because it is absurd."

The moral of all this seems to be that while we may recognize the possibility and may even insist on the occasional right of belief in the absence of knowledge in the strict sense of the word, we cannot be too careful lest we allow this genuine right to believe to degenerate into an intellectual irresponsibility in matters of religious faith, such as Newman displayed when he virtually claimed the right to treat insufficient evidence as if it were sufficient in all cases in which religious welfare seemed to him to be served by such a course.† We are still in search of a guiding principle which shall transform the natural and only too intelligible will to believe from mere "wishful thinking" into something which can be exercised and reasonably defended as an undoubted right. Assuming that we cannot attain to strict demonstration of what we should like to know in religion, may it not be possible to arrive at universal validity, and to be reasonably assured that we have done so?

But are we sure that we have sufficiently examined the question whether the search for rational proof in religion is foredoomed to disappointment? As a matter of fact we have a twofold question

\* *Ibid.*

† Cf. E. Caird *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Thinkers*, Vol. I, p. 17.

before us. Our wilderness journey was intended to be transitional. The goal we set out to reach when we gained our emancipation was a promised land of independent religious knowledge, an intellectual home of our own to which we might bring our faith, and where we might live happily ever after. We certainly had no thought, when we broke away from the house of bondage, that we were going out to live and die in the wilderness. But now we are facing these two problems. In the first place, can we enter into the promised land, and if so, how? And in the second place, if we cannot get out of the wilderness, or until we do, what are the prospects of our finding a more satisfactory *modus vivendi* than is afforded by the still rather indefinite principle of the will to believe, the principle of the right to believe as we hope, if such belief is theoretically permissible as well as psychologically possible, and if our hope is in accord with what is desirable from a truly moral point of view?

It may be that in this suggestion of a moral criterion of religious faith we may find a clue to universal validity of belief, should religious knowledge be found to be unattainable. We use the True as a guide to what is good; may there not be some legitimate way of using the Good as a guide to what is true? Have we not the right to believe as we must, if we are to live as we ought?

But, once more, in our concern for a satisfactory *modus vivendi* we must not lose sight of the original purpose of our pilgrimage. Let us raise, more definitely than we have yet done, the question of the possibility of religious knowledge. If we can answer this question in the affirmative, the problem of a *modus vivendi* will become correspondingly less painfully acute; whereas, even if our answer should be in the negative, it may still turn out that incidentally in the course of our investigation we shall hit upon the path to a religious faith which, though we may never prove it true on theoretical grounds, we can recognize as morally justified, or even as morally imperative. That would be, at least, to solve the problem of a *modus vivendi*. At any rate these are the two questions immediately before us in the present phase of our pilgrimage.

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#### IV. IN THE WILDERNESS STILL: CRITICAL AGNOSTICISM AND MORAL FAITH.

The religious uncertainty and spiritual impoverishment of philosophical empiricism, notwithstanding all its freedom, make acutely insistent the question whether it may not be possible to get out of this wilderness and into the promised land for which we originally set out. But we are not, of course, the first to have felt dissatisfaction with the spiritual results of empiricism; as a matter of fact long years ago spies were sent into Canaan to see whether or not it would be practicable for the pilgrim tribes to enter in and take possession of that land of promise. In other words, under the conviction that by virtue of the rational constitution of man's mind it ought to be possible for him to enter into a rational knowledge of the nature of ultimate Reality, the critical philosophers have undertaken to investigate thoroughly the whole problem of knowledge, with special reference to the question of the possibility of gaining intellectual possession of the metaphysical domain. The generally acknowledged leader of this select band of spies is Immanuel Kant, and his report and that of those who are in essential agreement with him may perhaps be taken as the majority report.

This report is very detailed and methodical and contains much that is of undoubted importance; but alas, on the central question, as to whether it is possible for us to enter into an assured rational knowledge of ultimate Reality, the captain of the spies reports, the majority agreeing, that while the land is no doubt a goodly land, our powers are not equal to the task of invading it and making it our secure possession. There are giants in the land, "Things-in-themselves,"\* and we must regard them as quite invincible.

\* "The pure concepts of the understanding never admit of a transcendental, but only of an empirical use, and the principles of the pure understanding can only be referred, as general conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, never



with our poor limited cognitive powers we are, in relation to them, but as grasshoppers.

Such is the general tenor of the report, and it is anything but encouraging; but let us look a little more closely into the reasons offered for these negative conclusions. In his philosophy of scientific knowledge Kant controverts the empirical doctrine of the passive reception of simple ideas or perceptions as impressions of sense. There is, he contends, an active rational element in all knowledge of phenomena, in all intelligent experience indeed. It is true, as the empiricists insist, that there must be empirical material, elements of sense, if there is to be scientific knowledge; but there is this much truth in the doctrine of the rationalists, that there is knowledge only as this empirical content is arranged in rational form; and for the imposing of this rational form upon the raw material of sense impressions a rational activity of mind is necessary.\* Gaining knowledge is like getting manufactured products from a mill. As there will be no finished product unless

to things by themselves" (I Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, Max Müller's translation, second edition, 1900, p. 201) "All our representations are no doubt referred by the understanding to some sort of object, and as phenomena are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a *something* as the object of our sensuous intuition, this something being however the transcendental object only. This means a something equal to  $x$ , of which we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our understanding, cannot know anything" (*ibid.*, p. 204) "The object to which I refer the phenomenon in general is the transcendental object, that is, the entirely indefinite thought of something in general. This cannot be called the noumenon, for I know nothing of what it is by itself, and have no conception of it, except as the object of sensuous intuition in general, which is therefore the same for all phenomena" (*ibid.*, p. 206) "The concept of a noumenon, if taken as problematical only, remains not only admissible, but, as a concept to limit the sphere of sensibility, indispensable" "Our understanding acquires a kind of negative extension by calling things by themselves noumena. It cannot know these noumena by means of the categories, but can only think of them under the name of something unknown" (*ibid.*, pp. 208-9)

\* "Objects of sensuous intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility—existing *a priori* in the mind, because otherwise they could in no way be objects to us" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Müller's translation, p. 75) "To know a thing as object, first, there must be intuition by which the object is given to us though as a phenomenon only, secondly, there must be a concept by which an object is thought as corresponding to that intuition" (*ibid.*, p. 77) "If each feeling were limited to a single moment, it would be an absolutely individual unit. In order that the various determinations of a perception, as, for instance, the parts of a line, should form a unity, it is necessary

two conditions are fulfilled, the working of the mill and the supplying of it with raw material, so there will be no knowledge of anything unless the understanding is active and unless it is supplied with the raw material of sense-impressions. On the one hand, the working of the mind apart from any appeal to sense-experience yields only empty concepts, mere speculation as to possibilities. On the other hand, having one's senses stimulated without giving active attention to the content of sense impression yields no knowledge; merely to have our eyes open without attentive looking at anything amounts to the same thing as if we were blind. In short, all intelligent experience necessarily involves active attention on the part of rational mind, attention is virtually a judging process; and judging, attaching an idea as predicate to a content of experience as subject-matter, is a process of actively constructing or reconstructing the object. In the words of Kuno Fischer, interpreting Kant, the understanding constructs nature, although it does not create it. It makes it out of a given raw material of sense. Nature as a whole, including all its objects and all its laws, is, as far as we know it at all, our own construction.\* Each and every intelligently conscious subject makes his own world, the world of his own experience and knowledge. We perceive what our minds have moulded, nothing more. We could not by means of a succession of any number of sense-impressions become aware of an object with various parts and properties existing in space and persisting in time, if the understanding did not, as an active, constructing principle, take these impressions as they are successively received and hold them, or selections from them, together as a unified and continuous whole. A mere succession of sensa-

that they should be run over and held together by the mind. Thus act I call the synthesis of apprehension" (Watson's *Selections from Kant*, p. 57). "If the earlier determinations—the prior parts of the line, the antecedent moments of time—were to drop out of my consciousness and could not be reproduced when I passed on to the later determinations, I should never be conscious of a whole" (*ibid.*, p. 59). "Then and then only do we say that we know an object, if we have produced synthetical unity in the manifold of intuition" (Muller's translation, p. 87).

\* "The understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature" (Muller's translation, p. 104).

tions or other conscious elements, the Kantians are fond of pointing out, is not a consciousness of the succession.\*

In the Kantian view, then, all objects of knowledge are subjective constructs; but the subjectivism of this critical philosophy is radically different from that of the sceptical empiricism previously discussed. Here all is subjective construction, indeed, but within the limits of this subjectivity there is a universal necessity which takes the place of the old *bona fide* objectivity, or independence. This necessity, and this universality are found in the fact that all rational human subjects must and do construct their worlds in essentially the same way. The individual, in so far as he is rational, does his constructing of the world out of sense-impressions in accordance with the *a priori* constitution of the understanding, so that what the individual knows of nature as thus constructed is valid for all other rational subjects as well as for himself.

In connection with what he calls the deduction of the categories, Kant sets himself the problem of explaining how it is that Nature fits into the *a priori* forms of the human understanding. Scholasticism and the earlier rationalism posited divinely implanted innate ideas, to which reality must of course correspond, since otherwise God would have to be regarded as a deceiver. But Kant, repudiating this dogmatic rationalism with its suggestion of a miraculous correspondence or pre-established harmony,

\* Watson's *Selections from Kant*, p. 57 (Muller's translation, pp. 82-83). See in this connection T. H. Green's lectures on the *Logic of J. S. Mill*, in his collected *Works*, Vol. II. A typical statement is found on page 257: "In the case of seeing an object for the first time, I should have successively to attend to sundry sensations, and over and above this to hold together these successively felt objects in juxtaposition as parts of a space." That Mill himself did some groping in the deduction of this view of the critical philosophers is evident from a remarkable passage in his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (Vol. I, pp. 260-262), in which he says: "The theory which resolves Mind into a series of feelings has intrinsic difficulties. If we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series."

claims that the only non-miraculous or undogmatic explanation of our knowledge of nature is to be found in the view that the mind constructs nature in accordance with certain *a priori* ways of understanding. And it seems true enough that if dogmatism and miracle are to be excluded and if the *a priori* element in human knowledge is to be regarded as *absolutely a priori*, there is no logical way to avoid going at least as far in the direction of idealism as Kant does, and saying that mind as we know it in man constructs nature, even if it does not create it.\*

All phenomena, then, as knowable are subject *a priori* to rules, for example, changes in phenomena can be understood only when viewed as presupposing phenomena on which they follow according to rule † Rationality of form in connection with space and time gives knowledge of what is possible; connection with sensation is an indication of actuality; and the two together, rational form and empirical content, lead to what must of necessity be regarded as real by all rational minds.‡

What is known of the world, however, is the world of human experience, or, at most, of possible human experience, in so far as it has been constructed in rational perception and thought. The world as a completed whole in space and time is not an object of possible knowledge, simply because no such world is humanly experienced or experienceable.§ Similarly, the thinking, knowing self, the subject which is never object but always that to which objects are presented, since it only experiences and is never experienced, is unknowable. And finally the ultimate unity or totality of reality in a supposed Absolute, since it cannot come within the limits of human experience, is likewise unknowable.|| We have

\* For the theory that thought creates nature and does not merely construct it, see p 75 below, and for the theory that the *a priori* element in knowledge is not necessarily all absolutely *a priori*, but may be in part at least only relatively *a priori*, see p 215 n, and also the author's *The Problem of Knowledge*, Ch XVI

† Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Muller's translation, pp 114, 135

‡ *Ibid*, p 178

§ "No knowledge *a priori* is possible to us except of objects of possible experience only" (Muller's translation, p 766)

|| "We can never find in experience enough material to fill such a concept" (*Ibid*, p 500).

rational ideas of these supposed entities, the world, the self, and the Absolute, and we often find it convenient to make use of these ideas; but the ideas never lead us to experience of the things of which they are the ideas, as other ideas commonly do. As the navigator makes use of the stars as something to be guided by but never to be reached, so we find it possible to make only a regulative use of our ideas of the world, the self, and the Absolute. They are, indeed, the objects of a necessary question; but, being in-experienceable, they are not the objects of any possible knowledge.

Thus the practical upshot of the majority report of the spies is that we must go back to the wilderness and learn to live there. For the sceptical empiricism from which we sought escape, we are offered in exchange a critical agnosticism. We never experience the whole ultimate independent Reality, the Absolute, or any other transcendent God, and so we cannot know him. All the speculative "proofs" of the existence of God are nothing but manipulations of concepts void of empirical content, and can therefore give us no genuine knowledge.\* Once more, in religion and in metaphysics generally, we are forced to say,

" We have but faith, we cannot know,  
For knowledge is of things we see "—

that is, of phenomena

\* "The concept of an absolutely necessary Being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it. If in an identical judgment I reject the predicate and retain the subject, there arises a contradiction. But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction. To accept a triangle and yet to reject its three angles is contradictory, but there is no contradiction at all in admitting the non-existence of the triangle and of its three angles. The same applies to the concept of an absolutely necessary Being. Remove its existence, and you remove the thing itself, with all its predicates, so that a contradiction becomes impossible." "[The] principle that everything contingent must have a cause is valid in the world of sense only, and has not even a meaning outside it." "The physico-theological proof, baffled in its own undertaking, takes suddenly refuge in the cosmological proof, and thus is only the ontological proof in disguise" (*ibid.*, pp. 477, 479-80, 491, 506)

' We found that although we had thought of a tower that could reach to the sky, the supply of materials would suffice for a dwelling-house only, sufficiently roomy for all our business on the level plain of experience, and high enough to enable us to survey it and that the original bold undertaking could not but fail for want of materials, not to

This seems discouraging but when we turn to the recognized leader of the critical movement in philosophy, he has words of reassurance for us. He claims to know what he is about. "I destroyed knowledge," he makes bold to tell us, "I destroyed knowledge"—that is, metaphysical and religious knowledge—"in order to make room for faith." It turns out that what he means by this is, that he had to show that the claim to know and be able to prove either the existence or the non-existence of any such metaphysical entity as God, assumes the possibility of knowledge of independent Reality, whereas on the principles of the critical philosophy no such knowledge is possible; but that while we cannot know or prove anything in the transcendent realm, we may be justified, under certain conditions, in believing something about it—provided always that our belief be rational in form, for if not rational it is not permissible, even as a belief.

But is this anything more than we were already assured of on empirical grounds? Can we not go beyond mere possibility and claim actuality, or even necessity, for our religious beliefs? Not on theoretical grounds, Kant would say. And yet he does offer—and this is Kant's specific contribution to religion—a way of attaining to necessity and universality in the case of certain religious beliefs; only it is on practical, not theoretical grounds. Our religious faith may become adequately certain, he claims, if and in so far as it is based upon practical reason, or more particularly, on the rational moral ideal as a universally obligatory law. The moral ideal is imposed by the rational self upon itself as an unconditionally imperative law, as absolute as it could be if it were the direct command of God to the individual—more absolute, in fact, than it ever could be if imposed in any other way than through one's own rational will. The moral law of reason is, as such, as divine a revelation as any God could make it, and it is revelation of a divine Ideal, whether there be any metaphysically real God or not. It is what God wills, what God is, indeed—that

mention the confusion of tongues which inevitably divided the labourers in their views of the building, and scattered them over all the world, where each tried to erect his own building according to his own plan" (*ibid.*, p. 567).

is, if there be any God in the sense of a Power or Being worthy of our worship. We may be back in the wilderness of metaphysical agnosticism, but we are at Mount Sinai, where in the rational, universally valid moral ideal, with its categorical imperative, we hear the thunders of the Divine Law. As rational it must be universally valid; its principles must be such as can be made a universal law,\* and this plainly involves the obligation to treat every rational or potentially rational being always as an ultimate end, and never as a mere tool, or means. This is so because a rational ideal must be self-consistent, inwardly harmonious, and only the all-inclusive social ideal (as Hobhouse has so well shown in his book, *The Rational Good*) can be a principle of universal harmony. The principle of seeking values for one's self alone is a principle of disharmony, of conflict; it can never allow for self-sacrifice in the form of giving one's life for one's fellows. although this supreme sacrifice has sometimes been necessary for the highest well-being of humanity.

But in the rational moral law we have not only the Divine Reality in the sense of *what* God is, or, in other words, an Object to be worshipped by moral obedience; there is a rational basis, Kant would tell us, for the additional assertion *that* God is. In fact, in view of the unconditional imperative rationally attaching to the moral law, we are justified in asserting, not as theoretically proved or proveable, but as logically involved in the consciousness of an absolutely binding moral law, freedom and immortality as well as the existence of God. If I am under absolute unconditional obligation to act in accordance with a moral law, I must be free to do so; otherwise I should not be to blame for any wrongdoing. Scientific knowledge of man's moral freedom is impossible; but faith in such freedom is a universally necessary inference from the validity of the moral law. But since the moral ideal is absolutely binding and since the ideal of moral perfection can be made real only through an unending series of acts, an unending existence is imperative for everyone upon whom this ideal rests.

\* Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, T. K. Abbott's translation, p. 119.

as an obligation. Similarly, the moral certainty of unconditional imperativeness of an ideal requiring unending time for its full realization logically involves a morally certain inference that the ultimately determining Factor in reality is and will be sufficiently favourable to the absolute good of the human individual to provide for him that unending existence and opportunity, and whatever happiness may be essential to his realization of the highest good. That is, the categorical imperative of the moral law involves the existence of God as well as freedom and immortality.\* All three may be viewed either as moral certainties or as postulates, according as the absolutely binding character of the moral ideal is regarded as a moral certainty or as a postulate. But the difference here is not great. The postulate, being a moral postulate, carries with it the absolute imperative of the moral law. What the primacy of the practical reason means essentially in this connection is that moral need is absolute need. Whatever beliefs are truly needed as instrumental to moral need are absolutely needed; they must be rationally permissible, of course, but within the limits of the rationally possible, our theories must conform to moral necessity. This is not to act upon the more than dubious assumption that whatever seems practically good in the way of belief is to be regarded as true. It means that the absolutely Good is, in a certain definite way, a guide to the true—specifically, to the truths of freedom, God, and eternal life.

Thus even if we may be, theoretically speaking, in the wilderness, we are not without a religious *modus vivendi*. Not only have we been to Mount Sinai and received the moral law as an absolute or divine imperative; we have been provided with a tabernacle, a tent of meeting for the worship of God in the wilderness of agnosticism. We have found reason to include in our moral certainties the existence of a supreme cosmic Power securing for us unending opportunity to realize progressively the absolute moral ideal, or, in other words, a God who will always, in spite of anything that can happen, guarantee us further opportunity to

\* See Kant's *Theory of Ethics* (Abbott), pp. 87-91, 220-21, 230



obey the moral law. In this it is involved that the moral law is God's law. On the basis of morality, as self-devotion to the moral law, we may have religion, as self-devotion to the moral Law-giver. This may not be all that there is for us in religion, but doing one's duty as the will of God, or as if it were the will of a morally perfect Divine Friend, is surely a part of what religion ought to be.

In his book on *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*—a book which has not always been given the attention it deserves, I think—Kant offers a sympathetic but critical re-interpretation of the religion he inherited from his fathers. His aim is to exhibit the rational essence of traditional dogma. From this point of view nothing irrational can be admitted to be revelation. The intimate relation of religion to morality, in Kant's view, we have already indicated. For him, as morality is based on reason, so religion is based on morality, not morality on religion. The moral consciousness is autonomous. But while morality is subjection of the will to the moral law, apart from any question as to whose law the moral ideal may be, religion is subjection of the will to a moral Law-giver, the recognition of duties as divine commands. Or better, religion includes both piety and virtue, that is, reverence for the moral law, as of God, and obedience to that law. Speculative proof of God's existence is not essential for religion, but the idea of God, together with the possibility of his existence, is essential. To the believer in the God of the moral law, every duty becomes a religious obligation, and the joyful discharge of duty the test of real piety.

This emphasis upon morality is made the determining factor in working out the details of Kant's theology. If an article of faith or anything else in traditional religion has no meaning for the moral life, he considers that it has no place in a rational religion. Nothing not moral can be allowed to be revelation. We are not to say that whatever God commands (according to tradition) is right, but that whatever is right (according to reason) God commands.

In undertaking a reinterpretation of the doctrine of sin Kant takes the position that while there is in human nature a principle of good, in the idea of the moral law and the reverence felt for it, there is also in man a principle of evil, a bias toward sin. Even in the midst of many deeds which are in themselves good, the man who does them is fundamentally evil so long as his primary motive in doing his good deeds is not reverence for the moral law. If an individual provides for occasional departures from the perfect standard of rectitude, there is in him something inherently evil. The natural bias to evil is seen in the proneness of the natural man to invert the right relation between moral law and human desire. Whereas desire should be subordinated to the moral law, there is a natural tendency to allow desire to usurp dominion over the life. It remains an insoluble problem why there should be in the natural man this evil bias, why one who is rational enough to recognize the absolute imperative of the moral law and to reverence it as divine, should also be irrational enough to allow desire rather than the moral law to dominate his life. In other words, the ultimate ground of evil choice is for Kant an inscrutable mystery.

As for salvation, there can be no such thing apart from good character. What the sinner needs is a renovation of his reverence for the moral law, so that it shall become his sincere intention to fulfil all duty. The change from a sinful life to one governed by the moral law can be accomplished only by a new birth; the new life is a new creation. When it becomes a man's one fundamental motive to do his duty, he is regenerated, and then alone is he morally good. When this purity of principle is chosen there begins an endless progression toward the complete embodiment of the moral law in the life and disposition of the individual, so that while in one sense a man is saved at the time of his moral renovation, in another sense he is then only beginning to experience a progressive salvation. Good and evil do not gradually merge into each other, but are disjoined by an immeasurable gulf; hence the distance to be traversed in quitting evil and attaining to good

is infinite. As the moral penalty of transgression has a sight-outrunning duration, so also has the process of elimination of evil from the life and disposition. Thus the idea of finality of destiny has value as a regulative idea only

But in this work of salvation man is not a passive recipient. Just because the only real salvation is moral salvation, it is necessary that in it the man himself be the agent. No man can be made good but by his own act. Any help he may receive toward such an act becomes effective only as he chooses to accept the help. If he is forgiven anything, he must choose to fulfil the conditions of being forgiven. For a man to make the moral law the supreme motive is to create for himself an essentially good character; in other words to be saved. Hence in the last analysis according to Kant—and the religious consciousness may hesitate to follow him here—man is his own saviour.

It is true that such reintegration of character is incomprehensible. As inexplicable as the original lapse into evil is the conversion to good of one who is radically bad. Character expresses itself in the choice of motives; how then can one who is morally bad express himself in a choice of the moral law as the ruling principle of his life? The source of self-conversion, like the source of moral evil, is to be found in an incomprehensible act of freedom.

But while reintegration of character is incomprehensible, it is by no means impossible. The sinner is left without excuse, for the categorical imperative, Thou shalt become a better man, carries with it the implication, Thou canst. We may not be able to eradicate the evil bias, but we can overcome it. It is not necessary to know what God may have done, what he is now doing or what he may yet do for our salvation; it is only necessary that we know what *we* have to do, and that is to surrender to the moral law of reason, to know our duty and to do it.

Moreover, while the change from a sinful life to one governed by the moral law requires what may be regarded as a new birth, an act or process which is incomprehensible, there may still be a process of events gradually leading up to this change. And the

best means of vividly awakening a true appreciation of the moral ideal of humanity and thus producing the regeneration of the life so far as its principle is concerned, is to present to the imagination the concrete ideal of humanity, the Son-of-God ideal. As Kant conceives it, this Son-of-God idea is not that against which the Mohammedan so forcibly objects. It involves no departure from strict monotheism. It is a conception to which no legends of a supernatural birth can add anything. It is only necessary that the Son-of-God ideal be of one who is Godlike-minded; it is not necessary that he be more than man; in fact he must be thoroughly human, if he is to be our exemplar. The Son of God is the ideal of moral perfection, and faith in the Son of God is accepting this ideal. Even the question as to whether the eternal ideal was embodied in the historic Jesus, is left by Kant as one with regard to which absolute certainty is neither attainable nor necessary. The opinion is a defensible one, in the light of such evidence as we have, that Jesus did give objective embodiment to the true moral ideal; but the object of saving faith is not the historical Jesus but the Christ-ideal. No reason can be given, on Kantian principles, why the Son-of-God ideal should not be, or have been, embodied in more than one historic, human "Son of God"; but as the Ideal of moral reason, it is essentially one and universal. This Son-of-God ideal, this true moral Ideal of humanity, when received into the heart of man, brings regeneration.

The reception of the Son-of-God ideal into the heart brings justification also, but only because it brings regeneration. Any thought of transferable guilt and a superfluous, transferable merit is a delusive fiction. The new regenerate man suffers vicariously for the sins of the old man; punishment of past sins is given in reintegrating the character. But nothing could be admitted as a true gospel of divine grace and justification by faith that does not accord with absolute morality. None but the morally regenerate are justified. This justification of the regenerate is gracious, however, as well as just. At no stage in his career is man perfect;

but though the details of his life may be imperfect, a practical faith in the Christ-ideal and an honest striving to realize it win the approval of God. Justification is being held to be what we are about to become, it is viewing the phenomenal from a point of view transcending time and change.

In a way that is reminiscent of the "state of nature" of the political theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, Kant speaks of an ethical state of nature in which envy, ambition, and avarice are developed out of social conflict and corrupt the character of individuals. The only way of effectively providing against this result is "to be found in an ethical commonwealth or "empire of virtue," "a union of men to guard against evil and to further good." Such a community would be a human brotherhood under a divine Fatherhood, and might well be called the Kingdom of God on earth. In its ideal form, however, it is not immediately realizable by man. Various attempts to approximate this ideal, none of them as successful as we could wish, have been made in and through the institutions and activities of organized religion.

Kant's doctrine of prayer and the means of grace calls for special mention. Grace is God's supplying anything which may be needed for our salvation but which may lie beyond our power; the primary means of grace, therefore, is the earnest endeavour to do our best. Any action in itself non-moral, such as ritual acts and even private and public prayer, can serve as means of grace only indirectly, that is, by promoting the good will. To seek justification by external rites, or by anything but morality, is superstition. There is in religion as it exists, Kant thinks, altogether too much "pious drivelling and doing nothing." Deedless wishes called prayers cannot compensate for deliberate transgressions. If we were what we ought to be, the universe would obey our wishes, for we should then wish only as we ought. True prayer is not wishing our own desires, even in the presence of God; it is willing God's will; it is an expression of the heart's desire to be well-pleasing to a morally perfect God. Private and public devotional exercises are valuable in so far as they help

ourselves and other people to will and do God's will. Verbal private prayer has served its chief purpose when it has made the prayer-spirit habitual.

There is much in Kant's interpretation of religion which has, I think, permanent validity. Our sojourn in the wilderness will have served us well if it impresses indelibly upon our minds the indispensableness of the moral element in religion. We have found something to take with us into the promised land, if we should ever succeed in getting there.

But there are certain inadequacies in the Kantian view which must be noted. One of the most outstanding of these defects is the failure to recognize the value of worshipful, more or less mystical communion with God, as one of the ultimate ends of life, a distinct element in the spiritual ideal. Religion, when it is vital, moral, and reasonable, is an indispensable means to the highest possible development of morality, and this in itself is enough to give it absolute value; but it is also of absolute value as an end. It is not a mere means, even to so absolute an end as morality.

Another defect of the Kantian position is that when it postulates on moral grounds the necessity of God's existence, it does not go deep enough. Our most immediate moral need of God is not to give us continued opportunity after death to keep on working toward the realization of the moral ideal; still less is it as Kant sometimes seems to say, to make the virtuous adequately happy in a future life. Our most immediate moral need of God is our need of moral salvation, our need of that reinforcement of the good will which can come through religious experience at its best. If the highest possible realization of the moral ideal here and now is absolutely imperative, and if the highest moral achievement with the aid of religion at its best is higher, other things being equal, than the highest moral achievement without it, then moral religion is absolutely imperative, and so is what it necessarily presupposes, namely, the existence of the God of moral salvation.

Kant was probably kept from developing this phase of the moral argument for postulating the existence of God by the fact that while he rightly saw that there can be no moral salvation of man except as it is accomplished in and through the choice and activity of man's own will, his metaphysical agnosticism kept him from developing any theory as to how God can be immanent in, or can operate through, the will of man as a morally free agent. As a consequence he had to content himself with what must seem to religion in its most characteristic forms a half-truth at best, namely, the doctrine that man must be his own saviour. While the moral consciousness is right in insisting that there is no real salvation which is not, or does not include, moral salvation, it is a fundamental tenet of all the most vital experimental religion that it is God who is the Saviour of man.

Kant's own recognition of this defect in his interpretation of religion takes the form of an acknowledgment that there are certain mysteries of religion of which we can find no solution, save a relative and practical one. Specifically, there are insoluble mysteries in connection with the nature of God and with his relation to man. as, for instance, how God can create a free being; how he can give this free being the power, when corrupted, to return to God; and how it is that this change should take place in some and not in others. With regard to the second of these three specified mysteries, that is, how God could give a sinful free being power to will the moral law, Kant's difficulty lay in the fact that from his point of view the idea of God's moral salvation of man seemed to contradict that which is the presupposition of all human morality, namely, the moral autonomy of man.

No doubt there is a real problem here, but the special difficulty felt by Kant at this point only serves to accentuate what is keenly felt by many minds on other grounds, namely, that there is a very real religious need to transcend the dualistic agnosticism of the Kantian philosophical position. Kant may be right enough in making a rather sharp distinction between ordinary scientific knowledge and religious faith; there are great and important

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differences between religious experience and ordinary sense-perception. But the distinction as made by Kant is in large part a reflection of his conclusion that no religious judgments can be verified in experience, for the reason that the God we postulate is so purely transcendent as to be unexperienceable and therefore, strictly speaking, unknowable. The view is one with which very many of those who are positively interested in religion would probably agree ; it accords with the majority report of the spies sent out to investigate the prospects of a successful invasion of the promised land. But have not some of the spies reported that we are well able to enter into the land and take possession of it? May it not be well for us to look into that question again? It is not always true that the voice of the majority is the voice of God.



## V THE PROMISED LAND · RATIONAL IDEALISM AND SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY.

The contributions of the wilderness sojourn to the life of an independent spiritual faith have been very important, particularly in the latter phase of the journey, that of the Kantian critical philosophy. But this is no reason why we should not undertake to eliminate, if possible, certain defects of the Kantian mode of expressing the religious consciousness. In particular, we seem called upon to attempt to overcome the agnostic limitation of knowledge to the realm of phenomena, or possible sense-experience. Kant has been our Moses, but he cannot lead us into the land of promise. We are again concerned with the question as to whether religious faith, with the moral values which have come into its possession, may not be able to emerge from the wilderness of theoretical doubt and enter into and take possession of the promised land of an assured and rational knowledge of God as the ultimate Reality with which religion has to do. Was it not reported by some, albeit a minority, of those who went to spy out the land, "Let us go up at once and possess it, for we are well able to overcome it?" What if it should turn out that they were right after all?

On Kantian principles knowledge is confined to the realm of possible experience. Just what does, or should, "possible experience" mean? Does modern science, with Kant as its sponsor, confine its statements to what either has been or actually can be experienced by human beings? Was what it tells us about the early geological ages, for instance, ever experienced by man? Is it any longer possible to experience these facts of pre-history? And yet do they not enter into scientific knowledge? Does not the scientist, on the basis of what has been experienced, tell us much of things and events of which no man will ever find it possible to get direct experience? Not to speak as yet of religious experience,

or of what knowledge of religious Reality it may make accessible, is not the Kantian position with reference to knowledge and experience in general one of unstable equilibrium between that of Hume on one side and that of Hegel on the other? If we are justified in contradicting, with Kant, the sceptical doctrine of Hume, and maintaining that the unexperienced but hypothetically experienceable is partially knowable *a priori*, may we not be justified in venturing still further and maintaining that, on the basis of experience as interpreted by rational mind, it may be possible to build a genuine theoretical knowledge of that *ultimate* Reality of which religion desires assurance?\*

Hegel and his followers have been dissatisfied with the limited idealism of Kant, according to which mind only constructs nature out of given material, instead of creating it. In their opinion there is room for an absolute idealism as a fourth alternative to the Humian pure empiricism, the Kantian critical agnosticism, and the pre-Kantian rationalistic dogmatism with its notion of a seemingly miraculous, divinely pre-established harmony between absolutely *a priori* ideas and independent reality. This fourth alternative is the view that mind not only constructs but creates nature. It is, of course, Absolute Mind, or Absolute Thought, which is regarded as creating nature; but it is held that this Absolute Mind has been communicating itself in principle throughout the course of the evolution of Reason in the objective order, and is always communicating itself subjectively to finite minds, so that the validity of finite minds' knowledge is easily accounted for. In so far as the finite mind is rational, reality and knowledge are being created in it by Absolute Mind.

If, then, we will be "strong and very courageous," with Hegel as our Joshua, it would seem that a way may be found to depart from the wilderness region of negation and theoretical

\* Compare what Nettleship says of T. H. Green: "While the whole of his metaphysic might be said to be little more than a prolonged attempt to get to the bottom of the question, 'What is a fact of experience?' an occasional remark shows that in his mind this apparently simple question involved that of the nature of the world and of God" (Green's *Works*, Vol. III, p. lxxvi.)

doubt, which surely can never be our permanent goal and place of rest. A conquering faith, we see, must be boldly rational, and a rational faith will have faith in reason. As Israel of the legend entered into the promised land only by continually advancing, no matter what the difficulties or threatening dangers of the way, so if our faith would achieve a rational knowledge of its Object, it must keep right on investigating and thinking "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational."\* This is the magic

\* Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, Eng trans by Dyce, p 227n Compare with Hegel's famous maxim these statements of the rationalistic principle by acknowledged Hegelians

"The only way in which philosophy can prove its rights is by philosophizing. You cannot enter on the criticism of the instrument of thought without taking for granted, at least, its adequacy for the work of self-criticism. Is it possible for intelligence to imagine or conceive of such a thing as a reality which is not a thinkable, intelligible reality? All science starts with the tacit assumption that nature is intelligible. [In philosophy] too, the presupposition is that the world of mind is an intelligible world, that thought or reason will find itself—the hidden presence of rational relations, of an objective reason—in the facts and events it contemplates" (John Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, 1904 edition, pp 4, 20, 22)

"No fact, which is in its nature incapable of being explained or reduced to law can be admitted to exist in the intelligible universe. This principle may be said to be incapable of proof, since a proof of it would already presuppose it. But a disproof would do so equally. The self-contradiction of absolute scepticism makes us conscious of the unity of thought and things, of being and knowing, as an ultimate truth, which yet is not an assumption, because all belief and unbelief, all assertion and denial, alike presuppose it" (Edward Caird, *Hegel*, p 141) "If philosophy is incapable of a universal synthesis, it cannot make any synthesis at all. If we cannot know God, we cannot know anything" (Edward Caird, *Essays on Literature and Philosophy* Vol I, pp 205, 206)

"The faith by which we live and work and occasionally think is faith in the rationality of the universe" (D G Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, p 226)

"[My] philosophical creed. I have called Speculative Idealism, the doctrine that we are capable of knowing Reality as it actually is, and that Reality when so known is absolutely rational. If [man] cannot know God he can know nothing" (John Watson, *In Outline of Philosophy*, 1898, pp vi, 295) "If the universe is not intelligible, no possible intelligence can comprehend it, if there exists any intelligence whatever, the universe must be intelligible" "Grant that the universe is rational or intelligible, and that in man as an intelligence this rationality or intelligible reality is capable of being grasped, and it cannot be denied that the system of thought is at the same time the system of things. We must not think of the categories of thought as forms of *our* thought, which may be externally imposed upon an alien matter, supplied to us independently of thought" (John Watson, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, 1912, Vol I, pp. 74, 294).

wand which must go before us and remove all obstacles from our path. In this sign we shall conquer. This being our symbol we may tread with assurance the high and dry *a priori* road. The waters of Jordan will divide as we step into them, and the walls of Jericho, as we march about them, will ultimately fall down flat.

Followers of Hegel like to start with the assumption of the possibility of knowledge, an assumption which seems reasonable enough in view of the fact that we cannot even contradict the proposition that knowledge is possible, without implicitly assuming that enough knowledge is possible to justify that negative judgment. But with the possibility of knowledge granted, members of the Hegelian school have claimed to be able to show that Absolute Reality is one all-inclusive rational conscious Experience or Mind. In direct opposition to Mansel and Spencer, who defined the Absolute as that which stands in no necessary relation to anything, thus making the conclusion unavoidable that the Absolute is unknowable, since in order to be known it would have to stand in the relation of object to a knowing subject,\* these Hegelian thinkers have insisted on the right to conceive Absolute Reality in such a way as to make it essentially knowable. If the "Thing-in-Itself" is consciousness, it ceases to be unknowable. More explicitly, if we can maintain that Reality is one all-inclusive rational consciousness of whose cognitive life our rational interpretations of experience form a phase or part, we can infer not only that the Absolute is essentially knowable, but also that it is actually known by us, in part and progressively, in all our conscious experience and rational thought. There is consequently a concerted effort to defend the view that Reality is such an all-inclusive rational Experience, particularly as the all-inclusive rational Experience or Mind is commonly identified with God. Some of the arguments are of the deductive type, as when it is maintained that reality as intelligible must be rational, and that as rational it must be a systematic organization of experience, or in other words, a unity of mind. "An intelligible system," it

\* H. Mansel, *The Limits of Religious Thought*, H. Spencer, *First Principles*

is argued, "necessarily implies an intelligence that is capable of grasping the system."\*

Thought is a relating activity; new relations are established by thought, why then should not these relations established by thought be taken as a fair sample of all relations? But if relations are the work of mind, and nature is "a single, all-inclusive system of relations," are we not entitled to infer that the uniform order of nature is the work of a single spiritual principle or intelligence in nature which constitutes the system of relations by eternally holding plurality in unity?† Knowledge of reality is by means of a system of ideas; but how can we know by means of ideas anything which is not itself essentially idea? Thus, according to the Hegelian rational idealism, "thought is things and things are thought,"‡ reality is truth, a coherent system of ideas or thought-constructs;§ the object, whether a particular thing or the universe as a whole, has its existence only for and in the consciousness of a subject.||

The most characteristic arguments which support this monistic form of idealism are dialectical in form. In opposition to

\* J. Watson, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol. I, p. 74

† T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sections 20, 21, 28, 29, 33

‡ Green, *Works*, III, p. 111

§ "The central or cardinal point of idealism is its refusal to be kept standing at a fixed disruption between Subject and Object, between Spirit and Nature. Its *Idea* is the identity or unity of both." "This completed unity in which all things receive their entirety and become adequate, is their Truth, and that Truth, as known in religious language, is God. Rightly or wrongly, God is thus interpreted in the *Logic* of Hegel." (W. Wallace, *Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel*, pp. 35, 193)

|| "No object can be conceived as existing except in relation to a thinking subject. In thinking myself, my own individual consciousness and an outward world of objects, I at the same time tacitly think or presuppose a higher, wider, more comprehensive thought or consciousness which embraces and is the unity of both." (J. Caird, *Introduction*, pp. 118, 149) "It [is] impossible to reduce the subject to a *mere* object among other objects," and it is equally "impossible to reduce the object to a *mere* phase in the life of the subject. Each of them presupposes the other, and therefore neither can be regarded as producing the other. Hence we are compelled to think of them both as rooted in a still higher principle, which is at once the source of their relatively independent existence and the all-embracing unity that limits their independence." Such a principle is found in the idea of "an absolute unity, which transcends the opposition of subject and object." (E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion* I, pp. 64-68)

the principles of formal logic, for which truth is to be found on one side of a logical contradiction and not on the other, for Hegel the truth is to be found by synthesising in a more adequate concept the propositions on both sides of the real or supposed contradictions which arise in the course of thought. One such dialectical argument for absolute idealism consists in showing it to be the synthesis of natural realism and subjective idealism. According to natural realism the entire object of sense-perception, colours, sounds, and other sense-qualities included, is independently real, while according to subjective idealism it is a dependent content of the subject's conscious experience, and each of these mutually contradictory propositions is supported by strong arguments. But from the point of view of absolute or objective idealism the enemies are reconcilable; the physical object, while real independently of human consciousness, is dependent for its existence upon the Absolute Consciousness, and the solution of this antinomy is considered to be a weighty consideration in favor of the Hegelian objective idealism.\*

Another dialectical argument for absolute idealism consists in showing it to be a synthesis of the subjective or psychological idealism of the Berkeleyan or Human type with the abstract but more objective idealism of the Platonic type. The real is content of subjective consciousness, rational in form and therefore universally valid. It is a union of the rational with the empirical, of the logical idea with the psychological idea, of the abstract universal with the concrete particular in the Concrete Universal. Or, as described by one of its advocates, this speculative idealism is "neither subjective nor objective, but both as well as neither, and something more than either"†

\* Interesting but variant forms of this dialectical argument may be found in J. Royce's synthesis of "intentional" and "external meaning" (*The World and the Individual*, I, *passim*), and W. E. Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. For a criticism of these arguments, see the author's discussion in *The Problem of Knowledge*, pp. 142-4, 163ff., and *Philos. Rev.*, Jan., 1914, pp. 29-32.

† Compare W. Wallace, *Prolegomena*, p. 158. "'Ideas' in the Hegelian sense [are] neither merely objective nor merely subjective, but both at once." "As Aristotle—with considerable assistance from Plato—made explicit the abstract universal that was

It is also possible to regard absolute idealism as a "higher synthesis" in still other connections. As claiming rational knowledge of ultimate reality it may be viewed as the synthesis of certain elements of dogmatic traditionalism and sceptical empiricism respectively. Whereas traditionalism is characterized by uncritical belief, and empiricism—many times, at least—by critical unbelief, rational idealism claims to exemplify critical belief. Again, the Hegelian idealism may be regarded as reconstruction after the Kantian destruction of the pre-Kantian theistic construction. The older theism undertook to prove the existence of a *transcendent* God. The Kantian criticism maintained that the only tenable position with reference to such a Being, theoretically speaking, is agnosticism. The Hegelians claim to have brought forth an adequate theoretical vindication of belief in God as *immanent* in nature and in man.

Among the special arguments for absolute or speculative idealism there is one which recurs time after time in varied forms. This is the argument to the effect that we cannot be aware of a

implicit in Socrates, so Hegel—with less considerable assistance from Fichte and Schelling—made explicit the concrete universal that was implicit in Kant." "The Concrete Notion is the Secret of Hegel" (J. H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel*, pp. xi, xxi, lxi, lxx, 1865 edn.) The psychological idealism involved in absolute idealism is sometimes stressed, as in these words of Ritchie: "Matter and motion are only known to us as forms of consciousness" (*Phil. Studies*, p. 25). More commonly, however, while the doctrine of subjective idealism, that the object is idea in the psychological sense, is assumed to be essentially valid though inadequate, the emphasis is placed upon the logical or universal idea, as, e.g. in Haldane's insistence that the core of all contents of experience, even of sensations, is *intelligi*, and that even the most immediate contents of consciousness are permeated through and through by the universals of thought (*The Pathway to Reality*, Vol. I, Lect. IV).

In the following passage from Bosanquet both sides are equally stressed: "The whole world, for each of us, is our course of consciousness, in so far as this is regarded as a system of objects which we are obliged to think" (*Essentials of Logic*, p. 14).

One further dialectical argument for an idealism of the general type under consideration is that which has been suggested recently by Prof. J. S. Mackenzie. Pointing out that it is difficult for us to think of value as purely objective, attaching simply to things, or as purely subjective, belonging simply to our attitude toward things, the author concludes that value must be ultimately both objective and subjective, as becomes possible when they are interpreted in the light of an objective Spiritual Principle, as being valid for an Absolute Subject (*Ultimate Values in the Light of Contemporary Thought, passim*).

limit without having in thought transcended that limit, so that the self must be potentially, and in its true nature, from the eternal point of view, absolute and infinite. In other words, knowledge of our own imperfection, implies, it is held, the reality of the Perfect or Ideal Self \*

Of special interest are the various forms this argument takes in the writings of Josiah Royce. All knowledge or ignorance or erroneous thought is of something experienced and something complete, and therefore, it is argued, a complete experience. If I believe that my idea is true, or even if I am aware that I am ignorant, or that I am possibly in error—and I must judge in one of these ways about my own ideas—I necessarily presuppose the reality of a whole of truth about reality. For this whole truth to be fully

\* "If I know that my knowledge is limited, I must also know something of what is beyond the limit. If we are conscious that the facts and laws that constitute what we call science are manifestations of absolute realities, it must be because our intelligence in some way comprehends both spheres" (J. Watson, *Outline of Philosophy*, p. 36)

"Our minds, just because we know them finite, cannot be merely finite. That which is altogether limited cannot know itself as limited. We are finite and infinite in one. Our knowledge is imperfect and we know that it is imperfect, i.e., we have a standard or ideal of perfection by which we judge our progress in attaining truth. The self-consciousness which we find to be presupposed in all knowledge, we yet cannot fully know. We cannot, so to speak, get beyond it. It is there, we know it must be there, and yet it is not there. The cosmos we presuppose we yet only gradually come to know (The Universal Self does not reach full consciousness in us). God only gradually comes to himself in man" (D. G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, p. 235)

T. H. Green's position is succinctly stated by Benn. "To be conscious at all is to have a succession of ideas, conceived as successive, and this, according to Green, implies being above succession, which is to be out of time, to be eternal" (*History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. II, p. 405, Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sections 55-65)

"The distinction between the ideal and the actual is one which is made by thought, and which therefore thought can transcend—nay, in the very act of making it, has already transcended. In the very distinction is pre-supposed the identity that is beyond the distinction. We have that in our nature, as conscious spiritual beings, which constitutes a potential infinitude. In other words, when we examine into the real significance of the rational and spiritual nature and life of man, we find that it involves what is virtually the consciousness of God and of our essential relation to Him." "The knowledge of a limit involves a virtual, and in some sense an actual transcendence of it. It is our implicit or virtual knowledge of God which alone gives reality to our partial knowledge and makes us divine that it is partial." "Nothing that is absolutely inscrutable to reason can be made known to faith" (J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 73, 115-118)



set forth in a series of judgments in time, an infinite succession of events would be required. But in view of the fact that that by which I judge any statement to be true or false is not only truth but reality, we are led to substitute for the "false infinite" of an actually infinite series in time the true infinite of a "self-representative system" transcending time, but infinitely potential so far as its self-expression in time is concerned. This is that Absolute Experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest thought can rationally conceive as genuinely possible \*

The Hegelian argument for absolute idealism is commonly regarded as a version of the ontological argument for the existence of God, and the distinguishing mark of the ontological argument is the attempt to prove the existence of God from the idea of God. Now in absolute idealism God is identified with the Absolute, viewed as an all-inclusive Reality, and it can scarcely be denied that all-inclusive Reality exists. If, then, we maintain, as the Hegelians claim we may, and that to be logical we must, that all-inclusive Reality is an all-inclusive Experience, or Consciousness, or Mind, it follows that such an Absolute Mind, or conscious Experience, exists. Or, to state the position differently, on the principle that what is real is rational and what is rational is real, it can be asserted that the Absolutely Real is rational, and

*The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Ch. XI, *The Conception of God*, pp. 15-44, *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 105-116, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, Supplementary Essay, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, Lecture VII, *William James and Other Essays*, Essay IV. The Roycean argument is stated thus by Carl S. Patton: "There must be such a thing as truth, otherwise there is no such thing as error, and all distinctions between things that are and things that are not fall away. If nothing is true, then the very statement that nothing is true is itself false, and therefore something must be true. In other words, the idea of truth, and the conviction that something is true, are involved in the very attempt to deny them."

"What we really mean when we say that something is true, is that the statement we make can be verified in our own experience or in the experience of other persons. If then, there is anything that is true, not merely for you and me, but in itself and for all competent intelligences, if there is any absolute or permanent truth, this can only be because there is an absolute or infinite spirit or mind, by agreement or disagreement with whose experiences or insight every particular statement that can be made is either true or false. Without the existence of such a mind or spirit, truth and error are alike impossible." ("The New Theism," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. V, 1906-7, pp. 366-8).

the Absolutely Rational, or God, is real. Thus, in the words of Edward Caird, idealism is the real meaning of the ontological argument, since that argument points to "the ultimate unity of thought and Being which is at once the presupposition and the end of all knowledge."\*

In appreciation of absolute idealism it may be said, to begin with, that it is, if valid, a positive solution of the problem of knowledge. Reality, it holds, is immediately experienced and

\* *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 1889, Vol II, pp 123, 128 "We have on the one side the notion of God, and on the other Being as opposed to the Notion. What accordingly is demanded is the reconciliation of the two in such a way that the Notion will force itself to take on the form of Being, or that the nature of Being will be deduced from the Notion and the Other. The form in which this mediation appears is that of the Ontological Proof of the existence of God, in which we start from the Notion. The Notion of God is the most real of all things: it is all reality. All that really remains outside of it is a dead abstraction. The thought that God is the substance of all reality, and consequently contains Being as well, is perfectly correct. Being is such a poor characteristic or quality that it directly attaches to the Notion. Being is contained in the Notion" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., Vol II, pp 352-4) "The conception or Notion of God implies that He is the Substance of all realities, the most real Essence. But Being also is reality, therefore Being belongs to Him" (*ibid*, Vol III, p 354) "The Notion of God, is, involves Being also" (*Ibid*, p 357) "This inseparableness of Notion and Being is found in an absolute form only in the case of God" (*ibid*, 358) "The Notion of God is identical with Being. Being is the poorest of all abstractions, but the Notion is not so poor as not to contain this determination of it" (*ibid*, p 365)

John Caird says the same thing in different words: "The true meaning of the ontological proof is that our whole conscious life is based on a universal self-consciousness, an absolute spiritual life." "In thinking myself, my own individual consciousness and an outward world of objects, I at the same time tacitly think or presuppose a higher consciousness which embraces and is the unity of both." (*Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp 149, 150) Compare A. E. Taylor's statement: "The ontological proof appears, in any sense in which it is not fallacious, to amount merely to the principle that significant thought gives us genuine knowledge, and therefore, since the thorough-going individuality of structure of its object is presupposed in all significant thought, Reality must be a perfect individual. If by 'God' we mean anything less than the Absolute whole, the ontological proof ceases to have any cogency" (*Elements of Metaphysics*, 1907, p 403)

W. E. Hocking, while presenting the ontological argument in more empirical form than is commonly done, and insisting that in its true form the argument is "a report of experience," maintains that "this same ontological argument is the only proof of God" (*The Meaning of God in Human Experience* 1912, pp 307, 312). For a critical evaluation of Hocking's thought in this connection, see the author's article, "Hocking's Philosophy of Religion," *Philosophical Review*, Jan., 1914, and *The Problem of Knowledge*, Ch. VIII.

progressively known by means of rational interpretation of the content of experience. It offers, therefore, rational conceptual knowledge of what religion can give only in the form of imaginative representation and mere belief. It marks an improvement upon religion, both in the truth-content of its ideas and in the certainty of its knowledge. At least this is its claim. For Hegel, philosophy is the truth of religion, that is, it preserves its true essence and demonstrates its essential truth. "Philosophy seeks to apprehend in reasoned knowledge the same truth which the religious mind has in its faith."\*

Probably no member of the British Hegelian school was more pronounced in his interpretation of the Hegelian speculative idealism as simply the conceptual form of what religion presents less adequately and less certainly in terms of imagination and feeling, than J. Hutchison Stirling, the pioneer of the movement. "I have in the *Begriff* what the ordinary man has in the *Vorstellung*," he wrote in a letter to a friend †. Or, as he elsewhere explains this statement, "What they have *positively* in the feeling, or *positively* in the understanding, or *positively* in a union of both,

\* W. Wallace *Prolegomena to Hegel's Logic*, p. 31. To give Hegel's own words, "The object of religion as well as of philosophy is eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication of God. Philosophy is knowledge of that which is eternal, of what God is, and what flows out of his nature. Philosophy, therefore, only unfolds itself when it unfolds religion, and in unfolding itself it unfolds religion. As thus occupied with eternal truth it is the same kind of activity as religion is. Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship." "Das Denken ist auch Gottesdienst." "Philosophy is identical with religion, but the distinction is that it is so in a peculiar manner. What they have in common is that they are religion, what distinguishes them from each other is merely the kind of religion which we find in each." (*Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., I, pp. 19, 20). "Religion is consciousness of the absolute truth, of Truth as the Universal, the All-Comprehending, outside of which there lies nothing at all. Religion is this speculative element in the form of a state of consciousness, of which the objects are not simple qualities of thought, but are concretely filled up." (*ibid.*, pp. 22, 23). "It is the nature of the understanding to stick to the finite even when it is dealing with the Infinite itself." "The teaching of Christ taken by itself belongs to the world of ordinary figurative ideas only." (*Philosophy of Religion*, III, pp. 19, 85). "What was initiated by Luther as faith in feeling and the witness of the Spirit, the more mature mind strives to apprehend in conception." (*Phil. of Right*, Dyde's trans., p. xxix).

† James Hutchison Stirling *His Life and Work*, by A. H. Stirling, p. 319.

I have reflectively, or ideally, or speculatively, in reason."\*  
 "The Secret of Hegel," the Concrete Universal, or Notion, to Stirling "the essential diamond of the universe," restores to us, he is sure, the entire content of traditional religion, "all that the Illumination has deprived us of,—and that, too, in a higher and richer form" than it had when it was mere faith.†

\* *Philosophy and Theology*, p 11

† *The Secret of Hegel*, 1865 edition, pp 141, 142 "Religion is not confined to the humble, only, and never was there a time in the history of humanity when the proud heart longed more ardently than now to lay itself down in peace and trust within the sanctuary of religion, an offering to God. Now for these latter is it that religion—since the *Aufklärung*—must appeal to philosophy. And just to fulfil this function was it that Kant and Hegel specially came. The former, breathing ever the sincerest reverence for Christianity, had no object during his long life but the demonstration to himself and others of the existence of God, the freedom of the Will, and the immortality of the Soul. The latter followed in the same cause, and, in addition to the reconstruction of the truths of natural religion, sought to reconcile to philosophy Christianity itself. (*Secret of Hegel*, p 166)

Of T. H. Green, Nettleship says, "In the creeds of modern liberalism and modern evangelicalism he found a congenial language, which he had no difficulty in translating when he wished into that of German metaphysics" (Green, *Works*, III, p 29). Green himself says, "The Christian dogma must be retained in its completeness, but it must be transformed into a philosophy" (*ibid*, p 182). "All religion consists in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of imagination" (*ibid*, p 219).

John Caird puts special emphasis upon this idea of religion in relation to speculative philosophy. Religious knowledge, as knowledge involved in feeling, he regards as "only implicit or virtual knowledge," it must become philosophical, speculative, before it truly deserves the name of knowledge. Still, "religion and philosophy have common objects and a common content," and it is because religion is implicitly rational that its content can be expressed in a true philosophy. Religion is knowledge "couched in the forms of feeling, of immediate perception, of representations which are not absolute truth, but truth strained through finite images and materialised conceptions." But what such representations contain, though only implicitly and in undeveloped form, is rational thought (*Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp 2, 3, 41, 72. Cf. Ch VII, "Inadequacy of Religious Knowledge in the Unscientific Form.") In his Gifford Lectures on *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, he indicates that it is the function of reason to "translate the necessarily inadequate language in which ordinary thought represents spiritual truth into that which is fitted to express its purely ideal reality" (Vol I, p 55), but, in the opinion of his brother, "if he committed an error it was that he followed Hegel in believing that the whole structure of dogma as developed by the Church could be re-interpreted by philosophical reflection without any essential change" (*ibid*, p lxxvi).

Edward Caird, as the above words indicate, was more critical of the inherited content of faith than was his brother, of whom A. W. Benn remarks, facetiously but ungenerously, that "if his private opinions were unorthodox, [he] had three very strong reasons for not

What, then, may we expect from the adoption of this rational absolute idealism? What will it mean for our thought and worship of God to have established ourselves in the promised land of an assured rational knowledge of reality? It would seem that it ought to mean, eventually at least, the construction of a magnificent temple of theological thought wherein we may worship the one Eternal, All-Inclusive and Rational Absolute, now recognized as our God. For, from the point of view at which we have arrived, theology is philosophy and philosophy is theology, for the obvious reason that God is Absolute Reality and Absolute Reality is God. For those whose traditional faith was Christian, the natural conclusion was that by means of the Hegelian philosophy the truth of Christianity could be vindicated. Hegel himself saw in his speculative idealism the proof of Christianity as Absolute Religion. Hutcheson Stirling, pioneer British Hegelian, was enthusiastic as to the value of Hegelianism for the rational expression and vindication of his traditional belief. Hegelianism,

making them public. He was a Scotchman, he was a Presbyterian minister, and he was Principal of Glasgow University" (*History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol II, p 410). The younger Caird was wont to insist that religion cannot be rationalized without being greatly modified. But what he called the "dilemma" of reason and faith, according to which "it seems as if religious faith must seek reason as a condition of its own life, and yet that in seeking reason it seeks its own destruction," did not represent his own final position. "The ultimate and healthy action of reason," he hastens to add, "must preserve for us, or restore to us, all that is valuable in faith. A faith that really springs out of our rational or spiritual nature cannot be found ultimately irrational." "I will not conceal my conviction," he goes on to say, "that the dissolving process [of a criticism by reason] must be fatal to many things which men have thought and still think to be bound up with their religious life, but I do not believe that it will destroy anything that is really necessary to it" (*Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Vol I, pp 13, 14, 19, 20, 22). Thus it would seem that his position was not at bottom radically different from that of his brother. For him, as for the other, idealism was "Christianity theorised" (*Essays on Literature and Philosophy*, p 534).

Equivalent expressions are common in the literature of the movement. "What is called 'faith,'" says Watson, "is really reason which is not aware of itself as reason" (*Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p 95). According to R. B. Haldane, "Religion is the consciousness of a direct relation to God, but in forms that belong to the region of feeling and are consequently describable only symbolically" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol II, p. xxiv). A. M. Fairbairn says of Faith and Reason, "Where both are sons of God it were sin to seek to make one legitimate at the expense of the other's legitimacy" (*Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 19).

according to this physician-philosopher, is "the only food on which.....Humanity will thrive"\* Hegel, in his opinion, had "no object but to restore Faith—Faith in God—Faith in the immortality of the Soul and the Freedom of the Will—nay, Faith in Christianity as the Revealed Religion—and that too, in perfect harmony with the Right of Private Judgment"† Stirling, we do not forget, interpreted his position as "essentially the same as what is called the Hegelian Right"‡ Josiah Royce, who could describe himself as one of those students whom "a more modern and radical scepticism" had put "very much out of sympathy with many of . . . the unessential accidents of religious tradition as represented in the historical faith,"§ could also say, "While I wish to be no slave of any tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and all the unessential accidents of religious tradition, identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy"||

The most fundamental of all religious concepts is the concept of God. What absolute idealism, at least in its more constructive forms, has to say about the nature of God is what is implied in its identification of God with the all-including Experience, or the Absolute. Reality as an intelligible whole is held to be a system characterized by a higher degree of the sort of unity we have in the world of our experience. This Whole of Ultimate Reality, the Absolute, is Absolute Spirit, Absolute Mind or Reason, the Whole Truth in concrete form, Ideal Reality, or the Real Ideal. This Absolute, as the Ultimate Reality, is God, and being as knowable as rationality and truth, it is known to some extent by

\* *The Secret of Hegel*, 1898 edn., p. lxxiii

† *Ibid.*, p. xxvii, cf. p. lxi. In the 1865 edition, the pages are xii, and lxxvii

‡ *James Hutchison Stirling: His Life and Work*, by A. H. Stirling, p. 319

§ *The Conception of God*, p. 19. Compare with this the statement which appears in the Preface to the second volume of *The World and the Individual*: "Since childhood, I have never had any faith about the problem of Immortality except in so far as I have seemed to myself to see philosophical reasons for such faith . . . and I regard the whole issue as one for reason" (pp. xiv, xv)

|| *The Conception of God*, p. 50, Cf. *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. v

all rational minds, including even the self-confessed atheist.\* As Absolute Reason, God is expressed and present in the rational order of the world and in the rationality of man's mind; he is the Logos, the Light which lights every man, coming into the world. This Absolute may not be a person in the crude anthropomorphic sense in which the God of the popular religious imagination is a person, but if he were not at least personal, how could we finite persons be included in his being? He is Person as speculative

\* 'God exists in His eternal truth before time was' (Hegel, *Phil. of Rel.*, III 37) "The object of religion as well as of philosophy is eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication of God. Philosophy is knowledge of that which is eternal, of what God is, and what flows out of his nature" (*Phil. of Rel.*, I, p. 19) "God is the Idea, the Absolute, the Essential Reality which is grasped in thought and in the Notion" (*ibid.*, p. 25) "God is the highest Thought" (*ibid.*, p. 62), "the reconciled unity of Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself" (*ibid.*, p. 72) "In Himself or potentially God is Spirit, this is our notion or conception of Him" (*ibid.*, p. 81) "God is the Absolute Truth the Truth of everything" (*ibid.*, p. 90) "God is Spirit, the Absolute Spirit" (*ibid.*, p. 92) "There is for Hegel nothing but God, and this God is a personal God and no mere pantheistic substance that just passively undergoes a mutation of necessity. Hegel, however, looks on the ordinary *the supreme* of idolatry as but a name, an empty abstraction, and he has attempted to construct God out of his universe as the absolute Spirit which he is" (Stirling *The Secret of Hegel*, pp. 720-1)

'Nature in its reality number, a principle which is partial a self-distinguishing consciousness. 'Nature' is spoken of as an independent agent and to this there is no objection, so long as we understand it to include the spiritual principle, neither in time nor in space, immaterial and immovable, eternally at one with itself, which is necessary to the possibility of a world of phenomena" (Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Section 54) "The universe is a single eternal activity or energy, of which it is the essence to be self-conscious" "We may best conceive of God as a completed self-consciousness, a being of perfect understanding and perfect love, whose life is an eternal act of self-realisation through self-sacrifice" (R. L. Nettleship's exposition of Green's philosophy, in Vol. III of the works of Green, pp. lxxv-xviii) "A follower of Hegel must hold that the objective world in its actual totality is thought, that the processes of our intelligence are but reflections of that real thought under the conditions of a limited animal nature" "That there is one spiritual self-conscious being, of which all that is real is the activity or expression; that we are related to this spiritual being, not merely as parts of the world which is its expression, but as partakers in some inchoate measure of the self-consciousness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world, that this participation is the source of morality and religion, this we take to be the vital truth which Hegel had to teach" (Green, *Works*, III, pp. 143, 146).

"God is the Absolute Synthesis, the All, Being, dialectically determined, Being and Thought held by reason" (S. S. Laurie, *Syntheticæ*, II pp. 59, 63, 227, 409) "The secret ground on which all finite intelligence rests is the consciousness of an Absolute

idealism conceives personality. It is of the essence of personality to be self-knowing, and God as completely self-knowing is Absolute Personality. It is we who are incompletely personal. Moreover, inasmuch as rationality is unitary in form, the true metaphysic must be a monism, or singularism. The Absolute is a single unitary personal Being. As such he is not "that which does not stand in any necessary relation;" not only could such a pseudo-Absolute not be known; he could not even be. The true Absolute stands in certain necessary relations to the world of things and finite persons. Still, he is not limited in any such

Intelligence " "The thought which is the *prins* of all things is .. a thought or self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which is the unity of all individual selves and their objects, of all thinkers and all objects of thought " "The universal reason thinks in us " (J Caird *Int. to Phil of Rel.*, pp 120, 149)

'The idea of God [is] the idea of an absolute principle of unity which binds in one 'all thinking things, all objects of thought'.....the source of being to all things that are, and of knowing to all beings that know the ultimate essential principle of our intelligence " (E Caird, *Evolution of Rel.*, I, p 68) "God is a principle of unity in an all comprehending whole akin to that which gives unity to our own existence as self-conscious beings " (*Erol of Theology*, I p 33)

"The Idea of God is that of a Being who is the absolute totality of all reality " (J Watson, *Interpretation of Rel Exp.* I p 317) "The world is the self-differentiation of God, and therefore God exists and is self conscious only in this differentiation " (*ibid*, p 332) "The Absolute is self-conscious and to this extent a person But not... in the sense of being an exclusive self centered individual " (Watson, *Christianity and Idealism*, p 202)

"If a spiritual principle is recognized in the universe, it must be recognized..... everywhere, as the condition of our knowing a system of nature " (D G. Ritchie, *Darwinism and Politics*, 2nd edn, p 115) "God is not 'a Being among other beings' but the meaning of the whole " (*Philos Studies*, p 121)

"God cannot be less than the Ultimately Real. The Ultimately Real cannot be described as a First Cause [or] as Substance The meaning of subject as distinguished from substance appears to be the wicket gate of the pathway to Reality " "'God' is nothing short of the Highest and Most Real " "Ultimate Reality was . found to be Mind, and within Mind the whole of experience, possible as well as actual, was found to fall " "God [is] the Ultimate Reality and the Ultimate Reality Mind " (R B Haldane, *The Pathway to Reality*, Vol I, p 1, II, pp xvii, 14) "There is only a single actual universe, the universe which in one abstract aspect is thought, in another, nature, in its concrete, individual, living actuality mind " (*ibid*, Vol I, p 114)

"The God of Religion we identified with the Absolute of Philosophy " (H. Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, p 269, cf Lecture XVIII, *passim*)

"You can quite properly define the Absolute as Thought a thought whose Ideas are not mere shadows, but have an aspect in which they are felt as well as meant loved as well as conceived, willed as well as viewed Such an Absolute



sense as would involve disparagement or inadequacy from the point of view of religion. Instead of supposing that the existence of man limits the power of God, we should understand that, from the point of view of time, God is realizing himself in a process of which man, as a dependent being, is a feature

The Real is the rational Here we have the key to the idealistic interpretation of the transcendence of God The Absolute or God is not transcendent in the sense of being in another world beyond this world of nature and man, but in the sense of including the present natural and human reality with which we are familiar, and much more, past, present, and future, of which we know little or nothing. God is transcendent, not as something outside of the circumference transcends the circle, but as the entire circumference transcends while it includes a small arc of the same "On the earth the broken arc. In the heaven the perfect round" Eternity is not unending succession, but timelessness, or better, time-transcendence and the comprehension of all time "God's

Thought you can also call in its wholeness, a Self God is known as Thought fulfilled; as Experience absolutely organized, so as to have one ideal unity of meaning, as Truth transparent to itself as Life in absolute accordance with idea, as Selfhood eternally obtained" (Royce *The Conception of God* pp 45 46) "God's life includes, in the organic total of one conscious eternal instant, all life, and so all goodness and evil" (*Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p 457) "There is at last but one Self, organically, reflectively, consciously inclusive of all the selves and so of all truth" (*Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p 379) "God is a Person Temporally viewed, his life is that of the entire realm of consciousness in so far as, in its temporal efforts toward perfection, this consciousness of the universe passes from instant to instant of the temporal order from act to act, from experience to experience, from stage to stage Eternally viewed, however, God's life is the infinite whole that includes this endless temporal process, and that consciously surveys it as one life, God's own life God is thus a Person, because for our view he is self-conscious, and because the Self of which he is conscious is a Self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of these ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite selves God in his totality as the Absolute Being is conscious not in time but of time and of all that infinite time contains In time there follow in their sequence, the chords of his endless symphony For him is this whole symphony of life at once" (*World and the Individual*, II, pp 418, 419)

"God the infinite consciousness" "To all eternity God is what He is, and never can be other, but it will take Him to all eternity to live out all that He is" "Thus we get two modes of God—the infinite, perfect, unconditioned, primordial being; and the finite, imperfect, conditioned and limited being of which we are ourselves expressions And yet these two are one" (R J Campbell, *The New Theology*, pp 22, 23)

will is done in Heaven " That is, in the transcendental realm, the Absolute Ideal is eternally realized. All that is rational is eternally real from the transcendental point of view, even if there may be much of the rational that is not yet empirically actual to man as a being in the time-order. What is only being actualized in history is at once absolutely ideal and eternally real. This is the philosophical meaning of the Heaven of popular religion, in which all evil is overcome. To us the Ideal seems to be altogether outside the natural and human realm and to belong to the end of time, a future period infinitely remote from the present. But from the point of view of Absolute Truth the realm of the Ideal is here as much as anywhere, and its period is now as much as in the future. It is universal and eternal. To use Hegel's terminology, it is " God in his Eternal Idea in-and-for-Self," " God as He is in Himself." <sup>a</sup>

Nature, from the point of view of absolute idealism, is at once the product and the scene of the progressive evolution of the divine Idea. Impersonal things are not independent realities, but neither are they on the other hand phases of the Absolute Self. They are contents of the Absolute Experience, dependent upon that Divine Consciousness for their existence. They are products of the Absolute Will, of God, but that means nothing different from the statement that they are products of the Divine Thought, for where all is Thought, Will is also Thought. The physical world is completely determined by Absolute Reason. " Some call it evolution, others call it God. ' Its laws, discovered by man's

\* *Philosophy of Religion*, Vol I, p 25, Vol III, p 7 In different terms other members of the school say the same thing " The eternity of thought is the being of God " " The ' possible self ' is God However, that God does not actually exist at all is a misapprehension That which from the point of view given by our ignorance and want is merely possible from a truer point of view is actual " (Green, *Works*, III, pp 159, 224) " God, the ideal " [is] " the meaning of the whole " (Ritchie, *Phil Studies*, pp 35, 121) " Eternally viewed God's life is the infinite whole that includes this endless temporal process " " The world as a whole is absolutely good " (Royce, *The World and the Individual*, II, p 418, *Rel Aspect of Phil*, p 444) " Only the ideal is real," and " only as ideal is the self real " (F H Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, pp 292-3) " ' God ' for Bosanquet [is] Reality in its character of perfection " (R F A. Hoernlé, *Matter, Life, Mind, and God*, p 199)

Reason, are the laws of the absolutely rational Cosmic Process. The Shekinah of God is in all nature. Everything seems "apparelled in celestial light." The absolute idealist "is nature's priest, and by the vision splendid is on his way attended." He feels a Presence—

" Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns  
And the round ocean and the living air  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man,  
A motion and a spirit that impels  
All thinking things, all objects of all thoughts  
And rolls through all things "

Absolute idealism is the philosophy of the immanence of Divine Reason \* without which was not made anything that was made.

" " Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. The 'physical' elements prove to be Dialectical. The process of meteorological action is the exhibition of their Dialectic. It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other natural process, and, as it were, forces nature out of itself " (Hegel, *Logic*, Wallace's transl., p. 150). " Neither the notion nor the judgment are merely found in our head, or merely framed by us. The notion is the very heart of things, and makes them what they are. All things are a judgment—a universal which is individualised " (*ibid* pp. 299, 300). " Nature is divine in its essential Being. Nature is nothing outside its essential Being (God) " (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, Bailhe's transl., p. 790).

" The world is a system of thought. The world is the thought of God " " Nature as a whole, is but the other of reason as a whole " (J. H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel*, 1898 edn., pp. 86, 96).

" Facts are relations " " Nature means the single and unalterable order of relations. Relations are the work of the mind, and yet the essence of reality " (Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sections 20, 36, 37 cf. 13, 15).

" God is all and in all " " The world in which we outwardly live is only the unreal and the evanescent making believe to be real, the true, the real, the world of unchangeable and eternal reality, is that in which we pray. ...Even when we pray that evils may cease, it is, if our prayer be the prayer of faith, because in spirit we realize that they have already ceased, because we are in a sphere in which we discern the nothingness of all that is not God; even when we pray that new blessings may be communicated to us, it is because we realize that already all things are ours. Our prayer for spiritual improvement is efficacious, just because of the conviction that we are already perfect, even as our Father in heaven is perfect " (J. Caird, *Introduction to the Phil of Rel*, p. 221, 288-9).

" We can find the ideal anywhere only by finding it everywhere " (E. Caird, *Hegel*, p. 115).

" Hegel means ...to affirm that the world when fully understood is identical with God. It is the very essence of God as mind or spirit to manifest himself in the world,

Creation is the dependence of all that has being upon the Divine Logos, the absolute dependence of the world upon God. Absolute Reason knows all that is or can be; this is the divine omniscience. Absolute Reason can do all that can be done rationally, and is always doing it;\* this is the divine omnipotence. Absolute Reason

and without such manifestation he cannot be... There is no abstract separation of the world and God, but properly understood, the world is the self-differentiation of God, and therefore God exists and is self-conscious only in this differentiation. Hegel is the consistent opponent of all forms of transcendence. A God who is beyond the world can have no reality. At the same time Hegel does not accept the immediate identification of the world with God. If the world is conceived as a mere assemblage of objects in space and time he would deny that the world is identical with God. Only when it is seen that the world is a spiritual organism can it be said that it is identical with God" (J. Watson, *Interpretation of Religious Experience*, I, pp. 332-3)

"The world is such stuff as ideas are made of. Thought possesses all things. But the world isn't unreal. It extends infinitely beyond our private consciousness, because it is the world of an universal mind" (Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 800)

The following passage, if not by a thoroughgoing Hegelian, shows the influence of latter-day absolute idealism. [God's] immanence in creation [is] analogous to our presence in our works, with the obvious difference, of course, that we finite beings who die and pass away can only be impersonally present in our works, whereas He must be conceived as ever present to sustain and animate the universe, which thus becomes a living manifestation of Himself, no mere machine, or book, or picture, but a perpetually sounding voice" (J. R. Illingworth, *The Divine Immanence*, p. 73).

"Contingent things exist, but their being has the value merely of possibility; they simply have hypothetical existence. They are the essential condition of absolute necessity" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, II, p. 146). "If the finite exists, the Infinite exists too. Being which is characterised as finite possesses this characteristic only in the sense that it cannot exist independently in relation to the Infinite, but is, on the contrary, ideal merely, a moment of the Infinite.....It is just the fact that the finite world is merely a manifestation or appearance which constitutes the absolute power of the Infinite" (*ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 260). "Finite knowledge. [has] no way of passing from the finite to the Infinite, nor from the contingent to the Absolutely necessary, nor from effects to an absolutely first non-finite cause...If it is agreed that Spirit does actually make this transition, then the fact of this transition is not a fact of knowledge, but of Spirit in general, and in a definite sense of faith. This elevation to God, whether seen in feeling or in faith takes place in the inmost part of Spirit, in the region of Thought. Religion has its centre and the root of its movement in thought" (*ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 291-2, 293).

"The assertion that God causes any particular phenomenon is not exactly false, but turns out on strict analysis to be unmeaning, for in whatever sense he is the cause of any one phenomenon he is the cause of all" (Nettleship in Green's *Works*, III, p. ci, quoting p. 264).

"The lowest stage of thinking supposes that its objects are all independent one of another. To it things seem to exist apart from relations. This first stage of thinking,

is wherever reality is; thus is the divine omnipresence. "If a spiritual principle is recognized in the universe," says Ritchie, "it must be recognized . . . everywhere."\*

"There is no great nor small  
To tho Soul that maketh all,  
And where it cometh, all things are;  
And it cometh everywhere."

"Blessed are they who have eyes to see," writes Oxenham;

"They shall find God everywhere,  
They shall see Him where others see stones."

Absolute idealism is the sight-cleansing medicine which will enable everyone to see God everywhere. As in Tagore's translation of the Songs of Kabir.

"The creature is in Brahma, and Brahma is in the creature, they  
are ever distinct, yet ever united  
He himself is the tree, the seed, and the germ,  
He himself is the flower, the fruit and the shade,  
He himself is the sun, the light, and the lighted  
He himself is Brahma, creature, and Maya  
He himself is the manifold form, the infinite space;  
He is the breath, the word, and the meaning.  
He himself is the limit and the limitless, and beyond both the  
limited and the limitless is He, the Pure Being.  
He is the Immanent Mind in Brahma and in the universe"

Generally speaking, the Hegelians are at pains to distinguish their idealistic theory of nature from pantheism.† They

nearest allied to sense-perception, supposes that *things* are the essential elements of all being. The second stage of thought, which we may call the understanding, regards *relations* as essential. It deals with the category of relativity. Relativity presupposes self-relation. Self-relation is the category of the *reason*, just as relativity is the category of the *understanding*, or non-relativity (atomism) the category of *sense-perception*. Sense-perception is atheistic, the understanding is pantheistic, the reason is theistic" (W. T. Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*, pp. 32-5. "The idea of causality followed out into the conception of self-activity and self-determination arrives at theism" (W. T. Harris, *Introd. to the Study of Philos.*, p. 32).

\* *Darwinism and Politics*, 2nd edn., p. 115.

† "Spirit is not substance only, but is also self-determined as Subject. Those who say that speculative philosophy is Pantheism, generally know nothing of this distinction."

are willing to say that from an ultimate point of view God is the only reality, but they are not willing to say that nature as commonly understood is God. In fact, absolute idealism is presented as the higher synthesis in contrast with both the dualistic transcendence characteristic of deism and the distinctionless identity involved in pantheism.

If it be said, God is all this here, this paper, etc., then that certainly is Pantheism. Pantheism of this kind is not to be found in any religion. It has never occurred to any man to say, all is God—that is, things in their individuality or contingency—much less has it been maintained in any philosophy" (Hegel, *Phil. of Religion*, I, pp 96, 97, cf III, pp 318, 319). "The definition according to which Spirit is unity with itself, and comprises the world as something ideal within itself, is called Pantheism, or more precisely the Pantheism of Spiritualism. But it is precisely the fundamental characteristic of Spirit that it is differentiation and positing of the difference, and that is the very creation which those who bring the charge of Pantheism always want to have. The next thing indeed is that the separation does not remain permanent but is annulled, for otherwise we would find ourselves in dualism and Manichaeism" (*ibid*, Vol I, p 335).

"The world is a system of thought. To that extent, this view is pantheistic, for the world is seen as the thought of God, and so God. But in the same way all ordinary views are pantheistic, for to each of them, name itself as it may, the world is the *work* of God, and so God, as the *work* of God, it is the product of his thought, the product of himself, and so himself" (Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel*, pp 86, 87).

"Can we include in one system of the universe a God who is infinite and absolute, and a world in which reality is ascribed to nature, and freedom and individuality to man? Pantheism solves the problem but solves it only too easily. It reaches the unity we are in quest of by the simple expedient of annulling the element of difference, or reducing it to a phantom of the imagination" (J Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. I, p 114). "What Pantheism gains by the sacrifice of individuality and responsibility in man, by depriving the finite world of reality and reducing nature, man and God, to a blank colorless identity, a true philosophy attains in another and deeper way. It gives us a principle in the light of which we can see that God is all in all, without denying reality to the finite world and to every individual human spirit, or without denying it, except in so far as it involves a life apart from God" (*Introd to the Phil of Rel*, p 221).

"A pantheistic system, which loses the subject in the Absolute, cannot explain how that subject should apprehend the substance of which it is but a transitory mode, nor, on the other hand, can it explain why the substance should manifest itself in and to a subject" (E Caird, *Essays in Lit and Phil*, p 515). "Constructive idealism and pantheism both assert that the world can have no reality apart from God, and therefore that the finite as such has no existence. But Pantheism conceives of the divine as equally manifested in nature and in mind" (Watson, *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p 444).

"Reflection discovers that extension in space and sequence in time involve mutual dependence throughout the universe. At this stage of thought he has left atheism and

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Absolute idealism makes short work of the traditional notion of miracle. Historical science, while looking for natural explanations of well accredited events, may feel obliged to leave the question of the possibility of miracles in uncertainty. But speculative idealism, as a form of rationalism, claims to arrive at certainty. "The real is rational;" that is what makes it a knowable system. The laws of natural causation are the laws of Reason immanent throughout the universe. We cannot know anything beyond the immediately given to be real, save as we are able to fit it in, with what is given, as a part of a rational system. Evidence of the activity of God, the Absolutely Rational Mind and Will, is not to be found in disorder but in order.

"One asked for a sign from God, and day by day  
The sun rose in pearl, in scarlet set,  
Each night the stars appeared in bright array,  
Each morn the thirsting grass with dew was wet  
The corn failed not its harvest, nor the vine  
And yet he saw no sign"\*

arrived at pantheism" (Harris, *Int to the Study of Phil.*, p. 32) "The understanding is pantheistic, it finds everything finite and relative, and dependent on an absolute that transcends all qualities and attributes" (*Psychologic Foundations of Education*, p. 35) "The idea of causality followed out into the conception of self-activity and self determination corrects the pantheistic result and arrives at theism" (*Int to the Study of Phil.*, p. 32).

"The conception of God, as an Absolute Experience undertakes to be distinctively theistic, and not pantheistic. It is not the conception of any Unconscious Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed, nor of a Universal Substance, in whose law our ethical independence is lost, nor of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore" (Royce, *The Conception of God*, pp. 48, 49-50)

"Is the doctrine of God immanent in nature and man pantheistic? So it would appear to be, as immanence has hitherto been understood. God immanent as Being and Thinking is implicit Pantheism. But what shall we say of God as immanent Thought? Thinking eternal is continuous, never failing Ground of all, but the resultant Thought has claims of its own. Such immanence is not Pantheism. It may appear so to minds which cannot conceive the separation of Being thinking from its fulfilled Thought" (S. S. Laurie, *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, pp. 235 G, cf. *Synthetica*, II, p. 67)

"Spirit which is merely immanent in matter, without also transcending it, cannot be spirit at all." "Pantheism, the belief that God is merely immanent in matter, is really indistinguishable from materialism; it is merely materialism grown sentimental" (J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, p. 69)

\* Victor Starbuck, "The Seekers"

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Indeed if the world be not a rational system, we are without proof of the existence of God. Absolute Reason, so far from being an explanation of the unknown, the irrational, is the explanation of the rational and the known. Science traces out the rational order of the world, the scientist shows us what God is doing and how he does it, he thinks God's thoughts after him. All nature is one universal and prolonged rational thought and deed. The supernatural in the sense of a violation of the systematic unity of the universe is, from any point of view, unprovable. The empiricist Hume thought it incredible. To the rationalist, Spinoza for instance, it is absurd, impossible.\* In this, as in so many other respects, Hegelianism is a post-Kantian Spinozism. As Absolute

\* "The essential standpoint of reason in the matter of miracles is that the truth of the Spiritual cannot be attested in an outward way" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, II, p. 338). "Miracles, if they are to attest the truth of anything, must first be attested themselves. But what has to be attested by them is the Idea which has no need of them, and because of this has no need to attest them. Miracles are an interference with the course and the eternal laws of Nature. But the truth is that it is Spirit which is this Miracle, this absolute interference" (*ibid.*, III, p. 119).

"A 'supernatural event' would be something which contradicted the conditions under which alone a thing can be an 'event', it would be something which purported to be an element in a continuous order and yet at the same time to break the continuity of the order, and as long as the truth of religion is supposed to depend upon supernatural events, science is right in pronouncing it a fiction and in identifying faith with unreason" (Nettlehip, in Green's *Works*, III, p. xcvin).

"With the advancing spiritual life of the world, men are led more and more to seek their proofs of God and of divine action, not in sudden and unaccountable marvels or capricious displays of supernatural power, but in the manifestations of wisdom and beneficence in intelligible relations and sequences, and both the intelligence and the moral sense recoil from ascribing to the object of supreme reverence in its dealing with human souls the uncertainty and capricious action, not to say the arbitrary favoritism, of an irresponsible potentate" (J. Caird, *University Sermons*, p. 73).

"No longer is it possible, as it once was, to intercalate the ideal, the divine, as it were surreptitiously, as one existence in a world otherwise secular and natural. Under the acknowledged reign of law, the world is a connected drama in which there is no place for episodes" (E. Caird, *Hegel*, p. 115).

"Miracles even if they were verified are quite irrelevant to a religious truth. I think only those can consistently believe in miracles having happened, who believe that they can happen now" (D. G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, p. 59).

"In dealing with the claim of Christianity to be a supernatural system, we prefer to keep to the popular, scriptural, and unevasive definition of the miracle, as a suspension of the laws of nature, or, better still, as an autocratic act of divine power, regardless of these laws, and independent of the use of means. Of any alleged event of this kind we deny the possibility." "In adopting the anti-supernatural theory of the universe,



Reason is immanent in all Nature, so it is, from the point of view at which we have arrived, throughout the whole course of history. The Eternal Will of Divine Reason is making actual in time what ought to be, or in other words what eternally is. Not only the history of human thought but every event in the historical process also fits into a dialectic of reason. If we cannot say, whatever is is best, we can at least be sure that every day in every way the world is becoming better and better. Of course the negative phases of the process are not always in themselves better than the positive phases they have displaced; as in the repairing of a road, things often must be made worse in order to be made better. But it is always to the higher synthesis we must look in order to read the true meaning of the whole. Taken in its context, all that happens is providential, divinely purposed. All is determined in accordance with the rational law, but at the same time all fits into a single teleological system. Even disasters are means to the absolute End—the evolution, not in nature alone but more especially in history, of the Divine Idea.\*

the writer must not be understood as questioning that a divine power moves in all nature and in all history, but only as denying that such a power moves in a sphere beyond and outside of nature. Granting that there is a supernatural element common to all phenomena, he denies that in any phenomena whatever, physical or spiritual, there is such an element over and above what is common to all alike, or that there are certain classes of phenomena, which are supernatural in a sense and to a degree which other classes are not. Further, in denying the specially supernatural character of Christianity, he is far from denying the existence of a great mystery in its genesis and constitution. 'Geheimnisse sind noch keine Wunder' (William Mackintosh, *The Natural History of the Christian Religion*, pp. 32, 7-8)

"Naturalism involves the negation of creative interference in nature and of miracle in history. In the revival of idealist philosophy the spiritual is resolved and at the same time naturalism is given its full swing. To natural law is conceded all that it can possibly demand. But the spiritual is not surrendered. It is always to be discovered at the highest point of view. The supernatural only has perished. No longer are we to seek for interferences in nature or miracles in history. If there be miracle it is the miracle of the whole. In truth, the idealism which is now in the ascendant is simply a translated naturalism. Miracle becomes not improbable, but impossible. For the imperfect induction by which naturalism renders the supernatural unlikely, idealism substitutes an iron deduction which renders it impossible" (C. F. D'Arcy, *Idealism and Theology*, pp. 52-54)

\* "The only thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of *Reason*, that Reason is the Sovereign of the World, that the

The Hegelian philosophy of history and divine providence is based upon its doctrine of the immanence of God, that is, of Absolute Reason or Spirit, in man. Man, from this point of view, is essentially Thought. All we ever do is to think; the universe does the rest. Our bodies are not part of us; they belong to the physical world. The part of our action which is really ours is not the behaviour of our body, but our conscious identification of ourselves with an ideal end. Moreover, man is essentially Reason, rational Thought. He is not, at any stage of his historical exist-

history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process. On the one hand, Reason is the *substance* of the Universe, viz, that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. On the other hand it is the *Infinite Energy* of the Universe, since reason is not so powerless as to be incapable of producing anything but a mere ideal, a mere intention—having its place outside reality, nobody knows where; something separate and abstract, in the heads of certain human beings. It is *the infinite complex of things*, their entire Essence and Truth 'Reason' reveals itself in the World, and in that World nothing else is revealed but this and its honour and glory... If the clear idea of Reason is not already developed in our minds, in beginning the study of Universal History, we should at least have the firm, unconquerable faith that Reason *does* exist there, and that the World of intelligence and conscious volition is not abandoned to chance. Yet I am not obliged to make any such preliminary demand upon your faith... The *result of the investigation* happens to be known to me, because I have traversed the entire field. It is only an inference from the history of the World, that its development has been a rational process, that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the World-Spirit—that Spirit whose nature is always one and the same, but which unfolds thus its one nature in the phenomena of the World's existence... This idea—that Reason directs the World [appears] in the form of the *religious truth*, that the world is not abandoned to chance and external contingent causes, but that a *Providence* controls it. A Providence (that of God) presides over the events of the World. *Divine Providence* is Wisdom, endowed with infinite Power, which realises its aim, viz, the absolute rational design of the world. The *final cause of the world at large* we allege to be the *consciousness* of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and *ipso facto*, the reality of that freedom" (Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, English translation by Sibree, pp. 9, 10, 11, 13, 20, cf. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel*, 1898, pp. 94-98).

"God can only be called the Moral Governor of the world, in the sense that by the essential nature of the world, and especially of man as the highest finite agent in it, the good must realize itself through the construction of society. In other words, God is immanent in the conscience of man, and only as so immanent can he be called the Moral Governor of the world. It is no doubt true that good must and does prevail over evil, and that it is vain for man to war against the inevitable tendency toward good, but it is not true that this invincible progress of goodness is independent of the free volition of man. God works, not upon man, but in him. No good is achieved without a fierce struggle, and this struggle is due to man's unconquerable rationality, and to the corresponding rationality in the nature of things" (Watson, *Interpretation of Religious Experience*, II, pp. 141, 142).

ence, perfectly rational; but in so far as he has realized in time what he eternally is in Ideal (or in other words, in so far as he truly and positively is), he is rational. A materialist has said, "Man is what he eats" (*Der Mensch ist was er isst*). In a materialistic sense this is true of the body, but in a different and deeper sense it is true of his innermost self. In essence man is Spirit, Reason, Truth, Thought, and he must be fed with the Bread of Life, that is, Truth; it will make him, in his actual temporal existence, ever more fully what he eternally is in the realm of the Absolute Idea.

The mutual relation of God and man is determined by this circumstance that man is in incompleteness what God is in ideal completeness. Man is essentially spirit, reason; God is Absolute Reason, Absolute Spirit. Man's life, as we know it, is limited in space and time; the Absolute is not limited. Eliminate space and time and numerical distinctions disappear. Man's true self, then, apart from the limitations of space and time, is God. Even here and now "closer is he than breathing, nearer than hands and feet." We are finite and partial self-expressions of the Absolute, the one and only Reality. Unlike impersonal things which are mere ideas, objects of the Divine Mind, we participate in the selfhood of the Divine Subject. We are not independent of God. In common with all animals, our bodies are dependent on God; but as persons we are independent, not of God, but *in* God. In so far as man truly is—and that means in so far as he truly acts, thinks rationally—he is what the immanence of the Absolute makes him. He can say, "By the grace of God I am what I *am*," and even, "The Father and I are one." What applies to one applies to all. In the words of Sri Ananda Acharya, "Though all men have different faces, different minds, this is my faith: one heart moves them all."\*

\* "Truth, aware of what it is, is mind (spirit)" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind* [Wallace's translation], p. 58). "Man always remains good, viewed in accordance with his notion or conception" (*Philosophy of Religion*, III, p. 49).

"In the growth of our experience an animal organism gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness. What we call our mental history is not

Religion, for the absolute idealist, is a normal expression of the rational nature of man. It is life in the Absolute, and having the Absolute in the life. It is being indwelt by the Divine Spirit, the Logos. It is the rational or divine in man recognizing and seeking to realize further its true destiny in union with the Absolute Reason or Spirit from which it has come and of which it is a part.

a history of this consciousness, which in itself can have no history, but a history of the process by which the animal organism becomes its vehicle " "The attainment of knowledge is only explicable as a reproduction of itself, in the human soul, by the consciousness for which the cosmos of related facts exists—a reproduction itself, in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ " (T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sections 67, 71, cf. sections 63-73) "To know God we must be God. The unifying principle of the world is indeed in us, it is our self " (Green, *Works*, III, p. 145, cf. p. 146, quoted in note, p. 88 above) "The 'possible self' is God, and in our identity with it lies the true unity with God. That which from the point of view given by our ignorance and want is merely possible, from a truer point of view is actual. That in virtue of which I am I is that in virtue of which I am one with God. God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities, the completion of that which, as merely in it, is incomplete and therefore unreal, in being conscious of himself man is conscious of God, and thus knows that God is, but knows what he is only so far as he knows what he himself really is " (*ibid.* pp. 224, 226, 227) "Every man has God in him " (Nettleship on Green's view, in Green's *Works*, III, pp. c, xciv)

"Strictly speaking, it is not we that think, but the universal reason that thinks in us " (J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 149)

"It becomes possible to think of man as 'a partaker in the divine nature,' and, therefore, as a self-conscious and self-determining spirit, without gifting him with an absolute individuality, which would cut him off from all union and communion with his fellow-creatures and with God " (E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, II, p. 81) "A universal religion, built upon the idea of the unity of man with God contains a kernel which is essentially rational and which cannot but gain greater and greater importance the more man's spiritual life is developed " (*Evolution of Theology*, I, p. 23) "The true self of man is the ideal self, and the ideal self is God " (Watson, *Interpretation of Religious Experience*, I, p. 332), cf. S. S. Laurie, *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, pp. 235-6)

"If God is immanent in nature, He must also be immanent in man since man is a part of nature " (J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, p. 74) "Everyone believes in God if he believes in his own existence " "The ultimate Self of the universe is God. Where is the dividing line between our being and God's? There is no dividing line except from our side. My God is my deeper Self, and yours too " "Jesus was God, but so are we. We are one with God in so far as our lives express the same thing [Divine Love] " (R. J. Campbell, *The New Theology*, pp. 17, 34-5, 94, cf. C. S. Patton, in "The New Theism," *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1907, p. 362 "God is in humanity, and humanity is a part of God ")

"You in one sense, never do or can get beyond your own ideas, nor ought you to wish to do so, because in truth all those other minds that constitute your outer and real

Religion is a seeking, and at its best a progressive realizing, of rational wholeness of life. The more truly rational any man is, the more moral he will be, and the more rational and moral he is, the more religious he will be; the more he is whole, the more he will be holy. The "all-round man" will be characterized by insight into Reality (God) and into his own relation to that Reality, by depth of feeling under rational control, and by action for the realization of rational ideals. Man will be religious as long as he is rational, that is, as long as he really *is*. Religion is not due to be superseded with the progress of the race. It cannot be rationalized out of existence. So long as he is truly rational, man will be incurably religious \*

world are in essence one with your own self. This whole world of ideas is essentially one world, and so it is essentially the world of one self and *That art thou*" (J. Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 368). "To an infinite collection of objects the axiom that the part cannot be equal to the whole does not apply. The individual Self may be conceived then as a Part equal to the Whole and finally united, as such equal, to the Whole wherein it dwells" (*The World and the Individual*, Volume II, pp. 449, 452). "All assertions about truth [imply] that the world of truth is a world of experience whose type of consciousness is higher in its level than is the type of our human minds, but whose life is such that our life belongs as part to this living whole" (*Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 313).

\* "Religion is the union of [the] idea which we call God with the conscious subject" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, II, p. 330). "[The] elevation of the soul to God is, speaking generally, that fact in the history of the human spirit which we call religion" (*Ibid.*, III, p. 229). "Religion is not consciousness of this or that truth in individual objects, but of the absolute truth, of truth as the Universal, the All comprehending, outside of which there lies nothing at all" (*Ibid.*, I, p. 22). "Religion is the Divine Spirit's knowledge of itself through the mediation of finite spirit. Absolute Spirit in its consciousness is knowledge of itself. If it has knowledge of what is other than itself, it then ceases to be Absolute Spirit" (*Ibid.*, I, p. 206). "We defined religion as being in the stricter sense the self-consciousness of God" (*Ibid.*, II, p. 327). "No man is so utterly ruined, so lost, and so bad, nor can we regard anyone as being so wretched that he has no religion whatever in him" (*Ibid.*, I, p. 5).

"Religion is more than morality. In the religious consciousness we find the belief, however vague and indistinct, in an object, a not-myself, an object, further, which is real. An ideal which is not real, which is only in our heads, cannot be the object of religion and in particular the ideal self, as the 'is to be' which is real only so far as we put it forth by our wills, is not a real object, and so not the object for religion. Hence, because it is unreal, the ideal of personal morality is not enough for religion. For the religious consciousness that object is real. We find in the religious consciousness the ideal self considered as realized and real. The ideal self, which in morality is to be, is here the real ideal which truly is" (F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, 1876, pp. 282, 285).

"Religion is simply the return of the finite consciousness into union with the infinite,

The heart of true prayer is aspiration after rationality of thought and life, and all such aspiration is implicit prayer. True prayer will surely be answered, for the Universe is rational and the will to be rational is in harmony with the deepest nature of things. True prayer is divinely inspired; it is the divine Reason

the reconciliation of the human spirit with the Divine" (J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 48) "From the human side religion [is] the surrender of the soul to God, [from] the Divine, the life of God in the soul" (*Ibid*, p. 280). "Religion is the sphere in which the contradiction between the ideal and the actual has vanished, in which the infinite ideal is no longer a forever distant goal, but a realised end. Whilst the ideal of morality is only progressively realised, the ideal of religion is realised here and now, in the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realised" (*Ibid*, pp. 281, 284). "Religion is the absolute self-surrender of the soul to God. It means the giving up or annulling of the private, particular self, of every interest or satisfaction that belongs to me as this particular individuality, and the blending or identification of my will, and potentially of my whole life and being, with the will of the Infinite" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, p. 193).

"A man's religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the universe, the summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things" (E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, I, p. 30). "Religion [is] always the more or less developed consciousness of that infinite unity which is beyond all the divisions of the finite, particularly the division of subject and object" (*Ibid*, p. 82). "The consciousness of the identity of that which is realising itself within and without us turns morality into religion" (*Essays on Literature and Philosophy*, p. 532). "The religious consciousness, in its essential meaning, is the consciousness of a Being who embraces all our life, . . . who lifts us above ourselves and binds our limited and transitory existence to the eternal". "A universal religion, built upon the idea of the unity of man and God contains a kernel which is essentially rational" (*Evolution of Theology*, I, pp. 23, 32).

"What is religion? 'The feeling of dependence' Hegel said that is the religion of a beast. Rather is it the feeling of union. In ordinary knowledge we are limited to particulars. When we know God we return to the unity of thought and being. Religion is the sense of communion with all men through God, that is, through the highest or ideal good" (D. G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 251-2).

"To view even the selfhood that passes away, even the deeds of the hour, as a service to God, and to regard the life of our most fragmentary selfhood as the divine life taking on human form,—this is of the deepest essence of religion" (Royce, *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 429).

"When two or three are gathered together, coöperating for a social good, there is the Divine Spirit in the midst of them" (Bosanquet, *Essays and Addresses*, 1891, p. 121). "The difference between morality and religion seems to be that in morality we know that the good purpose is real, in religion we believe that nothing else is real" (*Ibid* p. 125, cf. p. 124). "We are spirits and our life is one with that of the Spirit which is the whole and the good. Then, surely, we are eternal, and your religion gives you this conviction". "Religion only requires us to rise above the appearance and keep our unhesitating grasp on the reality which is wholly good" (*What Religion Is*, pp. 25, 42).

"Spiritual religion is the conscious union of man with God. Just in proportion as we see and reverence the mysterious depths of our own nature, shall we rise in

in us willing God's will, that is, willing the absolutely rational Ideal. It is not begging for a miraculous interruption of the natural order; we might as well pray that what has already happened may not have happened as that future effects of present causes may not follow. Prayer is not our changing God's mind, but God's changing our minds; taken with its necessary consequences, therefore, true prayer is its own answer. Thus the prayer for divine guidance finds its answer in the guidance to right action which comes through the rational, that is, the intelligent and well-informed good will.\*

In its cruder and less rational forms, religion seeks the divine, the holy, in particular things, in the peculiar, the mysterious, the unknown and unknowable. As it becomes more rational, it finds God in the whole of Reality as unified in the deeper, rational Self. Its God is *Brahman*, and *Brahman* is *atman*. It tends thus to confirm as essentially true the characteristic intuition of mysticism

" For outward God he findeth not  
Who finds not God within .  
Then go not thou in search of Him  
But to thyself repair,  
Wait thou within the silence dim  
And thou shalt find Him there "†

worship of the Eternal Spirit who is its source and ground " (J G Schurman, *Agnosticism and Religion*, p. 165)

" Faith is, in fact, nothing but the name for the doctrine that by recognizing yourself as already perfect in the perfect Absolute you become perfect " (A E Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*, 1901, p. 433)

\* " So long as our prayers express the effort after a higher life, recognised as proceeding from, and only to be satisfied by the grace of God, the theological formulæ in which they are clothed are of little importance " " Look not for an external answer to your prayer. Your prayer will be its own answer, even as virtuous action is its own reward. Prayer indeed, if of the right sort, is already incipient action, or more properly, it is moral action which has not yet made its outward sign " (T H Green, *Works*, III, pp. 273, 274-5) " Even when we pray that evils may cease, it is, if our prayer be the prayer of faith, because in spirit we realise that they have already ceased, because we are in a sphere in which we discern the nothingness of all that is not God, even when we pray that new blessing may be communicated to us, it is because we realise that already all things are ours. Our prayer for spiritual improvement is efficacious, just because of the conviction that we are already perfect, even as our Father in heaven is perfect " (J. Card, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 288-9)

† F. L. Hosmer, " The Indwelling God."

"The soul finds God in its own depths" (Ruysbroeck); this is the united testimony of the mystics. Indeed the principal difference between the absolute idealist and the mystic seems to be that the one seeks through rational thought what the other claims to reach through feeling. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that we find absolute idealism, particularly in these last days, appealing to mystical religious experience as containing empirical verification for the theories which it has speculatively evolved. And whatever may be thought of this argument, it is a remarkable fact that the pronounced mystics who have been free enough from traditionalism to express freely the suggestions of mystical experience do agree in their theology in many fundamental respects with the religious doctrines of absolute idealism.\*

What has been said of the relation of man to God brings up the question of the moral freedom of man. Here the Hegelian doctrine is offered as a higher synthesis, in which the contradiction between man's moral consciousness of freedom and the scientific principle of determinism is transcended in the concept of rational self-determinism. Whatever is, is intelligible, but events not

\* This point of view is represented by W. E. Hocking, in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. "Idealism is unfinished, not having found its way to worship. The mystic finds the absolute in immediate experience" (Hocking, *Meaning of God*, pp. xi, xix). What may have been a seed-thought in Professor Hocking's fertile mind is this remark in Royce's *The Conception of God*, p. 48: "It is to the rich experience of Christian mysticism that the historical honour belongs of having bridged the gulf that seemed to separate, and that to many minds still separates, the God of practical faith from the God of philosophical definition." Stirling, in his *Philosophy and Theology* (p. 320), had called attention to this relationship. "Meister Eckhart," he says, "leaves nothing for Hegel. 'The eye,' he cries, 'with which God sees me is the eye with which I see Him, my eye and His eye are one.'" Several other writers, each in his own way, have called attention to the value of religious experience, and particularly of religious mysticism, as confirming the validity of an idealistic theory of reality. For example, G. J. Blewett holds that "the centre of reality for the religious heart is the centre of reality for the reason also. In a gospel which builds itself upon the idea of an eternal Son of God who became the Son of Man, and is the centre, the organizing principle of the whole scheme of human history I think we have the synthesis, the whole of truth, of which man's perpetual spirit of Enlightenment on the one side and his perpetual Mysticism on the other, are the sundered and shattered fragments" (*The Christian View of the World*, 1912, pp. 330, 342). Compare also C. C. J. Webb's *God and Personality*, p. 259, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 187, and article, "God and the World," in *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 1927, p. 297.



completely determined by causes would not be completely intelligible, and so must be rejected as unreal. The "free" act is just as explicable in terms of circumstances, character and motive as is any event, organic or inorganic, in terms of its antecedent conditions. There is this difference, however, that some acts are motivated by rational ideas and ideals, and such acts, being performed in participation in that Absolute Reason or Spirit upon which all things and persons depend, partake of the self-determined freedom of that Absolute which is never determined except by itself. In so far as man truly is, that is, in so far as he is rational, he determines his acts, or what is the same thing, he is determined by God from within his own self. It is only in so far as he is an animal that he is determined *ab extra* and so is not free. In so far as a man is determined by irrational passion instead of by rational action, he is like other animals, a mere thing "rolled round in earth's diurnal course, with rocks and stones and trees." But in so far as he is rational, thoughtful, active, his life subserves an end immanent in his ideal, his true self. Liberty is power to realize my ideal; but unless my ideal is rational, it cannot be realized. True liberty is found only under law, the law of reason.\*

" That man is free whom the truth makes free,  
And all are slaves beside "

\* " Reason is Thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom " (Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, translated by Sibree, p. 13) " Freedom is a fundamental phase of will, as weight is of bodies. That which is heavy is the body, that which is free is the will. The will is a special way of thinking, it is thought translating itself into the reality. Man has no will without intelligence. Man cannot use his theoretic faculty without will, for in thinking we are active " (*Philosophy of Right*, Dyde's translation, Sec. 4, addition) " Ordinary man believes that he is free when he is allowed to act capriciously, but precisely in caprice it is inherent that he is not free. When I will the rational, I act according to the conception of ethical observance in general. The rational is the highway on which every one travels, and no one is specially marked. When a great artist finishes a work we say 'It must be so.' " (*Ibid*, Sec. 15, addition) " Morality is a definite realization of freedom " (*Ibid*, Sec. 30, note) " Freedom is quite as much actuality and necessity as it is subjective will. The idea here is its absolutely universal existence, viz., ethical observance " (*Ibid*, Sec. 73) " Finally the will is made really and consciously identical with the universal will. Now in this movement is illustrated the conception of freedom " (*ibid*, Sec. 106, note) " Freedom, the absolute will, the objective, and the circle of necessity, are all one principle " (*Ibid*, Sec. 145) " The mind

The ethics of absolute idealism is the ethics of rational self-realization. The moral law is the law of the realization, in the actual, temporal world, of the rational or ideal self, which from the absolute point of view, or in the Absolute, is eternally real. Rationality is the generic meaning of good and right. Work in

which knows itself as free is the rational will " (*Philosophy of Mind*. Wallace's translation, Sec 482) "Liberty receives the form of necessity" "This unity of the rational will with the single will constitutes the simple actuality of liberty" (*ibid*, Secs 484, 485) "The natural will is not the will as it ought to be, for it ought to be free, and the will of passion is not free. Freedom has an essential character only when it wills the essential will and this will represents what is good, right, moral. Man is to become free by the way of education" (*Philosophy of Religion*, I, p 244) "Man is related to a God in whom the human element is itself affirmative and an essential characteristic. Man thus, as occupying such a relation to God, is free. It is only the Moral, what is universal and rational, which is held to be in and for itself essential, and the freedom of self-consciousness consists of the essentiality of its true nature and its rationality" (*Ibid*, II, p 223)

[Man's] consciousness would not be what it is, as *knowing* but for the self-realization or reproduction in it of an eternal consciousness, not existing in time but the condition of there being an order in time, not an object of experience but the condition of there being an intelligent experience. In virtue of his character as knowing, therefore, we are entitled to say that man is a 'free cause'" (Green, *Prolegomena*, Sec 74) "When we transfer the term 'cause' from a relation between one thing and another within the determined world to the relation between that world and the agent implied in its existence, we must understand that the agent must act absolutely from itself in the action through which that world is—not, as does everything within the world, under determination by something else" (*Ibid*, Sec 76) "The question in regard to the freedom of moral agents is the question whether motives are of properly natural origin or can be rightly regarded as natural phenomena" (*ibid*, Sec. 87) "To a will free in the sense of unmotivated we can attach no meaning whatever. The question as to the freedom of the will we take to be the question of the origin of [the] 'strongest motive'" (*Ibid*, Sec 97) "When we speak of the human self reacting upon circumstances taking a motive from them, what we mean [is] a certain reproduction of itself on the part of the eternal self-conscious subject of the world" (*Ibid*, Sec 99) "The Ego identifies itself with some desire, and sets itself to bring into real existence the ideal object of which the consciousness is involved in the desire. This constitutes an act of will, which is thus always free, not in the sense of being undetermined by a motive, but in the sense that the motive lies in the man himself, that he makes it and is aware of doing so, and hence imputes to himself the act which is nothing else than the expression of the motive" (*ibid*, Sec 102) "The motive does indeed necessarily determine the act, it is the act on its inner side" (*Ibid*, Sec 105) "That a man's action is a joint result of his character and circumstances is true enough in a certain sense, and in that sense, is quite compatible with the assertion of human freedom. It is so compatible, if a 'free cause' consisting in a subject which is its own object is recognized as making both character and circumstances what they are. The character which makes circumstances has doubtless had its history, but the

the most rational way to realize the universally rational end, and you will be doing your duty. Hedonistic and Utilitarian ethics are essentially fallacious. They reason in this way: Right conduct brings happiness; this conduct brings happiness; therefore it is right. As against this, rational ethics reasons: The rational is right, and the right will be ultimately beneficial; this conduct is

history which thus determines moral action has been a history of moral action, i.e., of action in which the agent has been an object to himself, seeking to realize an idea of his own good which he is conscious of presenting to himself" (*Ibid*, Sec 106). "We may say that given the agent's character and circumstances as they are at any time, the action 'cannot help being done,' if by that we merely mean that the action is as necessarily related to the character and circumstances as any event to the sum of its conditions. All results are *necessary* results. 'Free-will' is either a name for you know not what, or it is included, is the essential factor, in character" (*ibid*, Sec 109). "The self-determining consciousness as little admits of derivation from that which has or is it not, as life from that which has or is it not. [So then] the earlier stage [of the human being's conscious existence] will not account for the latter *unless* it already involves the self-determining consciousness which carries freedom with it in all modes of its existence. This self-consciousness is not derived from nature. It has no origin. Whatever begins or ends does so for it or in relation to it" (*Ibid*, Sec 114).

"Absolute liberty of indifference would be equivalent to absolute irresponsibility.

The will of a man is nothing else than the self of the man or the man himself, it is that of which his whole life is the outcome. He is therefore free or self-determined, simply because his life and actions are the expression or realization of himself" (J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas*, II, pp 55, 56). "The necessity which is the pre-condition of our freedom is the manifestation of the very principle which makes us free" (E. Caird, *Essays on Literature and Philosophy*, p 532). "There is no experience except for an intelligent subject, and hence the determination of the known world by merely causal relations can only be a subordinate aspect in the determination of it as an intelligible system presupposing intelligence" (Watson, *Outline of Philosophy*, p 390).

"Man is free just because he is capable of being determined by ideas or thoughts, and by external stimuli as known. The element of thought is the condition of that freedom which is presupposed in all moral (responsible) action. In so far as his conduct is determined by the thinking of such ends as reason pronounces to be truly desirable, man is free in the higher sense—the sense in which freedom is not the presupposition but the end of moral action" (Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, pp 121, 122). "The freedom which is implied in morality is not the mere negative or logical freedom of either—or but the capacity which the individual self has of realizing the universal self. Our will to do what is right is God's will working in us" (*Ibid*, p 238). "Real effective will is in its nature universal will. The strongest individual is the most swayed by the universal reason. We are not free against the universal will" (*ibid*, p 243). "The defenders of free will have appealed to our consciousness of being free to choose between alternative courses of action, but on the basis of psychology the determinist has always had the answer ready, that we can only think so when we have insufficiently analyzed

rational; therefore it is right and will be ultimately beneficial. This is logically sound. But to be sure of doing right we must be able to select the good end and the best means. For this we need both science and metaphysics. We must have rational knowledge of reality, if we would formulate the rational ideal for conduct; we must know the laws of nature, including human nature, and we must conform to these laws, if we would choose the best means to realize the rational Ideal as end. In all this, self-knowledge is most essential; we must know the absolutely

the phenomena. Our choice between alternatives can always, if we know sufficient of the facts, be traced back to antecedent conditions in our character and circumstances.

There can be no genuine defence (or, rather, explanation) of free will so long as we do not distinguish between the meanings of cause, between the sense in which an event is the cause of another event and the sense in which we might talk of 'I' as being the cause, i.e., responsible for any action. The self is cause, not as one event in the series of natural events, but as present to all the events which form the series of actions for which I can be considered responsible, and as constituting them not merely events but *acts*. The presence of consciousness, in other words the presenting to ourselves of possible results as ends to be attained, is the fact of free will, in the sense in which free will is the condition of morality. That man acts freely, the causes of whose acts are ideas and not mere animal impulses (Cf. Spinoza). In the sense in which freedom is the end of conduct, it is equivalent to the acting constantly in accordance with rational aims, aims conducive to general well-being" (D. G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 303-304).

"Your acts are at once from the temporal point of view absolutely bound, and from the eternal point of view absolutely free. You are moral and free because you are in the eternal sense a part of the eternal World-Creator" (Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 433, 434). "Our theory of the Self assigns to it the character of the Free Individual, but maintains that this character belongs to it in its true relation to God, and cannot be observed, at any one instant of time, as an obvious and independent fact." "Individuals are all the various expressions of the Absolute. Free, in its own degree, is every individual will amongst all the wills that the world-life expresses, because every such will, as unique, is in some respect underrivable from all the others" (*The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 294, 336-337).

"To 'will' and to be 'free' are one and the same thing. I 'will' when my outward deed is the expression of my purpose. Freedom, in actual experience, is always limited, and admits of the most various degrees. I am most free when acting for the realization of a coherent rational purpose. In the end to be free is to know what you mean. The determinist is right in saying that conduct is completely determined by 'character' and circumstances, but wrong in holding that this makes infallible prediction possible. Infallible prediction is impossible because the assumed data of the prediction are such that you could not possibly have them until after the event" (Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 365-370).

"If there be freedom, it is the self-determination of the Absolute, which is simply a higher way of looking at necessity" (D'Arcy, *Idealism and Theology*, p. 54).

rational or Ideal Self as the ultimate End, and the actual self as constantly involved as means. If then a man is bad—if he is selfish, for example—what is needed is to get him to think more intensely and rationally. Let the selfish man be thoroughly rational in his selfishness, and he cannot but be good. Completely rational selfishness would be morality. One does not need to cease working for himself and begin to work for others instead; let him work for his own best interests and he will find that he cannot work against the best interests of his fellow-man. *Summum bonum est summus ego; summus ego est summus socius ego; ergo, summum bonum est summus socius ego.* Is not this reminiscent of the Brahmanic teaching that one should injure no living thing because every such being is in reality one's own self, since all are one in God? Or as Ramakrishna expressed it, "The reason why you should love your neighbour as yourself, is that your neighbour is yourself." The smaller self must die, in order that the larger self may live.\*

"In spiritual self-consciousness death loses its natural significance and becomes transformed and transfigured into the universality of spirit, which lives in its own communion, dies there daily, and daily rises again. That which belongs to the sphere of pictorial thought is thus here transferred to self-consciousness itself. The self-consciousness does not therefore really die: its particularity succumbs and expires in its universality" (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, translated by Baillie, p. 794)

"The true development of man lies in the direction of union between the developed will and the developed reason. It consists in so living that the objects in which self-satisfaction is habitually sought contribute to the realization of a true idea of what is best for man—such an idea as our reason would have when it had come to be all which it has the possibility of becoming, and which, as in God, it is. Such a life has always been called a life according to reason" (Green, *Prolegomena*, Secs 177, 178). "The divine idea of man can only be fulfilled in and through persons: the fulfilment can only take place in and through the society. Without society, no persons." "Each finds satisfaction for himself in procuring or witnessing the self-satisfaction of the other. The human spirit can only realize itself, or fulfil its idea, in persons, and it can only do so through society. Reciprocal services promote the recognition by one man of another as an 'alter ego'" (*ibid*, Secs 190, 191). "The idea of the absolutely desirable arises out of, or rather is identical with man's consciousness of himself as an end to himself. The self of which a man thus forecasts the fulfilment is a self already affected by interests in other persons" (*ibid*, Sec 199). "The individual's conscience is reason in him as informed by the work of reason without him in the structure and controlling sentiments of society" (*ibid*, Sec 216). "The distinction of good for self and good for others has never entered into that idea of a true good on which moral judgments are

In absolute idealism the problem of evil is faced from the point of view that God, or the Absolute, the one all-inclusive Reality, is absolutely rational and therefore absolutely good. As the Absolute Reality and as absolutely good, God can be neither unjust nor limited in power. Whatever happens because nature is a law-abiding rational system cannot be evil or an injustice to man, from the absolute point of view. Neither is God limited by the will of man; on the contrary, He is realizing Himself in every human act. Absolute idealism escapes the dilemma, Either God is unjust or limited in power, it shows us how to avoid both con-

foundeds. His own permanent well-being he necessarily presents to himself as a social well-being—a self-satisfaction which shall abide, but which no man can contemplate as abiding except so far as he identifies himself with a society whose well-being is to him as his own" (*ibid*, Sec. 232)

"God can only be at one with his work, can only make it to be truly *his* work by eternally dying—sacrificing what is dearest to him. God does not thereby *cease to be*, he does not annihilate *himself*, he lives eternally in the very process of sacrificing his dearest work. Hence God is said to be 'love,' for 'love' is the consciousness of survival in the act of self-surrender. How if this were the truth of the doctrine of the 'survival of the fittest'?" (R. L. Nettleship, *Philosophical Remains*, p. 41)

"Our social relations become to us a revelation of ourselves. The moral life may be described as the renunciation of the immediate, private, exclusive self, and the identification of my being with an ever widening sphere of existence beyond me. There is here a surrender of self which is yet, not the impoverishment, but the enriching of self" (J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas*, I, pp. 67, 68). "The way to self-realization is through self-renunciation. The life of the spiritual being as such, is, in a true sense, a continual dying. Every step in it is won by a break with the immediate or natural self—the self which is opposed to the not-self, for only as this self dies can the higher self, which is in unity with the not-self be developed. And, on the other hand, just for this reason there is for the spiritual self no absolute death. Because it is capable of dying to itself it cannot in any final sense die. The wider and completer is the good—i.e., the realization of ourselves—which we seek, the deeper and more thorough must be the negation of self on which it is based" (E. Caird, *Hegel*, pp. 211, 215).

"The true motive to a good action is desire to conform to the ideal of reason" (J. Watson, *Hedonistic Theories*, p. 136).

"By faith the particular man has to identify himself with the fore-realized divine ideal and this is done by dying to the private self as such and by the living in the self which is one with the divine ideal that is felt and known as the only real self, and now too as myself" (F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 296).

"I can love my neighbour as myself, only if I feel convinced that he is no other than myself, that in him is the same 'atman' that is within me, that barring the self-imposed limitations of space and time, which are due to 'avidya' or 'maya,' there is no difference between his being and mine" (P. D. Shastri, *The Essentials of Eastern Philosophy*, 1928, p. 16).

clusions. The ideal universe which exists in the mind of God is thoroughly rational, since God is Absolute Reason, and so is perfect, having no evil. It is the real and true world. It includes all that in this temporal process we call evil, but it includes it as supplemented by what to us is still future, and, as thus supplemented, it is no longer evil. It is part of the eternally real ideal. This eternally real ideal, moreover, is being actualized as fast as is rationally possible. What seems to us evil is necessary not only in relation to the perfect whole but for the further actualization of that ideal good. "All discord" (we may believe) is "harmony not understood; all partial evil, universal good"; and, from our point of view, all temporary evil, ultimate good. Evil is but empirically real; transcendently it is ideal. Accidentally evil, it is essentially good. Seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, it is mere negation, privation, defect of being, a nothing seeming to be something. Transcendently speaking, "God's in his heaven, All's right with the world." This applies to moral evil as truly as to physical evil. The temporal necessarily partakes of evil, just because it is temporal and, as such, incomplete. Moral evil is simply one of the symptoms of the finitude of man, viewed *sub specie temporis*. It is an expression of what man is, in so far as he is not yet, that is, in so far as, being an always necessarily incomplete manifestation in time of the Ideal Man who is eternally perfect in the Absolute he is and can be but a fragment of his true Self. His lack of being is lack in respect of Absolute Reason, and is manifested as ignorance, and this in turn expresses itself in what we call moral evil, or sin. True action is rational thought, and that is good; what we call evil action is lack of action, or being acted upon; that is, it is what we call passion.

"Far or forgot to me is near,  
Shadow and sunlight are the same,  
The banished Gods to me appear,  
And one to me are shame and fame."\*

\* R. W. Emerson, "Brahma," *Works* (Bohn's Standard Library), Vol. III, p. 427.

The Devil is the personification of a substantiated abstraction, existing only in "mortal mind," which is itself unreal as such, from the absolute point of view. The necessary and therefore not unjustifiable imperfection of the temporal is, in its evil character, from the point of view of eternity, absolutely nothing. No person who is real at all is irremediably bad or really bad. Evolution and movements of history, as the steady unfolding of the Absolute Idea, must necessarily be progressive. Personality, as essentially rational, is always and everywhere essentially good. Sin, as the 'irrationality—or lingering non-rationality—of an essentially rational being may be said to consist in being a thing or animal when one ought to be a person and divine. Sin is the attempt to work out an irrational principle; but error will not work, and must be given up. Selfishness for example, is irrational, and cannot last forever. But even sin, it is maintained, is a necessary means of learning to recognize and appreciate the good, and so is itself relatively good. There is no absolute evil. In the designedly ambiguous words of Royce, "Evil is a good thing—to overcome"\*

\* "If it must be said that good and evil in their conception, *i.e.*, in so far as they are *not* good and evil, are the same just as certainly it must be said that they are not the same but absolutely different. It is only these two propositions that make the whole complete, and when the first is asserted and asseverated, it must be met and opposed by insisting on the other, with immovable obstinacy. Since both are equally right, they are both equally wrong, and then wrong consists in taking such abstract forms as 'the same' and 'not the same,' 'identity' and 'non-identity' to be something true, fixed, real, and in resting on them. Neither the one nor the other has truth, their truth is just their movement. (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, pp 789-90) "Sin is described by saying that Man ate of the tree of knowledge. It is in fact this principle of knowledge which supplies the principle of man's divineness. It involves the promise and certainty of attaining once more the state in which Man is the image of God" (*Phil of Rel*, III, pp 53-54). "In so far as evil appears when a man does what is evil, it is at the same time something which is implicitly a nullity over which Spirit has power, and this power is of such a character that Spirit is able to make evil to cease to exist, to undo it" (*ibid*, III, p 129).

"Sin is the effort to actualise one's possibilities in that in which they cannot be actualized, *i.e.*, in pleasure. Sin, then, in itself, though not for the consciousness of the sinner, is no final reality, but only the possibility of this adequate actualisation of self in which it is overcome, and in saying that God is this adequate actualisation, the final reality to which all our possibilities are relative, we have said that in him sin as sin is not, but only sin as overcome" (T. H. Green, *Works*, III, p. 226).



### Salvation from sin is atonement in the sense of atonement

"Religion rises above morality in this, that whilst the ideal of morality is only progressively realized, the ideal of religion is realized here and now. The world in which we outwardly live is only the unreal and the evanescent making believe to be real. Even when we pray that evils may cease, it is, if our prayer be the prayer of faith, because in spirit we realize that they have already ceased, because we are in a sphere in which we realize the nothingness of all that is not of God" (J. Caird, *Int. to the Phil. of Rel.*, pp. 284, 288). "Evil in itself, [pantheism] points out, has no positive or affirmative reality. As error or falsehood has no positive reality, but is only the irrational, putting on for the moment the guise of rationality, so sin is only the unreal, assuming the semblance of the real. [Pantheism] is of indirect value, as a step towards a higher and more tenable solution of the problem. Negation is not resolvable simply into non-entity and nothingness. So far from the highest of beings, the infinite unity, being that in which the element of negation vanishes, it is rather that in which all possible determinations or negations are embraced." "It is not in the satisfaction of natural desires, but in the fact that it is an infinite nature that is seeking satisfaction in them, that the essence of sin lies" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, II, pp. 11, 13, 14, 68).

"All the evils and sorrows that belong to the development of the spiritual life—(and in a world which is in its essence spiritual, this ultimately means all evils and sorrows whatever)—contain in them 'the promise and the potency' of a good, in which they are not merely compensated, but taken up and transcended. The wounds of the spirit can be healed, so that not even a scar remains" (E. Caird, *Hegel*, p. 217).

"Evil that cannot be transcended cannot exist in a rational universe. We must hold that evil exists in order to be overcome, and that in some sense it is inseparable from good. Here we have at once the explanation of evil and of its compatibility with the absolute perfection of God. There is no evil, except for a rational being who is capable of willing a good which he identifies with the absolute good, but which is in reality in antagonism to it. But it is just the high destiny of man and the infinite perfection of God, which make it inconceivable how there should be a universe, containing beings who realize what is the meaning of their own life and of the whole, unless those beings pass through the long and painful process by which the absolutely good is revealed as that which can overcome the deepest depths of evil" (J. Watson, *Phil. Basis of Rel.*, pp. 457, 459).

"A wise teacher wills the errors and the faults and the naughtiness of his pupils as a means to their education. Reason suggests a *final* optimism, a *final* reconciliation, though this final stage may always remain a mere ideal" (Ritchie, *Phil. Studies*, pp. 132, 244).

"All judgments inspired by the religious point of view have this comprehensive and final character. All is right, or all is wrong. If 'God's in his heaven, all's right with the world.' If there be no God, or if He lacks either power or goodness, then nothing is right." "God is God is perfect. His loving kindness and power are unlimited. Supreme good involves every good." "The world that makes possible the spiritual process of learning to recognize and realize the best is the best world. I in no wise seek to justify evil. But I leave room for it" (H. Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, pp. 158, 268, 273-4).

"The world as a whole, is and must be absolutely good, since the infinite thought must know what is desirable, and knowing it, must have present in itself the true objects of desire." "Why canst thou not do any absolute evil? Because thy evil intent,

of man and God, and thus at the same time atonement of man

.. thy selfish will, thy struggle against the moral insight is an element in the organic life of God. In him thy evil impulses form part of a total good will, as the evil impulse of a good man forms an element in his realization of goodness. In God thy separateness is destroyed, and with it thy sin as evil. The evil will is a conquered element in the good will, and is as such necessary to goodness." "God's life includes, in the organic total of one conscious eternal instant, all life, and so all goodness and evil... God is nevertheless perfectly good. He so includes the evil will in the structure of his good will as the good man includes his evil will in his good will" (Royce, *Rel Aspect of Phil*, pp 444, 454, 456, 457). "If moral evil were simply destroyed and wiped away from the external world, the knowledge of moral goodness would also be destroyed. What you mean when you say that evil in this temporal world ought not to exist, and ought to be suppressed, is simply what God means by seeing that evil ought to be and is endlessly thwarted, endured, but subordinated. You can never clean the world of evil, but you can subordinate evil. The knowledge and presence of evil form a moment in the consciousness and in the life of goodness" (*Studies of Good and Evil*, pp 24, 28, 112). "My guilt is as enduring as time." "The world, as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all. The atoning deed has brought, as a fact, such good out of evil that, despite the evil deed, the world is better than it could have been if the evil deed had not been done. The atoning deeds are the most creative of the expressions which the community gives, through the deed of an individual, to its will that the unity of the spirit should triumph, not only despite, but through, the greatest tragedies—the tragedies of deliberate sin" (*The Problem of Christianity*, I, pp 261, 307-8, 373, 378). "This very presence of ill in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal order" (*World and the Individual*, II, p 385).

"The moral point of view cannot be final." "By my claim to be one with the ideal and by assertion of the non-reality of all that is opposed to it, the evil in the world and the evil incarnate in me through past bad acts, all falls into the unreal: I being one with the ideal, this is not mine, and so imputation of offences goes with a change of self, and applies not now to my true self, but to the unreal. Of course the bad self does not cease. For religious faith the end of the evolution... is already evolved" (Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, pp 279, 293). "'Heaven's design' can realize itself as effectively in 'Catiline or Borgia' as in the scrupulous or innocent" (*Appearance and Reality*, p 202).

"Nothing but good is a reality" (Bosanquet, *Essays and Addresses*, p. 124). "The universe may be perfect owing to the very fact, among others, that it includes, as conditions of finite life, both moral good and evil" (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p 218). "In pure morality the individual must always count as bad. In religion also he is always bad, but yet he is really and truly good." "Religion 'justifies' the religious man. It does not abolish his finiteness—his weakness and his sin. But what it does is to make him deny that they are real" (*What Religion Is*, pp 9, 49).

"To doubt God's existence is at bottom nothing but to doubt whether the universe, in its real nature, is such as to justify the religious attitude towards it, whether it deserves to be worshipped" (R F A Hoernlé, *Matter, Life, Mind and God*, pp 192-8).

"Evil is a negative, not a positive term. It denotes the absence rather than the presence of something. It is the perceived privation of good, the shadow where the light ought to be. Evil is not an intruder in an otherwise perfect universe, finiteness presumes

and man.\*In other words it is redemption, emancipation from finitude. The means is knowledge of the truth, insight into the

it Evil is not a principle at war with good Good is being, and evil is not-being Instead of asking how evil came to be in the universe we should recognize that nothing finite can exist without it In our present state of existence evil is necessary, that we may know that there is such a thing as good Your perception of evil is the concomitant of your expanding finite consciousness of good " 'Sin itself is a quest for God—a blundering quest, but a quest for all that That drunken debauch was a quest for life, a quest for God Men in their sinful follies to-day, and their blank atheism, and their foul blasphemies, their trampling upon things that are beautiful and good, are engaged in this dim, blundering quest for God, whom to know is life eternal The *roué* you saw in Piccadilly last night who went out to corrupt innocence and to wallow in filthiness of the flesh, was engaged in his blundering quest for God " (R J Campbell, *The New Theology*, pp 43-5, 153)

" Divine Love requires the varying forms of evil for the perfecting of love If we are selfish the world is for us the worst of all possible worlds, but if we love, it is the best " (William Temple, *Mens Creatrix* pp 290, 291)

" Every object which is in relation to the consciousness of the Absolute, in which the Absolute consciousness is manifested, as it must be completely and indivisibly, must partake of the perfection of the Absolute The total system of things in which the Absolute is revealed shares in its perfection Now, if the total system of things is perfect, there must be a point of view from which every constituent element of it is perfect It is impossible to say that the universe in which everything is imperfect is as a whole, perfect " (Hiralal Halder *Neo-Hegelianism*, 1927, p 443)

\* " The reconciliation of the Divine Being with its antithesis as a whole and specifically with the thought of this other—evil—[may be] presented in a figurative way [or] conceptually " " [According to] the imaginative idea (*Vorstellung*) Divine Being is reconciled with its existence through an event—the event of God's Emptying Himself of Himself, relinquishing His Divine Being through His factual Incarnation and His Death " " Implicitly and essentially, the knowledge of nature as the untrue inadequate expression of Spirit's existence, and this universality of self which has thereby arisen within the life of the self—these constitute the reconciliation of Spirit with itself " " The world is no doubt implicitly reconciled with the Divine Being, and that Being no doubt knows that it no longer regards the object as alienated from itself, but as one with itself in its Love But for self-consciousness this immediate presence has not yet the form and shape of spiritual reality " (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, pp 789, 793, 799)

" Men like Robert Blatchford of *The Clarion*, are being saved while trying to save His moral earnestness is a mark of his Christhood, and his work a part of the Atonement " " Go into any home where the spirit of self-sacrificing love is trying to do anything to supply a need or save a transgressor, and you see the Atonement " (R J Campbell, *The New Theology*, pp 172-3, 211)

" When cultural ideas directed against current orthodox Christianity first made an impression on my mind, it was more than anything else the doctrine of vicarious atonement, literally construed, that seemed shocking and unjust And it was with some interest and not without surprise that, taking stock of one's convictions, after a long development, one found that what was obviously the intention of the doctrine in question, so far from remaining the great stumbling block in Christianity, had become pretty nearly

essential and ultimate unreality of sin, and indeed, of all that is finite when viewed in abstraction from the Absolute or God. Empirically this atonement or redemption may come to us through an historic Mediator or Interpreter, who makes real to our imagination as well as to our thought the truth that our true self and the true self of every other rational spirit is the Divine Self. When it is seen that one's neighbor is one's self, and that that self is the Absolute, ideal Self, or God, it becomes evident that it would be only rational to love God with all one's heart and mind, and one's neighbor as one's self.

This atonement or redemption involves participation in eternal life,\* that is, in the life of the Infinite and Eternal.

its sole attractive feature. One had passed I suppose, from an individualistic rationalism to an appreciation of the world of spiritual membership' (Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 147)

\* "Man as Spirit is immortal, is an object of God's interest, is raised above finitude and dependence, above external circumstances: he has freedom to abstract himself from everything, and this implies that he can escape mortality." "The immortality of soul is the actual present quality of Spirit. Spirit is eternal and for this reason is already present. Spirit, as possessed of freedom, does not belong to the sphere of things limited, it, as being what thinks and knows in an absolute way, has the universal for its object, this is eternity which is not simply duration, as duration can be predicated of mountains, but knowledge. Spirit must become adequate to its conception or notion, it must become universal spirit. (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, III, pp. 57, 58) "The individual soul has an infinite, an eternal quality, namely that of being a citizen in the Kingdom of God. The infinite demand to see God, i.e., to become conscious in spirit of His truth as present truth is in this temporal Present not yet satisfied so far as consciousness in its character as ordinary consciousness is concerned" (*ibid.*, p. 105). "Spirit is immortal, it is eternal, and it is immortal and eternal in virtue of the fact that it is infinite. The infinitude of spirit is its inwardness and this is its thought and this abstract thought is real present infinitude, while its concrete inwardness consists in the fact that this thought is Spirit" (*ibid.*, p. 302).

'The immortality of the soul as = the eternity of thought = the being of God. To deny the 'immortality of the soul' in this sense is to maintain the destructibility of thought, and this is a contradiction in terms, for destruction has no meaning except in relation to thought. As a determination of thought everything is eternal. Relatively to our temporal consciousness [things] have perished, relatively to the thought, which, as eternal, holds past, present and future together they are permanent, their very transitoriness is eternal' (T. H. Green, *Works*, III, p. 159). "Eternal life is not presented to the Christian as an ultimate reward, but as a present reality" (Green, quoted by Nettleship in Green, *Works*, III, p. xxvii).

"There is at least the possibility for all men of a life which transcends the world of time and sense, and in virtue of which in his seeming weakness he can triumph over

This is not an experience postponed until after death ; eternal life can begin here and now just as well as after the death of the body. It is becoming rational, participation in the eternality of Absolute Reason. If the purposes of Absolute Reason manifesting itself in the temporal order should require the continued temporal existence of the finite individual after the dissolution of the physical body,

all external forces and limits, and claim affiance with God and the boundless realm of the infinite and eternal " (J Caird, *University Sermons* p 319) " In later years, he thought much on the question of immortality, but the only evidence for it that seemed to him of any real value, was that derived from the spiritual view of the nature of reality and from the goodness that must belong to a God who is a Spirit " (E Caird, on J Caird, in the latter's *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, p cxli)

" If the world and human life has an ethical purpose in it in some way or other our efforts must be not all in vain, and I begin to see that ' humanity ' apart from its individual members is an unreal abstraction " (D G Ritchie *Philosophical Studies*, p 64) " The individual life may continue, if that is best or be merged in the universal, if that is best " (*ibid*, p 238)

" I build my belief in immortality on the conviction that the fundamental reality of the universe is consciousness and that no consciousness can ever be extinguished, for it belongs to the whole, and must be fulfilled in the whole [It is] unthinkable that any kind of being which has ever become aware of itself, that is, has ever contained a ray of the eternal consciousness, can perish " (R J Campbell, *The New Theology*, pp 230-231)

" We know nothing about individual immortality nothing about any endless future progress of our species All that is dark We know only that the highest Truth is already attained from all eternity in the Infinite Thought and that in and for that Thought the victory that overcometh the world is once for all won Whatever happens to our poor selves, we know that the Whole is perfect " (J Royce *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885, p 478) " When you want immortality you want what rationally means that this moral individual, at home as he is in God's world does not remain fragmentarily expressed as on earth he is expressed, in a life of broken chance You want to know that somewhere he—this individual, he himself and not another—knows himself as fulfilled after his own kind Philosophy here supports tradition This is a moral world All moral battles get fought out All quests are fulfilled 'The goal—yes, your individual goal—is by yourself attained in the eternal life You yourself, and not merely another consciously know in the eternal world the attainment of that goal But how your eternal experience of your perfection is individually realized by you, is a question which cannot be answered, in so far as you remain on this shoal of time " (Royce, *Conception of God*, 1897, p 326) " Individuality we mean and seek That, in God, we win and consciously win, and in a life that is not this present mortal life I pretend not to guess by what processes this individuality of our human life is further expressed I know only that our various meanings, through whatever vicissitudes of fortune, constantly come to what we individually, and God in whom alone we are individuals, shall together regard as the attainment of our unique place, and of our true relationships both to other individuals and to the all-inclusive Individual, God himself "

such continued existence will be a fact. But in any case it will not be in any such future finite existence that the life which is truly eternal will consist, but in the experience involved in truly knowing the Absolute, the only true God, whatever the temporal mediation of this knowledge may be.

The possession of Eternal Life will manifest itself in religious experience,\* that is, in living according to the truth. In other

(*The Conception of Immortality*, 1900, pp 77, 80) "As to the problem of immortality it is one that I long deliberately declined, as a student of philosophy, to discuss in any formal way, because for years after I published, in my *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, my first statement of that general idealistic view of Being which I have ever since maintained, I was not clear as to how the general doctrine ought to apply to the case of the finite Individual. I plainly insisted that, in the Absolute all finite individual lives, wills, meanings are consciously recognized, fulfilled and justly expressed, precisely as they deserve to be. But I was not clear as to what consequences were involved in this thesis when one applied it to the question as to the continued existence of *this man* as he at present conceives himself. I may add that, since childhood, I have never had any faith about the problem of Immortality except in so far as I have seemed to myself to see philosophical reasons for such faith, and that I regard the whole issue as one for reason" (*The World and the Individual*, II, pp xiii-xv)

"The Self possesses individuality in God and for God. I know not consciously what my own individuality is. But God knows. And now God knows this in so far as, in the eternal world, in my final union with him I know myself as real. In God's will, and as united to him, my will does win unique expression. What is, however, in the idealistic world is somewhere known. The knowing, however, that my will wins unique expression in my life is, *ipso facto*, my individual and conscious knowing. Hence in God, in the eternal world, my own self attains an insight into my own reality and uniqueness" (*The World and the Individual*, II, pp 433-434). "Since this is my duty, nobody else in the universe—no, not God, in so far as God is other than myself—can do this duty for me. My duty I must myself do. And wherever in time I stand, I am dissatisfied with what is so far done. I must pass on to the next. As an ethical personality I have an insatiable need for an opportunity to find, to define and to accomplish my individual and unique duty. This need of mine is God's need in me and of me. Seen, then, from the eternal point of view, my personal life must be an endless series of deeds" ("Immortality" in *William James and Other Essays*, pp 292, 297).

"What is united with the eternal is eternal" (Bosanquet, *What Religion Is*, p. 27).

\* "What seems to be my act is God's, and conversely, too, what seems His is mine. This runs counter to the merely moral standpoint of Kant and Fichte" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, I, p 228).

"The capacity for the conception of being better forms the inchoate impulse to realize the conception, and the possibility of its realization. The prevalent wish to be better constitutes the being better. Whether or no in any individual case it shall obtain that prevalence, depends.. on the social influences brought to bear on the man,

words, its evidences are actual participating in the rational and Holy Spirit of God. Justification comes by faith alone, but only because true faith is never alone, it leads to works of righteousness. Faith is the conscious identification of the self with the Ideal, the Divine Man, who is identical at once with one's true self and, ultimately, with God. It is only as such identification becomes a conscious fact, implicitly if not explicitly, that the rational ideal comes to be progressively realized in the finite individual in the time order. Sanctification is through the Truth, and the word of God—the self-expression of the Absolute Idea—is truth. It is the work of the immanent God himself.

Fundamental, then, to religion is revelation\* of God, the Absolute. In a very real sense all growth of knowledge comes

but the influences effective for the purpose all have their origin, ultimately, in the desire to be better on the part of other men, as carrying with it a desire for the bettering of those in whom they are interested. The 'Grace of God' works through no other channels but such as fall under this general description" (Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 110)

"What we are in God's sight is determined by that identification with a divine ideal which constitutes the Christian faith" (J. Caird, *University Sermons*, p. 126). "In that act which constitutes the beginning of the religious life—call it faith, or trust or self surrender, or by whatever name you will—there is involved the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realised" (J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 284)

"To your private self you must die, and by faith be made one with the ideal ... You must believe that you too are really one with the divine, and must act as if you believed it. In short you must be justified not by works but solely by faith." "Faith is both the belief in the reality of an object and the will that that object be real" (Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, pp. 290-291)

"Faith is, in fact, nothing but the name for the central paradox of the system—the doctrine that by recognizing yourself as already perfect in the perfect Absolute you become perfect" (A. E. Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*, p. 433)

\* "The Divine Being is revealed. Its being revealed obviously consists in this, that what it is, is consciously known. It is known as spirit, as a Being which is essentially self-consciousness" (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 769). "God reveals Himself, it is said, in Nature, but God cannot reveal Himself to Nature, because God is Spirit, He can reveal Himself to Man only, who thinks and is Spirit" (*Philosophy of Religion*, III, p. 195)

"The whole world of human experience is the revelation of an eternal and absolute being" (Nettlehip, on Green, *Works*, III, p. lxxxvii). "[Man] cries for a revelation of [God] yet will not be persuaded that his hiding place is the intelligible world, and that he is incarnate in the son of man, who through the communicated strength of thought is lord also of that world" (Green, *Works*, III, p. 87).

by divine revelation. Scientists are true prophets of God, and their ability to predict the future is the proof of the genuineness of their revelation. Dogmatists and traditionalists in religion, opposing science in the name of religion, are fighting against the true and living God. And yet, while all advance in knowledge, all education, is man's progressive appropriation of what, from the side of the Absolute, is progressive self-revelation, it is also true that there is a revelation in which the religious consciousness is especially interested, namely, a revelation of what is most fundamental to the true way of life.

Hegel and his Christian followers have found it possible to read in or into their philosophical creed what they take to be the essential elements of their inherited belief in a God-man and in a Trinity within the Divine Unity. The ideal or rational man is, or would be, as such, a Divine Man. All empirical men are finite, incompletely divine; but in ideal, as an absolutely complete Self, the deeper Self in each of the many persons is God. In the Christ of Christian tradition, it is claimed, we get the true idea of man: when we contemplate that ideal figure we discover that sin is not essential to the idea of man, that goodness, rationality, divinity is his true essence. Historical criticism may possibly rob us of a Jesus in whom this Christ-ideal was actually exemplified, but in any case no historical criticism can take from us the ideal Christ. An apocalypse of divine humanity was and always will be an advent to be expected, for the reason that man is implicitly rational and divine; but that apocalypse will not involve any violation of the rational processes of evolution in nature and

"Revelation is intensely natural" (J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas*, I, p. 15)

"The conviction that God can be known, and is known, and that in the deepest sense all our knowledge is knowledge of Him, was the corner stone of his theology" (E. Caird concerning J. Caird, in *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* I, pp. cxxi-ii).

"All that we know as best and highest in the lives or ideas of others or in our own thoughts, that is the ideal, the revelation of God, the only God we can practically know and in whom it is a duty to have faith. This ideal in a progressive age or mind constantly grows. That is the perpetual revelation of God to man, the Holy Spirit 'leading us to all truth'" (D. G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies* pp. 58-59)



humanity. Its appearance is the blessed hope of all ages, all peoples, all religions.\*

\* "This incarnation of the Divine Being is the simple content of Absolute Religion. Here the Divine Being is known as Spirit, this religion is the Divine Being's consciousness concerning itself that it is Spirit. For spirit is knowledge of itself in its state of self-relinquishment, the absolute Reality, which is the process of retaining its harmony and identity with itself in its otherness. In this form of religion the Divine Being is, on that account, *revealed*." "Merely eternal, or *abstract* Spirit becomes in other to itself: it enters existence, and, in the first instance, enters *immediate* existence. It creates a world. This 'Creation' is the word which pictorial presentative thought uses to convey the absolute movement which the notion itself goes through. The world, however, is not merely spirit thus thrown out and scattered in all its plenitude with an external order imposed on it: for since spirit is essentially simple self, this self is likewise present therein. It is objectively existent spirit which is *individual* self, that has consciousness and distinguishes itself as other, as world, from itself." "The thought that absolute Being and self-existent Self are not inseparable appears in the form that the Divine Being empties itself of itself and is made flesh" (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, pp. 768-9, 781-2, 788). "This is the perfect religion, the Notion become objective to itself: the religion of the manifestation of God" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, II, pp. 327-328). "Knowledge supplies the principle of man's divineness; it involves the promise and certainty of attaining once more the state in which Man is the image of God" (*ibid.*, III, p. 54). "What we are concerned to show is that this idea, namely, the unity of Divine and human nature, attains the stage of certainty. This unity must accordingly show itself in one particular man, in a definite individual who is at the same time known to be the Divine Idea: the absolute Idea: the son of God" (*ibid.* III, p. 73).

"All religion consists in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of imagination. The value of the religion depends on the adequacy of the imagined form to the object thought of. To think of God and to give expression or realisation to the thought in moral life, that is our first and eternal business: but that is not distinctively religion. For religion to exist we must in some mode imagine God, and the most nearly adequate imagination of him is as a man in whom that which seems to be the end of moral discipline and progress has been fully attained: viz. the union of the will with God: perfect unselfishness, the direction of desire to ends which one rational being can consciously share with all other rational beings. Such a 'man' would not be man as we know man, because the conditions of human existence in this world are such that this end can never be completely attained. Thus the religious imagination of God as Christ has to become the imagination of him as a 'glorified' Christ: a Christ such as Jesus of Nazareth was potentially, not actually, a Christ 'put to death in the flesh,' but alive and giving life in the spirit" (T. H. Green *Works* III, p. 219).

"By its cardinal doctrine of the unity of God and Man Christianity has dissolved the dualism which such notions involved: bridged the gulf between the finite and infinite which, apart from Christianity, was never spanned, and by its conception of the self-realization of God in humanity, solved the problem which baffled the greatest minds of ancient times" (J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas*, I, p. 22).

"If it was the founder of Christianity who first realised in its full meaning the truth that the consciousness of God is presupposed and implied in the consciousness of the

This Divine Man is the Son of God—not of course in the crude literalistic sense in which the Christian dogma of incarnation and sonship presents itself to Mohammedan minds, and to which they rightly take strong exception on grounds of the spirituality and unity of God, but the Divine Man, in the Hegelian interpretation of the traditional dogma, is the objectification of the Divine Idea, or Reason, in the finite world and particularly in human history. The Absolute Notion has become objective to itself\* in space and time; God is made real to our imaginations in and through the Truth and Beauty and Goodness of a rational human life. "God as living Spirit distinguishes Himself from Himself, posits an Other, and in this Other remains identical with Himself, and has in this other His self-identity with Himself."† The eternal idea in and for itself is the truth of the pictorial religious thought of God the Father, the eternal Idea expressing itself in the realm of finite consciousness is the essential meaning of the thought of God the Son; and the realization of the Divine Ideal of a universal spiritual fellowship is the essential truth in the idea of God the Holy Spirit as an indwelling Presence in the Beloved Community. In such terms as these Hegel and his followers presented what one of them has called, "the doctrine of the Trinity or something like it."‡ If it is a trinitarian doctrine it is surely one which ought not to be particularly repugnant to Jews or Mohammedans,

world, and even more directly in the consciousness of self—and that therefore a self-conscious being cannot know what he really is, or realise his good except in utter self-surrender to God—then there is a supreme reason why all generations of men should call him divine, not indeed as isolated from others, but as the 'first-born of many brethren' " (E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, II, p. 230)

"The fullest revelation of the nature of the Deity is man at his best, the perfect man" (Henry Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 227)

"The idea of a Divine Man, the emanation of the infinite, the Soul of the universe, the source and goal of all humanity, is ages older than Christian theology" "Jesus was God, but so are we. He was God because His life was the expression of Divine Love, we, too, are one with God in so far as our lives express the same thing" (R. J. Campbell, *The New Theology*, pp. 89-90, 94)

\* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, II, pp. 327-328.

† *Ibid.*, III, p. 69

‡ R. J. Campbell, *The New Theology*, p. 85.

and which ought to be at least as acceptable to Hindus as to Christians.\*

\* " Spirit is content of its consciousness to begin with in the form of pure substance, in other words, it is content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the process of descending into existence, the sphere of particularity. The middle term between these two is their synthetic connexion, the consciousness of passing into otherness, the process of ideal presentation as such. The third state is the return from representation in idea and from that otherness, in other words, it is the element of self-consciousness itself " (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 776) " There are three moments to be distinguished: immanent absolute Being, explicit self-existence, which is the antithesis, the express otherness, of Being, and for which that Being is object, and Self-existence or Self-knowledge in that other, in that antithetic expression " (*ibid.* p. 776) " Spirit is Spirit knowing its own self " (*ibid.* p. 796) Substance has here attained to being absolute self-consciousness " (*ibid.* p. 797) " This is the notion of the absolute Idea, and the reality is now Spirit which exists for Spirit, which has made itself its object " " The true, right spirit, the Holy Spirit apprehends and knows the Divine " (*Philosophy of Religion*, II, pp. 334, 345) " The universal Spirit, the Whole which this spirit is, posits itself with its three characteristics or determinations, develops itself, realises itself, and only at the end we have in a completed form what constitutes at the same time its presupposition. The three forms indicated are: eternal Being in and with itself, the form of Universality, the form of manifestation or appearance, that of Particularisation, being for another, the form of the return from appearance into itself: absolute singleness or individuality. The divine Idea unfolds itself in these three forms. Spirit is divine history, the process of self-differentiation, of separation or dismemberment, and of the resumption of this. The divine history in its first form takes place outside of the world, outside of finitude where there is no space, representing God as He is in His essential being or in and for Himself. The second form is represented by the divine history in a real shape in the world, God in definite completed existence. The third stage is represented by the inner place, the Spiritual Community, existing at first in the world, but at the same time raising itself up to heaven " (*ibid.* III, pp. 2-3)

" Though the religious imagination may require, as historically it did require (whether it does is not so certain), a belief in the manifestation of God under the ordinary conditions of an individual human life as its starting point, it equally requires that this belief should pass into a belief in a person now spiritually present to and in us " (T. H. Green, *Works*, III, p. 220)

" Self-consciousness includes of necessity two inseparable elements, a self or subject which thinks, and an object which is thought of—not to speak of a third element, the unity or oneness of these two. To conceive of God as an abstract self-identical infinite would be to make Him, not greater, but less than man. Can we think of this finite world as constituting for infinite as for finite intelligence the medium of its self-realization? Have we here that second half of infinitude, in the knowledge and love of which the riches of the divine nature are unfolded? There is a sense in which this is true—God reveals Himself to Himself in nature and in the finite spirits He has made in His own image " " Unity in difference [is] the very essence of all intelligence, human or Divine. " " A reciprocity of thought and feeling in the life of the Eternal, . . . God as knowing and being known, loved and being loved by God " " The Divine Spirit that was embodied in the life of Christ is one and the same divine presence in all " (J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas*, I, pp. 65, 69, 73, 78, 79, II, 252, 253).

Such, at any rate, is the Hegelian or idealist statement of the absoluteness of Christianity. Does it conserve all that is best in historic Christianity? Fundamentally considered, is it more Christian than Hindu? One cannot but wonder whether, if Hegel had been born in India and brought up under the influence of the religious traditions of India, he would not have found some way of defending the absoluteness of some form of Indian religion. It is not without interest that when Principal Caird undertook to illustrate the principle that it is only in the light of the idea of religion that the history of religions can be understood, the history to which he went for his illustration was the religious history

' The three persons of the Trinity must be viewed as three phases or elements in the conception of God. God the Father must be regarded as an abstract conception of the infinite fulness of being which is involved in the Divine Nature, God, the Son, as an expression of the essential nature of God as self-objectifying, and God the Spirit as expressing the essential nature of God as a self-determinant and self-conscious Unity. But these logical distinctions do not imply that there are three distinct persons. What is true is that God is essentially self-existent, self-manifesting, self-knowing. God must be conceived as a person, or, as I should prefer to say, as a Spirit " (J. Watson, *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 354) " The doctrine of the Holy Spirit constitutes the essence of Christian theology " (*Interpretation of Religious Experience*, I, p. vii) " We must regard abstract personality as abolished in the Divine Unity. God is self-manifesting, conscious of himself as self-manifesting, and therefore self-unifying " (*Ibid*, p. 344)

" Does not the doctrine of the Trinity, as against the abstract Theism of the Jews, reject the conception of personality as inadequate? If God be thought of only as Creator, there can be no religion except a religion of wonder. But God is also the Son—He reveals Himself in man—and man requires our love and service. Lastly, through all the efforts of man moves the Spirit of God, bringing man back to Him, or, what is the same thing, manifesting God in man. And this is an eternal process. God for ever is in Himself the same, for ever he goes out of himself to become other, for ever He returns to Himself. The one is many, the universal, particular " (Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, p. 241. Cf. *D'Arcy Idealism and Theology*, p. 93, C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality, passim*, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, pp. 17, 18, " God and the World," in *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, II, 1927, p. 297)

" The article of the creed regarding the Holy Spirit, if I am right, is, in many respects, the really distinctive and therefore the capital article of the Christian creed, so far as that creed suggests a theory of the divine nature. Apart from the doctrine of the ideal community, and of the Divine Spirit as constituting the unity and the life of this community, Theism is not distinctively Christian in its meaning. The idea of the community gives us one of our very best indications of the way in which the problem of the One and the many is to be solved " (Rovce, *Problem of Christianity*, II, pp. 15-18).

of India.\* In any case this much seems clear : absolute idealism offers itself as a unity of differences, a way of reconciliation of all historical conflicts. If it can make good its claim to be the ultimate philosophy, a way to universality in religion is plainly in sight. The primary question for our consideration is whether with its attainment to this idealistic interpretation of religion, the pilgrimage of faith is over. The question, then, whether religion has now been safely, satisfactorily and permanently established in its true "promised land," or, in other words, whether absolute idealism may be regarded as the final word in religious philosophy, is the question to which we must next direct our attention.

\* *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 313-327.

## VI. THE THREAT OF CAPTIVITY · SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT IDEALISM

In our survey of the rational idealism which, from the point of view of our pilgrimage of faith, we have spoken of as the promised land, we have discovered enough to confirm the report of the spies. It is indeed in many respects a goodly land of corn and wine, of milk and honey. It is the promised land for the reason that in the constitution of the human mind there is the promise that man shall possess knowledge of Reality and that Reality shall be discovered to be rational and therefore essentially good. Also it would seem that this initial faith in reason has had some very gratifying results. In the first place, the absolute idealism to which we have been led, if it is as certain as it claims to be, furnishes a satisfactory solution of the problem of knowledge. With its doctrine that the human self lives and has its being in the Absolute Self to which all things are immediately present as ideas it claims to meet the challenge of agnosticism and to show just how knowledge of reality is possible. But it offers not only knowledge of reality in general, but also religious knowledge in particular, thereby producing a feeling of intellectual self-respect in religion. Not only is its exclusion of miracle-faith no real injury to religion; it is a positive benefit in that it obviates the necessity of inquiring why a rational, good, and presumably impartial God, if he occasionally intervenes to counteract the processes of nature in order to save man from evil, does not work such miracles oftener. But besides this negation of miracle, there are many other features of the system which undoubtedly have great religious value. In truth, we have been able to construct on one of the high places of this promised land a goodly temple to the Most High God, at once the absolutely Supreme and the absolutely Rational and therefore absolutely Good, has been seen to be immanent, as the organizing principle and true Essence of everything, in the whole realm of

Nature and in the mind of man. A religious interpretation has thus been put upon all science and all morality ; all discovery of truth and all achievement of goodness are now seen as progressive revelation of the one true and perfect God. Thus a foundation is laid, in spite of all facts of evil, for an optimism whose appeal to the religious consciousness is very great. Finally, absolute idealism sets up the ideal of a single rational religion for all the world, and by mediating between religions seemingly very diverse, would seem to further our quest for universality in religion. For when Christianity is expressed in terms of absolute idealism, it presents remarkable likenesses to those forms of thought which have been most characteristic of Indian religion ; and the same thing would be true of Mohammedanism, I believe, if it were to be similarly stated in terms of a monistic speculative idealism.

But according to absolute idealism itself we must not stop the process of critical and constructive thinking, and it is surely permissible to raise the question whether this form of idealistic philosophy does not exhibit, even when interpreted rather conservatively, some very real defects, as seen from the point of view of practical experiential religion. It is true, as we have seen, that in many ways this land of the Real which is rational and the Rational which is real is a goodly land, a land wherein one can eat bread without scarceness. But possibly it may be well to consider the prophetic warning, "When thou hast eaten and art full, beware that thou forget not the Lord thy God who led thee through the terrible wilderness." Is there not a danger that the upshot of all this rationalizing of religion will be such a secularizing of it that instead of being more religious, we shall come to be less religious than we were either in the Egypt of traditionalism or in the wilderness of doubt? Is there not for the absolute idealist the danger of concluding that it is enough just to be in the Canaan of idealistic philosophy, and that it is not really necessary to cultivate the soil of a personal religion? It was one of the ablest of the younger absolute idealists who confessed a few years ago that "idealism in religion. ....shows, so far, no adequate comprehension of the atti-

tude of worship," and who set himself the difficult task of inducing the absolutist actually to worship his Absolute.\*

As a matter of fact, there are many who find it difficult to think of the all-inclusive, timeless Absolute of absolute idealism, the "absolutely totalized all-enveloper,"† in any such way as would be calculated to meet the need they feel for a living God. Hear the words of a well-known religious thinker to whom the Absolute of philosophy, so far from being the God of religion, had come to seem only the generic concept of a thing, deified and doubtfully personified "The Absolute! How sublime the sound! Dimly only do I remember that this word occupied my thoughts in youth, when the Hegelian terminology threatened to draw me as well as others into its vortex. That was a long time ago, and the word has become strange to me, since I found in it no fruitful thought."‡ The criticism is a serious one, and it can hardly be denied that it is possible to quote sayings of the Hegelians themselves which would seem to suggest some such unfavorable judgment. "God cannot really exist for the finite spirit as such," says Hegel § "At no point of time can it be truly said that God exists"—these are words which I remember to have heard used by the most eminent of American followers of Hegel, the late Professor Royce, in expounding the nature of the super-temporal Absolute. But if God does not exist now, never has existed, and never will exist, how, we may ask, can we expect any response from God

\* W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. xi. Compare the following passages from the same: "Some there are who will not deny finality to idealistic arguments, but who cannot worship the Absolute. And they do not find that religion consists in our human knowledge of this absolute Knower. *Denken*, they think, *ist nicht Gottesdienst*" (*ibid.*, p. vi). "Philosophy . . . is inclined to halt in the world of thought, unable to see what more than thinking may be involved in the act of prayer. It identifies *Gottesdienst* with *Denken*, and thereby impoverishes the meaning of worship" (*ibid.*, p. 342).

† William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 295.

‡ A. Ritschl, *Theologie und Metaphysik*, p. 18. Cf. William James, *Pragmatism*, p. 71. "You cannot redescend into the world of particulars by the Absolute's aid, or deduce any necessary consequences of detail for your life from your idea of his nature. He gives you indeed the assurance that all is well with *Him*, and for his eternal way of thinking, but thereupon he leaves you to be finitely saved by your own temporal devices."

§ *Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. III, p. 5.



in time to our religious adjustments, which are necessarily in time? Are we sure that the Absolute of idealistic philosophy, taken in its bare literalness and apart from the religious haze through which it is so often viewed, is indeed the object in which practical experiential religion is interested? Are we sure, when we have placed our reliance for religious assurance upon speculative philosophy rather than upon religious experience, that we may not have substituted an idol, a fiction of the human mind, for the true and living Saviour-God of vital moral religion? Is the Absolute a false Baal? In what, essentially, does the Absolute Reason of the idealists differ from the Goddess of Reason invented and set up as an object of worship by the French revolutionists?

But apart from the question of the idealistic Absolute's sufficiency or insufficiency as an object of religious interest, what is to be said of its significance for the moral consciousness? We must always beware of saving religion at the expense of morality. If my moral ideal for my own life is already or eternally realized in the Absolute, how can I logically avoid the conclusion that the categorical imperative of the moral law is a gigantic hoax, and that life, so far from being "real" and "earnest," is one prolonged "moral holiday"† in the sense that there is no such thing as absolutely pressing moral obligation? From the point of view of absolute idealism it would seem that if anyone is responsible for evil, including moral evil, it is not man, but God, the Absolute. Man can be held responsible only for what he does, not for what he suffers, and moral evil as mere defect, privation of being, cannot be a product of any positive act on the part of man. As having no positive reality from the point of view of the Absolute, it is bound to be eliminated ultimately, we are told, from the world of appearance. But, we may ask, if the unreality of moral evil for the Absolute and the ab-

\* "The 'possible self' is God" "[God] from the point of view given by our ignorance and want is merely possible" (T. H. Green, *Works*, III, p. 221) "We may have to confess that a knowledge of [the world] in its spiritual reality—such a knowledge of it as would be knowledge of God—is impossible to us" (*ibid.*, p. 145) "Apart from the religious consciousness the Absolute cannot be known as God" (C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, pp. 219, 220)

† William James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 74, 78; *a Pluralistic Universe*, p. 116.

solute idealist has not prevented its putting in an appearance in the temporal order in the past and present, what guarantee is there in its supposed absolute unreality that the evil appearance will not continue and even increase throughout an unending succession of future events? \* And if evil always will be actual in the time order, on what ground is it excluded from reality in the super-temporal but all-time-including Absolute?

Now the idealistic explaining away—not to say justifying—of moral evil is only a particular phase of a pronounced intellectualism, according to which there is no good, ultimately, but intellectual good, and no evil but intellectual evil (ignorance), for the apparently very good reason that nothing is real but Absolute Reason. Man is held to be essentially nothing but rational thought; morality is acting out rational ideas, and sin, as we have seen, is nothing but *not* acting out rational ideas; religion is rational self-identification with the Ideal of Absolute Reason; prayer is aspiration after rationality; salvation is enlightenment, deliverance from ignorance and its consequences through revelation, which is nothing but a learning of the Truth; and divinity itself is nothing more than subjective rationality and objective conformity thereto. Is all this an insight into ultimate truth, or is it an obliteration of real distinctions in the interests of a theory?

Once we have admitted the possible or probable justification, from a practical point of view, of such criticisms as have been suggested with reference to the concepts of God and evil in absolute idealism, it is easy to entertain misgivings with reference to other characteristic features of the philosophy in question. Is justice done, in this highly monistic ("singularistic") and deterministic system, to the individuality of human persons? † Is the

\* "If the existence of evil is not at present inconsistent with the perfection of the Deity, but is rather an element in that perfection, why should that existence ever become intolerable to him?" (C. F. D'Anczy, *Idealism and Theology*, pp. 176, 177)

† Even Stirling admits the difficulty in Hegelianism at this point. "Very obscure, certainly, in many respects is the system of Hegel, and in none, perhaps, obscurer than in how we are to conceive God as a subjective spirit, and man as a subjective spirit, and

absolute idealist able to interpret human self-determination in relation to determination by the Absolute in such a way as to preserve for man a genuine responsible freedom?"\* Can the highest conceivable moral ideal be adequately expressed in terms of mere self-realization, which is, on the face of it, the seeking of values primarily or even exclusively for the self, albeit the rational and

God and man as in mutual relation' (*The Secret of Hegel*, p. 166) Edward Caird, after speaking of "the process of man's life as a continuation of the self-revelation of the Absolute Being which begins in nature," indicates that while man is a self-conscious and self-determining spirit "he is nevertheless not absolutely individual. I do not deny," he adds, "that there are many difficulties in this view, difficulties with which I have not attempted to deal" (*Evolution of Religion*, II, p. 84). John Watson maintains that it is only by a process of absolute mental abstraction that persons "as such exist. In our relations to other selves abstract personality is surrendered, separate personality is transcended" (*Interpretation of Religious Experience* I, pp. 213, 214).

It does not seem clear that T. H. Green has made a place for real human freedom in the self-determining action of which he has so much to say. The motive determines the action, he admits, but the self, he contends, determines the motive. This action of the self, however, is viewed as the necessary outcome of circumstances and the already achieved character of the self. This means, it is admitted, that the human act is like all events, the necessary, or in other words, the only possible, result of the existing conditions. An attempt is made to find a place for freedom by insisting that the character is the self, and that, as a rational self-determining person, man has his true being in the one universal self-determining principle upon whose consciousness all subjects and objects depend, and in this way shares in the absolute freedom of that which determines everything and is itself determined by nothing but itself. But, we would ask, if the inner act of the self in determining the outer action is a necessary result of circumstances and character, and these in turn the necessary results of previous conditions, inner and outer, and so on back to a time before the conscious life of the human individual began, how can it be maintained that I freely determine what was already pre-determined before my conscious life began? It is only the ambiguity and obscurity of the idea of participation in the eternal self-conscious and self-determining principle that makes it possible to camouflage the absolute determinism and non-freedom of Green's self-determinism. (See *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book II, Chapter I.)

Ritchie, with greater frankness, perhaps, admits that absolute idealism differs from materialism not in contradicting it but in that it includes it in its own more complete account of conduct. "I have tried to show that one form of idealism is quite compatible with the materialistic monism which is nowadays the working hypothesis of every scientific explorer in every department. Materialistic monism, it seems to me, only becomes false when put forward as a complete philosophy of the universe, because it leaves out of sight the conditions of human knowledge, which the special sciences may conveniently disregard, but which a candid philosophy cannot ignore. I cannot, as yet, see any other way out of a hopeless controversy than that toward which I have been led, especially by the teaching of the late Thomas Hill Green on the one side, and by the influence of scientific friends on the other" (*Darwin and Hegel*, pp. vi-vii).

"social" self?\* And when idealists interpret immortality—as many of them do—to mean the mere eternal presence in the timeless or all-time-including Absolute of the individual's temporal life from birth to death, and not any extension of conscious existence in a time-order after the death of the body, is this anything more than the proverbial giving of a stone to those who are asking for bread?†

\* Green professes to include all that is essential in action for the welfare of others under the principle of rational self-realization. He argues that if we act rationally we will necessarily present to ourselves our own permanent well-being as a social well-being, and thus we can do by identifying ourselves with a society whose well-being is to us as our own (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 232). But let us suppose the case of an individual confronted with the necessity of sacrificing either his own physical life or the highest spiritual well-being of society, and let us suppose, further, that immortality appears to him as at best very doubtful. Must he not, to be moral, choose the future good of others, even if it should seem to be choosing *nothingness* for himself? And how can such a choice be adequately and without artificiality interpreted in terms of *self-realization*, even of a "social" self? Identification of the self with others, on the basis of the idealistic doctrine that all selves are really but one in the Absolute is simply a means of obscuring the inadequacy of the ultra-individualistic ethics of self-realization as a means of expressing the moral ideal of unselfish love and social service. Hobhouse is a safer guide than Green at this point (see L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, especially Chapters V to VIII). "The rational good is not the good for the individual as an independent unit, it is the good of the whole of which he forms a part. It is reasonable so to act as to further the good of the whole. Yet in a discordant world sacrifice is often necessary. Even if we insist that in self-sacrifice the individual is choosing the least bad, and, therefore, the relatively good, for himself, that is not the rational motive. The rational motive is that his action furthers the general good. If we are asked whether in self-sacrifice the individual does not abandon his good, we must affirm or deny it, according to the sense in which the words are taken. The essential points are (1) that he sacrifices the good of self, so far as it is conceived in antithesis to the good of the whole, (2) that the reason for this sacrifice is not that it is a truer good for the individual, but that it is for the good of the whole, (3) that the necessity of such sacrifice rests on existing disharmonies, that is to say, is bad. The realization of the common good cannot, therefore, be regarded in an optimistic spirit as a simple sum of self-realizations" (*The Rational Good*, pp. 204, 205, 206).

† "The 'immortality of the soul' as equal to the eternity of thought equals the being of God. To deny the immortality of the soul in this sense is to maintain the destructibility of thought, and thus is a contradiction in terms, for destruction has no meaning except in relation to thought. As a determination of thought, everything is eternal. Men, like everything else, is eternal as a determination of thought. Relatively to our temporal consciousness, they have perished, relatively to thought, which, as eternal, holds past, present, and future together, they are permanent, their very transitoriness is eternal" (T. H. Green, *Works*, III, p. 159). Compare with this H. Münsterberg's *The Eternal Life*. John Caird finds in the idea of corporate immortality—participating with

These unfavourable criticisms of absolute idealism from the point of view of religion would receive confirmation and added emphasis from a consideration of some of the later developments of idealistic thought in what may still be called, in a broad sense of the term, the Hegelian School. In Bradley, Bosanquet, and some of their followers we see what may be regarded as the English counterpart of the older left-wing Hegelianism in Germany. That earlier movement, represented by the materialistic Feuerbach and the pantheistic Strauss, interpreted the Hegelian dictum, "Philosophy is the truth of religion," not with the right-wing Hegelians (of whom Stirling is the British counterpart) as meaning that the Hegelian philosophy proves the truth of traditional faith, but as meaning that speculative idealism includes what little truth there was in religion, but corrects it and leaves it far behind. Similarly the Hegelian definition of religion, as the Absolute Spirit's consciousness of itself through the mediation of the finite spirit, is taken, not as implying an eternal self-knowing spirit expressing itself in the temporal order in the gradual evolution of human reason and man's consciousness of the Absolute or God, but as meaning that apart from the human and other finite consciousness there is no conscious or spiritual reality in the universe.

Not quite so radical, perhaps, as this earlier left-wing Hegelianism, but, as we have suggested, moving in the same direction, is the British movement of which Bradley, Bosanquet, Taylor (in his earlier writings) and Collingwood may be taken as representatives.\*

other individuals in a "universal and undying life"—rather than in the idea of a merely individual immortality, "the explanation of the seeming incompleteness and evanescence of human life" (*University Sermons*, pp 184, 189) Immortality is to be thought of, "not as a vague and shadowy state of blessedness in some unknown existence beyond the grave, but as the realization of those possibilities of perfection which our nature contains, and which are present here and now, ready to be elicited in the earthly life of man" (*Ibid*, p 191) Elsewhere, indeed, Caird rightly objects to the substitution of the idea of corporate immortality for that of individual immortality, instead of making it the concomitant or complement of the other (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, II, pp 270, 272)

\* 'The way of taking the world which I have found most tenable is to regard it as a single Experience, superior to relations and containing in the fullest sense everything which

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On the one hand, they follow Green in regarding relations as the work of thought, but they make, on the other hand, a sharp distinction between Reality, the subject-matter of all our judgments,

18 We have then the Absolute Reality appearing in and to finite centres and uniting them in one experience. The immanence of the Absolute in the finite centres, and of finite centres in the Absolute, I have always set down as inexplicable. In the main I inherited this doctrine from others." (F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 245, 246) The part of this world-view which is most distinctively Bradleyian is the statement that the Absolute Experience is "superior to relations" (cf. "The Absolute is not any scheme of relations," *Appearance and Reality*, second edition p. 195), although it was probably suggested by Green's view of relations as the work of mind. "Can thought, however complete, be the same as reality, the same altogether, I mean, and with no difference between them? This is a question to which I could never give an affirmative reply" (*Appearance and Reality*, second edition, p. 354). This is a reaffirmation of that earlier statement of Bradley's doctrine of the super-rationality of reality. "Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence—a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational. The notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. Our principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more make that whole which commands our devotion, than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful" (*Principles of Logic*, second edition, II, p. 591). "In every judgment the genuine subject is reality, which goes beyond the predicate, and of which the predicate is an adjective" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 168). "Thought's relational content can never be the same as the subject, either as that subject appears or as it really is" (*ibid.*, p. 179). "Thought to reach its goal must get beyond relations. Yet in its nature it can find no other working means of progress" (*ibid.*, pp. 181, 182). "Every bare conjunction is contradictory when taken up by thought, because thought in its nature is incapable of conjunction. Contradiction is appearance.

Contradiction is everywhere necessary. *Appearances* are the stuff of which the universe is made" (*ibid.*, pp. 571, 572). From this point of view our thought of God is necessarily different from the reality. "God is necessarily led to end in the Absolute, which for religion is not God. If you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the God of religion. If again you separate them God becomes a finite factor in the Whole.

Short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and, having reached that goal, he is lost and religion with him. God is not God till he has become all in all, and a God which is all in all is not the God of religion. God is but an aspect—an appearance of the Absolute. The God which could exist would most assuredly be no God. It is a confused attempt to seize and hold in religion that Absolute, which, if it really were attained, would destroy religion" (*ibid.* pp. 146-450). "The Absolute for me cannot be God, because in the end the Absolute is related to nothing. When you begin to worship the Absolute or the Universe you have transformed it. It has become something less than the Universe. A personal God is not the ultimate truth about the Universe.

The highest Reality must be super-personal. The belief in God as a separate individual—I can accept as true, but only if it is supplemented by other beliefs which really contradict it. All truth must be imperfect. We are everywhere dependent on useful mythology. Absolutism, as I understand it, can fully warrant

and the thoughts or ideas which we construct and use as predicates. Absolute Reality is still regarded as one all-inclusive *Experience*—in some one of the many possible senses of that much-abused

relative and inconsistent truths. When a blind devotion to consistency is seen to involve either in the end worse inconsistency, or else mutilation of religion, there will be perhaps the readiness to be content with that relative truth which is based on Absolutism " (*Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 428, 430-431, 432, 436, 438) " Goodness, as such, is but appearance which is transcended in the Absolute. The good is not the Whole, and the Whole, as such, is not good. And viewed thus in relation to the Absolute, there is nothing either bad or good, there is not anything better or worse. But the Absolute appears in its phenomena. It manifests itself in goodness and badness. And so the Absolute is good. In the Absolute everything finite attains the perfection which it seeks, but not precisely as it seeks it " (*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 411, 419, 429)

Bouanquet, in his earlier statements of his position, subscribes to the view that the world is our consciousness. " Each one of us is shut up alone inside a circular panorama. The things and persons depicted in it move and act upon one another, but all this is in the panorama and not beyond it. The individual cannot get outside this encircling scenery, and no one else can get inside it. Everyone of us has painted for himself the picture within which he is shut up, and he is perpetually painting and repainting it. This magical panorama, from which the individual cannot escape and the laws of which are the laws of his experience, is simply his own mind regarded as a content or world. The whole world, for each of us, is our course of consciousness, in so far as this is regarded as a system of objects which we are obliged to think. Every mind is a working system of presentations. In one sense my mind is in my head, in the other sense my head is in my mind " (*Essentials of Logic*, pp. 14, 15, 17). This panorama is the world of appearance. Reality as distinguished from mere appearance, is that larger whole to which we are led in thought by the attempt to eliminate contradiction from the world of our conscious experience. " This positive and constructive principle of non contradiction forces us to the conception of the Absolute " " What we call the individual is a living world of content which in it strives after unity and completeness because it has in it the active spirit of non contradiction, the form of the whole " " The Absolute is merely something more of what we are continually experiencing, simply the high-water mark of fluctuations in experience, of which, in general, we are daily and normally aware. The Absolute is not present in its full nature within any finite experience but [while] we experience nothing perfectly, the Absolute we experience in everything " " The Absolute [is] the transmutation and rearrangement of particular experiences by inclusion in a completer whole of experience " " The levels of experience form different worlds with different degrees of reality, though they are nothing but one and the same world, more or less fully experienced " " In our everyday world the unitary experience is *prima facie* wanting. But, our life contains power and insight by which without in any way denying that things are what they are, we can frame some positive conception of what more they must be, and how if we take them as such a 'more,' they are more themselves and plainly indicate their full nature to lie in the universe of a single experience " " There is no rule as to how far 'persons' can overlap in their contents. It is impotence, and no mysterious limitation that keeps them apart. At their strongest they become confluent, and

term But Absolute Reality is also regarded as being beyond all relations. It is not rational—here Hegel is left behind—but super-rational, super-moral, super-personal But while the in-

we see how they might be wholly so There is no hard barrier set that can make our being discontinuous with others or with the perfect experience " " Our argument rests on the necessary fusion of experiences relevant to each other Transmutation must be the rule in the complete experience Everything must be there but not as analysed into temporal moments and yet drawn out unchanged into a panorama within a spacious present of unmeasurable span " (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp 267 289, 373, 375, 377, 378, 386, *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p xxi, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp xxi, 391) The last quotation indicates Bosanquet's essential agreement with Bradley and disagreement with Royce as to the nature of the Absolute Experience But with reference to this Absolute we seem forced to conclude that if it is not for Bosanquet, as it apparently is for Bradley, a really existing transcendent experience—what Bosanquet refers to as "Heaven" (p 268)—it must be what Bosanquet himself acknowledges that it will be called, namely, "a mere abstraction" (p 374) In short, while Bradley and Bosanquet agree that the Absolute contains all finite experiences transmuted sufficiently to make up one harmonious whole, Bradley, affirming the transcendent existence of this experience tends to leave it unknowable, while Bosanquet, concerned to affirm the knowableness of the Absolute, tends to leave it an abstraction "Thought is not a matter of reproducing a transcendent world—a block universe" "Every object of thought is real, and every object of thought is transcendent of immediate experience But to reject transcendence of experience, experience including all thought and objects of thought is merely to reject the unknowable thing in itself" "Nature is real as we know and value it, and is not created by our thinking" (*The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp 2, 127, 145, 146)

Bosanquet's results for religion are not very different from those of Bradley In the words of his most authoritative interpreter "what he would mean by 'God,' if he did not on the whole avoid the term because of its theistic associations [is] Reality as a whole, conceived as perfect, and as transcending and transforming within itself the opposition of good and evil In this perfection man participates, and religion is his sense of this participation, of his fragmentariness, made whole The theist's concept of God, as the will for good against evil, is still too much coloured by his antithesis of good and evil to be adequate to a Reality which, as a whole, is perfect" (Hoernlé, *Matter, Life, Mind, and God*, pp 200, 201) "As both Bradley and Bosanquet [and we may add, Hoernlé] agree, to conceive reality as God is a way of thinking which has a high degree of truth, but which under philosophical criticism turns out still to be inadequate to the nature of reality as a whole" (Hoernlé, *Idealism as a Philosophy*, pp 313-314) Where Bradley says that good is included in the Absolute, therefore the Absolute may be said to be good (v *supra*) Bosanquet thinks it better to say that while "there is evil within the Absolute" "the Absolute is not characterised by evil" "Good as absorbed in perfection only involves evil as absorbed within the good" (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p 217) "The universe may be perfect owing to the very fact, among others, that it includes as conditions of finite life, both moral good and evil" (*Ibid*, p 218) Cf A E Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p 396 "May we say that the Absolute is known in Metaphysics to be 'good'? The answer depends upon the precise meaning we attach to the statement In the sense that it is the really existing embodiment of the ideals we are trying amid our



tention is, or at least was at first, to regard the Absolute as more perfect than personality could be, the actual outcome, naturally enough, is that it is habitually thought of in impersonal terms. Moreover, this Absolute or single, harmonious totality of Experience (whether viewed as transcendent and humanly unknowable, as it is by Bradley, or as it is by Bosanquet, as being nothing but the world as it is, and therefore progressively knowable) is sharply distinguished from the God of religion. But not only is the God of religion not the Absolute; from this point of view he does not exist. Not only would a God who was but a part of the Absolute be unsatisfactory to religion; there is no adequate reason, it is claimed, to suppose that any such finite God exists. On the other hand, if we mean by God Absolute Reality as religion apprehends it, since the philosophy criticizes, as inconsistent, and displaces the imaginative concepts of religion, it must be held that it is the Absolute and not God that Reality is, or that is real. In so far as God is not the "super-rational," "super-moral," or virtually impersonal Absolute, then, from this point of view, he does not exist at all.

ignorance and confusion to realize, we clearly must say 'yes'. But if we use the word 'good' in a narrower sense, to mean 'ethically good,' we can hardly say without qualification that the whole is good. For 'ethical goodness' belongs essentially to the time-order, and means the process of the gradual assertion of the ideal against apparent evil." Cf. Taylor's *The Problem of Conduct*, p. 429.

For R. G. Collingwood, "faith is that knowledge of ultimate truth, which, owing to its intuitive or imaginative form, cannot justify itself under criticism." Religion stands between art and science in the dialectic of life. Art creates objects by the imagination; religion believes in the reality of objects of the imagination, science eliminates all mythology, and religion perishes. "We have long ago left religion behind." "When philosophers call their ultimate reality by the name of God they are taking that name in vain. God and the Absolute are not identical but irretrievably distinct. And yet God is the imaginative or intuitive form in which the Absolute reveals itself to the religious consciousness." (*Speculum Mentis*, pp. 132, 151, 152, etc.) "Religion must at all costs have a God with a definite character of his own, philosophy must have an all-embracing totality, a rounded and complete universe. And when it is found that God, to be good, cannot be at all, then religion and philosophy accept different horns of the dilemma. The 'universe' which philosophy is supposed to choose is the empty abstraction of a something which is nothing definite, it is not an Absolute, but only the indication of an unsolved problem. And for religion too the problem is unsolved." (Collingwood, *Religion and Philosophy*, p. 120).

Somewhat different again, but similarly negative from the religious point of view is the "new idealism" of the Italian school. In two respects it is the antithesis of the English development. While Bradley and Bosanquet may be regarded as Hegelian in holding that Reality is the Absolute Experience, but as anti-Hegelian in denying that the nature of Reality is rational thought, Croce and Gentile are Hegelian in finding in rational thought the nature and substance of Reality, but they are anti-Hegelian in that they deny that all reality is a single all-inclusive Experience or Absolute. But in both cases the results for religion are about equally negative. The one school offers as the only religious object a Reality which is one Experience, but (whether concrete but transcendent and unknowable or immanent and knowable but abstract) not rational, the other offers a Reality which is rational but neither a single Experience nor anything super-human. Religion cannot get along with either concept, and if either one of these positions is what the older absolute idealism must eventually come to, the prospects for a religion of love and trust toward God are not, for the idealist, very bright.

Absolute idealism seemed at first not only satisfactory to the religious and moral consciousness, but a veritable gospel of joy and light. Now, however, we begin to suspect that this was only because we read into it certain moral and religious ideas which we were interested in maintaining against materialistic and agnostic attack, such as the ideas of God, freedom and immortality, and that seen in its true nature, it would be found to be quite inadequate to meet the practical spiritual needs of man. To the soul that cries out for the living God, a God who cares for humanity and its values, the philosophical Absolute must seem but a poor substitute, and the question arises as to whether it is not a mere idol, the artificial product of human speculation. But it is not with reference to God alone that absolutism proves unsatisfactory; it fails to do justice to the moral personality of man. It provides no unambiguous place for the moral freedom and responsibility of man, or for the conservation of what is essential in individual personality throughout the changes of the cosmic process. It is not

without justification, then, it would seem, that there has arisen what we may call a prophetic reaction within idealism. The prophets of the movement, among whom we may refer to Seth Pringle-Pattison and James Ward, although there are others who might well be mentioned, aim to save us from what they regard as the futilities and dangers of absolutism by calling us back to the belief in a real God and a real man, a morally free and responsible individual. The protest is primarily against the identification of the human and the divine self-consciousness.\* Exception is taken to the argument that since the world is one world, and at the same time essentially idea, constituted through the relating activity of a self or mind, we must therefore conclude that in reality there is but one Self, one Mind. As against this view, which would regard man as a mere fragmentary phase of the Absolute and without true individuality, the protesting prophets of a more pluralistic but theistic idealism would have us hold fast to our own reality as unique and some would even say imper-

\* In Pringle-Pattison's opinion the theistic interpretation of Hegel is, as an interpretation, erroneous, and a mere reflection of the theism of the interpreter (*Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 33). "The radical error both of Hegelianism and of the allied English doctrine I take to be the identification of the human and the divine self-consciousness, or to put it more broadly, the unification of consciousness in a single Self." The attempt of Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian schools to unify the divine and the human subject is ultimately destructive of the reality of both. "Hegelianism sacrifices the best interests of humanity to a logical abstraction styled the Idea, in which both God and man disappear..... Neo-Kantianism or Neo-Hegelianism erects into a god the mere form of self-consciousness in general (A. Seth [Pringle-Pattison], *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 215, 221-222, 230). "Each self is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious to other selves. The self resists invasion. The unity of things cannot be properly expressed by making it depend upon a unity of the Self in all thinkers, for the very characteristic of a self is this exclusiveness. Though the self is, in knowledge, a principle of unification, it is, in existence or metaphysically, a principle of isolation. I have a centre of my own which I maintain even in my dealings with God Himself. Religion is the self-surrender of the human will to the divine. But this is a self-surrender, a surrender which only self, only will, can make" (*ibid.*, pp. 216-218). The doctrine of the universal Self is reached by a process of reasoning which I have already compared to the procedure of Scholastic Realism in dealing with individuals and 'universals'. The imaginary subject (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*) of the theory of knowledge is hypostatized by the Neo-Kantians as the one ultimately real Thinker" (*ibid.*, pp. 218, 220). "Finite centres may 'overlap' indefinitely in content, but they cannot overlap at all in existence; their very *raison d'être* is to be distinct, and, in that sense, separate and exclusive focalizations of a common universe" (*The Idea of God*, p. 264).

vious selves, having independent centres of our own, not only in distinction from each other but in distinction from God as well. So insistent are they on this point that, rather than admit that since the world is numerically one, the subject for which it is object must be but one, they would prefer to say that since the subjects are many, and each has a world as its object, the worlds must therefore be many, the "one world" of ordinary thought being a fiction, a substantiated abstraction, conveniently adapted to meet the needs of minds communicating with each other.\* As

\* 'The world I perceive is the world I construct. No one can ever perceive any world but the one he makes' (B. P. Bowne, *Personalism*, pp 71, 72) *Per contra*, see the statement by Professor G. Daves Hicks, in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol II, where it is maintained that the activity of the judgment with reference to the object is one of discrimination rather than of construction.

When ten men look at the sun or moon, said Reid, they all see the same individual object. But not so, Hamilton replies: the truth is that each of these persons sees a different object. With these diametrically opposite statements of the two chieftains of the Scottish philosophy, we may begin our inquiry. Hamilton is right in so far as each concrete experience has its own concrete object. Our first question is to get clear ideas as to the relation of the different (actual) objects of Hamilton's statement to the one identical (phenomenal) object of Reid's. The question naturally presents itself in the form: How does the one sun become an object to ten different men? Yet the proper form rather is: How, and in what sense, do the ten come to know that the actual object of each is the same individual object for all? When in place of the Ego L we have M or N, so too in place of the non-Ego non-L we have non-M or non-N. The most, then, that L can indicate or communicate to M of any part of his own experience, is so much of it as is common to the experience of both. The sun as transsubjective object is not L's sun or M's sun or N's sun but rather what is common to them all, neglecting what is peculiar to each. If we ask, Since the sun as a transsubjective object is not the peculiar object of any given consciousness, for what consciousness is it an object? we have at once Kant's answer: *fur 'Bewusstsein uberhaupt,'* for consciousness in general. Following out this answer, we might presently see that this conceptual consciousness presupposes and is inseparable from the individual consciousness of immediate experience. Ordinary thought regarding the sun as independent of L and M and N *severally*, concludes that it is and remains an object, independently of them all *collectively*. This fallacy of naive realism is one step towards dualism, the hypothesis of introjection supple, the other. If we hold it true that all experience implies both subject and object, then we must find a subject for universal experience. I am here concerned with universal experience, Experience with a capital E, the common empirical knowledge of the race. Nature is the object of this experience. But the subject of it is not God but any individual, who through intersubjective intercourse advances to the stage of self-consciousness and reason" (James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, fourth, single-volume edition, pp 457, 458, 459, 463, 470, 609).

Ward introduces into this pluralistic idealism the idea of God not primarily, as with

a matter of fact there is a serious dilemma for idealism at this point. If we assume that the object is, through and through, the construct of the subject, either there is only one subject because the objective world is only one, or else there are many objective worlds one for each subject, because the subjects are many. Either conclusion is awkward to say the least. In fact we have here what looks very much like a *reductio ad absurdum* of idealism, whether in its singularistic or its pluralistic form. Moreover, from the practical point of view, while absolute idealism is chargeable with saving religion, or trying to save it, at the expense of morality, is not pluralistic idealism in danger of making a place for morality at the expense of some of the more essential values of religion? Back of the dilemma and fundamental to it is the idealistic assumption common to both absolutism and the pluralistic theory in question. May we not have been too uncritical in our easy adoption of this idealistic doctrine that the object is, *in toto*, a creation of the thought activity of the subject? May it not be well, before we go any further, to examine the evidence for the idealistic view, that is, the view that things are essentially and without remainder, idea?

Berkeley, to have in the mind of God a place for Nature to exist when and in so far as it is not in the minds of men (cf. Ashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*) but to explain the existence of the plurality of independent but interacting selves. Idealism introduces the idea of creation. It cannot be said that the world as we know it involves the idea of creation as a fact. If it did we should have a direct and tangible evidence of God's existence. The heavens declare the glory of God. Possibly it is so, but there is nothing in all our physical experience that *compels* us to admit it. On the other hand there is nothing that would justify us in denying it. [Mere pluralism] cannot be charged with inconsistency, but it is incomplete and unsatisfying. A plurality of beings primarily independent as regards their existence and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other is not logical plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological unity, and finally to suggest some ground beyond itself. The idea that God presents itself to us at the back. The Mind dependent on God for its existence though still independent in and for itself [for] then experience. With one creative Spirit over all we may well believe in a unity of the many created unit. It is not the idea of God. It is a matter of faith, not of knowledge, to be sure. But may we not hold it to be a rational faith, since without it we are without assured hope in a world that is then without clear meaning? (*The Realm of Ends* pp. 281-293, 241, 422-423). In the course of an interview which I had with Professor Ward in the summer of 1911, he expressed the opinion that the real reason why Dr. McTaggart had no place for God in his pluralistic idealism was that he did not

It ought to be clearly recognized at the outset that a certain burden of proof rests on the idealist. His view of the world is not the natural realistic view which was the achievement of pre-philosophical man ages ago and which has been the universal basis of practical living ever since. If we are to be asked to abandon this view for another, it is surely not too much to ask that the reasons advanced for making the change be good and sufficient. Do they satisfy this requirement?

The arguments for idealism, some of which are at the same time arguments for absolute idealism, are these: that idealism is a self-consistent theory, logically tenable, whether demonstrable or not; that it is the only alternative to a set of views, all of which have been discredited or can be shown to be untenable; that it furnishes the only logical way of conserving certain absolute spiritual values, as those of morality and religion; that it can be proved deductively from what is self-evident and universally admitted; that it results directly from an analysis of consciousness; that it is implicit in the process of definition and indeed in all judgment; that it emerges as the "higher synthesis" in a dialectic which necessarily arises in the course of a rational interpretation of experience; that it is verified in religious experience, particularly in that of the mystic; and finally, that it is pragmatically justified in view of its value as a "practical creed." These various arguments we must examine, as briefly as may be, in turn.

Postponing momentarily the consideration of the claim that idealism is a self-consistent theory, let us first notice the argument that it must be true for the reason that it is the only possible alternative to views that have been or can be shown to be untenable. Professor Royce argues for idealism as entitled to our acceptance on the ground that it is the only alternative to realism, which begins by claiming direct conscious experience of what exists independently of consciousness. This claim breaks down, he argues, when it is shown that everything directly experienced is

want a God. As for himself, recognizing the value of belief in God, he would agree with a recent statement of Wundt to the effect that while we cannot prove by reason that God exists, we can show that it is reasonable to believe in God.

content of consciousness, nothing more. The independent reality postulated by realism is then set up as the unknowable. But this unknowable is something concerning which we have no right to say anything. We have no right even to claim that it exists, since we have no consciousness of it, it is indistinguishable from nothing.\* This means, in Professor Royce's opinion, the collapse of all possible forms of realism, namely, naive natural realism and a dualistic, agnostic realism, leaving idealism in undisputed possession of the field.

Concerning this argument I will for the present simply say that while I should agree that an uncritical natural realism is untenable, and that an utterly dualistic realism is discredited by the complete agnosticism which it logically involves, this is not in itself a proof of idealism. There might conceivably be a third form of realism, tenable if not demonstrable. If any such realistic theory were to be advanced, idealism's possession of the field would no longer be unchallenged. (Whether there may not be such a tenable realism we shall inquire in a later lecture.)

The argument that idealism should be accepted because of its being the only way to counteract materialism and other naturalistic views, and thus to conserve adequately the values of morality and religion, may be regarded as a form of the pragmatic argument. If the theory in question is self-consistent and permissible in the light of the facts, and if it can be shown that absolute values of morality and religion can be conserved under no other scheme of thought, the argument, while not amounting to theoretical proof, must be admitted to be, from a practical point of view, a very strong one. But, while waiving for the time being the question of permissibility, is it true that the only possible way to show that God and free human spirits are real is to show that matter is unreal, that physical things are mere ideas, dependent contents of consciousness, human or divine? Clearly, the argument has no weight unless it can be shown to be impossible, even in the light of religious experience and the moral cer-

tainty of human responsibility, to establish either the reasonableness or the theoretical permissibility of belief in human freedom and the existence of God. Instead of undertaking to prove that spirit must exist since matter does not exist, may it not be wiser to ask whether there may not be a way of establishing directly, at least sufficiently for practical purposes, the reality of persons, human and divine.\* Furthermore, is it certain that the only way of thinking of the world of things as fundamentally dependent upon God is to think of them as mere thoughts in the mind of God? We human beings are able to make objects depend upon ourselves in other ways than by their dependence, as our ideas, upon our thought. Is man able to do this, and is God unable to make any distinction between dependence upon his thought and dependence upon his creative energy and will?

A favourite deductive argument for idealism is one which begins with a proposition which must be tacitly assumed even by those who try to disprove it, the assumption, namely, of the possibility of knowledge. Interpreting this to mean that Reality is intelligible, by means of the further premises that whatever is intelligible is rational and that what is rational is a system of ideas, or of relations established by mind, the conclusion is drawn that Reality, that is, Reality as a whole, Absolute Reality, is an absolutely rational system of ideas or contents of consciousness. This argument is obviously fallacious. Even if we must assume, in order to think seriously, that some reality is intelligible, it does not follow that all reality is intelligible. A still more glaring equivocation occurs in the transition from rational

\* In so far as personalism is personal realism, the doctrine that persons, human and divine, are realities, we may be most ready to agree with it, even if we may hesitate to subscribe to it in so far as it is *personal idealism*, the doctrine that "persons only are real" (E. G. Brightman, *Religious Values*, p. 167, cf. Bowne, *Personalism*, pp. 71-72, 109-110, 275, 278, etc.), and that nothing impersonal exists, except as ideas dependent upon the thought activity of persons. A. C. Knudson, in *The Philosophy of Personalism* (1927), an excellent exposition of the philosophy in question, not only freely admits that personalism "denies all extramental existence and affirms the complete phenomenality of matter," but goes on to say "The ontological reality of things makes unnecessary the ontological reality of spirit, either finite or infinite. The only satisfactory way to escape the materialistic or atheistic conclusion is to deny the realistic thesis that matter and material things are metaphysically real" (pp. 226, 374).



in the objective to rational in the subjective sense \* The fallacies are so obvious when the argument is stated in concise syllogistic form, that any such form of statement is generally avoided

One of the arguments most constantly employed in the literature of the subject is that which claims to discover the idealistic doctrine by a simple analysis of consciousness The objects of consciousness are contents of consciousness, it is claimed There is no distinct consciousness without some object presented in sensation or represented in thought, and we never become aware of an object except one which is object in relation to the conscious subject. Therefore, it is concluded, we have no reason to believe that any objects, or things, exist, except in and for consciousness Logically considered, this argument from the so-called 'egocentric predicament' is no more cogent than it would be to argue, since you cannot be seated beside any man except one who has at the time some one sitting beside him, there can therefore be no men except men with others sitting beside them It cannot prove idealism, for the "predicament" would still exist, if realism were true.

Besides this argument for subjective or psychological idealism from an analysis of consciousness in relation to its object, there is an argument for what we may call logical idealism from an analysis of the implications of the logical process of definition, or indeed of judgment in general. No definition can be true of any reality, it is argued, unless realities are such stuff as definitions are made of, namely, logical ideas, predicates The "is" of predication is erroneously taken as the "is" of identity, with a form of idealism as the result.

Sometimes the two forms of idealism last referred to, subjective or psychological idealism and abstract or logical idealism, are recognized, not indeed as fallacious and unjustified, but as inadequate, and the attempt is made to supplement the deficiencies of each by combining it with the other The result is an essentially dialectical argument leading to an idealism of the Hegelian type.

\* Cf Watson, *Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol I, p 74 For criticism see my book, *The Problem of Knowledge*, p 140

The thesis is idealism, concrete but subjective . things are particular contents of consciousness The antithesis is logical idealism, objective but abstract . things are logical ideas, predicates, definitions, abstract universals The synthesis is found in logical-psychological idealism, objective but concrete Here reality is the individual, the concrete universal, the union of the universal with the particular , it is the logical within the psychological, the rational within the realm of conscious experience This is perhaps the most plausible argument for idealism, but it is not a demonstration The concrete objective idealism of Hegel comes nearer to reality than the subjective idealism of Berkeley or the rather abstract idealism of Plato ; but it rests upon the assumption that the thesis and antithesis, subjective idealism and abstract logical idealism, are true as far as they go, only they are not the whole truth But if, as we have seen, both elemental forms of idealism are built upon fallacy, the mere combination of the two fallacious doctrines cannot be assumed to lead to truth A blind man and a paralytic may supplement each other's deficiencies, but the two together are not the full equivalent of a whole and healthy man.

Another dialectical argument asks, What must be true if both natural realism and subjective idealism are true? and finds the answer in objective idealism If things as we know them exist apart from the human mind, and if things depend for all that they are upon their relation to mind, there must be some other-than-human mind in and for which they exist when not in human minds. But what if we cannot be sure that things retain, when we are not looking at them, all the qualities we find in them? And what if we have no right to say that all the qualities of things depend for their existence upon consciousness? In that case the conclusion does not follow ; the higher synthesis is unnecessary, if not impossible

So far as we have gone, then, it would appear that idealism is at best a speculative theory, permissible perhaps, but not proved in any demonstrative fashion.\* But even if it has not been proved

\* Absolute idealism was first offered to the world as a rigidly demonstrated philosophical doctrine. As a result of further reflection and discussion, however, it has come to

by rational demonstration, either deductively or dialectically, may it not, as a permissible speculative theory, receive empirical verification? The affirmative answer is given by some who would

be regarded very commonly, even by those who subscribe to it, as no more than a permissible, or at most a defensible theory. J. S. Mackenzie, after attempting to think out the idea of the universe as an intelligible whole, and arriving at the conception of "an absolutely perfect Being, *in seipso totus, teres atque rotundus*," hastens to admit that "the results arrived at are of the nature of hypotheses not capable of being tested in quite the same sense in which ordinary scientific hypotheses can be tested." The only test that can be applied to metaphysical hypotheses, in his opinion, is to be found in "their intelligibility and explanatory power." But even in these respects some weaknesses must be admitted. The conception of perfection is perhaps not fully intelligible to us, and we cannot be sure that it will fully explain the universe as we know it. Mackenzie's position is, consequently, "to a certain extent, agnosticism." Moreover, that the universe is an intelligible whole was *assumed*, and it may certainly be asked what right we have to do this, and even what right we have to believe that there is any complete whole for us to discover. Perhaps, in the strictest sense, we have not a right to believe this, but it would seem at least that we have a right to hope for it, [and] even hope implies a certain degree of belief. At any rate, the only other intelligible hypothesis is "that the universe is un-intelligible." In the end the argument is, in a loose sense of the term, pragmatic. "We seem to have almost established a right to believe that our hypothesis is true. At least we may hope, with some confidence, that it is so." "We live by admiration, hope, and love"; and the more scope we can find for these attitudes of mind, the more fully are our lives sustained and strengthened. So far as this is what is meant by pragmatism, I believe it is justified. We have a right to the necessary conditions of the best kind of life, and hope is one of them, but we have not the right to affirm as true what has not been fully established." (*Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, pp. 464-472.)

Some twenty years ago Henry Jones delivered a course of lectures in Australia under the general title, 'Idealism as a Practical Creed.' The main line of his argument for absolute idealism, as the title suggests, is, loosely speaking, pragmatic, although a theoretical argument is presented as well. In his Gifford Lectures, however, delivered a dozen or more years afterwards, and significantly entitled, *A Faith that Enquires*, he presents his view as one "which I would demonstrate by irrefragable proof if I could" (*A Faith that Enquires*, p. 150.)

A. E. Taylor, at one time an ardent exponent of an absolute idealism of a more or less Bradleian type (*The Problem of Conduct* and *Elements of Metaphysics*) seems to have become uncertain not only of its provability but also of its truth, and to have given it up for a frankly theistic position, and for an indeterministic interpretation of human freedom (see his articles, "The Vindication of Religion" in E. G. Selwyn's *Essays Catholic and Critical*, 1926, and "The Freedom of Man" in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. II). In an autobiographical preface to the latter article he says of his student days at Oxford,

"For the time I was carried off my feet by Bradley," but he tells us that about 1908 he arrived at certain convictions, one of which was that "the business of metaphysical philosophy is a modest one," and that "its supreme task is the necessarily imperfect and tentative reconciliation of the exigencies of scientific thinking with the imperative moral and religious demands of life. There is no special infallibility about metaphysics."

find in the mystical religious experience the empirical verification of absolute idealism.\* On a speculative basis the absolute idealist advances the theory that God is the totality of Reality as a Spiritual Unity, rational or super-rational, moral or super-moral, personal or super-personal, transcending time and space, including all physical things as mere contents of experience and all so-called finite individuals as phases of its own being; and these, we are told, are the very doctrines which the radical mystic claims to become immediately assured of in and through his mystical experience. He claims to have verified the reality, accessibility, and sufficiency of the Absolute and Only One; having enjoyed the beatific vision of God, he cannot regard material things, time and place, evil, finite personality even, as other than illusory, unreal, destined to disappear. But is not mystical experience, then, an empirical demonstration of the truth of absolute idealism?

If we insist on being critical, we cannot take it as such. While not denying that religious experience at its best may have great value for verifying an essentially true philosophy of reality, we must not close our eyes to the fact that, psychologically considered, the more extreme mystical states are interpretable as phenomena of religious self-hypnosis, while the characteristic doctrines of the sole reality and ineffableness of God, and the "unreal" or transient, dream-like nature of material, temporal and finite things are all readily explained as the result of auto-suggestion during and after the mystical state. The absolute idealist has appealed to experience, to experience, then, let him go—not to an extremely rare, highly specialized but psychologically intelligible experience simply, but to all experience, to the experience of practical life in general and of practical religion in particular, as well as to the special contemplative and ecstatic experiences of the mystics. When the appeal to experience is thus made broad enough, while it may perhaps confirm belief in the reality, accessibility and sufficiency

\* A good illustration of this point of view is to be found in W. E. Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, already referred to. Cf. C. A. Bennett, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism*. For criticism of Hocking, see *Problem of Knowledge*, pp. 161-180, and *Philosophical Review*, XXIII, Jan. 1914, pp. 27-47.

of God, it seems clear that the dogmas of the sole reality and absolute ineffableness of God, and of the merely illusory and evanescent character of the finite personality, of moral distinctions, and even of existence in time and space will be seriously discredited

Up to the present we have not disputed the assumption that idealism in general and absolute idealism in particular are self-consistent enough to be regarded as permissible theories, even if not proved or provable. Let us now examine this assumption, at least in so far as it is concerned with absolute idealism. The general doctrine of absolute idealism, or absolutism, is that all things and persons and all experiences, whether past, present or future from our point of view, are included in a single, time-transcending Absolute Experience. Of this general absolutist doctrine there are two principal varieties. According to one theory the Absolute is a rational Experience in which the realities of our experience persist, unchanged except that they are viewed all together in an all-surveying gaze. This we may call the Roycean view. According to the other theory, every object, every person, every element of experience, is transmuted, fused more or less with everything else in the Absolute, so that nothing is, in and for the Absolute, what it is for us. This means that the Absolute is not rational but something else, presumably super-rational; not moral, but super-moral, not personal, but super-personal. This variety of absolutism we may term the Bradleyan view. There seems to be a third possibility, which we shall mention presently, but with this exception these two varieties seem to exhaust the possible forms of absolutist theory. McTaggart's Absolute as a Community of eternal persons without God; Howison's Republic of God made up of eternal independent persons, God being present as one perfectly rational Individual, the Final Cause of everything but the Efficient Cause of nothing in the lives of others;\* Rashdall's community of persons and a finite Creator-God—these are all forms, not of absolutism,

\* Cf. Overstreet's "God that is ourselves that we with all our countless fellows, ... not simply of human society but of cosmic society, are realising a God in the making, a God that is the world in the spiritual unity of its mass life" ("The Democratic Conception of God," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XI, 1912-1913, pp. 409, 410).

but of pluralistic idealism. On the other hand there are certain variations of absolutism which reduce to one or the other of the two types specified. Royce's later view, as set forth in his *Problem of Christianity*, was intended as a means of reconciling monism (singularism) and pluralism, but while he gives his attention almost entirely to the Absolute as a Community of Persons, he interprets this Community as itself constituting a single Absolute Person. Every person is a community of interpretation, and every unified community is a person.\* As for Bosanquet's "multiplicism," according to which there are experiences which have different degrees of adequacy and therefore different degrees of reality, since all the experiences are regarded as included in the Absolute Experience, as well as being transcended by it, we may say that if and in so far as it escapes pluralism, it is to be interpreted either as essentially absolutism of the Bradleian type or else as holding to such an abstract view of experience as a whole as means a position of unstable equilibrium between idealism and realism.

The question now before us is whether in its Roycean or in its Bradleian form absolute idealism is a self-consistent and tenable theory. First, with reference to the Roycean view, how can one of my experiences, an experience of ignorance or error, for example, be in and for a perfectly rational, all-comprehending and therefore all-knowing Absolute Mind exactly what it is for me? In the Absolute my ignorance or error would be accompanied by knowledge of that of which I am ignorant. But is it not psychologically inconceivable that contents of experience can be in full consciousness in the same rational mind with other relevant contents without being in the least modified by that fact? The Absolute's omniscience would make error no longer error and ignorance no longer ignorance so that these contents of experience could not be in the Absolute as they are in us. It would seem, therefore,

In December, 1915, in a conversation with Professor Royce, I referred to the fact that some pluralistic philosophers were inclined to interpret his *Problem of Christianity* as meaning that he had been drawn away to some extent from his monistic idealism. "Oh, no!" he replied, "what I aimed to do was to mediate between monism and pluralism, but you remember the passage about the two men in the boat [II, 241-243], that ought to make it clear that I still believe in the Absolute."

that the Roycean view of the Absolute is not rationally tenable. What then shall we say about the Bradleian view? This is to the effect that all finite experiences are included in the Absolute, but just because they are in the same conscious experience with all other experiences they are necessarily fused with them, transmuted beyond recognition. But, we would suggest, if what eternally is in the Absolute is not my experience *as I have it*, it is not my experience at all. My experience is always my experience as I have it, no more and no less; my memory of a past experience is different from that experience, but it does not claim to be the same experience over again; it is another experience. The Bradleian form of absolutism, then, like the Roycean, so far from being self-consistent and tenable, turns out to be self-refuting.

There is but one other possible form of absolutism, it would seem, and while it may perhaps be theoretically tenable, it does not seem to have found anyone courageous enough to adopt it. This is the view that all the varied and mutually conflicting finite experiences do exist, just as they are in the finite centre, in one all-inclusive Experience, but that such an aggregate can form no rational unity, so that the all-inclusive Experience must be regarded, to use Dr Schiller's analogy, as "morbidly dissociated, or even as downright mad" \* Surely, if a mad Absolute is the only Absolute we can believe in without self-contradiction, we will not adhere to the doctrine unless by the stern necessity of logic we are compelled to do so.

Now we cannot deny that we have been fairly warned by Bradley and others that the Absolute of their philosophy is not the God of religion. Perhaps it is well that this is so, if it be so. Certainly the absolute of absolute idealism, as it turns out, is not an object with which man in his religious need can have any particularly helpful relations. And inasmuch as God and the idealist's Absolute must be distinguished from each other, it may be that the more reason we have for doubting the existence of the so-called Absolute, the less we shall have for doubting the

\* F. C. S. Schiller, "Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol III, 1906, pp 477-482, Vol IV, pp 18-21.

existence of God. There must be an Absolute of some sort, of course, an Ultimate Reality with which we have to do, but that is not necessarily the Absolute of which absolute idealism speaks. One of the ablest of the philosophers trained by Bradley, and one who for many years was associated with Bradley and Bosanquet in defence of absolutism of their type—I refer to Professor A. E. Taylor—has within the past few years given evidence of a very thorough conversion from the Absolute of latter-day philosophy to the God of experiential religion. A few years ago he made this statement, “ You cannot really worship Bosanquet’s Absolute when your eyes have been opened to its real character, any more than you could worship a ‘ fortuitous concourse of atoms.’ You can only worship what is through and through good, and only that of which personality is the *essentia* is good.” \*

The Absolute of the absolutist is an idol. Back in the wilderness we heard the word of the moral God of moral religion, “ Thou shalt have no other Gods before me.” That was the God to whom we offered our prayers throughout our sojourn in the wilderness. Moreover, when we entered the promised land and built the glorious Temple, the understanding was that it was to be for that same God, the God of the categorical imperative, of the moral law. But does it turn out now that we have been offering our best gifts to an insensate idol, which we have made for ourselves? We are not decrying faith in reason or the use of reason in our faith. It was faith in reason which brought us into the promised land, and a goodly land it assuredly was. But our faith must have become an unreasonable faith in reason, or in what we mistook for true reason. At any rate what was at first accepted as the word of reason has now been, in the name of reason, rejected. And the upshot of it all is that we now have no assurance as to our security in this goodly land.

\* A. E. Taylor, in *Theology*, July, 1920, p. 42. Compare Taylor’s article on “ Theism ” in Hastings’ *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. XII, where theism is defined as “ the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being (a) intrinsically complete or perfect and (b) as a consequence, an adequate object of unqualified adoration or worship.”



Latterly the prophets who seem most surely to be inspired and true are prophesying the doom of the old idealistic order. The city of absolute idealism, we are now told, is not impregnable; its absolutistic temple is not inviolable. In time past there were those who assured us that our idealistic Zion was so permanently established that none of her foundation stones should be removed. But now their optimistic predictions are seen to have been expressions of vain confidence. Their wish was father to their thought. Now, on the contrary, the prophetic voices say, "Woe to them that are at ease in Zion; they shall go into captivity; Zion shall be plowed as a field; Jerusalem shall become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest."<sup>2</sup> Our philosophical defences, wherein we trusted, have become as nothing and we are in danger of falling a prey to the first warlike neighbour that may choose to attack us.

The prophets have not always been agreed, but there is one point on which all of them that are worthy of our attention seem to be unanimous. In spite of our imminent danger and the threat of captivity, we must not think of making an appeal to external authority, of returning to mere traditionalism.

"Woe to them that go down to Egypt for help!"

But it does not follow that God is discovered to have been unreal, just because our faith is likely to have to take up its pilgrimage once more. We have many precious beliefs still in our possession, even if we may have no immediate prospect of an adequate philosophy in which to house them. We may surely still cherish the faith which a certain philosopher has recently declared to be the meaning of idealism, namely, "that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the Universe."<sup>\*</sup> If we are able to retain this practical essence of the idealistic faith it may be that, even should we be taken captive and go into exile for a time, we can take to ourselves the promise that the "faithful remnant" shall return.

\* N. K. Smith, *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 1.

## VII. EXILE : PRAGMATISM AND RELIGIOUS VALUES

The weakness of speculative idealism as a metaphysical defense of religion has already been made sufficiently evident. It is not, I think, going too far to say that that structure of speculative rationalism, which at one time seemed so impregnable, has been shown to have so precarious a standing that the first vigorous onslaught is likely to lay it low and expose to the spoiler the religious values it was designed to protect. And indeed the prophetic warning of invasion and captivity has not remained long unfulfilled. In the name of Darwinism and the biological approach to philosophical problems the radical pragmatists, of whom John Dewey may be regarded as the outstanding leader, have undertaken to raze to the ground the walls of speculative metaphysics and the temple of absolutism, and to carry away captive the inhabitants of Zion into a strange and distant land.

Faith in reason may be well enough, these invading pragmatists concede ; but just what, they ask, is the nature of this reason in which we are asked to believe, and what is its function in life? From the biological point of view, consciousness is a manifestation of life which has proved its survival value in the struggle for existence. Consciousness is instrumental to life in its striving for a favorable adjustment to the environment. The structures of consciousness—concepts, judgments, and the like—are to be understood only in the light of a *functional* psychology. And as a functional psychology explains the genesis and persistence of our various thought-constructs, so also instrumental logic tests the value of ideas by the way in which they work in practical life. The subject of our judgments is reality, as Bradley,

and Bosanquet maintained, but this is not to be understood as a transcendent, inaccessible Absolute, but rather as the reality of our ordinary everyday experience. In connection with certain aspects of experienced reality, or contents of immediate experience, as the subject-matter of our thought, we use certain trial-predicates, guiding ideas, working hypotheses, and we test their value—their “truth” as we call it—by the way in which they work. The predicate is not necessarily a copy of the subject-matter; it is an instrument of adjustment. For example, we have been walking along the road at night, adjusting ourselves almost automatically to the familiar objects of the environment, when suddenly we are confronted with something which causes us to stop and think. We know not for the moment how to act toward it; our experience becomes “subjective,” a more or less confused medley of vague perceptions and suggested hypotheses as to what the object is, or in other words, what further experiences might be expected from it, under certain conditions. More or less tentatively we act upon one after another of these hypotheses until we find one that guides us so successfully and satisfactorily with reference to the at first unfamiliar object that we need explore it no further, but can act toward it as something which we know. The tentative judgment is verified, the experience ceases to be subjective, the element in the situation which had become doubtful and subjective regains its objectivity, and life goes on very much as before. Thus the distinction between the psychological and the ontological falls within experience and is purely functional. Ideas, then, are instruments of adjustment to the various situations in which the living being finds itself; they are not copies of independently existing things, but tools for enabling us to get along with things experienced. There is a place for speculation, but only for the purpose of developing the meaning of the hypothesis; speculation can never by itself bring knowledge of the realities of the empirical world. In order to know, we must test our hypotheses by acting upon them as temporary substitutes for further immediate experience of things, and see how this experimental action works. There is no

adequate test of the truth of the idea apart from the way it works when we act upon it (This is the essential core of pragmatism as a logical theory. But many pragmatists go beyond this essential pragmatism, and maintain not only that the test of truth is ultimately practical, but that there is nothing in the nature of truth but the satisfactory practical working of ideas in concrete situations of life, their working in the way they set out to work ) Rationality, furthermore, from this pragmatic point of view, is simply harmony among our working ideas, the smooth running of the mechanism which we have constructed out of our several mental tools. There is no basis for the inference that the crude empirical reality upon which we work with this "rational" mechanism of thought is itself a rational harmony, or even that its constituent elements are ideas. It is what it is experienced as, and nothing more, so far as we can say. The only transcendent reality we can recognize is that which, not experienced by us now, may be experienced by others now, or by ourselves or others at some other time. By this rigid restriction of knowledge-claims to the field of human experience, it is hoped to make naive realism self-consistent, and an adequate substitute for all speculative systems of metaphysics.\*

The hosts of the radical pragmatists have left but little of the temple of absolutism, or even of those walls of metaphysical idealism behind which religious belief has been accustomed to seek protection. If, as a consequence of these ravages, we find ourselves carried away captive into involuntary exile, what is it going

\* John Dewey (and others), *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chicago, 1903, *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917; John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, New York, 1910, *How We Think*, Boston, 1910, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Chicago, 1916, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, New York, 1920, *Experience and Nature*, Chicago, 1925, "The Development of American Pragmatism," in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University, Vol II, 1925, pp 351-377, G. H. Mead, *The Definition of the Psychological*, Chicago, 1903, A. W. Moore, *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, Chicago, 1910, H. H. Bawden, *The Principles of Pragmatism*, Boston, 1910, J. K. Hart, *Inside Experience*, New York, 1927, cf A. K. Rogers, *Religious Conception of the World*, New York, 1907, pp 6-78, H. C. Ackerman, *Harvard Theological Review*, 1919, pp 427-34.

to mean for our religion? Shall we become apostate, or shall we cherish the essentials of our former faith, hoping that some day we may be allowed to return to our own land? The temptation to apostasy is indeed great. If our ideas are instruments of adjustment to the environment rather than representations of independently existing realities, what must we think of the idea of God? Is there any real God, or is there only our human idea of God, as a more or less useful tool for dealing with the realities of experience? Hear the words of a man of strong religious interests who found himself forced into exile in the land of pragmatism. In a book entitled *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence* he wrote "A man creates whatever concepts and principles he may need in order to make himself master of the phenomena of his environment. To the same end were the gods created.....Man made the gods to do for him what he could not do for himself ....It is an inextinguishable need of human nature to create gods for itself and so ever to replace old gods by new . . . The word God is the expression of your appreciation of existence. . . . But all our ideas are but figurative expressions. Even the concept of a personal God has symbolic validity only. And the function of a symbol is not to give an exact report concerning the nature of an object, but to express the appreciations of the subject.....Your God is just *your* God."\* Another religious thinker under the dominating influence of radical pragmatism, concludes that the truth of the idea of God means simply the value of the idea in actual experience, not the existence of an objective reality corresponding to the subjective idea.† The idea of God he regards as a mere generalization for all the values we know.‡ The reality which the idea of God expresses is the spirit of the group in so far as it is recognized as valid and authoritative;§ it is the

G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*, Chicago, 1909, pp. 50, 73, 74, 76.

† E. S. Ames, "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *American Journal of Theology*, X, 1906, pp. 219-32.

‡ Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, 1910, p. 818.

§ *Journal of Religion*, I, 1921, p. 267.

common will idealized and magnified and presented in personal symbolism \* In the words of another writer of the same school, " We may still say ' God exists,' but we must mean by ' God ' and by ' exist ' something entirely different from that which the words have meant in the religious philosophy of the past. God in the old sense, is dead .. The Parent God, guardian of life and giver of immortality is no more."† All the more radical pragmatists are humanists in religion ; they believe in religion as a sense of the value of social relationships, or the co-operative quest of a good life ;‡ it is, in the phrase of Natorp, " religion within the limits of humanity." Some members of the school would have us give up all use of the name and idea of God as standing for nothing more than an illusory " wish-being " ; others advocate the continued use of the term, apparently as a species of " indispensable fiction "

But what greater indignity could be offered any person who has had a sincere belief in the objective reality of God and has experienced the benefits of that belief than to be asked to continue to use the idea of God in a practical way as before, while denying the existence of any objective reality corresponding to the subjective idea? How shall we sing the songs of Zion in this strange land of pragmatism? As one of the most far-seeing of religious thinkers who have felt the influence of radical pragmatism has well said, " Let any pragmatist try to act upon the idea of God, ..... and at the same time disbelieve in his existence ; he will find that no action will follow, if ontological reference be denied to the idea."§

It is true enough that in the higher religions the idea of God does symbolize the highest values which society has learned to appreciate ; when adjustment is made to God as a means of promot-

\* *Ibid.*, p 465

† A E Haydon, " The Theological Trend of Pragmatism," *American Journal of Theology*, XXIII, 1919, p 409.

‡ Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, p vii, et passim, Haydon, *American Review*, I, 1923, p. 85.

§ G B Foster, " Pragmatism and Knowledge," *American Journal of Theology*, XI, 1907, p 596.

ing spiritual ideals, he is necessarily thought of as embodying these ideals in his own character. Even if it were true, therefore, as the radical pragmatists seem to suppose, that we must give up belief in the existence of God, it would not follow that we must abandon the pursuit of the spiritual ideals for which the idea of God, at its best, has stood. And this, in effect, is what the more spiritually minded of the radical pragmatists themselves actually suggest; that we devote ourselves to the promotion of the spiritual well-being of humanity as earnestly as if there were a God whose will was the realization of the spiritual ideal of humanity, and whose power was available to help in that realization.

There can be no doubt that, whether we believe in God as an existent Being or not, we ought to be devoted to the spiritual ideal and the well-being of humanity. Whether it be psychologically possible to be as devoted to the divine ideal and as successful in its pursuit without belief in the divine existence as with such belief, is another question. But devoted to such an ideal we undoubtedly ought to be, and such devotion might well be regarded as the most precious thing in the religious life as we know it. He who best loves the divine values as he sees them actualized and potential in the human lives about him may well be adjudged the truest lover of God; and it is well for us to make the most of this humanistic element in religion. It is in unselfish and intelligent social service that spirituality is most truly made objective.\* In the words of a latter-day prophet of the social gospel, "When we submit to a God, we submit to the supremacy of the common good. . . The salvation of the individual, is, of course, an essential part of salvation, [but] salvation is the voluntary socializing of the soul."† It

\* "He who finds the inward in the outward is more spiritual than he who can only find the inward in the inward" (Henry Suso, quoted by Rufus M. Jones, *New Studies in Mystical Religion*, 1927, p. 75). In the *Calcutta Review*, for March, 1927, Professor S. N. Dasgupta is reported as having said, "There are two kinds of spiritualism, objective and subjective, the former being well known in America in the form of hospitals, welfare institutions, and all the vast number of things which make for the welfare of humanity."

† W. Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, 1917, pp. 95-99.

is true, as one of the radical pragmatists has pointed out, that there is a sense of the divine "which comes with comradeship in a genial company of earnest, idealistic souls who are interested in .....the common good."\*

In so far, then, as devotion to the universally valid spiritual ideal for humanity is to be regarded as religion, we may conclude that in unselfish love and altruistic service we have an element of universal religion; and possibly it is worth being banished for a time from the realm of metaphysics and theology in order to be duly impressed with this lesson. In the Golden Rule of reciprocity inculcated by Confucianism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity, and in the high place given in Indian traditional teaching to a sympathy for all living beings, we have indications of something which must be made fundamental in any religion which can reasonably expect to be the universal religion of the future. There are many who feel that the best concrete individual embodiment of this principle of unselfish love is to be found in the historic figure of Jesus Christ; the minds of others turn at once to the gentle Gautama Buddha, devoting himself to missionary activity even at the cost of postponing thereby his own complete salvation, according to his own theory. But the principle itself is universally and eternally valid, an indispensable element in any religion which is to be the future religion of mankind.

But while unselfish love, the spirit of altruistic service, cannot be absent from ideal religion, it is still more obviously true that such love, directed toward one's fellow-men, or even toward all living beings, does not in itself fulfil the characteristic idea of religion. "Religion within the limits of humanity," a religion of simple aspiration after truth, beauty, and goodness in human life, however important and admirable it may be, still falls short of what has been throughout history characteristic of religion. His-

\* E. S. Ames, *Journal of Religion*, I, 1921, p. 481. Cf. Royce: "Man the community is the source of salvation. By man the community I mean man viewed as one conscious spiritual whole of life. And I say that this conscious spiritual community is the sole possessor of the means of grace, and is the essential source of the salvation of the individual." (*The Problem of Christianity*, I, pp. 405, 406).



torically, religion has been interested in the relation of a superhuman cosmic Factor toward our human values, whether the crude material and sensuous values or the spiritual values of truth (or rationality), beauty and goodness; and vital experiential religion has always meant by the distinctively religious quality or value something not quite identical with the intellectual, the aesthetic, or the moral value, whether taken singly, or all together. If then, our pragmatism is to be a religious pragmatism, whether in the more pronounced form in which truth is identified with value for life, or in the more moderate form in which value for life is taken as an indispensable test of truth, we must raise the question as to just what is the distinctive character of religious value.

Religious value is appreciated in and through religious feeling, and religious feeling, as was pointed out long ago by Schleiermacher, emerges in connection with our consciousness of the universe and its relationship to us. Religious value, however refined and ideal, however social and moral it may become, never loses its cosmic flavor. Religion is fundamentally an experiential consciousness or "feeling" of ultimate dependence. It is not a mere disinterested and detached scientific consciousness of the universe. It is interested in the fate of man and his values in the struggle for existence. It arises out of the tension between the welter of forces in time and space about us and the eternal values which we are conscious that we bear within us. And just because religion contemplates neither cosmic processes abstractly nor human values abstractly, but cosmic processes in relation to human values, it rises above the cosmic and above the human to the thought of a superhuman and supramundane Reality. It thus becomes, as Professor Otto has insisted, no mere feeling of dependence, but a creature-feeling, the emotion of a creature conscious of that which is above all creatures. It includes, as Professor Wobbermin has pointed out, a tendency toward the transcendent, developing and differentiating itself, in its higher forms, into a feeling of ardent longing for what the world does not fully reveal

or give, and a feeling of security in the assurance of this transcendent Reality and its sufficiency for our need.\*

"It seems time .. to begin with the clearest distinction between our faith and your ethics and metaphysics, between our piety and what you call morality" (Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, Oman's translation, p. 34). "Religion resigns... ..all claims on anything that belongs either to science or morality" (*Ibid.*, p. 35). "While morality always shows itself as manipulating, as self-controlling, piety appears as a surrender, a submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over against man" (*Ibid.*, p. 37). "True science is complete vision, true practice is culture and art self-produced; true religion is sense and taste for the Infinite" (*Ibid.*, p. 39). "This third, which is the series of feeling, what life will it form? The religious, as I think This is the peculiar sphere which I would assign to religion Your feeling is piety, in so far as it expresses the being and life common to you and to the All Your feeling is piety in so far as it is the result of the operation of God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you" (*Ibid.*, p. 45) "No man is pious, however perfectly he understands these principles and conceptions, who cannot show that they have originated in himself and, being the outcome of his own feeling, are peculiar to himself" (*Ibid.*, p. 47). "The sum-total of religion is to feel that, in its highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one" (*Ibid.*, pp. 49, 50) "Religious emotions, the sense for the unity of the original source of life" (*Ibid.*, p. 55). "The whole religious life consists of two elements, that man surrender himself to the Universe and allow himself to be influenced by the side of it that is turned toward him is one part, and that he transplant this contact which is one of definite feeling, within, and take it up into the inner unity of his life and being, is the other The religious life is nothing else than the constant renewal of this proceeding" (*Ibid.*, p. 58) "Religion is chiefly to be sought . . . . where the living contact of man with the world fashions itself as feeling" (*Ibid.*, p. 63). "Instinct for the Universe as religion" (*Ibid.*, p. 86). "The religious man must, at least, be conscious of his feelings as the immediate product of the Universe" (*Ibid.*, p. 90) "Only what... is feeling and immediate consciousness can belong to religion" "Any feeling is piety only in so far as in it and along with it, it affects us as a revelation of God" "Otherwise than by the emotions produced in us by the world we do not claim to have God in our feeling" (*Ibid.*, pp. 93, 94) "The true nature of religion is neither this idea nor any other, but immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world" "In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion" (*Ibid.*, p. 101) "The feeling of absolute dependence is religion" (Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith*, in Cross, *The Theology of Schleiermacher*, p. 121) "The religious feeling is never experienced in isolation from other experience but always in connection with a world consciousness" (*Ibid.*, p. 153) "Only when we are conscious of belonging to that unity which we call the world, do we recognize our absolute dependence upon that higher infinite unity we call God Our absolute dependence on God involves the absolute dependence of the world also" (*Ibid.*, p. 156)

"The religious view of the world rests on the fact that man in some degree distinguishes himself in worth from the phenomena which surround him and from the influences of nature which press in upon him. All religion is equivalent to an explanation of the course of the world in the sense that the sublime spiritual powers (or the

If, then, we apply a pragmatist way of thinking to religion and find religious judgments to be judgments of value, we must be on our guard against reducing religious value without remainder to values which are not distinctively religious. There is good ground, indeed, for maintaining that religious judgments are value-judgments. This is true, not only of such religious judgments as explicitly attach a predicate of religious value, such as

spiritual power) which rule in or over it conserve and confirm to the personal spirit its claims and its independence over against the restrictions of nature and the natural effects of human society " (Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, English translation, p 17)

" In every religion what is sought with the help of the superhuman spiritual power revered by man is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature .. Religion springs up as faith in superhuman spiritual powers, by whose help the power which man possesses in himself is in some way supplemented, and elevated into a unity of its own kind which is a match for the pressure of the natural world " (*Ibid*, p 199) " In Christianity we are not religiously dependent upon the supramundane God without at the same time experiencing our religious freedom relatively to the world " (*Ibid*, p 588)

" When I seek to represent a world-whole because I wish to comprehend the multiplicity of things in a never-failing connection of law, then I go the way of metaphysics. When I seek to represent a world-whole because I do not wish to lose myself, as a person conscious of my highest good, in the multiplicity of things, then I receive the impulses of religious faith " (Herrmann, *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit*, 1879, p 86) " The most important thing for the man who is to submit himself to God is surely that he should be absolutely certain of the reality of God, and Jesus does establish in us, through the fact of His personal life, a certainty of God which is superior to every doubt

If we yield to his attraction, we learn to share His invincible confidence [in which] is implied the idea of a Power greater than all things, which will see to it that Jesus who lost His life in this world, shall be none the less victorious over the world. Thus God makes Himself known to us as the Power that is with Jesus. But the God we recognize is not only the God of Jesus Christ. He is our own God " (Herrmann, *Communion with God*, third English edition, pp 97, 98, 99).

" Religion is a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend " (Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, p 27)

" The feeling which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence is the religious feeling. It is determined by the relation of values to reality " (Höfding, *Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, p 107)

" Religion is man's seeking communion with a supramundane power or powers, which lay claim to him and determine his life. This seeking has its roots in the worth-perceiving heart and in the desire for blessedness on the part of man, and it is evoked by impressions due to disclosures of that power in the real world " (G. B. Foster, *Christianity in its Modern Expression*, section 10 2). " Our faith in this worth of the world is the

holy or divine, to particular things or persons, times or places, acts, or institutions. All live judgments are expressions of interest, and religious judgments, as such, express the religious interest. The predicate of the judgment indicates the interest which the person making the judgment has in the subject-matter judged about. It is in accord with a sound psychology to find at the root of even the more theoretical and speculative judgments of religion a practical motive, an appreciation of value in general

essence of religion " (*American Journal of Theology*, XII, 1908, p 230) " Our vocation is to achieve ideal values, religion is the conviction that such values are by us achievable in virtue of our constitution and of the constitution of that whole of which we are a part " (*Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*, p 110) " Faith arises out of the tension between the world around us and the eternity within us " (Article in the *Chicago Standard*, May 4, 1912)

" Theism is an interpretation of the universe in terms of a philosophy which makes it possible to believe in a cosmic support of his [man's] ideals and values I believe that this cosmic interest is an inescapable aspect of religion The deepest springs of religious experience are in man's sense of dependence on the non-human cosmos " (G B Smith, " Is Theism Essential to Religion? " *Journal of Religion*, V, 1925, p 371) " In religion man brings his highest ideals and his most precious values into the presence of that vast cosmic mystery which has produced him and which holds him in its power He seeks to obtain from this cosmic power some kind of a blessing on these values and ideals " (*Ibid*, p 374).

" The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply felt religious experience Schleiermacher has the credit of isolating a very important element in such an experience This is the 'feeling of dependence' But the feeling . . is not a 'feeling of dependence' in the 'natural' sense of the word Schleiermacher recognizes this by distinguishing the feeling of pious or religious dependence from all other feelings of dependence His mistake is in making the distinction merely that between 'absolute' and 'relative' dependence, and therefore a difference of degree and not of intrinsic quality The precise 'moment' or element of religious feeling [is a] 'feeling of dependence' which is yet at the same time far more than, and something other than merely a feeling of dependence I propose to call it 'creature consciousness' or creature-feeling It is the emotion of a creature . . overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures " (Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, English translation, pp 8, 9, 10) " The deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious emotion [is] something for which there is only one approximate expression, *mysterium tremendum* " (*Ibid*, p 12) This *mysterium tremendum* Otto analyzes into the element of awfulness, the element of "overpoweringness," the element of energy, the "wholly other," and the element of fascination (*Ibid*, Chapters IV, V, VI)

" It is the tendency toward transcendence which is the fundamental characteristic of the religious experience " (Wobbermin, "Psychologie und Erkenntniskritik der religiösen Erfahrung" in *Weltanschauung*, 1911, p 357). " The nature of religion is for

and of religious value in particular, of which the theoretical elaboration is either a fully justified, a partially justified, or a quite unjustified rationalization. And not only is an appreciation of value the psychological basis of original and living religious judgments; it is scarcely too much to say that religious value is the primitive and primary test of the truth of religious judgments. The man makes his religious judgment not simply because he feels like it; he feels that his judgment is justified and true, because he needs to believe what it asserts, and because, when he does believe it and act upon it, he finds both it and the consequences of his action satisfactory.\*

us a relationship of man to an over-world of which he has intimations in his faith, on which he feels himself to be dependent, in whose shelter he knows himself to be secure, and which is the goal of his heart's most ardent yearning. The inmost essence of religion resides, then, in the surmising and believing relationship to a reality which, in its essential nature and intrinsic value is to be characterized, over against the finite, space-time, sense-world, as an over-world. This relationship reflects itself in the feeling-trinity—the feeling of dependence, the feeling of security, and the feeling of ardent yearning. The feeling of dependence is the fundamental religious feeling which allows itself to be differentiated into the two polar opposite and conflicting feelings of security and ardent longing, in order to bring this oppositeness back into itself. The expanding activity of the feeling of security and of ardent yearning includes the dual tendency—striving for blessedness and consciousness of duty" (Wobbermin, *Das Wesen der Religion*, p. 254, cf. D. S. Robinson, *Journal of Religion*, 1923, p. 660).

Religious feeling is "the consciousness of humble dependence on God and of loving communion with him" (Max Scheibe, *Die Bedeutung der Werturteile für das religiöse Erkennen*, 1893, p. 36). "Redemption from the limits of finitude and rest from his longing for perfect blessedness, for the conditions of satisfying his inmost demands, for certainty that these demands can be met, for the securing of that which to him is worthful—this is what man seeks and finds in religion" (*Ibid.*, p. 35).

\* "I recall the twofold manner in which the mind . . . appropriates the sensations aroused in it. They are determined, according to their value for the Ego, by the feeling of pleasure or pain. . . . On the other hand through an idea the sensation is judged in respect of its cause. . . . The two functions of spirit . . . are always in operation simultaneously. All conscious cognition of the things which excite sensation is not only accompanied, but likewise guided, by feeling. . . . Value judgments, therefore, are determinative in the case of all connected knowledge of the world, even when carried out in the most objective fashion. . . . We have therefore to distinguish between *concomitant* and *independent* value-judgments. The former are operative and necessary in all theoretical cognition. But all perceptions of moral ends or moral hindrances are *independent* value-judgments. . . . Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments, which relate to man's attitude to the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain in which man either enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed him by God, or feels grievously

It is important to note that social or moral value, however significant for the testing of religious value, does not exhaust the whole content of religious value. As Professor Otto has pointed out in his recent well-known discussion of the idea of the "holy,"

the lack of God's help to that end" (Albrecht Ritschl, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, English translation by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay, pp 203, 204, 205) "Scientific knowledge is accompanied or guided by a judgment affirming the worth of impartial knowledge gained by observation. In Christianity, religious knowledge consists in independent value-judgments, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the blessedness which is assured by God and sought by man, and the whole of the world" (*Ibid.*, p 207) "In Christianity, the religious motive of ethical action lies here, that the Kingdom of God, which it is our task to realise, represents also the highest good which God destines for us as our supramundane goal. For here there emerges the value-judgment that our blessedness consists in that elevation above the world in the Kingdom of God which accords with our true destiny. This is a religious judgment, inasmuch as it indicates the value of this attitude taken up by believers towards the world" (*Ibid.*, pp 205, 206) "A given action, in the light of human society and the law of the State, is a wrong and a crime. But the same action is a sin when it springs from indifference toward God, as the Benefactor and Governor of human life. By bringing out this aspect we stamp sin as a religious idea, as a characteristic value-notion" (*Ibid.*, p 334) "Every cognition of a religious sort is a direct judgment of value. The nature of God and the Divine we can only know in its essence by determining its value for our salvation" "If Christ by what He has done and suffered for my salvation is my Lord, and if, by trusting for my salvation to the power of what He has done for me, I honour Him as my God, then that is a value-judgment of a direct kind" (*Ibid.*, p 398). "Man as spirit distinguishes himself from the world, gains through the conception of God the idea of his worth as against the world, and rises in the Christian religion to the self-feeling that the worth of his spiritual personality transcends that of the whole system of nature" (*Ibid.*, p 620).

"The subject has in the feeling of pleasure and pain a means of establishing an order of values [which] are fixed in value-judgments" (Herrmann, *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit*, 1879, p 140) "The concern of religion is to regard the multiplicity of the world as the orderly whole of means by which the highest value of the pious man, which is experienced in feeling, is realized" (*Ibid.*, p. 85). According to Herrmann it is as conscious of the categorical imperative of the moral law that man knows himself to have absolute value, and on the basis of this consciousness of his own value he assigns value to other things, according as they help or hinder his realization of the moral ideal (*Ibid.*, pp 81, etc.; cf Garvie, *The Christian Certainty amid the Modern Perplexity*, pp 237, 238)

"The religious feeling is determined by the relation of values to reality. This relation, as it manifests itself to men, determines the value which they assign to existence. Religious judgments, therefore, . . . are secondary judgments of value, in comparison with the primary judgments of value they are derivative" (Höfding, *Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, p 107)

while holiness or divineness, the religious value *par excellence*, has come rightly enough in the more advanced religions to connote ideal spiritual values in general and moral values in particular, throughout the history of religion it has meant and still means in

'The whole soul is always at work in its different functions' "Judgments which come into being through the combined representing and feeling activity of the soul are to be regarded as value-judgments" "All man's knowledge consists fundamentally of value judgments" "What is exhibited in the customary judgments of common knowledge is the result of a process of gradually emptying these value-judgments of their feeling content" "Religious knowledge as such is made up of value-judgments exclusively." "Man's original cognitive activity has always included the conviction of the reality of its objects" (Otto Ritschl, *Ueber Werturteile* pp 34, 35) "To set value judgments and so-called 'existence judgments' over against each other and then to identify theoretical judgments with the so called 'existence judgments,' as if value judgments expressed a non existence, is a very foolish misconception of the actual operations of our thought For in value judgments quite as much as in theoretical judgments one always intends to express only what is regarded as true On the other hand even the content of theoretical judgments can be actually erroneous and incorrect Decision concerning the truth of a judgment depends not on how far the value experience enters into the act of judgment, but rather on the objects judged about and their special qualities So then from the point of view of formal psychology value-judgments, quite as much as customary and theoretical judgments, are 'existence-judgments,' if this expression is to be used at all" (*Ibid*, p 22)

"I assign value to an object of which on reflection I am sure that its reality affords, or would afford, satisfaction to my whole self, and indeed, a higher satisfaction than its non-existence" (Max Reischle, *Werturteile und Glaubensurteile*, p 41) A value-judgment is "a judgment in which to any object a predicate of value is assigned" (*Ibid*, p 44) In the strict interpretation of this definition, according to which only those judgments are value-judgments which are such *verbally*, Reischle has to admit that comparatively few of the judgments of religion are value judgments (*Ibid*, pp 76, 85, 88) If, however, we take the *psychological* point of view, according to which such "feeling-judgments" as arise out of and express a personal appreciation of values are called value-judgments, many and perhaps most of the judgments of faith are to be included under that term (*Ibid*, pp 78, 86) *Epistemologically*, however, the term value-judgment comprises all judgments whose validity depends on the attitude of the feeling-willing subject to its object, and from this point of view all affirmations of the religious consciousness are value judgments (*Ibid*, pp 81, 96, 93-8) Religious judgments, as judgments of trust, express the attitude of the whole feeling-willing self to the religious Object (*Ibid*, pp 103-107) Religious judgments, according to Reischle, are not "theoretical," nor are they mere postulates They express truths well-known to the religious man "We do not judge that God's holy love must be real, because it is so valuable to us as to be indispensable; on the contrary, God's love makes-itself known to us as a reality: the appearance of Jesus Christ makes instantly upon our spiritual consciousness the impression of divine exaltation and love . . . We simply interpret the given historic phenomenon as divine revelation" (*Ibid*, pp 102-3)

all vital religious life something more and other than the ideal or cultural values of moral goodness, truth (or rationality\*) and beauty. The holy is the "numinous," that is, the quality characteristic of the *numen* or object of religious veneration and of the consciousness which recognizes and responds to it. It is the awe-inspiring, the mysterious, the overwhelming, the fascinating and all-compelling.† Now these qualities or elements of dis-

\* Cf O C Quick, *Hibbert Journal*, xii, 1923-4, p 127, L Hodgson, *The Place of Reason in Christian Apologetic*, 1925, p 19

† "The end, norm, ideal of religion, we call the *holy* " "The holy can be defined as to its essence only through the totality of the norms which rule the logical, ethical, and aesthetic life. These norms are supreme and final among all that we possess, beyond them we know of nothing. They are holy for us for this reason, that they are not products of the life of the individual soul, nor even the result of empirical social consciousness, but value-contents of a higher rational reality which we are permitted to participate in and to experience in ourselves. The holy is therefore the normal consciousness of the true, good, and beautiful, experienced as transcendent reality. Religion is transcendent life " This transcendent life begins in "transcendent feeling " (Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence), which is followed by transcendent representing and transcendent willing (W. Windelband, "Das Heilige," *Präludien*, 1911, II, pp 274, 282, 283, 286, 296)

"Everything in religion which rests upon legitimate grounds of feeling is tenable and justified, but as to what in feeling is legitimate it is not for feeling itself to decide, but for the normative systems of science, morality, and art " (P. Natorp, *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität*, 1908, p 49)

"We have come to use the words *holy*, *sacred* in an entirely derivative sense, quite different from that which they originally bore. We generally take 'holy' as meaning 'completely good', it is the absolute moral attribute. It is true that all this moral significance is contained in the word 'holy,' but it includes in addition a clear overplus of meaning. This 'holy' represents the gradual filling in with ethical meaning of what was a unique original feeling-response, which can be in itself ethically neutral. It is worth while to find a word to stand for this element in isolation, this 'extra' in the meaning of 'holy' above and beyond the meaning of goodness. For this purpose I adopt a word coined from the Latin *numen*. I shall speak then of a unique 'numinous' category of value, and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied " (R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, English translation, edition of 1923, pp 5-7)

"'I am a man of *unclean* lips' " Depart from me, for I am a *sinful* man, O Lord " So say respectively Isaiah and Peter, when the numinous reality encounters them as a present fact of consciousness. The feeling is not that of the transgression of the moral law it is the feeling of absolute 'profaneness'. He only, who is 'in the Spirit' knows and feels what this 'profaneness' is and [therefore] he passes upon the *numen* a judgment of appreciation of a unique kind by the category diametrically contrary to the 'profane,' the category 'holy,' which is proper to the *numen* alone, but to it in an absolute degree, he says, 'Tu solus sanctus' This 'sanctus,'.. ..



distinctively religious value are fundamentally cosmic in their reference. Perhaps Otto has not brought this out quite explicitly enough. But what he has done—and we may thank him for it—is to insist that for our developed religious consciousness, both elements, the ideal and the numinous, the spiritual and the cosmic, are indispensable. There are other voices clamouring for a hearing to-day which we cannot so safely follow. On the one hand there is the new Swiss-German “theology of crisis,” advocating what would be virtually a return to primitive religion, to the numinous without the cultural, the consciousness of an overwhelming, awe-inspiring, wholly transcendent Something, without intelligibility or ideal spiritual value. On the other hand we have the radical pragmatists to whom we have referred, interpreting the holy or divine in terms of purely cultural values, the ideal without the numinous. The triumph of their point of view would mean not only the disappearance of the distinctively religious element in the spiritual ideal as, for instance, the consciousness of fellowship with God, but the loss of the special dynamic of religion in the pursuit of the ideal values of truth, beauty, and goodness.

But, granted the permanent importance of the numinous or distinctively religious element in religion, the validity and necessity of the generally recognized criteria of religious value should be clearly understood. Indeed the question may well be raised whether there is not a numinous quality in the moral as well as in the cosmic consciousness. This is not only suggested in the well-known Kantian coupling of the moral law within with the starry heavens above; it is strongly maintained throughout the whole Kantian and Ritschlian interpretation of religion. We have no

is the positive *numinous* value or worth. The felt necessity and longing for ‘atone-  
ment’ amounts to a longing to transcend this sundering unworthiness, given with  
the self’s existence as ‘creature’ and profane natural being” (*Ibid.* pp. 52-57). “Let us  
call the faculty of genuinely cognizing and recognizing the holy in its appearances  
the faculty of *divination*.” “Divination is no new theological discovery. Schleiermacher,  
.. ..... Fries and DeWette have all in effect made use of it, the last  
named with special reference to the divination of the Divine in history” (*Ibid.*, pp. 148,  
150). “The elements of the numinous the wholly non-rational, incomprehensible  
by concepts, the elements of mystery, fascination, awfulness, and energy” (*Ibid.*, p. 155).

more fundamental or objective ground for the consciousness of God, Herrmann would remind us, than we find in the fact that we hear within ourselves the demand of the moral law. But be that as it may, it is clear that unless we are to be put to hopeless spiritual confusion, no religion can be regarded as valid if it conflicts with the universal moral obligation to treat personality, with its potentialities of moral development, always and everywhere as a sacred and ultimate end, and never as a mere means to other ends, however "numinous" or holy these other ends may seem to be.

But even with the aid of the moral consciousness, recognition of religious value seems to be so dependent upon variable factors in the individual human subject that the need of some further and possibly more objective and universally accessible standard by which to test religious judgments has been felt even by many of those who have been among the first to maintain that all vital religious judgments are judgments of value. In the case of the older Ritschlians, who had reacted rather violently against the disappointing and misleading philosophy of absolute idealism, this needed objectivity was to be found, not in any metaphysical development of theology, but in the appeal to historic fact. Now religious judgments express the feeling-willing-thinking religious consciousness shared by members of a religious fellowship bound together by their agreement in some particular variety of the religious consciousness, and when the religious appeal is made to historic fact the fact or facts selected are very certain to be those in which the particular religious fellowship is already favorably interested. Thus in the Ritschlian development of theology the central historic fact made normative for Christian religious belief was the historic Jesus as appropriated and responded to in the Christian faith which produced the New Testament. That is, the religious doctrine of the Christian was to be made up of what could be derived from the appreciation of the spirit and life of the historic Jesus as being, in its quality and function, holy, or divine; and nothing incompatible with such a definition of the divine was to be allowed a place in the system of Christian doctrine.

Now assuming that we know what kind of person the historic Jesus was and the kind of life he lived, this historical criterion has, for those who can accept it, a definite normative meaning. Briefly put, it makes Christlikeness the norm of the divine, whether the divine Reality be thought of as transcendent, or immanent in human experience, or both. But the question has been raised, particularly by Troeltsch, the leading systematic thinker of the German religio-historical school, whether this appeal to Christian history exclusively is not altogether too narrow and dogmatic in its presuppositions to be a way of gaining genuine objectivity in religion. His own view is that the appeal to history must be to the universal history of religion, from a philosophical consideration of which we may derive religious standards which will be universally valid and acceptable.\*

\* "The positive religions are just the forms in which religion must exhibit itself"

Religion can only be given fully in a great multitude of forms of the utmost definiteness " "You are wrong with your universal religion that is natural to all, for no one will have his own true and right religion, if it is the same for all" "The whole of religion can be exhibited only in an endless series of shapes that are gradually developed in different points of time and space" (Schleiermacher, *On Religion* English translation, pp 217, 223) "If we follow any man's religious history, we find first dim presentiments which never quite stir the depths of the heart Afterwards it first comes to pass that the sense for the Universe rises once for all into clear consciousness One man discovers it in one relation, another in another Hereafter all things are referred to this relation, and so group themselves around it Such a moment, therefore, in the strictest sense, determines every man's religion" (*Ibid*, p 225) "Consider the variety of forms in which every single kind of fellowship with the Universe has already appeared" (*Ibid*, p 235) "Every essential element of human nature forms a basis of communion" As a result of the natural human "impulse to combine with others and to communicate to others our inner experience" there ensues "the formation of an association or communion based upon that experience and composed of those who are capable of appreciating it Thus religion produces religious communions" (*The Christian Faith*, Section 6, Cross, *Theology of Schleiermacher*, p 125) "In the case of the Christian, religious faith in Christ must modify all pious feelings" (*Ibid*, p 132) "All Christians are agreed on two points. (1) in referring the origin of their communion to Jesus of Nazareth. (2) in the description of his work as redemption" "In Christianity redemption is the central point and rests on the person of its Founder" (*Ibid* pp 134, 136). Christianity is essentially different from other religions and cannot be a mere perfecting of that which lay potentially in them, Christianity can never progress beyond Christ" (*Ibid*, p. 136) "The Christian religion is that monotheistic form of faith within the teleological (moral) class, in which everything is referred to the redemption wrought by Jesus" (*Werke*, Vol. I, p. 440 ff, quoted by Ritschl, *Justification and Re-*

This seems fair enough and correct in principle, but in practice certain difficulties make themselves felt. After his critical

*conciliation*, p 8) "Is Christianity to be universal and, as the sole type of religion, to rule alone in humanity? It scorns this autocracy. As nothing is more irreligious than to demand general uniformity in mankind, so nothing is more unchristian than to seek uniformity in religion." "However long such a moment may still linger, new developments of religion, whether under Christianity or alongside of it, must come" (*On Religion*, pp 251, 252, 253)

"Every religion must take shape as the religion of a community whose members agree in recognizing certain Divine operations on them, and show that they are thus conscious of a common salvation" (Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, p 28) "In Christianity, revelation through God's Son is the *punctum stans* of all knowledge and religious conduct" (*Ibid*, p 202) "The nature of Christianity as a universal religion is such that in the Christian view of the world a definite place is assigned to its historical founder" (*Ibid*, p 385) "Only through the impulse and direction we receive from Him, is it possible for us to enter into His relation to God and to the world" (*Ibid*, p 387). "We are able to know and understand God, sin, conversion, eternal life, in the Christian sense, only so far as we consciously and intentionally reckon ourselves members of the community which Christ has founded" (*Ibid*, p 4) "Christianity is the monotheistic, completely spiritual and ethical religion, which, based on the life of its Author as Redeemer and Founder of the Kingdom of God, consists in the freedom of the children of God, involves the impulse to conduct from the motive of love, which aims at the moral organization of mankind, and grounds blessedness in the relation of sonship to God, as well as in the Kingdom of God" (*Ibid*, p. 13) "Christ founds His religion with the claim that He brings the perfect revelation of God, so that beyond what He brings no further revelation is conceivable or is to be looked for" (*Ibid*, p 388)

"God makes himself known to us, so that we may recognise Him, through a fact, on the strength of which we are able to believe on Him. ... Now we Christians hold that we know only one fact in the whole world which can overcome every doubt of the reality of God, namely, the appearance of Jesus in history, the story of which has been preserved for us in the New Testament. Our certainty of God has its root in the fact that within the realm of history to which we ourselves belong, we encounter the man Jesus as an undoubted reality" (Herrmann, *Communion with God*, English translation of 1896, p 51. In the third English edition, published in 1913, the last sentence quoted above is omitted, and this is inserted "Our certainty of God may be knudled by many other experiences, but has ultimately its firmest basis in the fact that within the realm of history to which we ourselves belong we encounter the man Jesus as an undoubted reality" (pp. 59, 60) "The Christian's consciousness that God communes with him rests on two objective facts, the first of which is the historical fact of the person of Jesus. . . The second objective ground is that we hear within ourselves the demand of the moral law. There are no other grounds for the truth of the Christian religion. . . Anyone who has let the fact of the personal life of Jesus work upon him, and who has been led thereby to trust in Him, cannot help thinking that here is a Power over all things, and that that Power is with Jesus. In what he experiences at the hands of Jesus, he feels himself in the grip of this Power. Here his religious life begins, but this beginning is kept from being a purely subjective experience by these two objective things, viz., by that historical fact, which when once seen, never disappears, and by his con-

survey of the history of religion Troeltsch comes to the conclusion that, for the European and American type of civilization, religion

science Through Jesus he has not merely a thought of God supported by proofs or authorities, but he has the Living God Himself, who is working upon him " (English translation, 1913, pp 102-103) " That experience which, in the light of Christ, we have learnt to count as a work and word of God for us, has the power to make us rejoice in what is eternal, and so brings us actually to live in it " " We can know in all experiences, great or small, that we are laid hold of and borne up by a Love that is not to be distinguished from the power of the Eternal which through the moral law claims us for itself " " We are certain of God and of His communion with us, seeing that nothing can ever blot out the historical fact to comprehend which is to feel God's nearness in all the relations of our life, and that the inner use of that historical fact lifts us up into joy in God and so to a share in the Eternal " Life in the eternal is laid open before us when we understand moral necessity and we share in that life in the Eternal when we choose with joy, and so of our own free will, to do what is morally necessary. 'The power that helps us to do this is our God Jesus Christ is God present for us, surrounding us with grace and compassion, only when we give Him the glory that in His appearance, as it stands before us in the Gospels, we see God's approach to us and God's presence with every one of us ' ' In the Person of Christ that which is truly supernatural has entered the world, and is now lifting us above it " The vision of the truly supernatural is ours only when we experience Jesus' power to make us certain of God " (*Ibid*, pp 195, 196, 197, 198, 201)

" Certainly the best religion must be unconditionally free from all purely historic tradition, and it must give to historical investigation full freedom But that does not mean that the bond which unites religion directly with the historic must be sundered This bond must not be sundered if religion is not to be essentially injured " (G Wobbermin, ' Psychologie und Erkenntniskritik der religiösen Erfahrung,' in *Weltanschauung*, 1911, p 349)

" My theological teacher was Ritschl But I have been led gradually into opposition to the Ritschlian system first, with regard to supernaturalism, which, it seems to me, cannot be asserted in the light of the historical study of religions, Christian and non-Christian I noticed that I had been brought into very close approximation to Schleiermacher " (E Troeltsch, " Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII, 1898, p 52) "[In] exclusive supernaturalism [theology] feels able or required to prove the divineness and supernaturalness of one's own religion and the humanness and naturalness of other religions This exclusive supernaturalism is now of course for ever destroyed for science through the eighteenth century criticism of miracles But as for what we may call inclusive supernaturalism, i.e., the recognition of revelation and miracle in all religion everywhere, it remains a permanent object of interest in the philosophy of religion " (" Religionsphilosophie " in Windelband's *Die Philosophie im XX Jahrhundert*, p 453) " It is the exclusiveness of the supernaturalism to which I am opposed, because it is not provable, and is contradicted by all history and psychology " (" Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, p 766)

" The [religionsgeschichtlich] movement signifies the recognition that human religion exists only in manifold specific religious cults which develop in very

must continue to be Christocentric, but that Oriental peoples may be expected to continue to find their historic norms for religion in their own traditions. This may be admirably liberal in spirit, but

complex relations of mutual contact and influence, and that in this development it is impossible to make the older dogmatic distinction between a natural and a supernatural revelation" (Troeltsch, "The Dogmatics of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule," *American Journal of Theology*, XVII, Jan., 1913, pp. 1, 2) "Even the Ritschlian school was and continues to be a type of biblicism which, indeed, permits historical criticism of the Bible, but which declines to engage in any study of comparative religions" (*Ibid.*, p. 8) "The very thought of setting forth any one historical religion as complete and final, capable of supplanting all others, seems to me to be open to serious criticism and doubt" "We cannot set Christianity forth as absolute religion" (*Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10) The first task of a dogmatics proceeding on the basis of the history of religions consists in establishing on the basis of a historical and philosophical comparison of religions the fundamental and universal supremacy of Christianity for our own culture and civilization. We have absolutely no occasion to abandon the Christian fundamentals of the European and American world. We must, therefore, develop our religious future on the basis of this fundamental aspect of our whole psychic life" (*Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11. Cf. *Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte*) "Christianity can be compared with other world-religions. They can all be measured by a standard which emerges in the course of this comparative study through the exercise of our own religious and ethical appreciation. Such a standard is not scientifically demonstrable as an objective reality. It is simply a decision which grows out of a sympathetic understanding of the facts. In my own opinion the decision will be reached in favour of prophetic Christian theism, as over against the quietism and pessimism of Oriental religions" (*Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11)

"Christianity is itself a developing religion. It possesses the highest degree of validity attained among all the historical religions which we are able to examine. It is the loftiest and most spiritual religion we know. Such was the conclusion I reached some twenty years ago, [but] there are a number of points which I should wish to modify to-day. Whilst the concept of individuality impresses me more forcibly every day, I no longer believe this to be so easily reconcilable with that of supreme validity. Christianity is a purely historical, individual, relative phenomenon. On the other hand, Buddhism and Brahmanism especially [are] really humane and spiritual religions capable of appealing in precisely the same way to the inner certitude and devotion of their followers as Christianity." "Christianity is indissolubly bound up with elements of the ancient and modern civilizations of Europe. It stands or falls with European civilization." "It is final and unconditional for us, because we have nothing else, and because in what we have we can recognize the accents of the divine voice. But this does not preclude the possibility that other racial groups, living under entirely different cultural conditions, may experience their contact with the Divine Life in quite a different way." "If we wish to determine their relative value, it is not the religions alone that we must compare, but always only the civilizations. But who will presume to make a final pronouncement here? Only God Himself. can do that" (Troeltsch, "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions" in *Christian Thought Its History and Application*, 1923, pp. 21-27)

it is open to the obvious criticism that it seems to give up the ideal of universality in religion. It is not that absolute uniformity in the religious life of the world is to be looked for. Not only in ritual but in the elements of memory and sentimental association, great differences may be allowed for. But if what is meant by the doctrine of the ultimate relativity of religion to racial civilization is either that some peoples must be left permanently to believe something less than the highest religious truth accessible to man, or else that religious truths may be mutually contradictory, we must decline to choose either horn of the proposed dilemma. Nothing but the truth and nothing but the best is good enough in the end for any people or any man. On the other hand it is carrying pragmatism altogether too far to maintain that what may seem to be the temporary practical value of mutually contradictory doctrines for the different peoples means that there can be mutually contradictory truths. There is a pragmatic interest in harmony, in rationality, in the synthesis of the true elements in points of view which seem mutually opposed, and it would surely be a perverse pragmatism which would refuse to recognize as valid the search for universal value and validity in the realm of religious belief.

The fact is that we are being led to discover what seems to be an exaggerated relativism and consequent confusion with reference to the meaning of truth in the value-judgment theory which Troeltsch inherited from the Ritschlians and which at this point has much in common with current pragmatism. Troeltsch recognizes, to be sure, the claims of rationality in religion; he sets up, as the goal of religious philosophy, empirical religion in rational form, and sees that this involves a metaphysical development of theology.\* But acquiescence in the final multiplicity and mutual inconsistency of the great racial religions can only mean, assuming that it is real, one or the other of two things—either on the one

\* *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft*, 1905, pp. 23, 24, 27, 28; "Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII, 1898, pp. 45, 46; "Wesen der Religion," *Kultur der Gegenwart*, T.I, Abt. IV, pp. 487, 488.

hand, an ultimate religious agnosticism, or at least pessimism as to the capacity of large sections of the human race to learn the truth in religion; or else, on the other hand, the sceptical pragmatism which would deny that truth means any sort of representation of reality, or anything but mere temporary practical success through the manipulation of essentially fictitious ideas. That what it means in the case of Troeltsch himself is a touch of agnosticism rather than an extreme, nihilistic pragmatism becomes clear from his own confession;\* but the more radical alternative is not without its advocates among the pragmatists of to-day.

But this radical pragmatism—or hyper-pragmatism, as it might well be called, in distinction from essential pragmatism which simply says that the test of truth about reality is ultimately a practical test †—can be shown to be a self-destructive doctrine. If the doctrine that there is no universal and permanent truth about reality be itself true, it must be either a permanent and universally valid truth, or else a mere temporarily useful thought-device of some thinkers. The radical pragmatists themselves probably mean that their doctrine is universally valid and permanently true, but obviously they cannot maintain this explicitly without self-contradiction. If then it be maintained that radical pragmatism is a mere fictitious device of thought which proves useful from the point of view of the temporary purposes of certain individuals, we need not concern ourselves to deny the statement. It ought to be enough to point out that the fact that we sometimes have to give up doctrines which we formerly regarded as true is no proof that every proposition that has been, is, or will be considered true will some day have to be given up.

If then we are still exiled from our former metaphysical home, we must not become too fully reconciled to our captive condition. We must not allow the blandishments of our pragmatist captors to make us forget the values we have lost, or blind our eyes to the fact that all is not well with us in this strange land to

\* *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, p. 224.

† Cf. *The Problem of Knowledge*, pp. 408-9, 417-23.



which we have been brought. And yet we have learned some important lessons through our captivity and exile. It does not seem possible that we shall ever go back to the method of dogmatic rationalistic speculation in theology or to the idolatry of trying to worship the fictitious Absolute of absolute idealism. The exile has cured us forever, let us hope, of all such idolatry.

Moreover, the straitened circumstances in which, as captives of pragmatism, we have had to exist, have been the occasion of our learning to appreciate more fully the religious value of practical and social idealism, or in other words, the religious significance of aspiration toward the spiritual ideals of truth, beauty, and moral goodness in the individual life and in society. It is something to have seen more clearly than before that the most essential thing in religion though not its entire essence is self-dedication to an ideal end whose value is divine, whether we believe in the existence of a Divine Being or not.

Another lesson of the utmost importance which the sojourn in the land of pragmatism impresses upon those who continue to cherish the vital essence of faith in God and experimental religion is the specifically religious character of the dogy. At its core, theology is the necessary intellectual expression of religious experience; whatever else it may be, it is a product of personal appreciation of experienced religious value. We have been saved for ever, let us hope, from our former folly of attempting to rest our religious beliefs upon a wholly non-religious basis.\*

Another fruitful suggestion which has come to us has been the idea of the normative value of the historical in religious construction. But it has not yet been made very clear just how this suggestion is to be put into practice without either a narrow and exclusive dogmatism in the name of some one historical religion on

\* We may thus see that the experimental dogy is not, for example, Herrmann's *Die Metaphysik der Ethik* (1908), which is a purely theoretical work, recently published, is of interest in this connection. It seems to me that Herrmann, working in abstraction from specifically religious experiences, will always err on the side of idealism and fail to reach completely adequate conclusions. This is why "religious experience, particularly so-called 'moral' experience, to be carefully considered by everyone who wishes to reason out a true religious philosophy" (*Journal of Philosophy*, XXIV, 1927, p. 301).

the one hand, or an abandonment of the quest for universal religion on the other. Rationality, too, seems to be pragmatically necessary in theology, but just what the attempt to reach it will mean for belief and life we must leave for later lectures to show. Let it suffice for the moment to say that while looking no longer toward absolute idealism and while quite convinced of the futility of a purely speculative rationalism in philosophy, we still cherish the hope that, as a faithful remnant of the captivity, we may one day be able to return to a metaphysical home of our own. While no longer regarding absolute idealism as demonstrated, as demonstrable, or even as tenable as a system, we may nevertheless conceivably find a way of using some of its suggestions as elements of a tenable metaphysical theory. What is meant is not that we should pick and choose from among its doctrines in mere eclectic fashion, but rather that we should be on the look-out for promising metaphysical hypotheses and ready to test them by some approved philosophical method. And perhaps it is not too much to hope that ultimately we may find a way of retaining, more securely than in speculative absolutism, all that is most essential in philosophical idealism, namely, the reasoned conviction that "spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe."

## VIII. HOMEWARD BOUND: REPRESENTATIONAL PRAGMATISM AND MORAL OPTIMISM.

In our last lecture we noted what is no doubt one of the important discoveries of the scientific study of religion, namely, that the judgments of religious faith are initially and fundamentally value-judgments. It is vain and foolish for systems of religious doctrine to deny their religious origin. If there is anything to their discredit in the fact, it cannot be attributed to the bare fact of a religious origin, but rather to the kind of religious experience and consciousness in which the systems in question have had their origin. As a matter of fact the elements in religious dogma whose vitality is most open to suspicion, generally speaking, are those which are purely speculative constructions, having no root in the fertile soil of the religious life itself.

But while it is of fundamental importance to recognize that life-values, real or supposed, find expression in all characteristically religious judgments, it is at least equally important to understand that being religious judgments of value does not necessarily keep them from being at the same time theoretical judgments of existence. In fact, it is probably more seriously mistaken and misleading to say that religious judgments are value-judgments and therefore not judgments of existence, than to say, with Julius Kaftan, for instance, that religious judgments are not religious value-judgments, generally speaking, but judgments about reality, although resting as theoretical propositions upon a consciousness or judgment of value. On the one hand the typical religious proposition, as it emerges in the life of religion, is a judgment of value, either explicitly or implicitly, and on the other hand the typical religious proposition has to do, implicitly if not explicitly, with objective Reality in its fundamental relation to our values. In other

words, it is concerned with God. As Professor Kaftan has been at pains to insist, while we may readily grant that assurance of the truth of the faith depends principally upon personal experiences in the hearts of men, what we mean when we call a religious judgment true is just this, that the state of things we believe in is real, that our judgments represent an objective Reality which has its own existence and character regardless of us and our opinions.\*

\* "Representation is picture of another; in feeling we become aware of ourselves as living beings" "All our simple judgments are of a double sort. Either they express a state of fact, which we represent, or they express a relation which as living beings we assume to the represented" "Theoretical judgments express a state of fact, value judgments give expression of our attitude to the same" "When we analyze picty as inner experience we find that in the last analysis value-judgments lie at its basis as that which particularly determines it" "I have never asserted that religious judgments are value-judgments, on the contrary I hold this expression to be at the very least liable to be misunderstood. No, value-judgments are fundamental to them, but they themselves are theoretical propositions. So essentially true is this that even the estimate of the value of the world in connection with religious faith, since it is joined to the thought of God, is made up of theoretical, objectively significant propositions, derived from or founded upon the knowledge of God" "All religious knowledge is knowledge of God" (Julius Kaftan, *Das Wesen der christlichen Religion*, pp 40, 42, 45, 46, 49, 410) "Faith, although consisting of theoretical propositions, is nevertheless something which is practically conditioned, whereas religion is a practical concern of the human spirit, nothing more" "The conviction of the truth [of propositions of faith] is . . . grounded subjectively; objectively they have another measure of truth. Moreover, when we investigate this peculiarity we find it grounded in the fact that they are not the outcome of observation of facts and reflection upon the same, but that value-judgments lie at their root" (*Ibid*, p. 50). "The special criterion of the truth of religion and consequently of religious faith as well [is] whether it really gives the good which it promises" (*Ibid*, p 197) "But truth is truth. It never means anything else than that our judgments correspond to the objective state of affairs, which is given regardless of us and our opinion. We cannot speak of a double truth" (*Ibid*, p 213). "The fact that we hold anything to be true always signifies that we are convinced that it is, or maintains itself as it is, apart altogether from our knowledge or faith. Our knowledge or faith adds nothing to it, makes no difference in the state of the case. The fact that anything is objectively true means nothing else whatever except just this, that it is in this way wholly independent of our subjective relation to it . . . By the truth of the Christian faith . . . we mean nothing else than what the common notion of truth signifies. Let the ways and means by which we are assured of the truth of the faith be what they may, granted that in this matter the result depends on personal experience in the heart of man, and that the knowledge . . . is perpetually conceived in these personal relations,—still the fact that we call it true has just the significance that the state of things we believe in is real, and maintains itself as it is, apart altogether from our faith" (Kaftan, *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, Eng tr., Vol I, pp 6, 7). "A direct combination of science and faith is to-day impossible" (*Ibid*, Vol II, p 420) "Where religion has achieved spiritual character it cannot remain out of relation to

This recognition that religious judgments, even if value-judgments, are theories about reality based more or less upon their religious value, promises to have important consequences for our philosophy. On the one hand it involves a modified statement of

science. "To the religious man at this stage everything depends on the truth of his faith in God, on its being a fact that he possesses in it a real knowledge. And this makes it necessary for him to bring his faith into relation with all his other knowledge." "Faith in God and Science" must be brought together in a "unity of knowledge." "Knowledge of God is personal conviction. In such convictions value feelings are always the decisive factor."

What we are aware of as the highest value we posit as the Supreme Power over all reality. It is so because it ought to be so—that is the inner dialectic of faith." (*Die Einheit des Erkennens in Drei akademischen Reden*, pp. 49, 50, 61). "The paramount importance of the practical point of view in all our knowledge." "Man's knowledge of the world . . . always [remains] relative." (*Truth of the Christian Religion*, II, pp. 421, 423). "Feelings of value cooperate in every final human decision concerning truth, and no such decision is consummated without them." (*Drei akad. Reden*, p. 69).

The judgment, 'God exists,' is "a theoretical judgment which does not rest upon scientific observation and knowledge of a fact, but asserts the presence of a fact out of practical necessities." (R. A. Lipsius, *Philosophie und Religion*, p. 168, note 2).

"As we agree with Ritschl that the internal experiential effects of what is external to us constitute the sole material for our knowledge, we must maintain further that the knowledge which we get by elaborating this material by means of the categories of thought undertakes to determine the nature of the transcendent. When I say, 'My neighbor is sick,' I do not mean the perceptual or memory-image of him in my consciousness, but his real person independent of my consciousness, and similarly, I mean by being sick not my representation thereof, but a real state to which this representation corresponds." "Whether it is possible to know the real thing existing beyond us as it is in itself . . . is not the present question."

The religious man is not simply concerned to be certain as to what he must regard as religiously valuable, but also whether what is to be judged religiously valuable also really exists. He wishes to know not merely how the world is to be estimated from the religious point of view, he wants to know too whether the world can be thus estimated, whether with this estimate of the world its objective essence is discovered." "While an object of moral value does not lose its moral value, if it is not realized, an object of religious value would be divested of its religious value, if it were taken as not really existing." "Religious knowledge . . . is a knowledge which the religious man as religious possesses or seeks for." "The fundamental knowledge of all religion [is] . . . that Deity exists." "Knowledge of the existence of God is not achieved on the ground of inferences . . . but on the ground of a postulate which emerges from the needs of feeling." "That through which man's religious needs are satisfied is for him of religious value." "Man in religious knowledge is certain that that which is religiously worthwhile to him is real and true." The judgment 'God is Love' is to be sure no value-judgment, but at the basis of this judgment there lies the religious value judgment, 'The love of God is religiously valuable.' On the ground of this value judgment it is postulated that God is love." "The judgments of religious knowledge are . . . not value-judgments but postulates on the ground of value judgments."

our religious pragmatism, and on the other hand it has an obvious bearing upon the question of the mutual relations of theology and metaphysics; we shall deal with these matters in the indicated order.

In taking the certainly very defensible position that religious propositions are statements of what religion takes to be true about reality we took a stand which involves the consequence that religious pragmatism, if it be true at all, can be true only within the limits of a religious realism. The predicate not only expresses a consciousness of value; it claims to be a representation of reality. From this point of view we may still hold to what we call essential pragmatism; that is, we may still maintain without inconsistency, that the *test* of truth about reality is ultimately practical. But we cannot consistently hold, with this realistic reference, that the meaning of truth is nothing but this practical value of ideas; in other words, we cannot endorse the hyper-pragmatism of much current pragmatism.

In fact, what we would suggest as a theory of truth is a synthesis of what we may call the good essence of intellectualism with the good essence of pragmatism. The definition of truth, as a logical definition, must state the proximate genus to which truth as a species belongs, and it must state the differentia which marks off this species, truth, from all other species belonging to the same genus. Now the proximate genus of truth is to be found, we claim, in intellectualism, and its specific differentia in pragmatism. Truth is representation of subject-matter by predicate,

" True in religion is not synonymous with valuable, but because it is valuable we postulate it as true " " All our religious judgments, though practically conditioned, are theoretical judgments " " Of God's essence we know only that which is demanded by our religious needs " (Max Scheibe, *Die Bedeutung der Werturteile für das religiöse Erkennen*, 1893, pp 41-44, 36-37, 48, 51-52, 63, 83, 87)

On the basis of his experience of the insufficiency of this present world to meet his needs, especially the needs of his spiritual life, man becomes conscious of his need of a supramundane reality and supramundane values. " In its developed form religion is on its theoretical side the world view which denies the all-sufficiency of the mundane as such, and posits the existence of the supramundane in the sense both of a highest Power and of a highest value " (Siebeck, *Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie*, p 442, cf pp 3, 11, 15, 31, 210, 446)

of reality by idea, as intellectualists have always insisted ; but the test as to whether this representation of reality by idea is such as to merit the epithet ' true ' is found in the practical test of acting upon the idea, being guided by it, in adjusting one's self to the reality in question. The judgment is finally made in the light of the consequences of such experimental action. What is taken as true is whatever representation of reality by idea is held to be satisfactory for the practical purposes considered. If the judgment is mistaken, it must be either because the idea or predicate was not really satisfactory for the purposes considered or because some important purpose or purposes did not receive adequate consideration. Real as distinct from merely apparent truth is representation of reality by idea, of subject-matter by predicate, such that it will be, as contrasted with what contradicts it, the right judgment to make in view of all the purposes that ought to be considered when we have to choose between it and its contradictory \*

This representational or realistic pragmatism shows that the way is clear for a religious pragmatism which will affirm the independent reality of the Object of religious interest and yet find in practical religious value an indication of validity and truth. It is interesting to be able to quote on behalf of a moderate common-sense pragmatism so typical an intellectualist as T. H. Green. "Live on as if there were God and duty," he advises, "and they will prove themselves to you in your life"†. What is thus indicated is a moderate and discriminating religious pragmatism intermediate between ultra-conservative pragmatism, which would make the appeal to practical value an apologetic for a traditional system as a whole, and an ultra-radical pragmatism, which would advocate use of any religious ideas which may promise to have practical value, regardless of all other, more theoretical considerations. Assuming that a world-view of some sort is practically necessary, but that we are not yet able to establish fully any

\* For a critique of the intellectualistic theory of truth, a critique of current pragmatism, and a fuller statement of this representational pragmatism, see my book, *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1915, Chs. XVII, XVIII, and XIX, respectively. \* Cf. B. H. Streeter, in *Reality*, 1926, p. 50: "Truth means adequacy in representation."

† *Works*, III, p. 273

one metaphysical theory, to the exclusion of all others, a critical and realistic religious pragmatism would have us adopt as our religious life-hypothesis or working faith the theory which, besides meeting the logical test of self-consistency, the scientific test of agreement with, or at least non-contradiction of, established scientific fact, and whatever directly ethical test there may be, is also best qualified to serve the religion which best serves the morality which best serves the well-being of humanity, individual and social.

Now it may be confessed at once that on the face of it this pragmatism looks as though it would be a method most difficult to apply. Even if we can be optimistic enough to believe that a theology which is necessary for a religion which is necessary for a morality which is necessary for the highest human well-being is true, how are we going to find out what theology it is that is thus pragmatically qualified for our acceptance? We are confronted then with a two-fold problem, namely, first, Just what religious beliefs would a critical representational or realistic pragmatism lead us to? and, second, why should we or how can we be optimistic enough to accept it?

But before definitely attempting the solution of this difficult double problem, let it be noted that the theology or system of religious ideas called for by such a critical representational pragmatism will be of necessity essentially metaphysical. The ideal religion needs ideas which claim to represent reality; however true it may be that they are symbols expressive of religious feeling and instruments for the guidance of religious adjustment, they are also elements in a theory of the nature of ultimate Reality. The theology which religion needs is itself in need of metaphysics, and indeed in a sense it is already metaphysics. As the German theologian, Wobbermin, maintained in his doctor's dissertation, theology without metaphysics is impossible. What religion needs in its thought about God is a theory of reality which cannot be refuted, either by logic, as being self-contradictory, or by science, as being in conflict with the facts; and to frame such a theory and defend



it as thus logically and scientifically tenable is to engage in the metaphysical task.\*

\* Cf my dissertation, *The Reaction against Metaphysics in Theology*, 1911. Influenced by Ritschl and Kaftan on the theological side and by Dilthey's "Weltanschauungslehre" in philosophy, Troeltsch and Wobbermin arrived at the position that even a religiously founded theology needs metaphysics—is already in the field of metaphysics, in fact, and must be treated as a metaphysical theory among others. "Epistemology is the end of the course of metaphysics" (W Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, p. 516). Philosophy deals with the same riddles of the world and of life as poetry and religion, but philosophy, as metaphysics, differs from religion and poetry in that it seeks to raise some particular world-view to universal validity. However, the task it sets itself is an impossible one. Individuality, nation, period, cultural environment, and other factors, influence the philosopher as well as the poet and the religionist (Dilthey, "Das Wesen der Philosophie," *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, Part VI, pp. 35, 55, 57, 60, 68). From a critical point of view nothing remains of the various metaphysical systems but the disposition of the soul ("Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen," *Weltanschauung*, edited by Max Frischeisen-Köhler, 1911, p. 51). When fully criticised, philosophy becomes simply *Weltanschauungslehre* a discipline which undertakes to explain and evaluate metaphysical systems and world views in general, by showing how they are related to life in its practical and broadly human aspects (*Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, VI, pp. 37-8, 62).

"I have been led gradually into opposition to the Ritschlian system with reference to the all-too-simple overcoming of natural, philosophical and metaphysical difficulties through a mere theory of the phenomenology of nature—a solution of the problem with which I cannot be satisfied in the light of a wide study of philosophical literature" (E. Troeltsch, "Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschr. für Theol. und Kirche*, VIII, 1898, p. 52). "As was true of my teacher Dilthey, [I have tried] to combine the historical and philosophical pursuits of the time, although I wanted to win surer positions therein than Dilthey. This need directed me to transcendentalism and the attempt therefrom to gain satisfaction for both demands" (*Gesammelte Schriften*, II, p. 751, cf. "Religionsphilosophie" in Windelband's *Die Philosophie im XX. Jahrhundert*, p. 429). "Religion includes among other things the assertion of a real object of its faith, the idea of God. The idea of God is, of course, directly accessible in no other way than that of religious faith. So there comes to be a philosophical treatment of the idea of God, not by way of a deductive metaphysics, but through elaboration and unification of experience in ultimate concepts. The chief task of [theological] metaphysics is making sure the spiritual values of reason in the world-ground. The metaphysics of religion becomes a reworking of the God-idea and conforming it with the modern scientific world-view" ("Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft," *Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, IV, pp. 487-8).

"Theology without metaphysics is impossible" (G. Wobbermin, *Theologie und Metaphysik*, 1901, p. 27; *Zeitschr. für Theol. und Kirche*, 1907, p. 147. See also *Die religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*, p. 76, cf. p. 74). "This does not mean that religion without metaphysics is impossible" ("Psychologie und Erkenntniskritik," *Weltanschauung*, 1911, p. 344). "Religion cannot be identified with metaphysics, if religion is other than a definitely oriented world-view" (*Ibid.*, p. 345). "The most characteristic mark of religious experience in general is its direction toward a

The importance of the function of philosophy in religion, of metaphysics in theology, has been recognized by no people so generally and so constantly as by the people of India. Gautama Buddha reacted against it, but time has taken its revenge; in the

world or sphere of *Jenseitigkeit* "It is the tendency toward the transcendent which fundamentally characterizes religious experience" "In Buddhism . . . there is a tendency toward the transcendent in the thought of redemption, or at least a tendency toward the tendency toward the transcendent" "The tendency toward the transcendent has the value only of a very wisful question But religious experience knows the answer. There is a world of *Jenseitigkeit*, and it is the highest, the true reality - this is the answer" (*Ibid*, pp 357, 358, 359) "The purely empirical psychological treatment of religious experience ignores and must ignore the question of truth with respect to the content of religious experience

It is just in the question of truth that religious experience has its decisive interest The claim to validity as truth is constitutive for religious experience Without the claim to truth there can be no religious experience in the true sense of the word It would be like a knife without a blade" (*Ibid*, pp 349, 350) "The religious interest in truth finds adequate satisfaction only in the conviction that religious experience sets forth what is fully true The world of *Jenseitigkeit* is valid for it as the truth" (*Ibid*, p 359) "True religious experience is never simply identical with a metaphysical world view Religious experience always includes a metaphysical world-view in itself as a germ, but it is not that, nor does it emphasize it chiefly" (*Ibid*, p 351) "The metaphysical consciousness is that which seeks to penetrate beyond the empirical world, because it does not see in it the ultimate absolute reality and truth" (*Ibid*, p 345) "The essence of metaphysics can only be determined by the analysis of the metaphysical consciousness For all metaphysics is only an expression of a deep metaphysical consciousness The question of the relation of theology to metaphysics is

that of the relation of the religious and the metaphysical consciousness The religious and the metaphysical consciousness are not altogether identical, but they are akin to each other and therefore incline to manifold contacts and crossings" (*Zt f Th u. K.*, 1907, p 149) "Metaphysics is that philosophical discipline which puts the question as to what lies beyond experience If we denote this by the term 'transcendent,' we can say, Metaphysics is that philosophical discipline which puts the question as to the transcendent" (*Theologie und Metaphysik*, p 27) "Metaphysics has to do with that which, in the epistemological sense, lies beyond consciousness, in so far as it does lie beyond consciousness. Every problem appearing with regard to what lies beyond consciousness as such is metaphysical" (*Ibid*, p 47). "There are two divisions of metaphysics (1) that which is concerned with reality beyond consciousness corresponding to the sensibly given presentation of things—this is the lower storey of metaphysics, and (2) that concerned with reality beyond consciousness, to which the life of will and feeling impel—this is the upper storey of metaphysics" (*Ibid*, pp 47-8). "Either man must understand by metaphysics every view of the world as a whole which consciously or unconsciously seeks to go beyond empirical reality, . . . or one must understand by that idea every sort of philosophical, theoretical-intellectual construction and elaboration of such a world-view" ("Psy und Erk," p. 345) "Theology without metaphysics is impossible, because the objects of Christian faith with which theology has to do lie out beyond experience in the ordinary sense of the word All propositions of Christian

land of its birth, the land of metaphysical religion, Buddhism has all but disappeared, and in other lands, where it has had its greatest triumphs, it has become essentially, often explicitly, metaphysical. In this emphasis upon the necessity of theological metaphysics India has, I believe, an important contribution to make to

faith have relation to God      God is a metaphysical entity      All propositions of the Christian faith are in the last analysis metaphysical propositions " (*Theol und Metaphysik*, p. 29) ' Can theology be allowed to avoid the question whether corresponding to the represented objects with which it has to do there are realities beyond consciousness? By no means. Theology must rather raise this question quite necessarily and as its peculiar task. Can theology avoid the question what scientific justification the assumption has that the represented objects with which it has to do correspond to realities beyond consciousness? With the question as to the relation of the things of faith to reality, and how the assumption as to their correspondence is to be judged scientifically, theology stands or falls ' (*Ibid*, pp. 57-8) " That the believer is convinced ' of the objective existence of objects of faith is certain, and this situation must be surely the starting point and basis for the scientific elaboration of the problem. But just this is the problem, how that conviction is grounded and how it is to be judged scientifically " (*Ibid*, p. 100)

" If modern theology following Ritschl will have absolutely nothing of metaphysics in theology, it is surely because by metaphysics it means something different from what I have defined as such. [The Ritschlians] always have in mind a discipline whose project is to unveil the mysteries of the world whole by means of pure thought, in abstraction from all experience, the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, pre-eminently. Briefly this idea of metaphysics is limited to the intellectualistic speculative metaphysics.

To have freed theology from the bonds of such metaphysics is the service for which credit is due to Ritschl above all others. Modern theology expressly opposes only intellectualistic speculative metaphysics, but thinks it has won the right to ignore all metaphysics. [The Ritschlians] act as if all reflection concerning the transcendent had been excluded. I hold by the name metaphysics even for this reflection concerning the transcendent " (*Ibid*, pp. 23-9) " Kaftan was the first of the Ritschlian theologians to come definitely out of that unclearness and contradiction, and he did so because he goes on in all decisive points to metaphysical positions, although he himself has not used this terminology and would presumably refuse it emphatically. He makes use of metaphysical propositions (in our sense), while Ritschl and his followers do not " (*Ibid*, pp. 32-3). " Ritschl tries to avoid metaphysical constructions (in our sense) and to hold himself purely to history, while Kaftan consciously proceeds to such metaphysical constructions (in our sense) " (*Ibid*, p. 39) " Kaftan's *Dogmatik* represents the beginning of the new development. reflection concerning the transcendent " (*Ibid*, p. 61) " Kaftan and Troeltsch both demand that the unity of the spiritual life be not destroyed, and both emphasize the necessity of theology as coordinating itself with the fundamental problems of contemporary philosophy " (*Ibid*, p. 11, cf. p. 29) " In the position taken I am influenced especially by Dilthey. Dilthey is the one who most consequentially excludes that pseudo-metaphysics from philosophy. But he does not regard as metaphysics the reflection upon the metaphysical moments of consciousness and upon the ulti-

the universal religion of the future. It does not follow from this that the speculative rationalism of the method or the absolutistic idealism of the outcome of much of India's religious metaphysics must necessarily be taken over unchanged into the final religion of the world; but it is sure to mean much for the religion of the future that the outstanding leaders of a people at once so religious, so metaphysical in their interests, and so influential potentially have through the centuries insisted that one's faith must commend itself on universal grounds of reason

The metaphysical development of theology is a normal expression of the certainly not unreasonable demand that religion be made reasonable. Surely we may have faith enough in the vitality of religion to believe that when religion has been made truly rational it will not have been rationalized out of existence, as some of its critics profess to think, but will rather have been rationalized into something approximating universal and final validity. If there exists anywhere a purely pragmatic theology from which all metaphysical problems have disappeared, if there are any who can boast that the rocks and shoals of metaphysical thought no longer matter for the religious man, the chances are that this is not because the waters of religion have become deeper,

mate problems resulting therefrom—while I see just here the only justified type of metaphysics to-day" (*Ibid*, p. 26)

"The metaphysician takes into consideration the ethical, aesthetic and religious powers of the spirit, and so deals with what has no place in the exact individual sciences" (Wobbermin, *Zeitschr f Th und K*, 1907, p. 118) "The highest degree of certainty of religious judgments exists where the demands of feeling and will are judged to be most valuable, and where not merely an individual but a universal human value is brought to the highest degree of probability" (*Theologie und Metaphysik*, p. 95) "If indeed we cannot obtain an exact knowledge of the transcendent, we can at least seek, upon the ground of experimental knowledge, a solution of questions which concern the transcendent [These questions concern] the measure in which [the view] is justified by the facts of experience and offers a key to their understanding. In this way metaphysics is possible" (*Ibid*, pp. 27-8) "It must be shown in relation to definite particular constructions of theological metaphysics (in the formal sense) that no results of universal metaphysics (in the material philosophical sense) oppose them and exclude them *a priori* from scientific consideration. But theological propositions of formal metaphysical character should neither be discovered in the way of material-metaphysical thought operations, nor be proved subsequently in that way" (*Ibid*, p. 118).

but because the ships the pragmatists use are of such shallow draught that they merely skim over the surface waters of life and thought, and the question suggests itself whether vessels of such shallow draught are fitted to carry all that human nature needs

The autonomy of religion is real, and it is important to recognize it, but it is relative only. Religion may have vitality enough to be able to live as an exile in a strange and uncongenial land, philosophically speaking; but when it bethinks itself, it cannot but long for a metaphysical home of its own; it must at least draw up the plans and specifications for a temple to be rebuilt in the happy event of a return to the homeland of a rational theory of reality and secure re-establishment there. It is not enough to seek objectivity in history alone, there is a pragmatic religious need of rationality which drives us for objectivity through and beyond all history to philosophy, to metaphysics. The hour of conflict between religion and science has become for religion a time of subjectivity; to many the religious Object seems, for the moment, to be no longer objective, but subjective, doubtful, a mere hypothesis. It is—in a double sense of the term, perhaps—the psychological moment. But faith and action live in the ontological, and life must pass through the psychological moment, the moment of analysis, of mere psychology of religion; it must take advantage of the psychological moment to make of it a time for reconstruction; it must regain, for the sake of the practical values of life, a religious ontology, a metaphysical philosophy of God.\* In addition to showing that alongside of science, or what is theoretically proved, are propositions which are practically essential, and whether we can or cannot show that the practically essential and the theoretically proved overlap to any extent, it is imperative that we be at least in a position to point out that what has been disproved on theoretical grounds does not coincide with what, on practical grounds, is essential.

There is a pragmatic need, then, for metaphysics in theology and religion. There is a pragmatic call for rationality, for sys-

\* *The Reaction against Metaphysics in Theology*, pp. 84-6.

tem, for harmony between what we need as scientific and what we need as moral and religious. Religious values and judgments which seemed certain enough when unchallenged may become a problem for the critical faculty and for philosophy when challenged in the light of newly discovered scientific facts and newly appreciated values of the spiritual life. Intellectual difficulties may emerge in religion which cannot be overcome save by more intellectual activity as well as by more religion. Religious dogmas in their crude, uncritical form will have to die, in order that what is essential in them may live.\* The doubt suggested by a seeming conflict of religious values with other values or with cold facts is not best treated by the method of repression, but by being brought out into the open. Doubt is often cured by the homeopathic method of more doubt. In the realm of the mind, things tend to become unsettled periodically until they are settled right. Our theological tools sometimes have to be repaired; metaphysics is the repair-shop to which we bring them when we have to "stop and think." In the clash between separate thought-mechanisms, mutual adjustment becomes imperative; metaphysics intervenes as a sort of traffic-policeman who comes to prevent any clashing between vehicles which have a right to be on the road, such as science, morality, religion. Or metaphysics is a clearing-house for ultimate values, where all claims must be presented for recognition and adjustment. Religious value-judgments in their virgin freshness are like the vine which needs the oak of rational philosophy to support it. Or better, the relation of metaphysics to the religious consciousness is like that of the woody fibre to the living protoplasm in the tree. Both are needed. Fresh religious value-judgments are the vital part; the metaphysical element is like the wood which gives the needed stiffening and enables the living faith to stand upright in the world of thought. At the same time and on the other hand, metaphysics is the careful gardener,

\* "When men begin to search for logical grounds of belief there is an implication of doubt which is almost fatal to the religious attitude of mind. When, however, distrust arises with regard to the ground on which religion rests, there is nothing for it but to fall back on metaphysics" (J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*, p. 144).

pruning away not only all decayed branches but also all undue "expansions of feeling," thus causing what is left to be healthy and more fruitful. But if metaphysics is still ancillary to theology, it is no longer as a slave acting under external compulsion, but rather in full harmony with the modern democratic ideal of service freely rendered.

But before undertaking to develop to any extent the content of theological metaphysics, let us take up the prior question as to whether we may not be able to formulate, objectively and without dogmatism, so that our results may be recognized as universally valid, the main theoretical judgments which emerge from and rest upon the universal values of religion. Such theoretical judgments as to real existence, based on the value-judgments of religion, it is common to regard as postulates; and it is true enough that while they are at first more purely intuitive and immediate, they can be formulated more reflectively as postulates. But while these postulates make explicit some of the immediate intuitions of religion, and while it is possible to test them as working hypotheses and view them in the light of the consequences, a logical looseness often exists in the relation between values and postulates which is not ultimately in the interest either of clearness or of religious assurance. It is always easy to postulate the seemingly desirable as if it were imperative and indispensable, and then to conclude, in accordance with an easy-going pragmatism, that since it is valuable it must be true. In distinction from this procedure, our attempt will be to deduce some of the principal theoretical propositions of religion, by a process of strictly logical inference, from what can be reasonably regarded as universally valid values, whether they are universally regarded as such, or not.

One of the values on the basis of which we can draw inferences is the moral value, the value of conscientiousness, or of the consciousness of moral obligation. On the basis of the universal validity of the human consciousness of duty and responsibility, we can infer the essential, even if very narrowly limited, freedom of man "to originate events, independently of foreign determining

causes.''\* No one has brought this out more clearly or convincingly than the immortal Immanuel Kant. Man, as will, or practical reason, imposes upon himself as an inexorable command the fulfilment of his whole duty as a rational agent to all other rational agents as well as to himself; he must act according to a principle which would be valid for all rational beings, and treat all persons as ultimate ends, never as mere means. If he does not do this, he is guilty. But if he is really responsible for acting according to this principle, he must be free to do so; if he absolutely could not do so, he could not fairly be held responsible. In applying this doctrine, we must of course recognize the limitations which special conditions of heredity, individual history, and total environment must impose upon the freedom of the individual; but within these limits there is a best possible action which is different from the worst possible action, if there is any validity at all in the universal rational consciousness of moral obligation. If every human volition and action were in its entirety an inevitable effect of causes which existed in time before the individual's own consciousness began, there would be no freedom and no valid consciousness of moral obligation. Unless the whole moral consciousness is a delusion, man must have the power, in the moment of volition, to transcend in some measure his already acquired character; he must be able, in a way not completely predetermined by external factors and by his past, to direct his attention to possible motives in such a way as to become, to a very limited degree at any one time but ultimately in a very real and important way, a creator of his own action and character and of changes in the world of things and persons. Thus a metaphysical doctrine (man's creative free agency) has been inferred from the validity of a moral value-judgment, and this doctrine, familiar since the days of Kant, is of the greatest importance for religion as well as for morality. The final judgment as to the validity of this inferred metaphysical doctrine must wait, of course, until it has been shown to be theoretically permissible, in the light of all per-

\* Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics* (Sempke's transl., p. 57)



tinent facts, to accept it as true ; but if it be not thus theoretically permissible, neither is it permissible to hold men morally responsible for anything they will or do.\*

Kant went on to postulate immortality and the existence of God on the basis of the universal validity of the rational consciousness of an unconditionally binding law of moral perfection. So long as we are dealing in postulates rather than strictly logical inferences as to actual fact, this is legitimate enough. The rationally self-imposed ideal or law of moral perfection, that is, of what I ought to become, involves the logical consequences that I ought to have unending opportunity to become what I ought to become, and that there ought to be whatever Divine Factor in reality may be necessary to make it possible for me to become what I ought to become. On the basis of this which ought to be, I may rationally postulate or demand that it be so, and assume that God exists and that, at least if and so far as my will is directed toward the moral ideal, I am an immortal spirit. I may even go farther ; on the basis of the intuitive judgment that it is truly desirable that the virtuous be ultimately happy, I may postulate and believe that in the future God will make the virtuous adequately happy. But while I am *morally* justified in *postulating* God and immortality, I am not *logically* justified in *inferring* that they are actual. From the validity of the consciousness of moral obligation I am logical-

\* "Duty is the necessity of an act, out of reverence felt for law." "What kind of law is that, the representation of which must alone determine the will, if this last is to be denominated absolutely and altogether good? Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal." "There is an imperative which commands categorically. Such imperative concerns not the matter of action but its form or principle." "Man and every reasonable agent exists as an end in himself, and not as a mere means or instrumental [and] must in every action regard his existence, and that of every other Intelligent, as an end in itself." "Will is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason, and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events, independently of foreign determining causes." "Freedom of will is autonomy, i.e. that property of will by which it determines its own causality, and gives itself its own law." Upon the hypothesis that a maxim is . . . the only valid determinator of choice, . . . a will so determinable is quite independent . . . of the law of cause and effect, and of the [mechanism of the physical system [and] therefore, . . . i. free will." (Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics*, Semple's transl., pp. 11, 13, 39, 41, 57, 58, 94)

ly justified in inferring that I *am* a free agent, and from the validity of the ideal of moral perfection I am logically justified in inferring that there *ought to be* unending opportunity and a God or His practical equivalent; but I am not logically justified, apart from some further optimistic assumption, in changing the form of these latter inferences from what ought to be to what is.\*

Is there no way, then, of inferring immortality and the existence of God—the God we need—from values which are critically defensible as universally valid? I believe there is a way. Such inferences must be held subject to their being found theoretically permissible, of course; they must not be held in any way that is self-contradictory or that contradicts established fact. But with this proviso I believe it can be shown that, while on the basis of moral value we can only infer that man is an essentially free agent and that God and immortality ought to be, there is an implicitly religious value, critically defensible as universally valid, on the basis of which we can logically infer the reality of immortality and the existence of the God we imperatively need. Let us see how this is so.

\* The following quotations from Rashdall and Sorley, if understood as revealing an attempt to *infer* the existence of God from the validity of an absolute moral law, are open to the criticism suggested

"An absolute Moral Law or moving ideal, cannot exist in material things. And it does not exist in the mind of this or that individual. Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real, a Mind which is the source of whatever is true in our moral judgments, can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself. .... The belief in God, though not . . . a postulate of there being such a thing as Morality at all, is a logical presupposition of an 'objective' or absolute Morality. A moral ideal can exist nowhere and nowhere but in a mind; an absolute moral ideal can exist only in a Mind from which all Reality is derived (or at least a Mind by which all Reality is controlled). Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God." (H. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, II, p. 212)

"Persons are conscious of values and of an ideal of goodness which they recognize as having undoubted authority for the direction of their activity, the validity of these values or laws and of this ideal, however, does not depend upon their recognition, it is objective and eternal; and how could this eternal validity stand alone, not embodied in matter and neither seen nor realized by finite minds, unless there were an eternal mind whose thought and will were therein expressed? God must therefore exist and his nature be goodness" (W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, pp. 352-3).

The value I refer to is the value of a certain critically justifiable human attitude toward reality and destiny. It is an attitude which avoids pessimism on the one side and an unlimited optimism on the other. Unlimited optimism is an attitude which is not critically justifiable, in view of the moral ideal and the fact of moral evil. To say, "Whatever is, is right," and "All's well with the world," is a sign of moral color-blindness; it is an intolerable insult to the moral consciousness. The exercise of man's freedom in the deliberate choice of anything lower than the highest possible at the time is something which absolutely ought not to be, and it will be forever deplorable. Moreover, in its influence on action, absolute optimism is extremely unfortunate; logically and psychologically it tends to the view that the right way to overcome what seems to be evil is not to change it but to convince oneself that it is essentially good and only seems to be evil.

On the other hand, any attitude which is more pessimistic than the facts require is not critically justifiable. An undue pessimism is altogether too common. It is not the normal expression of healthy, vigorous life. It is disastrous in its effects, for its psychological tendency is to inhibit activities which might either remove or greatly reduce the evils which undoubtedly exist. There are evils enough and their evil is real enough for the temptation to a limp and spineless pessimism to be a very real one. And as if the evils which undoubtedly exist were not enough, fearful, anxious man has had the perversity to invent innumerable imaginary evils with which he torments his mind still further. In the list may be included the endless hell-fire of Catholic Christianity, of the older Protestantism, and of Mohammedanism, and the nightmare of a fated transmigration as it presents itself to the imagination of the masses in the religious life of India. In the same general category with the artificial evils of superstitious religion may be placed the fictitious freedom-denying all-determinism of dogmatic men of science and half-wise philosophers; it is a snare for the unwary, and has beguiled many into the pessimistic net. Enlightenment brings emancipation from all such imaginary evil and superstitious fear. As for the wretchedness and

want which undoubtedly do exist, they present a challenge to the good will, a problem to be solved rather than an excuse for inactive pessimism. To the animal struggle for existence must be added, in our consideration, the human struggle for a better existence, and when the altruistic service which we have already stressed as one of the fundamental factors of universally valid religion becomes duly dominant, there will come such an amelioration of the conditions of life, physical and spiritual, as will eventually make life seem so well worth living that any pronounced pessimism will become well-nigh impossible. Love will lay the foundation for hope.

Between a morally color-blind absolute optimism and any attitude which is more pessimistic than the facts, seen in the white light of truth, require, there is ample room and justification for the attitude now commonly called meliorism, an attitude, namely, which recognizes the facts of evil but believes that in innumerable ways good may triumph over ill, if only man will do what he can. William James' statement of this intermediate position has become classic.

"There are unhappy men who think the salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as pessimism. Optimism in turn [is] the doctrine that thinks the world's salvation inevitable. Midway between the two there stands what may be called the doctrine of meliorism. Meliorism treats salvation as neither necessary nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become."\*

This melioristic doctrine, this element of hope not so much for salvation *from* the world as for salvation *of* the world, must characterize any religion which is to hope for acceptance as the religion of the world. There has not been enough of it in the Christianity of the past, with its vain expectation of an apocalyptic return of the exalted Christ, to judge the individual and destroy the existing social order. Nor is there enough of this melior-

\* William James, *Pragmatism*, 1907, pp. 285, 286

ism in quietistic and ascetic mysticism to justify our regarding it as qualified to be the universal and final religion of mankind. One may agree with Professor Dasgupta that the attitude of the seers who practised the Yoga discipline, their dissatisfaction with the world, was "no ordinary pessimism,"\* without closing his eyes to what seems to be the truth, namely, that they were very far from being optimistic enough, or better, melioristic enough, with regard to the possible salvation of man as a cultural and social being. There is a great truth and value in mystical religion, and this we must presently refer to more fully, but there is a use sometimes made of mysticism which strongly suggests a fictitious compensation for a sense of inferiority in the face of difficult social problems and duties. The India of the future will continue to revere, let us hope, such sages as Ramakrishna for the completeness of their self-dedication to the religious life; but the new India will never attain its true place in the world by following the advice, "Say when you pray, Lord, grant that my work in the world and for the world may grow less day by day, for I see that my work growing manifold only makes me lose sight of Thee"† More in accord with the spirit that befits the new age is the social idealism of that truly great spirit, Mahatma Gandhi; but I have no doubt that he himself would say that no mere return to primitive simplicity of life can ever bring about an ideal social order. Many and important are the things which the East has to say to the West, but may not the East, perchance, find something timely in the message of meliorism which comes from the youthful, hopeful West?

" We are living, we are dwelling  
In a grand and awful time,  
In an age on ages telling "

" Tell me not in mournful numbers  
Life is but an empty dream ...  
" Life is real and life is earnest "

\* *Hindu Mysticism*, p. 68

† See *The Gospel of Ramakrishna*, pp. 170-173; *Ramakrishna, His Life and Sayings*, pp. 115, 159, 178.

'These simple words, with the familiar observation,

" Time makes ancient good uncouth,"

may well be taken as a characteristic message of the melioristic West.

But mere meliorism would be singularly inadequate as a gospel. The message, " Save thyself and others," sounds like cruel mockery to the soul that has not only heard the categorical imperative but also knows what the feeling of absolute dependence means. Meliorism, if it is to be adequate as an attitude toward reality and destiny, must become *religious* meliorism and that in a sense which means something more than simply the reinforcing of the human will through religious exercises, highly important as that undoubtedly is. Let man assume responsibility as he may for the triumph of the right, and let him work in the most approved and effective way for the realization of this end: he must soon recognize that he is not the only factor to be considered, and that he has values the adequate conservation of which lies absolutely beyond his unaided power. The question is whether, if and in so far as man as a morally free agent does his best toward the triumph of the right, even with the help of religious exercises, he can be wholly free from anxiety as to the ultimate outcome; whether when he produces values that are absolute, he can trust that throughout all cosmic changes these absolute values will be conserved.

The point of view which expresses itself in the affirmative we may call moral optimism. It is an attitude which combines the normal optimistic impulse of a healthy mind in a healthy body with an appreciation of the absolute importance of duty and the moral will. If we are to keep our meliorism from giving way ultimately to pessimism, if we are to insure the steady maintenance of moral idealism and the spirit of social service, we must add to our meliorism this at least implicitly religious element of moral optimism. It is a fact that there has been something essentially akin to moral optimism at the heart of much of what has been most vital and dynamic in the religious history of mankind. There are strong

suggestions of it in Confucianism, especially in its more religious developments;\* it has been at the heart of Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity, at their best; and it must needs find a large place, I believe, in the faith of awakened India, if she is to fill her rightful place in the future religious history of the world. Unless it should be precluded by something in the realm of fact, its normality and its great spiritual and social value make a strong bid for its acceptance. It may well be the first self-conscious expression of moral optimism to cherish the surmise that moral optimism is too good *not* to be true.

If then we evaluate this form of religious meliorism which we have called moral optimism as valid, and adopt it as our attitude toward reality and destiny, is there anything that in strict logic we can infer from it with reference to the nature of reality? The answer is simple and ought to be obvious. If moral optimism is valid, the cosmos, ultimately considered, must be on the side of the spiritual. In other words, the God we imperatively need exists. If we define God as a superhuman Cosmic Factor great enough and good enough to justify an attitude of moral optimism on our part, it is undeniable that the metaphysical proposition that God exists is logically implied in the value-judgment that moral optimism is valid.

This God of moral optimism is not to be regarded as infinite in any sense of the word that would involve self-contradiction, but neither is he 'finite' in any objectionable sense of the term. He, —or it, if we prefer that pronoun—is great enough for our absolute, trustful dependence, on condition that we are ready to do our part. The God of moral optimism is a causal Factor also in relation to us and our values, a Factor constantly favourable to absolute spiritual values as ends, to other values as means, and to human persons especially as bearers, actually and potentially, of moral and other absolute values. Furthermore, such a God must be at least one being, and intelligent and moral, and therefore

\* Moral optimism found expression in Chu-Hsi's doctrine that Law and Love are the foundation of the universe. See *The Philosophy of Human Nature*, by Chu-Hsi, transl. by J. P. Bruce, London, 1922.

spirit, or something else just as good, and I do not see how we can imagine or conceive a God just as good as intelligent moral Spirit without being intelligent moral Spirit.

Moreover, taking what is involved in moral optimism, namely, God's adequacy and favourableness to man, in connection with the absolute value of the spiritual and of man as its bearer, we can draw another very important inference. This is the immortality of the individual human person, or else something just as good; and it does not seem possible to imagine or conceive any way in which the absolute values bound up with the individual person could be adequately conserved if the individual consciousness were itself to be permanently wiped out. If our essence never dies, we as individual persons are immortal; for, as true love well knows, the essential values of personality without the persons in and for whom they exist are dead and empty abstractions. "To maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the state of final release," says Ramanuja, "amounts to the doctrine that final release is the annihilation of the Self. . . . The 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an 'I,' for it appears to itself"\* Without the survival of the individual human person, there would be no adequate conservation of values; without an adequate conservation of values, the existence of the God we need could not be asserted; and without the existence of the God we need, moral optimism could not logically be regarded as valid. An ultimate pessimism would be necessary.

Furthermore, in moral optimism, and in the existence of the God we need, we have a confirmation of the responsible freedom of man, already found to be securely based upon the ultimate validity of moral values. If moral optimism is justified by the nature of reality, there can be no ultimate contradiction between the Good and the True. If there were, we should have to be pessimists; the spiritual ideal would be essentially unrealizable. But if what is ultimately good to believe must be true, man's limited but creative

\* *Com. Br. S.*, I, 1. 1 (*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 69, 70).



freedom must be true, since the absolute values of conscientious moral action logically presuppose the truth of responsible freedom. Unless, then, in the light of fact, decisive considerations should be forthcoming against these conclusions which we have drawn logically from the assumption that moral consciousness and moral optimism are valid, we are entitled, in the name of a normal spiritual life, to affirm the responsible freedom of man, the existence of a God great enough and good enough to meet our imperative religious need, and the immortality of all that is of essential worth in individual personality.

But, it may be objected, how can moral optimism, with its implication of the existence of the God we need, be maintained in the face of the evils that abound in the world? In the history of Indian religious thought the problem of evil has been taken very seriously, and the solution at which it arrived does credit to the ingenuity of the Indian mind, considering the very limited body of knowledge available at the time the doctrine was evolved. In the doctrine of *karma* we have an early formulation of the fact that the world from which our experiences come is a world of law, of a dependable sequence of cause and effect, and that this is true even in the realm of human experience and conduct. In the doctrine of *samsara* we have an early, imaginative and naturally somewhat crude expression of the faith that what is most essential in the individual persists in spite of bodily death. Fear and the play of the imagination threw a sinister light upon this doctrine of persistence, so that it came to be viewed as something dreadful, from which emancipation was to be sought. But was not this partly because of the fact that there had already begun to be formulated what was felt to be a worthier idea of the persistence of the inmost essence of the individual in spite of change and physical decay? At any rate, under the form of the two closely related ideas of *karma* and *samsara* (that is, in their vital and lasting essence, namely, first, the understanding that the world is a world of law and order, of a dependable sequence of cause and effect, both in the physical realm and in the psychical; and, second, the belief in the persistence, the essential immortality, of the individual) we have two of

the most important presuppositions of a satisfactory solution of the age-old religious problem of evil.

With the idea of a non-miraculous, dependable universe from which we may learn what to expect and how we ought to adjust ourselves, and the expectation of opportunity for the continuation of the process of spiritual development in spite of bodily death, one begins to gain a perception of the true meaning of the riddle of existence. May I suggest that what traditional Indian thought needs in order to supplement what was on the whole and for the time so well begun, is principally these two things? First, there is needed, in so far as it has not already come, a new *moksha*, or emancipation, partial to be sure, but exceedingly important as far as it goes, emancipation by a new *jnana-marga*, namely, by way of the modern world-view of science, with its more adequate knowledge of causality in nature and in man, and its understanding that all traditional doctrines of the future life, whether of *samsara* and *nirvana* or of heaven and hell, are alike the outcome of natural processes of far from infallible human thinking and imagination.

The other thing which, as I see it, the traditional religious thought of India needs for the satisfactory solution of the problem of evil, and particularly of moral evil, is a new assurance of the fact of a really originitive moral freedom in man. This must come as a moral certainty, an inference from the moral certainty of the absoluteness of moral obligation. Then with these three presuppositions—a law-abiding, non-miraculous universe, the responsible freedom of man, and the immortality of all that is essential in individual personality—it will be found possible, I firmly believe, to interpret the facts of evil in such a way as is quite compatible with what we have called moral optimism, and with its metaphysical implications, among which the most fundamental is the existence of a God great enough and favourable enough to our true well-being to meet all our imperative religious needs. (In a later lecture I shall return to this subject, although I cannot undertake in this course of lectures to set forth in detail the way in which it seems to me with these presuppositions the religious problem of evil is to

be solved. What I have had to say on that subject is to be found in print in several different places already)\*

I have spoken of the *moksha*, the emancipation which comes by the new way of knowledge, the *jnana-marga* of modern science. It contains, I would have you believe, genuine religious value. But its value is largely in the negation of the ineptitudes of tradition; on the positive side it is, as a way of salvation, sadly deficient. Positive redemption, in the religious sense of the word, we naturally and no doubt rightly look for in the realm of religion itself. If now we can point to redemption or salvation, not as a something to be expected only as an experience of the individual after death, but in some sense as a genuine fact of present religious experience, this fact should be of the greatest importance, as making it possible to apply a further test, empirical in character, to the metaphysical inferences we have drawn from the proposition of the validity of moral optimism. The next question for our consideration, then, is this: If we act upon moral optimism as a life-hypothesis, will it be found to work well? More particularly, will it be found to work to any extent, in the way in which true scientific hypotheses work, namely, to verification? If so, the consequences for our pilgrimage of faith in search of universality in religion will be greatly expedited. Our exile in the land of pragmatism, where we have had to subsist on value-judgments and what we have found it possible to extract from them, will soon be over. We shall enter into a metaphysical home of our own, where we can have verified knowledge of the religious Object, comparable to that certainty in scientific knowledge of self and the world which has had such weighty and far-reaching consequences. We ought also to be able then to hold our own against all rival metaphysical systems; we shall have, in addition to what they have, some materials of our own with which to build, and it does

\* *God in a World at War*, London, 1918, III, *Theology as an Empirical Science*, New York, 1919, Part III, Ch V; *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, New York, 1925, Ch. VII. The last named is the most complete of the three. Chapters III-VIII of the same volume contain a much fuller discussion of moral optimism and its implications than I could give in the present connection.

not appear that our construction must be less rational in form than theirs. In fact, while we may not have fully realized it, from the moment we began drawing logical inferences about reality from critically established moral and religious values, we have been virtually on our journey back from exile ; we have been homeward bound. Our captivity has been turned back, as streams into the water-courses. In our occupation with values we were like those who went forth bearing precious seed for sowing ; but the first fruits of the harvest are already in our hands. To Zion and a land that is our own, if all signs fail not, we shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing our sheaves with us.

## IX. RECONSTRUCTING THE TEMPLE · CRITICAL MONISM AND A SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY.

In our last lecture we found it possible to infer certain metaphysical doctrines from the validity of certain values which we had examined critically with a wholly favourable result. Thus from the validity of the moral consciousness of responsibility we were able to infer a genuinely creative, however limited, freedom of action on the part of man. Furthermore, on the basis of moral optimism, which, as compared with extreme optimism, pessimism, and a bare and inconclusive meliorism, we judged to be the best possible attitude to take, we drew two principal metaphysical inferences, namely, the existence of God as a power great enough and good enough to meet the imperative religious needs of man as a free but fallible and ultimately dependent being; and secondly, as involved in and involving the other, the full conservation of all the essential values of human personality, and so the conscious persistence of all human personalities of actually or potentially good will, even in spite of physical death. Resting as they do on critically examined moral and religious values, these beliefs in God, in freedom and in immortality may be reasonably held, so long as they remain uncontradicted by any relevant fact.

But to the scientifically minded the question is sure to suggest itself, whether we cannot go on to transform some part at least of this doctrinal content from practically justified belief to scientifically verified knowledge. God, from the point of view of our religious realism, is a Reality which does not depend for his existence upon our recognition of him; he is an *independent* Reality. But if the Divine is an independent Reality how can it enter into our immediate experience, and without immediate experience of the Divine, how can we verify scientifically any of our theological beliefs? Certainly, verified religious knowledge is not to be ex-

pected so long as our religious realism remains dualistic, that is, so long as the religious Object—God, or the Divine—is regarded as remaining always wholly transcendent. If, as the Kantians maintain, independent reality is never immanent within the field of immediate human experience, or in the language of religion, if it is never *revealed*, must not metaphysics remain what one of the Ritschlian theologians has derisively called it, an attempted "science of the transcendent," belonging as such to "the pre-critical stage of thought"?\* We may be "morally certain" or "religiously certain" that some proposition about reality is true; but how can we be theoretically certain, except as the proposition is verified in an experience in which what it asserts is discovered to be in accordance with the facts? Religion is a reaching out after transcendent reality, a "tendency toward the transcendent," no doubt, but unless the independent reality is sometimes revealed, made immanent, how can religion ever be adequately assured that its Object is really there?† It means much even to find that the practically necessary is also theoretically permissible;

\* F. Traub, *Theologie und Philosophie*, 1910, pages 139, 114. Traub also uses the expression, "world-view in the form of science" (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, XXV, 1915, page 112). It must be admitted, I think, that Wobbermin's theory leaves itself exposed to such a charge. While realistic in his affirmation of independent reality, he is dualistic in leaving that independent reality wholly transcendent. The transcendent he defines as "that which lies out beyond experience," that is, beyond "universal human experience." "The things of the external world are not given immediately, but representatives of them." Metaphysics, in his opinion, has to do with that which lies beyond consciousness, in so far as it does lie beyond consciousness. Every problem concerning what lies beyond consciousness as such is metaphysical, every construction which relates consciously to what lies beyond consciousness is metaphysical." (*Theologie und Metaphysik*, pages 42, 92, 47.)

† H. Ludemann criticizes modern theologians for trying to derive knowledge of transcendent existence from knowledge of values, whereas the critical philosophers derive their knowledge of values from knowledge of phenomenal existence and are satisfied to stop with the discussion of absolute values, that is, transcendent ideals as distinct from transcendent reality. The theologians naturally fail to attain to certainty of revelation, but here again, according to Ludemann, they fail because they have no adequate criterion of the genuineness of revelation (*Das Erkennen und die Werturteile*, 1910, pages 74, 75). Ludemann's criticism is largely justified as against certain Ritschlian or semi-Ritschlian theologians like Kaftan, who hold to a dualistic realism according to which, strictly speaking, there can be no revelation, since independent reality is forever transcendent and can never be immediately experienced. There can only be, at best, for the dualistic religious epistemo-

but can we go on and show that any part of what is so precious from a practical point of view is theoretically established, that it is verifiable and verified in the realm of empirical fact? Can we know on grounds of experience that God is real? Can we get all the way back from our pragmatist exile, and enter into our own land, a land of verified religious knowledge?

Now this verification of religious hypotheses in immediate experience is just what is claimed for religious mysticism. The mystic is not only a realist with regard to God; he is an immediatist. He claims to have had an immediate experience of God, and although he may profess inability to express what he has experienced and knows of God, he generally feels quite free to assert, as immediately certain to him on the basis of his experience, not only the reality of God and his accessibility to man in his inner life, but also his absolute sufficiency for man's every religious need. But not uncommonly he goes much further. He asserts not only that God is one, but also that God is the only One; that everything which to non-mystical common sense seems so real, things and finite selves, time and space, what we ordinarily call good and what we call evil—all this is mere illusory appearance, the content of a dream which vanishes at the soul's awakening, in the mystic state, to the sole reality and absolute goodness, or more than goodness, of God.

Now it seems permissible to believe that the mystic is right when he affirms, on the basis of his subjective experience and feeling of certainty, that God, who is sufficient for all our religious need, is real and is accessible to us in our own inner lives. There is nothing here which runs counter to the facts of common everyday human experience, however it may transcend them. But with the other doctrines characteristic of pronounced or what we may perhaps regard as extreme mysticism, the case is different. We cannot continue to live unless we act upon the assumption of the reali-

logy of the theologians in question, something in the phenomenal order which functions as a substitute for the ever-transcendent ultimate Reality, or Thing-in-itself. And naturally for the testing of such a proxy revelation there is no real criterion, since one of the two terms to be compared is forever beyond our experience.

ty of time and space and things and selves. In the words of Ramakrishna, "A man totally devoid of *maya* will not survive more than twenty-one days"\* But in view of the fact that the mystical trance and the states immediately preceding it lend themselves to psychological explanation as conforming to the general type of autohypnosis,† so that its suggestions are not to be taken *uncritically* as revelations of truth, we cannot reasonably regard the disappearance of the finite in the mystic trance as proving its unreality, any more than a thing is proved to be unreal by its lapse from the focus of consciousness when attention is turned to something else. Generally speaking, experience of an object, under whatever conditions, is better evidence of its being real than its disappearance or non-appearance, under certain conditions, is evidence of its being unreal. In view, indeed, of the psychology of the mystical state we might well hesitate to call even the mystic's certitude of the existence of God objectively valid, if it could not be otherwise confirmed. But what the mystic claims to know is important, if true; and if and in so far as what he is so sure of, subjectively, does happen to be true, it must be admitted that, in his high degree of subjective certitude of it, he enjoys a distinct and indeed a very great advantage. He who is subjectively sure of what is objectively true is ready for unfaltering, strong and successful action.

The great question then comes to be this: Is there any way of verifying objectively the positive elements of the mystic's subjective assurance? Can we verify the reality, accessibility and sufficiency of God in such a way that the verification is open to objective inspection, capable of objective verification? Only, it would seem, if in normal states of mind it is possible, under definite conditions, to gain experience of a Divine Reality capable of being recognized as such. This will necessarily mean what is

\* *Sayings of Ramakrishna*, paragraph 71, in Muller's *Life and Sayings of Ramakrishna*, 1898, p. 113.

† G. A. Coe, *Hibbert Journal*, Volume VI, pages 359-372, S. N. Dasgupta, *Hindu Mysticism*, pages 75-78.



called a monistic as well as a realistic theory of religious knowledge, a theory according to which the Divine may be both directly experienced or in a broad sense of the word perceived, and yet remain a Reality which does not depend for its existence upon its being thus experienced and recognized by us.

It is just here that religious philosophy finds itself aided by a movement which may at first seem to have little or no religious value, or even to have a negative value for religion. I refer to what is generally known as the new realism. Confining its attention ordinarily to the physical and the human, it has sought to defend what may be regarded as a further extension of natural realism, the doctrine namely, that the objects we perceive have, with all their perceived qualities and no doubt many others, an existence which is objective and independent of our acts of perception. "Raised up from the North," this foreign, formidable and at first rather forbidding figure on the religious horizon may yet turn out to be, even though he may claim no experience or knowledge of God, the instrument of the return of the faithful remnant of the Captivity, at least to the extent of granting them philosophical permission to make the homeward journey and to build once more a temple of religious knowledge in place of the structure which a radical and ruthless pragmatism caused to be destroyed. According to the new realism we can have direct experience and knowledge of objects which do not depend for their existence upon their being thus experienced and known by us. If this be so, may not God possibly be an Object similarly independently real and yet knowable because capable of being immediately apprehended in a normal religious experience?

As preliminary to an exposition of the monistic and realistic theory of religious knowledge thus hinted at, a theory that we may hope will be more critical and defensible than the monistic and realistic but rather dogmatic theory of the mystics, let me attempt to set forth, in brief outline, a theory of knowledge in general to which this theory of religious knowledge will correspond, and of which it will be the special religious application. And let it be

said at once that it differs from naive or natural realism and from what is known as the new realism in much the same way as the theory of religious knowledge to be defended will differ from the view implicit in naive or dogmatic mysticism.

The theory of perceptual knowledge which I would suggest for your consideration may be called critical realistic monism, or more briefly, critical monism. It is distinguished from dualistic critical realism by the fact that it does not take the real object and the content directly experienced in perception as two totally different existences. On the other hand it is distinguished from the extremely monistic "new realism" in that it denies that the perceived object is simply the independently real object viewed in relation to the perceiving subject, with no additional qualities because of that relation. Standing between agnostic dualism and the dogmatic monism of the new realism, "critical monism," the view we would defend, maintains that in perception the perceiving subject is immediately aware of an object which is *numerically* one and the same object as existed before and continues to exist after perception; but it would admit that the numerical identity obtains in spite of a *qualitative* difference between the object as perceived and the object as independently real. In other words, not only has the real object many qualities, probably, which are unperceived; the object as perceived has qualities which it does not possess when it is not being perceived.

Perhaps the best way of setting forth the nature of critical monism as a theory of knowledge and at the same time exhibiting the firm foundation upon which it rests is to show it emerging at the point of intersection of the lines of thought obviously suggested by two very common sense-experiences, namely, pain and the positive after-image, or after-sensation. When I feel a pain, I feel it in some definite part of my body, in my finger, for instance. The pain, as a special content of sense-experience, is in a part of my body, and since my body is in as real space as any I know or can imagine, it follows that the pain I feel is in real space. And

not only so, the real space in which pain is located is scarcely ever the space occupied by the brain or any part of it; it is in the body but outside the cranium altogether. Again, the pain exists when it is sensed and not when it is not sensed. Furthermore, from one sense we may learn all, what is true of pain in its space and time relations is no doubt true of the sense-qualities of the other senses, such as colors, sounds, tastes, odors, and the sense-qualities of touch, temperature, muscular sensation, and the rest. The qualities are where they are sensed as being, and they are there when and as long as they are sensed as being there, whether it be within the body, or on its surface, or at a distance from it.

Let us now turn to a consideration of positive after-sensations. If on waking in the morning we keep our eyes directed towards the window for a few moments and then close our eyes, we shall find, if we give attention to our after-sensations, that we can still "see the window," as we say, in whatever direction we look. That is, we experience an after-image or after-sensation, the same in form, relative brightness, and color, as in the original experience of the window, only very much fainter, and differently located, according as the closed eyes are turned in one direction or another. Now it is well understood that this positive after-sensation is simply the gradual fading out of the original sensation; it is the same process continued for a short time after the cessation of the original stimulation from without. If, then, the specific brightness and color-qualities of the positive after-sensation are a product of the psycho-physical organism—and obviously this is what they are, since they immediately flash into existence wherever we look, whenever we look there—the same thing must be true of the brightness and color-qualities of the original sensation, of which the positive after-sensation is the mere fading continuation. So then, from one example learning all, we can say that not only in after-sensations, hallucinations and the like but in ordinary sensation, the specific sense-quality, whether it be color, sound, the heat or cold quality, pain, or what not, is a product of the sensing process in the psycho-physical organism, and that its

location in space and duration in time are similarly conditioned by the psycho-physical subject

Let us next bring these two lines of thought together. Experienced sense-qualities, such as colors, sounds, and pains, exist when and where they are experienced, in real time and real space, and they are the product of the sensing activity of the psycho-physical organism, or of what is involved therein. They are produced subjectively, but they exist objectively. The process of producing specific sense-qualities on occasion of appropriate stimulation is one which has been inherited from a long animal ancestry in which each new capacity of sensing a particular sense-quality originated in a process of emergent or creative evolution. The hereditary nature of the capacity is well illustrated and substantiated in the laws of the inheritance of color-blindness. When a certain stimulation is received from the outer world through some sense-organ, the psycho-physical process of producing and sensing a specific sense-quality is stirred into activity by the co-ordinated psycho-physical activity involved in receiving the stimulation.

An important feature of the situation is that the sense-quality produced is located in real space and ordinarily in the same place in space as that occupied by the physical object from which the stimulus came. The location is ordinarily exact enough for our practical purposes. Even in such exceptional cases, as when in producing visual sense-qualities on occasion of stimulation by sun, moon, and stars, we locate them in the sky beyond the tallest trees and houses, quite beyond our reach, the location is accurate enough for ordinary pre-scientific practical purposes. This location of the sense-qualities at approximately the point of space from which the stimulus came may seem mysterious, but so is all consciousness mysterious from the point of view of physical science—it is essentially a new creation—and we get some light on the problem in its scientific aspects when we think of natural selection. Organisms which could produce sense-qualities, but which were unable to locate them fortunately in relation to stimuli would be very ill-adapted to survive in the struggle for existence and would con-

sequently disappear early in the course of animal evolution. Only those lines were fitted to survive in which the location of sense-qualities was accurate enough for the most urgent practical purposes such as the discovery of food and the avoiding of enemies.

Now the outcome of this process of producing and fortunately locating sense-qualities with reference to stimuli is, in human experience at least, perceptual awareness of the objects from which stimulations proceed. We are immediately aware of the sense-qualities and of their location, extent and duration, and ordinarily these sense-qualities are where the stimulating objects are at the time, so that in perceiving the color which is located on the object we perceive the object colored. This perception of real things is knowledge, not in the sense of something which can be demonstrated absolutely in a theoretical manner, but knowledge as an actual, practical achievement. That perception under normal conditions gives us genuine knowledge of outer reality is certain from the practical point of view, and defensible theoretically. The theory which I have just outlined and called "critical monism" is the theoretical defense to which I refer.\*

Direct or immediate knowledge of physical things is then an instance of what we may call empirical intuition or perception in a complex. When I use the term "intuition" I do not mean any magical immediate awareness of the absent but an immediate awareness of the present. Nor do I mean to assert that such "intuition" is infallible, it must always be taken critically. By the phrase "perception in a complex" I mean to say that in the midst of a complex of colors, sounds, and other sense-qualities, subjectively produced but objectively located, we are able to intuit or perceive the presence of a physical reality with qualities such as direction, distance, extent, shape, duration, motion, energy, and the like, none of which are sense-qualities, but none of which can be discerned except in and through the sense-qualities to which the

\* For further statements of the view here necessarily set forth with great brevity, see *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1915, Chapter XIV, and *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 1925, Ch. XI.

stimulations they originate give rise \* Moreover, if an extension of the meaning of "perception" be allowed, so that experiential awareness of the presence of non-physical objects may be included under the term, we may say that in a complex of sense-qualities, feeling-qualities, ideas, and the like, the conscious self and its activities are perceived, empirically intuited. The question suggested to the religious mind is whether it may not be similarly possible in the complex of religious experience, in its highest forms at least, to perceive or empirically intuit the reality and presence of God, as the mystics among others have always been ready to claim. May not the critical realistic monist, with his theory of the immediate perception of independently existing things, be the herald of the return from exile, preparing in the wilderness the way of the Lord?

Before proceeding, however, to follow out this suggestion, a word of reassurance may be in place with regard to the nature and implications of the realistic interpretation of the physical to which we seem to stand committed. What we propose, to begin with, is to hold to the fundamental correctness of the ordinary common-sense distinction for which one of your own great religious leaders, Ramanuja, stood when he maintained that while things perceived in dreams are mere *maya*, things perceived in the waking state are real † Briefly put, what we mean is this: physical things are not dependent for their existence, but only for some of their quali-

In antithesis to the Kantian position, from the point of view we now occupy what the understanding constructs is not nature but our knowledge of nature, not the objects but the ideas or thought-constructs by means of which the object is known. Moreover, the *a priori* element in our knowledge may be thought of as not necessarily all absolutely *a priori*, but as being in part at least only relatively *a priori*. Perhaps, as Bergson and James suggest, intelligence and nature have each made a contribution to the other. Perhaps what we have come to regard as the *a priori* element in knowledge is to some extent the result of creative evolution in which mind has actively taken impressions of immediately experienced reality and retained some of these impressions—in causal thinking, for instance—as a part of its permanent constitution. Whether this process is confined to the infancy of the individual or belongs in part to an ancestral development is a legitimate further question. (See Chapter XVI in *The Problem of Knowledge*, Maennellan, 1915.)

\* † *Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras*, I, 1 (S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 86).

ties, on their being perceived and known by the individual; neither are they dependent for their existence on human and animal consciousness in general, nor are they, *so far as we know*, dependent for their existence on the thought or present awareness of Deity. We do not say that there is any physical reality of which the Divine Mind is ignorant; but on the other hand even when we grant that, as religion leads us to think, the physical is ultimately dependent upon the divine, we see no adequate basis for the assumption that the only way in which the physical world can be dependent upon God is by being a mere idea in the Divine Mind, a mere component part of the Divine Thought. Man himself is able to make the existence of some things depend upon himself in a different way from the way in which his ideas depend upon his consciousness. If man can do this, surely what God can do is no less.

Returning, then, from this parenthetical word of reassurance, to the critical revision of commonsense realism which was its occasion, let it be pointed out that on the basis of the theory of knowledge outlined it ought to be possible to gain something in the way of scientific knowledge of every kind of reality of which the mind of man has experience. Scientific method has significance for knowledge as well as for practice. There is a scientific *natural* adjustment discoverable which has value not only for practical life in relation to our natural environment, but also for the widening of our knowledge of the natural world. Scientific *self*-adjustment is also possible, and no doubt such an adjustment would be of immense value to us, both practically and for purposes of knowledge. Similarly we may recognize the possibility and the importance, for practice and knowledge both, of a scientific *social* adjustment, and as leading to such an adjustment we may be sure that the *will to serve* will have a prominent part, that all cannot be safely left to the "will to live" and the "will to power." But what we are immediately concerned with at present is the possibility of a scientific *religious* adjustment. This, if it can be achieved, will be of the greatest importance, we may expect, not only for practical life but also for religious knowledge.

The ritual acts of religion, if viewed as themselves fulfilling the requirements of religious adjustment, are not essentially different from the crudest magic. What religion needs more than anything else, I believe, is the elimination of magic from its ritual and the substitution of a scientific religious adjustment. There is nothing more futile than prayer, if it be the mere uttering of pious wishes, even as consciously addressed to God, it may be nothing but a "vain repetition," or, as Kant expressed it, "pious drivelling and doing nothing." In this sense of the term we can quote with approval even the cutting words of Professor Radhakrishnan: "To pray to God is as futile a superstition as to bid the storm give us strength, or the earthquake to forgive our sins."\*

But there is nothing more dynamic for good than prayer when it is the right religious adjustment. Let us attempt to analyze into its distinguishable elements or phases this "right religious adjustment," that is, the religious adjustment which is known to be right by its continued effectiveness for good. The principal elements or phases of a right or scientific religious adjustment are, as it seems to me, six, which may be designated briefly by the following terms: aspiration, concentration, surrender, appropriation, response, and persistence. Spiritual aspiration is of fundamental importance. The ideal for the sake of realizing which we cultivate the religious relationship must be of such a character that it can be effectively promoted through religious adjustment, and it must be at the same time such that its realization is absolutely worth while. These two conditions are met by aspiration for a well rounded spiritual development and especially for noble moral character and its expression in genuinely unselfish service to other persons and to humanity at large. This will mean of course a radical reinterpretation of the religious terms, "salvation," "redemption," and "emancipation," so that they shall no longer refer either to deliverance from an arbitrary external Gehenna, as in the older popular Christianity and Mohammedanism, or, as in popular Hinduism,

\* *The Hindu View of Life*, 1927, page 74.



to being "lifted speedily from the ocean of deadly *samsara*."\* By "concentration" is meant here what the Germans call "Samm-lung" and the French "recueillement," a concentrated direction of attention and of religious adjustment toward God, that is, toward a Reality regarded as absolutely favourable to our true well-being and absolutely sufficient for our religious needs, and thus as worthy of our absolute worship. It seems to be this phase of religious adjustment which is referred to in these words of Kabir: "When I turned my thoughts toward God, I restrained my mind and my senses and my attention became lovingly fixed on him."† By "surrender" or what is sometimes called "abandon," is meant absolute dedication of one's self to the spiritual ideal and to God as not only an absolute End, but the necessary Means of our moral and spiritual self-realization. There is nothing more essential in prayer or in religion than this dedication of one's self to God. It is the true *prapatti*, the living and essential core of *bhakti*, a disciplining of the Soul in full devotion to a loving personal God.‡ By "appropriation" is meant the receptivity of faith, the deliberate and confident *taking* from God as the source of the spiritual power we need, just what we need to enable us to triumph over temptation, to make the good will the dominating principle of our lives, and to enhance our power for effective service. By "response" is meant the removal of inhibitions, a "letting ourselves go" in obedience to the courageous, just and generous impulses which come to us as we contemplate the true ideal, the good will of our God, and the need of our neighbour. These five elements, spiritual aspiration, religious concentration, self-surrender to God, an appropriating faith, and readiness to respond, with persistence in all this as the all-important sixth, are the essential phases of a dependable and therefore scientific religious adjustment. It is important to add, however, that when this right adjustment is entered into as a readjustment after conscious moral failure, the element of

\* *Bhagavad Gita*, XII, 7.

† See S. N. Dasgupta, *Indian Mysticism*, page 140.

‡ See *Bhagavad Gita*, IX, 34.

aspiration includes of necessity the repentant attitude of will, and the self-surrender and appropriating faith will then be accompanied by a consciousness of reconciliation. Like many another, no doubt, I know from experience the failure which follows failure to persist in this adjustment; but I know enough from personal experience to know that the religious attitude outlined is the right one, and I have learned from observation of the lives of a few choice spirits something of the potency for good that lies in persistence in this right religious adjustment. In common with Christians generally, I find in the historic Jesus what seems to me the best individual illustration of this right religious adjustment and its beneficent results.

But even if in this analysis of a certain religious attitude into its main elements we have a true statement of the right religious adjustment, it does not follow that the most effective way of inducing individuals to enter into that adjustment will always be simply to point out these elements in their completeness. An analysis of love does not necessarily lead to "falling in love" and an analytical knowledge of true religion cannot be counted upon to be in itself the invariable antecedent of the practice of true religion. Generally it is some other cue, besides the analytical understanding or without it, which conditions success in the practical religious life. In Christianity this cue to effective religious adjustment is often found in loving devotion to the person of Christ. Sometimes the effective cue is found in some impressive ritual act. But among ideas which have proved themselves dynamic in this connection, there is not one which can relegate to a second place the idea of a loving personal God. Buddhism had to come to this, to make its simplest and most effective appeal. The religious dynamic of Christianity at its best centers in faith in "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," the God of redeeming love and grace. Devotion to the person of Christ tends to lead, whether by a logical thought process or by a mere psychological "expansion of feeling," to devotion to his God, the Christ-like God, thus making what we have called the right religious adjustment pos-

sible, and not only that, but also making possible, psychologically and logically, from the point of view gained, the attitude we have called moral optimism, and at the same time giving a further incentive to altruistic service. When loving devotion to God is mentioned, the thoughts of some of you will revert immediately to the *bhakti* of your own faith and to some of the great religious passages of the *Bhagavad Gita* where Krishna (idealized and purified as compared with the far from moral or divine figure depicted in the *Puranas*) is taken as the God of love and grace. Millions, I doubt not, have felt their religious emotions stirred by such words as these :—

“ Give me thy heart ! Adore me ! Serve me ! Cling  
In faith and love and reverence to Me '  
So shalt thou come to Me !      And let go those  
Rites and wit duties    Fly to me alone '  
Make Me thy single refuge ! I will free  
Thy soul from all its sins ! Grieve thou not ! ”

But as in Christianity what was called “ justification by faith alone ” has sometimes meant an immoral attempt to find a substitute for personal righteousness, that is, for being what one ought to be and doing what one ought to do, so it has sometimes been, no doubt, with the *bhakti-marga* of Hinduism. But that is not *bhakti-marga* at its best, any more than the other is the gospel of justification by faith at its best. At their best the “ faith ” or “ trust ” of the Christian Evangelical and the “ Bhakti ” of the devout Hindu are both directed in large part, I doubt not, toward such an experience of fellowship with God as shall mean actual spiritual attainment here and now, rather than toward mere freedom from physical misery present or future, without such spiritual attainment. Similarly, the way of knowledge, the *mana-marga* of Hinduism, is not, ideally speaking, a purely intellectual pro-

\* See *Bhagavad Gita* XVIII, 70ff., and H. Maitra, *Hinduism*, 1916, page 55. It was my privilege, while in Calcutta, to attend a public meeting of the “ Fellowship of Faiths ” at which a Theosophist, a Hindu, a Buddhist, a Mohammedan, and a Christian spoke, in eirenic spirit, on *bhakti*.”

cess, but is rather an experience of religious insight involving a surrender of heart and life to what is taken to be the ultimate truth.\* Thus there has been a tendency for *bhakti-marga* at its best and *jñāna-marga* at its best to coincide. Compare with this the view of Ramakrishna, "Knowledge and love of God are ultimately one and the same. There is no difference between pure knowledge and pure love"† Furthermore, if we take the term *karma* in a somewhat unusual but perhaps not too greatly modified meaning, we may say that beneath all the inadequate ideas of popular religion there lies a most important fundamental truth in the thought of *karma-marga*, namely, that no God worthy of the name can ever be satisfied with any human knowledge or pious feeling as a substitute for good works, that is, for faithful devotion to the will of God as seen in the round of daily duties. These duties must be interpreted in terms of a sound individual and social ethics, but, that being assumed, we can agree with Professor Radhakrishnan when he says, "*Jñāna*, wisdom, *bhakti* or devotion, and *karma* or service are not exclusive, but emphasize the dominant aspects. *Jñāna* is realised experience. We are saved from sin only when we live in the presence of God. In its highest flights *bhakti* coincides with *jñāna*, and both of these issue in right *karma* or virtuous life"‡ Thus, we are given to understand, in Hinduism at its best what is sought, fundamentally, in all three ways—the way of works, the way of knowledge, and the way of devotion—is the right religious adjustment; and certainly, in so far as the right religious adjustment is found and practised, an ex-

\* Cf. A. C. Underwood, *Conversion: Christian and Non-Christian*, 1925, pages 258-259.

† Max Muller, *Ramakrishna, His Life and Sayings*, 1898, page ix. Cf. also A. J. Appasamy in *Christianity as Bhakti-marga*, 1927, pages 69 and 227-228. In the latter passage he says "*Jñāna* and *Bhakti* are but different phases of the same experience. .. knowledge and love lead us in the same direction."

‡ *The Hindu View of Life*, page 82. In the same connection Prof. Radhakrishnan goes on to say, "If we have true insight, right action will take care of itself. Truth cannot but act rightly." There is truth in this, but the trouble is that when we come to apply it, what we take to be true insight is often mixed with error. Right action cannot well be left for very long to take care of itself. It constantly needs renewed attention.

perience of salvation and a knowledge of God are to be expected as its normal consequences. This is theoretically sound; as to how far the ideal is realized in experience, the facts must be allowed to speak.

An essentially right religious adjustment is fundamental to all that is best and most permanent in religious conversion. I am not speaking now exclusively or particularly of conversion from one religion to another, but of conversion as an at least occasional phenomenon of all higher religions. Conversion as a spiritual experience involves, as a recent student of the subject in its comparative aspects has pointed out, surrender to a spiritual ideal.\* Whether the ideal be envisaged in a person, as in Paul's conversion, or taken more abstractly, as in the enlightenment of Buddha, an accelerated moral development, with impulses of an altruistic character, seems to be a normal feature of the experience. The altruistic element may be due to an expansion of the feeling of love from its original direction toward God, the love to God being itself an outcome of gratitude for the benefits of divine grace. The kindly impulse and feeling are naturally extended to all human beings when they are viewed as objects of value in God's sight. Or the altruistic element may appear in the results of conversion for the reason that it was included in the ideal toward which the convert aspired and for the sake of which he entered into a definite religious adjustment. In neither case is the psychological explanation particularly prejudicial to the interpretation in which religion is interested, to the effect, namely, that the experience is, in its spiritual aspects, the product of a gracious operation of God, the result of a divine response to a human religious adjustment. The convert's feeling of being under the control of a higher power which is at work in his inner life is, of course, a subjective intuition, or interpretation, and is perhaps not susceptible of objective logical demonstration, but that some causal Factor responds dependably to persistence in what we have called the right religious adjustment is an objectively observable, verifiable and therefore

\* Underwood, *op. cit.*, page 258.

essentially scientific fact The " new psychology " has important new light to throw upon cases of conversion in which there is a violent emotional upheaval ; the explosive effect seems to be occasioned by the liberation and uprush of a suppressed complex ;\* but no psychology, new or old, is entitled to rule out as illegitimate the religious or metaphysical interpretation of the experience as involving the greater immanence of a divine principle of Being, or even the active response of a Divine Factor to a human adjustment Even those who do not believe in God, as commonly defined, may be, for aught mere psychology as such can say to the contrary, recipients of the Divine grace, just as there are free agents who deny any human freedom, and intelligent persons, knowing many things, who nevertheless deny that any knowledge of reality is possible.

But in some instances at least, as we have pointed out already, the religious interpretation is not merely permissible, but based upon the verifiable fact of a dependable response of some Factor to a certain kind of religious adjustment on the part of man This Factor, certainly existent, ought to be recognized as the real God of experimental religion The way is thus opened up for the re-establishment of religious knowledge on a sound scientific and philosophical foundation The awareness of the Divine Factor which results from dependably successful religious adjustment conforms to the general character of empirical intuition, or perception in a complex whole of experienced elements As a result of acting intelligently on the hypothesis of the existence of a God great enough and good enough to justify our absolute self-surrender and confident, appropriating faith, there comes a religious experience of spiritual uplift and emancipation in which, as a complex of many psychological elements, there can be intuited empirically, or perceived, the operation of a Factor which we evaluate and interpret as divine, because of its absolute religious and spiritual value. It is here then, and not in traditional creeds or sacred books as

\* Cf. Underwood, *op. cit.*, page 182

such, that we find revelation. The sacred books at their best, are records and possible sources of revelation. But what is revealed is what is discovered in and through experience, and there is religious revelation whenever a truly divine Reality is discovered as a fact of human experience.

It is in this critically monistic form of a religious realism that we are first in a position to reap the full benefit of the Ritschlian thought that religious judgments are judgments of value. The appreciation of religious value is an element in the recognition of a Factor, not merely postulated, but perceived as Divine. Moreover, assuming that the particular qualities dependably promoted by means of a certain religious adjustment are not only divine in quality but divine in their origin, one is led to surmise that values of the same sort are also divine in their origin, even when they have emerged in human lives in other ways than in response to a definite religious adjustment. The spiritual life which results from religion at its best is *more of the same* spiritual life which is found much more widely present in human life than is so very specific thing as the right religious adjustment. Thus appreciation of the spiritual or ideal as divine thus leads directly to a theory of the Divine Life or Being which has great significance for the metaphysics of religion. It finds the Divine Life progressively immanent in the progress of human life toward the spiritual ideal. This idea of the progressive immanence of God in the spiritual may seem to make it difficult to differentiate the human and divine elements from each other in the spiritual life of the individual. But it is a fair question why we should insist on any mutually exclusive distinction. The criterion of the human is found in the fact of the content in question being consciously intended and willed by the individual. On the other hand, the criterion of the divine is, broadly speaking, a certain spiritual value. There seems no reason then, at least thus far, why we should not consider the human and the divine as partly overlapping.\* The view thus

\* Your faith is "not of yourselves; it is the gift of God," wrote the Christian Paul  
 "Revere me lovingly, I grant discipline of mind, and by that they come unto me," are

suggested is intermediate between an extreme pluralism on the one hand and pantheism on the other.

Our theory of an empirical intuition of God in the complex of religious experience may be regarded as a supplement to the thought of Schleiermacher who pointed out that in the feeling of absolute dependence we are aware of the Object of absolute dependence, or, in other words, conscious of the existence of God. That God is, and that He is the ultimate reality with which we have to do, can be asserted on the ground of that universal, largely *passive*, absolute dependence which Schleiermacher had in mind. That God is, and that He is a Factor which responds dependably to the special *active* dependence involved in the right religious adjustment, is what we can verify on the basis of objectively observable facts of religious experience.\*

It ought to be fairly clear from what has been said that the method we are recommending in the search for religious truth is simply the scientific experimental method. What is indicated is the logical treatment of the data of religious experience in the various religions of the world, in order to see what elements of faith are capable of verification in the strictly scientific sense, and therefore qualified to find place in the final universal religion. If it is true that there is a Factor in reality which responds dependably to the right religious adjustment and makes a difference for the better in the life of the human spirit, it ought to be possible to construct a theology the core of which at least will be scientific in the same

the words put into the mouth of Krishna in the *Bhagavad Gita*, X, 10. It is probably true; those who persist in the right religious adjustment are led into an experience of salvation which enables them to persist still further in that right adjustment, and it seems reasonable to believe that it was through a similar immanent operation of divine grace that they were enabled to enter into and maintain the adjustment of faith in the first place.

\* Was it not something like this that Ramanuja had in mind when he said, "It is only in meditation bearing the character of devotion that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in any other state" (*Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras*, III 2, 23)? Mahendra Nath Sircar expresses the interesting opinion that Ramanuja's *kinkara*-consciousness is akin to what Otto calls "creature-feeling" ("The Vedantic Conception of God," *Calcutta Review*, 1927, page 157).



empirical sense in which the sciences descriptive of objective reality are scientific.

A theology so constructed would be fundamentally different from speculative theology although there would be room in it for theological speculation. The true place of speculation in science is in developing the meaning of hypotheses, as a preliminary to their being tested in experience; to take an idea as valid simply because it has been deduced logically from our hypothesis, and without testing it in the light of empirical fact, is to be guilty of unscientific dogmatism. Speculative theologians are like speculators in stocks; their transactions are not always in accord with real values, they are often "short" on facts, and they often get more credit than is due them by clever manipulation of very limited resources. But there is always a day of reckoning, and for theological speculation it comes when theories are compared with the actual facts of human experience.

The results of applying scientific method to religious thinking must be expected to be negative in part. This will be true especially in connection with such elements of traditional belief as miracles, special providence, and external answers to petitionary prayer. A *dependable* religious factor, such as a scientifically minded religious faith must posit, would not arbitrarily intervene to help one person at one time and then refuse to intervene similarly to help another person under essentially the same circumstances at another time. Negative instances must be given full consideration in scientific procedure. No miraculous intervention occurred to stay the hand of violence and death, even when he who desired to live that he might deliver his people from their evil condition prayed, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." But he who had warned of the futility of "vain repetition," of saying "Lord, Lord," knew well that true prayer is not begging for this or that external thing, but rather the seeking of God himself, and the opening of heart and life to what we may call the **higher immanence** of that Power, not (for the religious consciousness) identifiable with ourselves, which makes for righteousness in

and through us when we are rightly adjusted thereto. What was he who had spoken disparagingly of "vain repetitions" doing when he spent the whole night in prayer to God, save cultivating the right religious adjustment and living in conscious fellowship with the great Heart of the universe which he thought of as "our Father"?

The positive results of applying the methods of objective empirical science in connection with religious experience will be, primarily, what we may call the laws of revelation, or of salvation. That is, they will be generalized statements of what Reality, or some Factor in reality, can be depended upon to effect in the individual human soul and through its activity, on condition of the maintaining of that dependably effective attitude which we have called the scientific or right religious adjustment. This attitude, as we have seen, is one of active dependence upon a power great enough and good enough for our religious need, a Power which, however closely related to us in the inner life, we cannot identify with ourselves as we know ourselves, but must treat as in a very real sense an Other. And it will be found, I believe, that these laws of salvation are fundamentally laws of the more definite formation and the dynamic reinforcement of the morally good will, and only incidentally or secondarily laws of emotional, intellectual, physiological and sociological effects.\*

But the empirical method in theology may be expected to contribute not only laws of salvation and spiritual achievement, but certain central and vital elements of theological theory. We learn something of the otherwise hidden nature of things and character of persons by observing what those things or persons can be depended upon to do, under certain determinate conditions. The same thing is true in religion. We can learn to some extent what God is from what God does, and particularly from what that objective religious Factor does on condition of the scientific religious adjustment on our part. And, we may add, whether the depend-

\* See *Theology as an Empirical Science*, Part II, Chap. 5, where the laws are formulated with specific reference to Christian religious experience.

able factor involved in the experience of present, progressive spiritual salvation through the right religious adjustment be one or many, personal, impersonal or superpersonal, and howsoever it may be related either to the outer universe or to our inmost selves, this much at least is obviously true in the light of what has been said already, that the real God of experimental religion is at least one in number, dependable, teleological and moral at least to the extent of making dependably toward a definite moral end, favourable to the true well-being of humanity, and adequate in power and in all the qualities needed for being Author of our progressive salvation, at least as far as it has progressed, and presumably farther. This divine Reality moreover is necessarily adjusted to by us as transcendent in relation to the human being, but as responding to the right adjustment by acting within the human spirit and thus becoming, in a very real and special sense, immanent, whatever further sense the immanence of God may come to bear.\* There may be other ways in which to supplement this empirically scientific idea of God, but this much we may safely say is verifiable and has been verified in religious experience in its highest and most scientific aspects. And this, be it noted, is the only knowledge of God which we can be sure has come by special revelation, for the only special revelation we can be sure of is that which is verifiable in religious experience, that which comes as the dependable result of a definite religious adjustment.

Having established, then, the fact of religious revelation in the dependable result of a scientific religious adjustment, with what it involves for the possibility of scientific verification of at least some religious beliefs and scientific refutation of some others, we may say that we have entered into our homeland and are in a position to build on the solid rock of fact—have already been building indeed—the temple of an objective knowledge of God. We are free to admit that the structure of theology as an empirical science will be a more modest one than the pretentious speculative fabric of rationalistic idealism ; but it may be all the safer and the more per-

\* Cf pp 224-5 *supra*.

manent for that, and no doubt it will be adequate for all the purposes of the religious life. We shall not be disturbed then if some of those who remember the former structure reared by absolute idealism should be loud in their lamentations when the foundation of this modest empirical house of worship is laid before their eyes. There are others who will be ready to shout for joy. We do not claim to be able to prove, in strictly objective fashion, so much as was claimed by the speculative theologians, but we have our compensation in the fact that our knowledge is not of mere speculative possibility, but of actuality, established as such by the scientific method of empirical verification. Our temple may seem smaller than the old one, but it is more adequately founded. Be it known, then, that *to the building of this modest but firmly founded temple of an empirically scientific theology all religions are invited to bring, as building material, such empirical data of dependably successful and universally valuable religious experience as they may have already acquired or be able hereafter to discover.* What we may expect indeed, is that this temple of a scientifically verified and therefore universally valid theology will be in the future the centre of a truly scientific religious education and a truly scientific evangelism and missionary activity in which different religions will share their values with each other and contribute thus to the spiritual enrichment of all.

## X. REBUILDING THE WALLS: THE NEW METAPHYSICS.

If we are to make sure of being permanently established as reasonable religionists in a home of our own, we must do more than construct an empirical theology in accordance with approved scientific method as a temple wherein to worship the God of our religious experience. We must look to our outer defenses also; we must rebuild the walls of religious metaphysics. Our religion, with the theology in which it finds legitimate expression, must stand or fall ultimately according as it can or cannot be reasonably held in the face of whatever facts science may be able to establish and whatever inferences may be logically drawn from adequately criticized and established values. This indicates the general nature and method of the metaphysics through which alone the intellectual security of religion can become an accomplished fact. It cannot be the old dogmatic metaphysics of *apriori* speculation, deductive or dialectical. It must be metaphysics by a new method, a synthesis of the general results of a scientific investigation of reality with such inferences as can be logically drawn from critically validated values. To such a metaphysical theory a scientifically formulated empirical theology will make an appreciable contribution. It will enrich the doctrinal content of metaphysics and add the verifications of religious experience to metaphysical certainty, at the same time that it is having its own content enriched by the contributions of scientific theory and being made more objective and certain by being shown to be able to meet its final theoretical test, namely, that of being included, without contradiction, in the most comprehensive and defensible philosophy of reality that can be constructed. It will hardly be necessary to argue the point that such a system of theological metaphysics as we have suggested—that is, one in which all that is essential to vital moral religion is included, together with an assured scientific

knowledge of reality, in one harmonious whole—is, and for the present must be, to a very great extent, only a program, and not an accomplished fact. But what is not sufficiently recognised is that the responsibility for that state of affairs rests not upon religion alone, but to a very considerable degree upon the unfinished and even acutely transitional condition of present-day science. Much of what we are offered to-day in the name of science is a confused mass of ill-digested experimental data with explanatory theories acknowledged in many instances by the scientists themselves to be not wholly satisfactory. This is particularly true of physics, biology and psychology.

In physics there have been discovered in the last twenty-five or thirty years a group of new phenomena which require for their explanation the new quantum or light-dart theory, but it is still necessary to retain the old wave theory in order to explain the many interference phenomena, and yet the two theories seem quite irreconcilable with each other.\* Moreover, leading scientists now tell us of the transformation of mass into radiant energy, and suggest the possibility of the reverse process. The old nineteenth century principles of the conservation of mass, the conservation of energy, and the conservation of momentum, while still useful, are now seen to be mere approximations, not absolutely true for all possible phenomena † And thus only a short generation after an eminent physicist declared that probably all the great discoveries in physics had already been made and that no qualitatively new phenomena were to be looked for ‡

Then there is the theory of relativity. Here the dust of controversy has not yet settled, and for the layman the situation is quite confused. But while the non-expert in this field must take both the mathematics and the experimental results on authority,

\* R. A. Millikan, *Evolution in Science and Religion*, 1927, pp. 21-24. Cf. A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 145. "It cannot be too clearly understood that the various physical laws which appear to apply to the behavior of atoms are not mutually consistent as at present formulated."

† Millikan, *op. cit.*, Ch. I.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10.

he may perhaps be allowed an opinion on the logic of the subject. Not to attempt to go into the subject in any detail, we may content ourselves with a reference to Einstein's own statement about one of the proposed empirical tests of the theory, a test which it has not yet been shown to be able to meet successfully. In his famous work on *Relativity* Einstein frankly says: "If the displacement of the spectral lines towards the red by the gravitational potential does not exist, then the general theory of relativity will be untenable."\* It would seem then that as long as this deduction from the Einsteinian general theory of relativity remains unconfirmed experimentally, the theory cannot be reasonably regarded as proved, and that if the deduction is correctly drawn and if it should turn out that the experimental results are correctly reported to be discrepant with it, the theory will have to be regarded as in part disproved. The rather close agreement of other experimental results with predictions made on the basis of the theory does not necessarily prove the theory as a whole. To assume that they do is to commit the familiar fallacy of "affirming the consequent."

In biology the causal explanation of evolution is still an essentially unsolved problem. On grounds of paleontology, comparative anatomy, and the like, competent scientists are all, we may say, convinced evolutionists. The theory of descent is the only scientific hypothesis. But the most scientific approach to the problem of the explanation of evolution is that of genetics, and it seems not too much to say that the geneticist does not yet see his way to a solution of the problem. The tendency of the science is to explain slight variations and sudden mutations alike, as being caused by new combinations of determining factors already existent in the

\* *Relativity*, English translation, p. 159. Professor J. H. Thirring, of Vienna, while regarding the special theory of relativity as made up of established empirical facts and conclusions necessarily resulting therefrom, points out that the general theory of relativity includes hypotheses which can only be said to seem theoretically reasonable, conclusions which are not necessarily to be drawn, and physical consequences not hitherto confirmed by experiment (*The Ideas of Einstein's Theory*, English translation, p. 167). Even Professor Michelson, on whose experimental results Einstein based his theory originally, is understood to accept the Einsteinian theory only in part.

parent forms, and inherited by them from earlier generations. All that happens from generation to generation, according to genetics, is simply, as it were, a new shuffling of the cards.\* Geneticists seem reluctant to admit either a process of creative evolution, or the inheritance of acquired characteristics, but without something of the sort in connection with the factors determining inheritance, it seems difficult if not impossible to explain the evolution of the immense variety of plant and animal forms from one or a few very simple forms of original living matter.

In the realm of general psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and psychical research, there are many problems of the greatest interest from the point of view of religion, which are still very far from being fully solved. Human freedom is attacked in the name of the science of behavior on the one hand and the theory of the unconscious on the other; immortality is questioned on the ground of the phenomena of alternating personality, and religious interpretations of such religious experiences as conversion, spiritual renewal through prayer, and mystical union are seriously challenged in the name of psychoanalysis. But there seems no sufficient reason to conclude that psychology has given or is likely to give the *coup de grâce* to the fundamental entities of a metaphysical theology, God, freedom, and immortality.

Cases of alternating personality are regularly cured by suggestion, and it seems reasonable to believe that they are phenomena of auto-suggestion in the first place, and so not at all incompatible with the idea of the ontological unity and possible persistence of personality. And while human freedom and divine response may be conditioned by instincts and complexes, it does not follow that they are excluded by such conditioning factors. On the one hand no psychology, even when helped out by the ambiguous concept of the unconscious, can ever rule out as not permissible the concept of a creative direction of attention as a factor in all processes that are recognizably processes of consciousness, and this is enough to

\* See T. H. Morgan, *Evolution and Genetics* 1925, *The Theory of the Gene*, 1926,



secure a place for responsible human freedom. On the other hand no sound and scientific psychology of religion will ever be able either to rule out the element of religious appreciation of the processes which the psychology of religion is able to describe, or to explain those processes in such a way as to leave no room logically for the view that there is a dependable Divine Reality at work in the dependable response to a scientific religious adjustment.

Nevertheless the present transitional state of scientific thought in many important fields makes peculiarly difficult the task of anyone who is disposed to follow at the same time the religious impulse and the rational interest as they combine to lead in the direction of a metaphysical development of religious concepts. But the religionist, be it remembered, has his own contributions to make to the solution of the metaphysical problem. Briefly stated, what he is in a position to bring to the metaphysical synthesis includes, as we have seen, the following elements: a creative human freedom, within however narrow limits—this as a logical inference from the absolute moral certainty of responsibility, a dependable source of moral salvation on condition of a certain describable religious adjustment, or in other words, the God of the religious experience of moral salvation—this as a scientific theological fact; a Reality great enough and favorable enough to our true values to justify absolute trust on the part of all persons of active good will, or in other words, the God of moral optimism—this as a logical inference from the critically defensible religious value of moral optimism; the conservation of all that is essential in finite personality, considered in its potentialities as well as in its actuality—this as a logical inference from the just-mentioned logical implication of moral optimism; and, we may add, as a fruitful thought suggested by both mystical religion and much of the classical metaphysical speculation, and a thought to be kept in reserve for use as a metaphysical hypothesis in connection with the proposed synthesis of scientific facts with logical inferences from moral and religious values—the immanence of God in the world and particularly in the spiritual life of man.

This indicates in a general way the task we have set ourselves in proposing to build up once more a metaphysical wall about the temple of empirical theology in which we propose to worship the God of our religious experience. How we shall fare with the building of this wall must remain to be seen. In view, however, of the disposition of many onlookers not only to mock at our attempt but even to hinder us in the work, it may be necessary for us to build as did Nehemiah of old, with sword in one hand and trowel in the other.

In his judicious editorial preface to the second volume of *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Professor Muirhead, after pointing out that in the past two or three decades there has grown up a wholly new appreciation of the independent and permanent significance of religious experience in human life, goes on to remark significantly that what is of importance in this new interest which the philosophers are taking in religious experience is the recognition of it as representing "a level of human experience (perhaps the highest) at which new aspects of the world of Reality reveal themselves to the soul."\* It would not require much argument, I imagine, to persuade the philosophers of India, this ancient land not only of religion but of religious philosophy, to agree that religion has value for knowledge, that in religious experience at its best there is insight into the deeper nature of things, a penetrating beneath the surface show, and catching, as it were, a fleeting vision of the inmost secret of reality. If this, which our Western philosophers have so commonly forgotten and which your Indian philosophers have so commonly remembered, be accepted as true, a hospitable attitude may be expected toward our thesis, that religion has an important contribution to make to metaphysics. Just what that contribution is, we have already attempted to indicate.

Pp 20-21 Cf A G Widgery, *Contemporary Thought of Great Britain*, 1927, p 248 "If God is the central constituent of Reality, if the relation of man to Him should be the central relation in man's life, it seems at least probable that if man does not make this the central relation he will get an inadequate and it may be a false view of the constituents of Reality, as well as of his proper relations to them and their relations to one another."

Man's essential freedom and responsibility as morally and religiously certain, the God of scientific theology, that is, the God of spiritual experience, the dependable objective Factor in the experience of moral salvation through scientific religious adjustment, a divine Life, immanent in all striving after the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, but becoming increasingly immanent in human life on definite religious conditions, and thus coming to be recognized, revealed, as not merely the Ideal but the Holy, a present Power working effectively toward a definitely spiritual end, and so essentially teleological, a cosmic God also, the God logically inferred from the validity of the normal, spiritually necessary religious attitude which we have called moral optimism, a God good enough and great enough for our absolute dependence and trust, a God working teleologically not in the spiritual life of man alone, but in the cosmos about us, and guaranteeing the conservation of all the essential values of individual human personality—these, as we have seen, are some at least of the contributions which religion is in a position to make toward an understanding of the nature of reality and the meaning of life

This, then, is what religion does for metaphysics—it offers a religious hypothesis for religious consideration. This hypothesis, including as it does the empirical God of scientific theology, the cosmic God of moral optimism, teleology, the divine immanence as a thing of degrees, human immortality and creative human freedom, is offered as scientifically verified in part, morally certain in part, and in part either as strongly suggested by mystical experience or as a plausible and not unreasonable surmise based upon an appreciation of religious value. It remains to ask what metaphysics can do for religion. Here again I feel that I am in the presence of those who are in cordial sympathy with my general thesis at least, namely, that metaphysics ought to be able to render religion an important service. In my opinion one of the contributions India has to make to the universal religion of mankind is to be found in that sense of the religious value of philosophy which has characterized many of her intellectual and religious leaders.

What the general procedure of a sound metaphysic must be we have already indicated. It must be adequately empirical and cognisant of practical values, as well as rationally self-consistent. It must seek to effect a synthesis of the general results of the sciences (including theology in so far as it is strictly inductive) with the ontological implications of critically established values (religious values being included). We shall now give our attention to some of the principal concepts which emerge in connection with such an attempted synthesis.

First let us consider freedom and related problems from the metaphysical point of view. Man is a responsible agent. This is morally certain, as certain as that the sense of moral obligation is valid. But if man is responsible, he is free, and that in the sense that his present conscious action is not completely determined by the preceding conditions, even when the internal conditions of inherited nature and acquired character are taken into account. Man's conscious conduct is to some extent being creatively determined at the time, his act corresponds to his character or some phase of his character in the moment of action, but this character of the moment of action does not necessarily coincide with the character of the immediately preceding moment; by a creative act of voluntary attention it is possible to make motives different to some extent from what they would otherwise have been, and thus to determine conduct and character together. On no other supposition would it be just to hold the individual guilty for failing to act in accordance with a higher standard.

But this creative direction of the will, within however narrow limits it may exist, is a fact of the vitalistic, as opposed to the mechanical order. Not all facts of life are of the purely mechanical type, so long as there are responsible free agents among living beings. But if there is this much truth in vitalism, there is probably more. Man as a living organism is no doubt a product of evolution, and it seems reasonable to suppose that his creative freedom is a further evolution of something not altogether

absent from his animal ancestors, and that possibly all living forms are determining to some extent their activity and development at the time it takes place, and are not simply and without remainder being determined by things other than, and events previous to their own present activity. It may well be that the only way in which a being with so highly developed an endowment of freedom as man enjoys could have been evolved was on the basis of a series of ancestral lives in which there existed a similar creative freedom in a much more rudimentary form.

That this vitalistic character is to be found in lower orders of life has been brought out very convincingly by Professor Hans Driesch. He has shown that the fertilized and developing egg of certain animals, the sea-urchin for instance, is a harmonious equipotential system, that is, any fragment whatever of the system is equally able to produce a small but complete organism, a fact which cannot be explained on the mechanistic theory, except by supposing that a machine may be divided up in any way whatsoever and that each fragment will do the work of the whole machine. That is not the way of machines, as we know machines.\* We might imagine a large number of "handy men" each doing one particular piece of work in a building operation, but each capable of doing, if need should arise, everything that any one of the others is doing, and the cells composing the developing organism of the sea-urchin may, in the early stage, be something like that. But this is not to explain the process mechanically, but in a vitalistic or activistic manner, since man is not a machine, but, as we have seen, within however narrow limits an essentially creative agent. On any definite and recognized meaning of the term mechanism, there are facts low down

\* "An ingenious machine, like a type-writing or calculating machine, is an elaborated tool, an extended hand, and has inside of it, so to speak, a human thought. For certain purposes it is not amiss to think of the organism as a machine, but it is a self-stoking, self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing engine!" (J. A. Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, 1920, Vol. I, p. 157).

in the scale of life which are manifestly super-mechanical.\* A strong case may similarly be made out for the view that there is something super-mechanical about the normal development of the individual plant or animal, and about its normal activity in continuing to work toward definite ends, with the changing use of means to overcome changing obstacles. Similarly, when identical structures are developed independently in divergent lines of evolution to serve an identical end, as when, to use Bergson's illustration, the mollusc *Pecten* and the vertebrates develop eyes with retina, lens, and cornea long after molluscs and vertebrates separated from their common parent-stem,† we are led to posit some super-mechanical factor, travelling by adaptive activity different paths but always to reach the same goal, and displaying thus what has every sign of being "a rudiment of choice"‡

This vitalistic or activistic theory in metaphysics is supported by our "critical monism" in epistemology, in the working out of which it was concluded that there is a creative production not only of memory images, ideas, and the like, but also of the concrete sense-qualities experienced in different locations at different times. Pointing in the same activistic direction, it would seem, is the evidence of psychical research, such as it is, for telepathic, not to speak of still more occult phenomena. If such alleged phenomena are genuine, they seem to involve some process which completely transcends mechanical action, as we know it. Thus from all directions lines of evidence converge in the direction of an activistic, super-mechanical theory. Not only do consciousness and life seem to be essentially activistic rather than mechanistic; the common-sense theory that the relation of brain and mind is one of mutual interaction is also the obvious one, since it has no presumption

\* Cf. Bergson *Creative Evolution*, English translation, p. 75. "If the crystalline lens of a Triton be removed, it is regenerated by the iris. Now the original lens was built out of the ectoderm while the iris is of mesodermic origin. What is more, in the *Salamandra maculata*, if the lens be removed and the iris left, the regeneration of the lens takes place at the upper part of the iris, but if this upper part of the iris itself be taken away, the regeneration takes place in the inner or retinal layer of the remaining region."

† *Creative Evolution*, English translation, pp. 62, 63, 75.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

against it, and all appearances are in its favor. On the other hand, activism tends to soften down the sharpness of the contrast between matter and mind without the *tour de force* of reducing matter to mere states of mind, or mind to a mere form or motion of matter. Mind is that which acts in certain ways, and matter is that which acts in certain other ways, but in both instances reality is something acting, and we know the reality in and by means of what it does.

It was no accident that put the concept of creation out of fashion in philosophy as soon as Kant had undermined belief in the reality of time, and it was not any accidental cause that led Bergson on from his emphasis upon the reality of "time and free will" to develop a doctrine of "creative evolution." Whether this concept of creation ought to be applied in connection with what seem to be the ultimate units of mass and energy, electrons and "quanta," we have no means of knowing scientifically; but that these are products of creation is a common surmise of the religious consciousness. From the morally optimistic faith that nothing in the physical world, nothing but the free will of man himself, can ultimately keep the individual person from realizing the spiritual ideal and attaining to true blessedness, it may be concluded that there is a Factor in the universe great enough as well as good enough for our absolute trust, and that consequently the whole physical universe is adequately under the control of that Factor. From this point of view it is natural to surmise that adequate divine control of the world is possible only because the world was originally created, or, better, perhaps, that it is and always was being created by the activity of God. Metaphysics can defend the permissibility of such a concept; but on the positive side, beyond inferences and surmises on the basis of a critical philosophy of religious values I do not think that philosophy is able, as yet, to go.

But the recognition of creativity as an ultimate characteristic of life is of far-reaching significance for both religion and metaphysics. This is not because it can be proved to a demonstration

or apart from religion that the cosmic Vital Impulse of Bergson,\* the "Nisus towards Deity" of Alexander,† or the ultimate cause of what Lloyd Morgan is content to call "emergent evolution"‡

\* We are still without Bergson's Gifford Lectures, but he has called the creative Life Urge of his philosophy "God" (Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, English translation, p. 248), and I recall with interest a statement made to me with unmistakable conviction by the French philosopher in 1911 to the effect that theology and metaphysics must be expected to approach each other more and more closely, since "the true metaphysic will be an immediate vision of reality, and the mystical experience is certainly that." For further light on this point see J. Chevalier, *Henri Bergson*, 1928, ch. VII. For suggestions toward a theistic interpretation of creative evolutionism, see B. H. Streeter's *Reality*, 1926: "If we are to think of Reality in terms of Life, we must decide whether the conception of life we use is derived from the vegetable, the animal, or the human world. The nature of life cannot be understood until it is studied in its last and richest development, that is, in man."

If the Idealist doctrine that the Universe is the expression of Mind could be fused with a more or less Bergsonian conception of Life-Force, the result would be something very like the vision of the Hebrew prophet—a Living God" (pp. 116, 117).

† "God is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. But this possessor of deity is not actual but ideal. As an actual existent, God is the finite world with its nisus towards deity" (S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 353; cf. *Mind*, XXX, p. 428).

‡ "For better or worse, while I hold that the proper attitude of materialism is strictly agnostic, therewith I, for one, cannot rest content. For better or worse, I acknowledge God as the Nisus through whose Activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed." "I acknowledge a physical world which, I admit, is beyond proof. I acknowledge also God. Who is, I contend, beyond disproof. And so far as I can judge, both acknowledgments work." "I accept, under acknowledgment, a physical world existent in its own right quite independently of any human or sub-human mind. Why do I accept this under acknowledgment? Because I am not satisfied that its existence can be irrefragably established subject to the searchlight of modern philosophical criticism. I admit then that in accepting it, I go beyond the positive evidence. But I claim that it embodies nothing that is discrepant with, or contradictory to, that evidence. How, then, do I reach this acknowledged physical world? By following downwards the line of 'involution' till I reach what is, for my constructive philosophy, the limiting concept. But if, in like manner, I follow upwards the line of 'dependence' I again reach (for my constructive philosophy) a limiting concept—that of ultimate dependence in terms of which the whole course of emergent evolution is explained (not merely interpreted) within one consistent and balanced scheme. Thus, too, I accept under acknowledgment. It too lies as I think, beyond proof by the positive evidence that philosophical criticism demands, and, within its province, is right in demanding. But is it discrepant with or contradictory to any positive evidence that we are bound to accept with natural piety? I think not. And I feel free therefore to urge its legitimacy under acknowledgment. This, for me, leads upwards towards God, as directive Activity within a scheme which aims at constructive consistency" (O. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, pp. 33, 36, 61.)



is the God of a normal and spiritually necessary moral optimism. We are not in a position to offer any such demonstration. But the conception of life as creative is religiously significant because of the natural and logical inference which has been drawn from the validity of the highest religious values we know, to the effect that the God we need exists, and that he must be doing, in connection with the natural world, whatever man needs to have done for him by a superhuman power in order that his true goal may be possible of realization. The statement that the creative principle at work in the course of biological evolution is God's, like the statement that all the physical energy of the universe is God's physical energy, is made, as Lloyd Morgan expresses it, "under acknowledgment," that is, not as fully demonstrated, but as resting on a firm practical basis and being clearly at the same time in the present state of our knowledge, theoretically permissible.\*

But in offering as theoretically permissible and apparently involved in what is essential to religion a religious interpretation of creative evolution, we are confronted at once with the theological and metaphysical problem of teleology. In facing this problem, let it be said at the outset that we do not claim to be able to furnish strict logical demonstration of the view that a superhuman conscious purpose is being brought to realization in and through the processes of evolution as a whole. The interpretation of the world in terms of divine purpose is not in the first instance the contribution of philosophy to religion, but the contribution of religion to philosophy. Still there is a metaphysical task which is set by this very contribution of religion, and that is the problem before us, as to just how we may without contradiction think of the world in general and the course of biological evolution in particular as instrumental to the purpose of a God who is good enough as well as great enough for our absolute trust.

In the first place, if, with Professor Whitehead, we view the physical world as a multiplicity of events in space-time, it would

\* Is not Lloyd Morgan's "acknowledgment" simply a critically safeguarded application of James's "will to believe"?

seem reasonably possible to accept the suggestion which religion offers, as Whitehead himself does, and interpret as God the "principle of concretion," which holds all such events together in a cosmic unity.\* In the second place, while it may not be possible to prove absolutely that there must have been conscious design in the pre-adaptation of the inorganic environment of our planet to the needs of life, the facts brought out by Professor Lawrence Henderson, of Harvard, as to the "fitness of the environment"†

\* A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 1925, *Religion in the Making*, 1926.

† "The ensemble of properties of the elements hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen..... lead to the presence of water and carbon deposits in the atmosphere, and to the meteorological cycle. This cycle regulates the temperature of the globe more perfectly than it could be regulated by any other substances conceived in any other similar cycle... Other similar results depend upon the chemical properties of these three elements. This ensemble of properties is of the highest importance in the evolutionary process for it is that which makes diversity possible. To this end it provides materials, and in large measure the necessary stability of conditions" (L. J. Henderson, *The Order of Nature*, 1917, pp. 181, 182, 184). "There is in truth, not one chance in countless millions of millions that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, and especially of their stable compounds, water and carbonic acid, which chiefly make up the atmosphere of a new planet, should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together. There is no greater probability that these unique properties should be without due cause uniquely favorable to the organic mechanism. These are no mere accidents, an explanation is to seek. It must be admitted, however, that no explanation is at hand." "How does it come about that each and all of these many unique properties should be favorable to the organic mechanism, should fit the universe for life? And for the answer to this question existing knowledge provides, I believe, no clue." "The two fitnesses are complementary, are they, then, single or dual in origin? The simple view would be to imagine one common impetus operating upon all matter, inorganic and organic, through all stages of its evolution, in all its stages and forms, and leading to worlds like our own through paths apparently purposeful and really not yet explained. Such, it seems to me is the natural hypothesis for the vitalist to adopt. But then vitalism vanishes, only teleology remains; for the unique characteristic of life is gone" (*The Fitness of the Environment*, 1913, pp. 276, 278, 299).

This last remark about vitalism is in keeping with Professor Henderson's unwarranted conclusion, that "the perfect induction of physical science, based upon each and all of its countless successes in every department of physics and chemistry, conclusively proves that the whole process of cosmic evolution from its earliest conceivable state to the present is pure mechanism" (*The Fitness of the Environment*, p. 304, italics mine). "On the other hand, it is conceivable that a tendency should work parallel with mechanism, without interfering with it" (*Ibid*, p. 306). "Matter and energy have an original property, assuredly not by chance, which organizes the universe in space and

are sufficiently striking to lend not only permissibility but a high degree of reasonableness to that religious interpretation.

The relation of teleology to mechanism demands reconsideration in the light of recent developments. After Newton and until early in our own century there was some excuse for the conclusion, although it was never logically justified, that mechanism was and would be the last word of science. In each of the intervening generations there were some who were "tough-minded"

time .... Given the universe, life, and the tendency, mechanism is inductively proved sufficient to account for all phenomena" (*Ibid.*, p. 308). This dogma of absolute mechanism is mainly responsible, I think, for Henderson's conclusion that teleology is proved by the facts. "We are obliged," he concludes, "to regard this collocation of properties as in some intelligible sense a preparation for the processes of planetary evolution. The properties of the elements must for the present be regarded as possessing a teleological character" (*The Order of Nature*, p. 192, italics mine).

That Professor Henderson's argument is simply a striking and valid defense of the reasonableness of a religious interpretation of the facts, and not an absolute demonstration of divine design is evident in view of R. B. Perry's objection that it is not proper to infer from a single instance of remarkable coincidence that the coincidence was designed. "It is not proper to infer a law from a single simultaneity, but only from a succession of simultaneities. If the first throw of a pair of dice happens to be a double-six, that does not prove that the dice are loaded, in spite of the fact that the chances were thirty-five to one against that particular combination. There would be ground for suspecting a partiality for double-sixes only provided in the long run this combination turned up more frequently than once in thirty-six times. The general or original physico-chemical composition of the cosmos is like a single throw of the dice, the chances are heavily against it, but this proves nothing as to any determining principle over and above chance. It would be possible to make such an inference only provided it were possible to gather in the cosmic elements and throw them again" (*General Theory of Value*, 1926, p. 66). This objection is valid against a claim to prove design; it has no importance as against the theoretical permissibility of a religious interpretation of the relation of the inorganic environment to the succession of living forms which has culminated in man. More to the point is the objection of C. D. Broad (*Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 44-5, October, 1925), that the fulfilment of the very peculiar conditions under which organisms can exist seems to be very local and temporary, as compared with the whole extent of space and time. As against any claim which might be made to demonstrate divine or superhuman design in the foundation of the world this objection must be given due weight, but since we know nothing about either the planets and satellites of other solar systems than our own or about other possibilities of conscious existence besides those which obtain in connection with certain protoplasmic structures, it would seem wholly gratuitous to assume that there are and have been no conscious beings in the universe except those that have inhabited this earth. In any case, but particularly in view of the indefinite possibilities of conscious existence at other places and times, the teleological interpretation of the relation of the environment to the life seems quite permissible.

enough, or perhaps we should say hard-hearted enough, callous enough to spiritual values, to draw from this doctrine of the-world-a-machine-and-man-a-machine-within-a-machine the logical conclusion that there is no responsible human freedom, nor any teleology, divine or human, that enters as a real factor into any event in the physical or biological world. There have been others, mostly objective idealists, who have felt free to admit that from the phenomenal point of view of descriptive science pure mechanism is the correct conception, but who have claimed that all this must be re-interpreted from the philosophical point of view as the objective realization of the all-inclusive Absolute Idea, or Absolute Purpose.\* But mechanism wearing a halo is mechanism still, and it is questionable whether a divine teleology that has any pragmatic meaning is any more consistent with a purely mechanistic interpretation of life than is the responsible freedom of man. If nothing happens or can happen but what mechanism fully explains, God, if he ever existed, might as well have died once the mechanical universe was launched on its endless career

Moreover, the situation in science is very different from what it was in the days of Lotze and the neo-Hegelians. "I can have no sympathy," wrote Lotze, "with the often repeated attempts of philosophers to show that the fundamental ideas of physical science are inadequate, disconnected, and frequently inconsistent."† But listen to the words of Professor Whitehead in his *Science and the Modern World*: "The appeal to mechanism on behalf of biology was in its origin an appeal to the well-attested self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis of all natural phenomena. But at present there is no such system of concepts."‡ Machines there are in the world, as human artifacts, and machine-like processes there are in the natural world; but it

\* "How universal," said Lotze, "is the extent and how little is the significance of mechanism in nature" (quoted by Newman Smyth, *The Meaning of Personal Life*, p. 15).

† *Metaphysics*, English translation, II, p. 114.

• ‡ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 145.      o

does not follow that either the universe in its concrete wholeness or the human or indeed any other organism is nothing but a machine.\* The difference between a completely mechanistic and a not completely mechanistic theory of life and personality is not a scientific but a philosophical difference, a difference not in experimental results but in the interpretation of experimental results. There is no scientific experiment performed by the absolute mechanist which the vitalist or teleologist cannot also perform and if the experiment is rightly performed in both cases the result will be the same. There is ample room within a not completely mechanistic view for an indefinitely extended search for mechanical factors in organic processes and there will always be ample room for the idea of a life that is more and other than mechanism, producing machine-like structures and using them for the more definite control and guidance of the physical energy which is being utilized in the realization of its ends. As Professor Muirhead—a philosopher of idealist traditions but one who has felt the influence of Bergson—speaking on the basis of his recent survey of contemporary philosophy, says is being increasingly recognized by leading thinkers, back of the mechanical there is “the operation of an underlying *nisus* or urge in Nature,” and in evolution particularly the operation of “a creative principle precipitating ever new and higher forms of life on the stage prepared for it by the lower.”† Moreover, to continue in the words of the same author, “There is implied in the idea of a *nisus* the direction of the ‘motion’ to something which is more than motion, something

\* B. H. Streeter, *Reality*, pp 11-12: “A machine is essentially an instrument, it is not in itself a creative power .. An actual machine is a ‘going concern’, but it is that only because it was designed and is controlled by intelligence and purpose; leave out these and it is nothing at all. If then you explain Nature—which is also a ‘going concern’—in terms of mechanism while expressly excluding from the connotation of that word all reference to intelligence and purpose, you are explaining it in terms of something that never has existed and never could.” Cf. Lotze, *Metaphysics*, II, p. 117. “It is the ingenuity of the inventor to which alone the handiness of the machine is due.”

† *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, p 17.

which can best perhaps be described as ideal as contrasted with the real or actual."\*

But is it conceivable that the world is the work of a worshipful God? Is the world as we know it consistent with the view that a purposive Agency, worthy of being worshipped as divine, has been at work in its original constitution and in the course of evolution hitherto, and is still at work therein? It seems to me, in spite of the evils which are incidental to the kind of world we are in, that a very good case can be made out for the belief that in its general constitution, as a world of natural law, of emergent evolution, and of creative freedom, it is better for the present stage of man's education than anything we can specifically think of would be in its place. Of course it would be better still to be in the kind of world we are in, improved as it might have been if man had always used his freedom in the best possible way. That almost goes without saying; but worse still than that man should often misuse his freedom would it be for him not to be free at all, for then no such thing as moral good would be for man a possibility. Anyway, what we are saying is not that the present condition of the world is the best conceivable or possible condition—far from it!—but that it is permissible and reasonable to believe, what we cannot absolutely prove, namely, that for the present stage of man's education the world we are in is the best possible *in kind*, that is, in its general constitution and in so far as God, not man, may be thought of as making it what it is. (What we mean here by "best possible" is at least as good as any other that was possible.)

A physical world of dependable mechanical and chemical law is surely better as a basis for the development of physical life than any alternative we might suggest. If we are to learn what to expect, and if we are to form good habits and useful habits of adjustment to our environment, that environment must be fundamentally dependable; when it changes it must change according

\* "Emergent Realism" in *Philosophical Essays Presented to John Watson*, 1922, p. 338.

to unchangeable law. It is admitted that this dependableness of nature means a seeming ruthlessness with reference to those lives that are unfavorably adjusted to its forces ; but if, as we have seen, it is reasonable to believe, on religious grounds, in the conservation of all the essential values of individual personality in spite of physical death, then it seems also reasonable to believe that a dependable law-abiding world for humanity at large is a greater good than physical survival through a law-upsetting miracle would be for the individual. Instead of an order-upsetting, miraculous interference with mechanical and chemical law, what we find in the world we live in is the emergence, in the course of animal and human evolution, of such radically new processes as sensation, memory, the voluntary direction of attention, conception, judgment, and reasoning. These processes and their products are, in the first instance, means of enabling the individual and social groups to adjust themselves to the law-abiding processes of nature in such a way as to reduce physical disaster to a minimum, and in the second place they make it possible to realize progressively in the finite realm the absolute ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, holiness, and love. It is true that sensation is sometimes painful, that thought is sometimes erroneous, and that the voluntary direction of attention is sometimes productive of moral evil. But pain is among the most useful of our sensations ; without its check on maladjustment to the environment it is very certain that none of the more highly developed of our animal ancestors would have survived long enough to evolve the human race ; neither humanity nor the human values would ever have come into existence without animal pain. There is often unnecessary or useless pain, and that is not in itself good ; but unnecessary pain must sometimes exist if the events of sensation are to happen according to physiological and psychological law ; and for the same reason as we gave before, it is better for human well-being that these processes be thus law-abiding than that the psychological should be a topsy-turvy, lawless realm in which there could be no scientific anticipation of which sensation would follow the fulfilment of any specific condi-

tions. Similarly, ignorance and error and a bias to evil are not in themselves good; but a world in which they are possible because there is a regular cause-and-effect sequence in the realm of thought and habit may well be regarded as better than a world in which they could not occur either because no new personalities were being brought into existence, or because there was no dependable law in the psychical realm. Of course unnecessary pain, error and ignorance, and moral evil should be got rid of as fast as possible, by education, by moral effort, and by the religious experience of moral salvation. And it is noteworthy that in the process of accomplishing these ends man is getting an immensely valuable intellectual development and expansion of knowledge and an incalculably precious social appreciation, moral training, and acquaintance and fellowship with God.

Sin, the deliberate choice of something inferior to the best possible under the circumstances, is always absolutely evil and forever regrettable; but by its very definition it is the creation of the finite self whose deed it is. If God is responsible for the kind of world we are in, he is responsible for the emergent evolution of finite free agents, but he cannot reasonably be held guilty for their not doing the best they can under all the circumstances. They alone are responsible for that, and their sin may be regarded as real and even as absolute evil in a world which, in spite of it, is still, for the present stage of our existence, *in kind* the best or at least as good as any that can be or be rationally conceived. All in all, therefore, it would seem that the burden of proof still rests on those who would say that for the present stage of our existence a better kind of world, one worthier of a worshipful God, is possible or rationally conceivable. But of course the world we are in, without ceasing to be the *kind* of world it is, might conceivably come to be a world in a much better *condition* than that in which it now is, and this is what will happen if we human individuals will but do our part.\*

\* On this whole topic of divine providence and the problem of evil, see *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, Ch. VII.



But one further item in the total situation must receive our attention before we can say that the question of a divine purpose at work in the world has been satisfactorily answered. The view we have favored has involved, as at least highly defensible, a vitalistic conception not only of human moral freedom, but of the realm of life in general. We have contended, in effect, that life, the living organism is itself, within whatever limits, determining at the time in a really originaive manner the course of its racial evolution, its individual development, and its individual action. How can this vitalistic belief in creative evolution and creative freedom be reconciled with a telcological view of the world? Was not Bergson justified in opposing vitalism to finalism as well as to mechanism,\* and may not the principal reason why we are still without his Gifford Lectures be that his vitalism logically excludes anything like an adequate telcology and therefore at the same time a theistic view of the world?†

\* *Creative Evolution*, English translation, pp 39-50

† An instructive illustration of the religious application of Bergsonian vitalism is to be found in the "common sense theology" of Mr Toad, which he makes haste to let us know "is not about God" "A God who is bowdlerised out of all qualities except creativeness is," he confesses, "scarcely recognizable" (*Common Sense Theology*, 1922, p 7) Cf H Waldon Carr, *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics*, 1927, pp 83, 85-6 "It cannot be denied that it is impossible to identify the idea of God which arises for the theory of creative evolution with 'the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob' Allegorise as we will the mythology of the Christian or of any other religion, we are confronted with the fact that the theory of evolution has completely altered the basis of traditional religious concepts and antiquated the venerable superstructure No amount of genuine admiration for the intellectual eminence, moral force, saintly lives, and courageous self-devotion of the founders and apostles of the great historic religions can disguise the fact that our modern conception of man's origin, and of the progressive creative evolution which has determined his present commanding position, has rendered obsolete the whole class of ideas on which then teaching was based" "Creative evolution is the theory that all actually existing living forms of activity are the present realisation of a universal organic activity, manifesting itself as an urge or impulse or striving, not only one in its origin but also one in the full extent of its multifarious process It is this new conception of life as a dynamical principle which impels us to form a new concept of God and of his relation to us The idea of God which emerges from the conception of creative evolution is vague and formless, the idea of an encompassing existence from which we derive the spur and direction towards defined actions, an impelling force of external origin, a striving which is causing us to strive. . . . Man himself is only one mode of this divine being The God of creative evolution

On the contrary I believe that the idea of a divine purpose being worked out in the world, can be maintained, even if we adopt a vitalistic conception, not only of human life, but of life in general. It may well be, and it is quite reasonable to believe, that the only possible way in which man's moral freedom could have appeared in the course of biological evolution was as a further development of a more rudimentary freedom or creativeness in the lives of his animal ancestors. If this was the case, then it is open to us to maintain that the vitalistic constitution of living organisms may well have been designed by the divine mind, since man's potential spiritual value as a rational free agent is quite evidently more than great enough to counterbalance the risk of undesirable developments of creatively evolving life, such, for example, perhaps, as injurious bacteria. (After all, the injurious bacteria are few as compared with beneficial forms, without some of which human life could not be maintained on the earth.) The indispensable minimum of God's control of creative evolution is a control sufficient to guarantee the ultimate emergence of beings with a capacity for unending spiritual progress; and this indispensable minimum presumably, in the light of the existence of the human race, has been a fact. But religion surmises that much more than this indispensable minimum in the way of divine immanence and teleology is a fact, and we know nothing which is fatal to the truth of such a surmise.

When we speak in terms of divine purpose, the natural interpretation to put upon our language is that we mean to imply intelligence in God, and thencefrom awareness, consciousness, and that in a form which is at the very least as high as the personal. There has been of late a deal of writing about the purpose immanent in the universe as if it were unconscious purpose.\* But the

is existence which refuses to be comprehended under any idea." But for an essentially theistic interpretation and extension of Bergson's philosophy, see Jacques Chevalier's *Henri Bergson*, English translation, 1928, especially Chapter VII.

\* See, for example, Edmund Noble, *Purposive Evolution*, 1926, J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, 1926, and among Christian theologians, C. A. Beckwith, *The Idea of God*, 1922.

concept of unconscious purpose requires explanation, at the very least. A machine may work automatically for a time, but it was the product originally of conscious purpose. The typical habit is an action originally consciously teleological, from which consciousness has partially or wholly lapsed. There has been a tendency among experimental educational psychologists of late to interpret so-called instinct in terms of what the individual has learned in infancy, and if Professor McDougall's experiments work out as they seem to promise, we may again have some use for Spencer's notion of instinct as inherited habit. We are not unmindful of Samuel Butler's no doubt very imaginative theory that bodies were originally grown by souls \* It is true that the strange concept of "unconscious mind" seems to have established itself in the new psycho-analytic psychology of Freud, Jung, and Adler, but it is still open to us to interpret repressed complexes and other phenomena of the subliminal in terms of instinct, memory, habit, and a process which is in some degree conscious, but so dissociated from our ordinary self-conscious life that we are not able to introspect it. All this tends to suggest the theory that wherever there has been or is a super-mechanical, vitalistic process, it is or was originally accompanied by some degree of consciousness. Further speculations may be suggested, but this is speculative enough, its chief justification being its value as a possible alternative to the rather unintelligible notion of unconscious purpose.

But neither the generally recognized sciences nor a metaphysic based exclusively upon them can carry us very far or very surely on matters of this sort, and questions crowd upon us. Let us see then what religion in its metaphysical development and at its critical best has to offer. We have already seen that the concept of a divine purpose at work in the universe is the contribution of religion and not something to be proved deductively or inductively on non-religious grounds. Just what is it then that religion has to say about divine teleology, and what in particular with refer-

\* S. Butler, *Life and Habit, Unconscious Memory, Evolution Old and New*; cf. May Sinclair, *A Defence of Idealism*, Ch. I.

ence to consciousness and personality as applied to God? Is God personal, impersonal, 'super-personal, or a unity, possibly, of all three? And what about the problem of the One and the Many in its religious aspects? Is God numerically one? And what is the relation of God to Nature on the one hand and to the individual human spirit on the other? Is God transcendent, or immanent, or both?

The questions are many and our time is limited. Perhaps this is well, since our knowledge is painfully limited also. But some attempt must be made to deal with these problems, if for no other reason than that a further test of positions already taken is involved in the question of a possible solution of such questions as those just asked. And I have no wish to evade the main question. I believe it can be said with much assurance that the verdict of practical experimental religion is unambiguously for the essential personality of God. It is an absolutist, a follower of Bosanquet and not a protagonist of theism, who has this to say, "In proportion as the worshipper feels himself responding to a power which responds to him, his religion takes on the theistic form"\* And as we have seen, there is a religious experience in which man finds a power which responds to him dependably, as he himself responds to that power along the lines of what we have called the right religious adjustment.

Thus expression of opinion in favor of the essentially personal nature of God may call for some justification. And let me say at once that when I express the view that in practical experimental religion which has found its Object and its right adjustment and so has come to be dependably successful because essentially scientific, God will continue to be thought of as personal and rightly so. I do not mean to exclude the possibility that God may be super-personal as well as personal, whatever we may have to say about the impersonal. The chief difficulty in connection with the idea of the super-personality of God is, as has often been pointed out, that we do not know what it means. God may be *quantitatively* super-

\* B. F. A. Hoernlé, *Matter, Life, Mind and God*, p. 197

personal in the sense that as Spirit he has the physical energy of the universe as his physical body. If we mean by the term "God" the supreme Spirit, Person, or "Loving, Intelligent Will,"\* with his body of universal physical energy, we can say that God is super-personal, that is, more than personal, since he is thought of as including, besides an essentially personal (conscious, self-conscious, and self-determining) mind, a body which is, abstractly considered, impersonal. But is God also *qualitatively* super-personal? It would be foolish to deny that he is, for no doubt Ultimate Reality contains much that is beyond our conception, because in kind as well as in degree it is utterly beyond our experience. But it would be almost as foolish, I think, to say that God is qualitatively super-personal; we can give no definite content to the word, and when we say super-personal we are in great danger of meaning impersonal. We have no definite idea of any higher kind of reality than the conscious, personal kind; it is to personality that the highest ideals we know, rationality, goodness, spiritual beauty, holiness and unselfish love, apply; and what we feel should be insisted upon is that if the Object of religious veneration be spoken of as super-personal it must be with the understanding that God is also truly personal—conscious, self-conscious, self-determining Spirit—so that he can be holy with a holiness whose ideal content is rationality or truth, spiritual beauty, and moral goodness expressing itself in acts of unselfish love.

The burden of proof would seem to rest upon the one who asserts that God is qualitatively super-personal,† and similarly the burden of proof must rest on him who says that God is numerical-

\* R. L. Swain, *What and Where is God?*

† Still, it may be that our modern thought of God can best be conveyed by coupling the terms "personal" and "supra personal." As I revise my manuscript for publication I find myself ready to agree with Professor Jacques Chevalier when he writes "We may be sure that the creating, free God whence the world proceeds, is not *impersonal*. His Being is not sub but supra personal a further advance along the same road, so much so that if an idea of the plenitude of being which characterizes Him is to be obtained, we must take that which represents the highest form of existence in His creatures, namely personality, strip away its limits and imperfections for the purpose of retaining only its positive qualities, and carry them to their highest point" (*Henri Bergson*, 1928, p. 287).

ly more than one. Religious assurance is assurance that there is a God who is great enough and good enough for all our religious need; and obviously, one such God would be enough. Moreover, it does not seem possible to find in religious experience any logical basis for asserting a plurality of Gods. Even the concept of God as a God of love does not require that the object of God's love be other Gods.

But while there seems to be nothing essential to religion which requires either qualitative super-personality (in any such sense as would cancel personality) or plurality in the religious Object, there are elements essential to religion which point decisively to the personality of God. Religion, when it knows what is essential to its permanence, knows that it must hold to God as Absolute Reality and to the Divine as the Absolutely Ideal. In practical life an ideal is that which is not yet a reality, but is to be made real. Can God, or the Divine, be both an Absolute Ideal and absolutely real?

Absolute idealists answer in the affirmative.\* They maintain that God, or, to be precise, the Absolute, which some of them identify with God and others substitute for God, is the Ideal Reality, the Absolute Ideal realized. "But they mean by the Absolute an all-inclusive reality, all existence as a unified whole. From this point of view there can be no validity, ultimately, in the moral consciousness, all reality, including each and every human being, is, in his true nature, from the absolute point of view, ideal,

\* This is true even of those who differ so widely as Bosanquet, a modified neo-Hegelian, and Dean Inge, a contemporary neo-Platonist, if we may be allowed the term "The paradox, 'to be realized because real,' so the late Mr Bosanquet wrote to me less than a month before his lamented death, 'is not a phrase but the real power of life'" (C. C. J. Webb in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, pp. 351-2). "The ultimate identity of existence and value is the venture of faith to which speculative Idealism [is] committed" (W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, First Series, p. 271. Cf. Dean Inge's "Confessio Fidei," in *Outspoken Essays*, Second Series. "The main thesis of this essay is that true faith is belief in the reality of absolute values" (p. 35). Cf. J. H. Muirhead's statement, "Any view which involves (as I think with Dean Inge that Idealism does) the ultimate identity of reality and value asserts *ipso verbo* the dependence of reality in some sense upon mind" ("Emergent Realism," in *Essays Presented to John Watson*, p. 342).

eternally perfect; the true ideal for everybody is eternally real; there is nothing to do, for all is eternally done. Thus what morality and common sense must affirm, religion and philosophy, from the absolutist point of view, must deny \*

" But surely it is not a satisfactory procedure to seek to do justice to religion by destroying confidence in the ultimate validity of morality. If the moral ideal is absolutely imperative, it must also be absolutely valid. The discrediting of morality is too heavy a price to pay for the vindication of religion. The idealistic way of uniting the two concepts of the Divine as ideal and the Divine as real is a failure.

" But how can any object continue to be regarded by thinking people as God, unless it is thought of as absolutely real and at the same time absolutely ideal? Does not religion, as worship and dependence, implicitly presuppose the union of both qualities, absolute reality and absolute ideality, in the religious object? There is a normal alternation in religion between dependence and worship. Religion as dependence uses God as means. Religion as worship appreciates God as end. Religion as worship demands absolute ideality; religion as dependence, absolute reality. The union of these two phases of normal religion points to the union of ideality and reality in God. Indeed, the motive which leads us to postulate God leads us to define what we mean by the God thus postulated, and to define that God as the Ideal Reality. Only, be it remembered, it is not in the sense in which absolute idealism speaks of " ideal reality " that we are committed to the use of that term. It cannot be an all-inclusive reality that is absolutely ideal or an all-inclusive ideal that is absolutely realized; if it were, there could be no moral task for either God or man. Once more, then, how can we regard as valid both religion, with its postulate of an absolutely Ideal Reality as the object of worship and dependence, and morality, with its assumption that the absolute

\* This and the following four paragraphs are quoted from the author's article, ' The Meaning of God in Modern Religion ' in the *Journal of Religion*, VI, 1926 (pp. 465-7), reprinted in *My Idea of God*, edited by J. Fort Newton, Boston, 1926.

ideal is not yet real, but is to be made real with the co-operation of human moral agents?

“Paradoxical as it may seem, it is quite possible, without contradiction, to maintain with religion that the absolute Ideal is already real, a perfectly satisfactory object of religious dependence and worship, and to maintain with morality that the absolute ideal is not yet real, but to be made real through obedience to the moral law. The unifying concept is that of *moral will*. If God is characterized by moral will, he may be absolutely ideal in character, and yet his perfect will may be still largely unrealized in the objective world. On this supposition God, as a Being of ideal or perfect moral will, can be trusted and worshipped with absolute satisfaction, while there is ample room for the absolute imperative of the moral consciousness calling man to a share in the task of making the ideal ends of the good will of God actual in the world of human experience.

“But moral will is essentially personal, personality being understood to mean, essentially, a being which is conscious, self-conscious, and consciously self-directing. If, then, God is Moral Will, he must be essentially personal. Superpersonality, if intelligible at all, is a self-contradictory concept unless it includes personality; we know no higher kind of reality than the personal, nor can we imagine any. Besides, as we have just seen, the reconciliation of religion and morality calls for the interpretation of God in terms of moral personality.”

We have still to consider, in the light of this view of God as personal, the mutual relation of the spiritual and the cosmic aspects of Deity. The solution of this age-old problem offered in the Upanishads, that Brahman is Atman, is significant as bearing witness to the religious need to identify the cosmic God and the God of spiritual experience. Moreover, in the thought of the divine immanence, and particularly of the immanent presence of God in the soul of man, we have what is without doubt one of the most important of India's contributions to the universal religion of the future. But the world-religion of the future will not accept any of the contributions of historical religions in the spirit of



traditionalism ; it will feel free, in adopting, to adapt and modify, and it may be surmised that in taking its cue from the traditional saying, Brahman is Atman, it will feel free to distinguish clearly, first, the cosmic God from the cosmos, and second, the God of spiritual experience from the human self, and then to make the identification not of the cosmos with the self, but of the cosmic God with the God of spiritual experience, the inexhaustible Reality—whether we call it Brahma or by some other name matters little—which, we realize in religious experience at its best, abides as permanent potentiality of spiritual salvation in the transcendent depths—or heights—of our own innermost self \* The spiritual aspects, the divine in terms of ideal values becoming immanent in human life, particularly through the spiritual influence of great and good personalities and through definite religious experience, are readily interpreted as the progressive realization of the conscious moral purpose of God through the immanence of the divine spiritual life in varying degrees in the lives of men

But what, more definitely, is the relation of this immanent divine spiritual life to the cosmic aspects of Deity? Can we establish on a reasonable metaphysical basis the religious surmise that the cosmic and the spiritual aspects of Deity are but different phases of one and the same Divine Reality? One of the most important identifications for us to be able to make between cosmic and spiritual aspects of Deity would be between that upon which we depend for the ultimate conservation of our highest values and that dependable factor which responds to the right religious adjustment. Is the cosmic conserver of values the God of the religious experience of moral and spiritual salvation? That God is the conserver of absolute values we inferred logically from critically tested religious values. That there is a dependable Source or Cause of spiritual salvation which may be called God, is an established fact. Can the identification be made?

“ Now the identification is one which can be made, reasonably enough, from the point of view of moral optimism. Briefly

\* Cf. K. Shastri, *An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy*, 1924, pp. 182-3.

stated, the argument is this Moral optimism logically involves the existence of the God we need. The God we need must be great enough and good enough to conserve for us our highest values It is reasonable to expect that so great and good a God will be able and willing to reveal himself, particularly by responding in a recognizable and dependable way to the right religious adjustment on the part of man But, as we have seen, it has been discovered through experience that a God who responds dependably to the right religious adjustment really exists The presumption, then, is that the Conservator of Values, the God of moral optimism, is fundamentally one and the same Divine Being as the God of revelation, of religious experience, of moral salvation.

" But there are other cosmic elements which must not be left out of consideration in determining the nature of the religious object The fundamental cosmic aspects of Deity are these a reality not identifiable with physical things or human persons; the supreme factor in reality as that upon which we are ultimately dependent; that upon which we depend for the ultimate conservation of the highest values, the immanent cause of cosmic process in general and of creative evolution more particularly; and finally, although more ambiguously, reality as a unified whole A unifying concept is called for, to bring together these cosmic aspects and the spiritual phases of Deity; and the one which seems to be most obviously suggested by the facts is that of a psychophysical organism, animated by an indwelling spiritual mind and will This analogy of the organism is inadequate, to be sure, but it is undoubtedly preferable to the anti-moral idealistic notion of one eternally static, all-inclusive pool of conscious experience. The physical universe is God's holy, awe-inspiring body; its energy is God's physical energy, organically related to a central ' Loving, Intelligent Will.' In one sense God may be thought of as including the Divine Body and Divine Life Force, as well as the Divine Mind and Will. This is the element of truth in " the higher pantheism." But the real God, after all, like the real man, is the spirit, not the body; the personal Mind and Will employing the energy for the fulfilment of conscious purposes, and not the

physiical energy itself. God being thus reasonably thought of as existing in the likeness of man, it is not difficult to believe that man has been made in the image of God. The analogy may be carried somewhat farther. The human mind and will are sometimes more fully immanent in the activities of the body than at other times. It may be in response to the stimulus of pain or of some other sensation that we put ourselves more fully into what our body is doing, and sometimes, it would seem, the initiative is with the mind itself. Similarly, in response to prayer as the right religious adjustment—and no doubt also often, or always, of the "divine initiative"—the immanent Divine Spirit enters more fully into the lives of men. From this point of view human individuals in their relation to the Divine Body and Spirit may be regarded as psycho-physical organs—or, better, perhaps, as cells—within the one great cosmic psycho-physical organism.\* The analogy holds at many points. Man, by taking thought, can modify not only his bodily behavior, but in time even the structure of his body. Similarly, the immanent Divine life can influence conduct and modify character. And as the life of the body is able to regenerate mutilated tissues and in some organisms entire organs, so there is a healing function exercised by the immanent Divine Life, regenerating and renewing the spiritual vigor of individuals and social groups.

"But this analogy of the central will and its psycho-physiical organism is hardly adequate for the full setting forth of the nature of the relation of God to human persons. It is still too external a

\* Whitehead suggests the concept of organism for the smallest realities we know. We suggest it for the largest. "The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the plan of the whole influences the very characters of the successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached" (A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 53, 90, 111). "Science is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms, whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms" (*Ibid.*, p. 145). "A primary organism [is] the emergence of some particular pattern as grasped in the unity of a real event" (*Ibid.*, p. 146). "An event [is] an activity, organising a real togetherness of alien things" (*Ibid.*, p. 210). "It seems possible that there may be physical laws expressing the modification of the ultimate basic organisms when they form part of higher organisms of adequate compactness of pattern" (*Ibid.*, p. 208). •

view that it gives us We must supplement it by means of another analogy, which is also in its turn insufficient and in need of being supplemented by the first We must pass from the thought of a psycho-physical organism to that of a spiritual society, of which God is the dominant Spirit, or better, to that of a well-beloved family, of which God is the Father. But the relation of God to man, while social, is more intimate than that of one member of a social group to another, and man's dependence upon God is more permanent, and his fellowship with God more intimate, than that of a child in relation to his father '\*

We have been trying to indicate the religiously essential and a metaphysically possible view of the nature of God and of his relation to nature and the human spirit We have identified the cosmic God of moral optimism with the God of scientific theology, and in doing so we have found a synthesis of the transcendence and the immanence of God, a union of the "Beyond" with the "Within" Thus, we may believe, justice is done to the Semitic "numinous" sense of awe-inspiring holiness and majesty of God,—"high and lifted up," as Isaiah expresses it—and the Indian mystical sense of union with the Divine in the inmost depths of the spirit. It is well to derive our thought of the divine immanence thus from religious experience, that is, from religion in its practical phase of deliverance from moral evil through a revelation of a saving power of God in the inner life, and from religion in its more mystical phase of worship, contemplation, and union, with its awareness of an immediacy of our human contact with the Eternal. A doctrine of immanence which begins at the centre, with the presence of God in religious experience, can easily spread to the periphery: if it is in an increase of the spiritual that God is revealed in response to religious adjustment, God must somehow be in the spiritual everywhere, for the spiritual that comes through definite religion is simply *more of the same* Spiritual Life which breaks through into the life of man in all his as-

\* This and the two preceding paragraphs are quoted from my article, "The Meaning of God," etc., *Journal of Religion*, VI, 1926 (pp 468-71).

piration after eternally valid ideals. Thus while it is no doubt true that as Sankara said, "there can be no object that can remain separated from the underlying Brahma,"\* we are led to make a distinction between degrees of the immanence of God, varying according to the degree of the spiritual quality manifested. This doctrine of varying degrees of the divine immanence is the only immanence that is wholly acceptable to the Christian moral and religious consciousness, and it is anticipated in part, though only in part, in the traditional doctrine of the Holy Spirit. And while it has seemed to some of us that the importance of stressing the distinction between the lesser and the greater immanence is sometimes neglected by your Indian saints and philosophers, as, for example, by Ramakrishna when he says "that God is manifesting Himself alike through the sage and the sinner, the virtuous and the vicious," and that "everything that exists is God,"† I am glad to believe that this distinction of degrees of the divine immanence is not uncongenial to the Indian religious consciousness, recognizing that the Upanishads speak of Brahma as "pervading all, yet transcending all," and one would not forget that ever-timely admonition, "Alas, alas that all men should possess divinity and be one with the Great Soul, and that, possessing it, the divine should so little avail them." At any rate it is a pleasure to find in present-day Hinduism so frank a recognition of the necessity of distinguishing degrees of the divine immanence as is contained in these words of Professor Radhakrishnan "While there is nothing which is not lit by God, God is more fully revealed in the organic than in the inorganic, more in the conscious than in the unconscious, more in man than in the lower creatures, more in the good man than in the evil. While Hinduism believes in the divine indwelling and declares that there is no escaping from the divine presence, it does not say that everything is God as we find it."‡ In this, as doubtless in many other matters, when the representatives of reli-

\* Quoted by K. Shastri, *op. cit.*, p. 180

† *Gospel of Ramakrishna*, p. 88, *Ramakrishna, His Life and Sayings*, p. 102.

‡ *The Hindu View of Life*, 1927, p. 71

gion are able to agree among themselves as to just what it is that religion must and can insist upon, it is to be expected that the indispensableness of the contribution of religion to metaphysics will come to be generally recognized and freely acknowledged

The view which we are putting forward as the metaphysical concept required to conserve the values of religion in the presence of the facts of science is about as far removed from the static absolutism of the Hegelians as it is from the theory entertained by many Bergsonians, to the effect that the ultimate principle in reality is a blindly groping creative Life-Force. Indeed our activist and immanent but at the same time spiritual and therefore transcendental theism might almost be regarded as a critical and selective synthesis of neo-Hegelian Absolutism on the one hand and the Bergsonian Cosmic Life-Force theory on the other. Some only of the features of the two philosophies, the Hegelian and the Bergsonian, are included in the synthesis and these the positive features, generally speaking, rather than the negative; but it will be readily seen that our view has much in common with each of these mutually antagonistic systems.

Religiously considered, the point of view we have set forth has much in common with the philosophy known in America as personalism, now held chiefly by disciples of the late Borden P. Bowne;† but in its interpretation of the physical world and in many of its arguments it is very different. Personalism maintains not only that persons, divine and human, are real, but that nothing else has metaphysical reality; and in order to prove this, it has resorted to artificial arguments, such as that interaction between different beings is impossible, so that what seems to be interaction must be one being's action within itself; or that the only thing that can remain the same thing in the midst of changes is a person. These reasonings, derived from Lotze, are very far from being conclusive. The latter argument overlooks the fact that an impersonal thing may change and yet be, *for a person*, the

\* Cf. B. H. Streeter, *Reality*, p. 183

† *Personalism*, Boston, 1908.

same thing, if the changes make no essential difference to the purposes of that person. And as for the argument for a unitary World-Ground from the impossibility of interaction, it is of course admitted by all that Reality must be enough of a unity for the kind of interaction that takes place to be possible; but this is very far from involving the conclusion that that unitary Totality is a Person. There is mystery in all action, whether within one and the same being or between different beings, but its mysteriousness does not interfere with its being real.

What is valuable in personalism is its personal realism, not its physical idealism and not the special arguments by which the doctrine as a whole is supported. Personal realism, the doctrine of the ultimate, permanent reality of persons, human and divine, is really derived from common experience, the moral consciousness, and religion; the arguments and the idealistic interpretation of the physical are "rationalizations" of beliefs already selected on practical grounds. But why should the true basis of personal realism be disguised and an attempt be made to exhibit the beliefs as the outcome of metaphysical speculation? Why not go to common sense, to morality, and to religion direct, and confess the fact to the world? It is true that some recent exponents of personalism make their appeal to religious values in support of their position,\* but they fail to bring out clearly just what the logical relation of their metaphysical doctrine is to the religious values: they seem to think that the values support the whole system of personalism, the physical idealism as well as the personal realism; and they still employ the artificial and unconvincing speculative arguments of Lotze and Bowne. Moreover while it is important to see that the personal self is a reality which is not reducible to its states and activities, it is surely possible to think of Nature as being adequately dependent upon God for the full satisfaction of the religious consciousness without our being obliged to believe that it is reducible either to mere appearances or even to the thought-activity of God. Constructing in thought is not the only produc-

\* E. S. Brightman, *Religious Values*, 1925; A. C. Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism*, 1927.

tion man is capable of, and surely God is not more restricted in his powers than man.

It is no friendly service to morals and religion, however well-meant, when their fundamental convictions are represented as resting on improbable doctrines which can only be supported in turn by inconclusive or even fallacious arguments. Whatever value metaphysical speculation, even at its best, may have for the conservation of the spiritual life of man, the direct and immediate values of the moral consciousness and religious experience must always be greater. We live in a day in which the world is rapidly emerging from barbaric superstition; dogmatic traditionalism is in principle set aside, and it is not to precarious metaphysical arguments we are to look, primarily at least, for a means of protection for the coming generations against an ultimate religious agnosticism and nihilism, but rather to those perennial sources of spiritual insight, the moral consciousness of duty and the religious experience of release, of uplift, and of revelation, which comes to those who find and persist in practising the right religious adjustment.



## XI. CONCLUSION : UNIVERSAL RELIGION.

We have been tracing in this course of lectures a pilgrimage, under the impulse and guidance of religious faith and the ideal of universal validity, through a goodly number of the realms of modern thought. Traditionalism, Empiricism, Critical Agnosticism, Absolute Idealism, Pragmatism, Realism, and Critical Monism have been traversed in succession. I dare not assume that my hearers and I have constantly travelled side by side ; but perhaps it may not be too much to hope that we have sometimes been within hailing distance of each other and that some of the things said may have awakened a responsive chord in the minds and hearts of at least some of my fellow-pilgrims. Neither am I in a position to conclude with any certainty that the pilgrimage itself is ended ; and it does not seem altogether desirable that it should be. Reality, it is to be hoped, has yet much more light to break forth upon us. I must recognize, too, that however anxious we may be to paint the thing as it is for the God of things as they are, we must always paint it as we see it or have seen it at some particular stage of our temporal development. I must crave your indulgence, therefore, if I return to the use of the plural form of speech and speak of *our* pilgrimage, *our* results and the outlook from the position to which we have been brought.

Our wandering has not all been to no purpose. From each of the realms of modern thought visited we have carried away some lasting contribution. By no means least is the contribution we have carried with us from the traditionalistic stage of our religious thought.

Not for one religion only, but for all religion that has proved its uplifting power we would commend, along with a constant seeking of new truth, a discriminating conservatism, such as would call for the conservation of the vital and dynamic values

of religious tradition, as far as this is practicable within the limits of what is logical, scientific, ideal, and therefore universally valid.

What this will mean in any particular instance, each religion must decide for itself. Speaking of Christianity and for it, if I may, I believe it can be fairly said that it has been shown to contain a good and vital essence which has not only permanent validity for its own adherents, but universal value for the religious life of mankind. At least one element in its tradition is unquestionably unique, namely, the historic Jesus, of whose faith and hope and love it has no reason to be ashamed. But once again, be it acknowledged, the Jesus of Christian tradition must die that he may live. Or rather, the trappings of an ancient and outworn Christology—in so far as it is outworn—must be cast aside that the true Jesus of history may be clothed anew in robes of religious appreciation and interpretation which will better befit him in the exalted place he is to occupy in the world of modern thought and life, and particularly in the universal religion of the future.

Of what we owe to the traditionalistic stage of religion I will not now say more, but, recalling the empiricist phase of our thinking, ask what permanent contribution it may be said to have made to our understanding and appreciation of religion. The empiricist philosophy in most of its distinctive features we have had to reject; but from its recourse to experience for knowledge we have learned ultimately to employ the empirical method in theology, that is, to seek verification of the hypotheses of faith in religious experience, and to refute the teachings of tradition in so far as they are incompatible with the facts of experience. We learned also critically to define the moral and rational right to believe, not only in the formulating of such religious hypotheses as it may be worth while to act upon with a view to verification, but also in determining our position in situations in which verification is for the time being impossible, but where faith and denial are alike theoretically permissible and psychologically possible, and where we have to act, either according to an inspiring and ennobling faith, or along the lines of a discouraging denial.

As for the Kantian critical philosophy, we have found it undesirable and ultimately unnecessary to retain its dualistic limiting of experience and knowledge to appearances as contrasted with reality. But this same critical philosophy has made contributions to our religious thought and faith which are of the very highest value. The fundamentally moral nature of religion at its best; the finding of the will of God revealed in the unconditional imperative of the rational moral consciousness; the identification of salvation with divine deliverance of man, in and through his own will, from the domination of moral evil; the creative freedom of man as morally certain because logically involved in the categorical imperative of the moral law—"thou oughtest, therefore thou canst"—and the activist character given to our metaphysical thought ultimately by this conception of creative freedom: these are the weighty positive contributions with which the moral element in the critical philosophy has permanently endowed our religious faith.

' Rational or rationalistic idealism we have not found it possible or desirable to retain as a whole. Its deductive and dialectical arguments were found to be faulty; its tendency toward pantheism and an impersonal absolutism was an offence both to the moral consciousness of the human individual and to the religious consciousness which seeks its salvation in a living, moral God; and finally, in its attempt to define its absolute in terms of a single absolutely all-inclusive consciousness, it seemed unable to avoid self-contradiction. But it impressed upon us a lasting sense and conviction of the importance of philosophy, and particularly of a metaphysical theory, for religion (a conviction which has nowhere been so keenly and persistently felt as in India); and it has pointed, and rightly, to rationality as a test of philosophical truth, and to a unitary view of Reality as its goal. In something like the Indian manner, too, it has rightly emphasized the immanence of the Divine in nature and in the soul of man; although here it has felt the need and to some extent secured the benefit of the corrective supplied by the ancient Greek identification of the divine with the ideal, whether transcendent or immanent, in

opposition to the pantheistic simple identification of the divine with the totality of the actual. It also needs, however, the corrective which would be found in the Kantian emphasis upon the absolute significance of the consciousness of moral values and moral distinctions, and the Kantian interpretation, derived from the Christian religion, of the divine and ideally religious as being moral through and through. If the question be asked whether or not we have found it possible to retain an essentially idealistic philosophy of reality, the answer is that we have not been able to find any sufficient reason for accepting the doctrine that Reality is nothing but *idea*, whether in the psychological or the logical sense of the terms, or both together; but if certain recent definitions of the term "idealism" be permissible, namely, that "the universe is the expression of mind" (Streeter), or "that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe" (Norman Kemp Smith),\* we too would claim the right to be enrolled under the idealist banner. But philosophical idealism has commonly been understood to mean something much more specific and something correspondingly more doubtful than this.

Current pragmatism we could be satisfied to accept neither in that reactionary form which is so demoralizing to philosophy because of its indiscriminating defense of some traditional dogmatic system as a whole on the ground of such practical values as have been associated with it, nor yet in that radical form which is so destructive of the concept of truth, which it reduces to a mere temporary utility, and so devastating in its consequences for religion, with its reduction of God to the mere idea of God, a symbol of social values and instrument of adjustment to the environment but not representing any objectively existing super-human reality. But from pragmatism we learned to appreciate more definitely the fact that the test of a true or false representation of reality is ultimately a practical test, even if it is often and

\* N K Smith, *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, 1924, p 1, B H Streeter, *Reality*, 1926, p 117. If to be an idealist one must "deny the realistic thesis that material things are metaphysically real" (A C Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 374), there seems no sufficient reason why we should either desire or feel obliged to be one.

indeed at its best, identical with the scientific test of acting upon a working hypothesis and being guided thereby into experiences in which the hypothesis is either refuted or confirmed. We have also been able to appreciate permanently the fundamental importance of that residue of religion which the radical or positivistic pragmatist is able to retain, namely, aspiration after ideal and socially valid values, self-dedication to the highest ultimate well-being of humanity. There is nothing in religion as individual devotion to a superhuman Being, however exalted, that can make amends for the lack of this religion of unselfish love and human brotherhood, this "co-operative quest of a good life," this discovery of something at least qualitatively divine in the ideal aspects of human life. Greater than faith in God, greater than the hope of immortality, is unselfish love toward our fellowmen. But we have also been able to retain that insight of religious pragmatism in which all the most vital and significant religious judgments are seen to be, whether explicitly or only implicitly, value-judgments in the very special and distinctive sense which would recognize in holiness or divineness a value that is unique and distinguishable from the other spiritual values, whether logical, aesthetic, social or moral.

From the introduction of an explicit realism into the moderate, scientific pragmatism which we found to be acceptable, there resulted a representational pragmatism according to which truth is representation of a reality which in many instances may continue to exist beyond human experience, although the test of judgments about such independent reality remains in the last analysis a practical and empirical test. From this representational or realistic point of view religious pragmatism is able to posit the independent reality of God, as ontologically quite distinct from the God-idea by means of which we represent certain aspects of the Divine Reality and thus guide our religion in its experimental adjustments. Furthermore, from the point of view of this realistic religious pragmatism we found ourselves able to formulate our faith very definitely and in a way that has remained permanently satisfactory. This was accomplished by recognizing

moral optimism as the most defensible attitude to take toward reality and destiny, and drawing out its logical implications, namely, responsible human freedom; immortality, or the conservation of all the essential values of individual moral personality; the existence of God, as a Power great enough and favourable enough to man to be absolutely trustworthy with reference to those human values the adequate conservation of which transcends the naturally restricted powers of man himself; and finally, such implications of the existence of God as an adequate providential control of the course of events in nature and history, and the entire reasonableness of the expectation of something in the religious experience of man which can be interpreted as communication or revelation on the part of God.

From the point of view of what I have called critical monism, which, in combination with religious realism and representational pragmatism is the philosophical position arrived at, it is maintained that in ordinary normal experience we are immediately aware of physical things and of a self, or mind, both of which have reality beyond and apart from that awareness, and that similarly in an ordinary social experience and in religious experience at its best there is a practically immediate empirical intuition, or perception in a complex, of other human persons and an independently existing divine Being, respectively. From this point of view there can be scientifically verified knowledge of independent reality in the physical, the mental, the social and the religious realm. Thus it was maintained, and still is, that there is a very real and important, though quite limited, range within which an empirical theology can become strictly scientific. From this point of view all empirical religion is invited to make available for scientific generalization and theoretical construction such verified and verifiable facts as may have been discovered in the dependable results of definite religious adjustment.

Finally, from the same general point of view we advocated the inclusion and completion of theology in what we called "the new metaphysics," in distinction from the old *apriori* speculation on the one hand, and on the other hand from all such inadequate

combinations of scientific results as ignore not only all considerations of value but also the possible knowledge-value of religious experience. By the new metaphysics was meant a rational synthesis of the well-established results of the recognized sciences, together with such metaphysical inferences as may be logically drawn from critically established values, and such elements of empirical theology as may have fulfilled the conditions of scientific verification. From the point of view of metaphysics thus constructed we found that it seemed most reasonable to interpret reality in activistic, teleological, and essentially theistic terms.

As a result, then, of our pilgrimage through these different realms of thought we seem to be able to distinguish four essentially valid methods of arriving at religious conclusions. These methods, which are mutually supplementary, we may designate as the historical, the pragmatic, the scientific, and the metaphysical. Let us look into these methods a little further.

What we have called the historical method is particularly difficult to state in universal terms. It is the method which is primarily concerned to preserve continuity with vital historical religion and to conserve all its valid values. But this means, almost of necessity, that what it actually seeks to conserve is the essential content of some particular historical religion. Thus the historical method is likely to be in practice not a single method, but a plurality of methods. The historical method in the form in which it is generally recognized among Christians is the Christocentric method, that is, the method which finds its normative revelation of the Divine in the spirit and ideals of the historic Jesus, as these are interpreted in the light not only of the most reliable traditions, but of the Christian religious experience at its best. From this point of view the aim is frankly to have a consistently Christian theology, and the method has proved its value at least to the extent of eliminating from the belief of the modern Christian all traditional elements which are incompatible with the highly spiritual view of God which results from taking the essentially Christ-like as the criterion of the Divine. Now I am quite free to confess that this Christocentric form of the

historical method appears to me to be essentially valid ; but I can easily see at the same time that it may seem to the adherents of other historic religions to be unduly narrow and dogmatic, and I am forced to admit that unless and until the method in question is tested further and supplemented by other and more universal methods there is much justice in the criticism. It would seem as though, theoretically at least, in the historical method of constructing and evaluating religious beliefs the appeal ought to be to the history of religion in general and not exclusively to any one particular religion. It was this consideration which led the late Professor Troeltsch, as the systematic theologian of the "religio-historical school," to undertake a critical philosophy of the history of religion as preliminary to the task of constructing a system of religious thought which should be thoroughly rational in its general form but at the same time in vital continuity with historic religion. The result of Troeltsch's attempt is an illuminating commentary on the difficulty of his undertaking. Briefly put, the outcome was virtually the Christocentric method, but with the proviso that this was to apply only to the Western, that is the European and derived civilizations ; Oriental cultures were to be expected to frame their future expressions of faith in continuity and essential accord with their historic past.

Now this may seem admirably fair, and yet it suffers from the serious drawback that it seems to involve giving up the ideal of universal validity in religion. The fault lay not with Troeltsch's general idea of a universally valid philosophy of the history of religion in general, but rather with the vagueness of his criteria and the consequent inconclusiveness of his results. What we would suggest, instead of the mere appeal to a critical philosophy of the history of religion, as a means of preserving the vital connection of modern universal religion with its roots in history, is that without giving up the historical method, but while continuing to use it in the form which seems to us to be valid, whether this be the Christocentric method or some other, we should use it always as subject to this test, namely, that its finding shall not be contradicted by any of the other and more universal methods,



the pragmatic, the scientific, and the metaphysical. If this were done, such variation as might still remain in the results obtained by using norms from different religions would at last, I think, be negligible. Before passing to a consideration of these other methods, however, it may be remarked that among the elements which would find their place in religion by the use of the Christocentric method and which would presumably stand the tests of the other methods are the ideal of altruistic service, or moral love; the outlook of moral optimism, or moral hope, with its implications of freedom, immortality and God; what we have called the right religious adjustment, or moral faith, with the religious experience of salvation from sin, to which it dependably leads; and finally, the historic Jesus, viewed as the concrete embodiment of moral faith, moral hope, and moral love, and religiously appreciated as a normative revelation of the immanence of the Divine.

As for the other three methods, the pragmatic, the scientific, and the metaphysical, it will be sufficient to recall briefly their salient features, since they have been discussed already at considerable length. The pragmatic method has the advantage, as compared with particular forms of the historical method, that its criterion is non-partisan and universal, even if it does not lead to a strict theoretical demonstration. It takes shape definitely in the critical approval of moral optimism as a life-attitude, and in the inference of freedom, immortality, and the existence of the God we need as logically involved in the validity of this moral optimism. The scientific method, while more restricted in its range than the pragmatic method, enjoys the advantage that it does, within its limited sphere of application, arrive at empirical demonstration, in the sense in which that is attained in the objective empirical sciences. It is centrally concerned with the right religious adjustment, with its dependable results, and with the theory of the religious Object which these results make possible, on the principle that we can know something of what a factor is in the light of what it dependably does. Finally, by the metaphysical method religious faith and knowledge are further tested

and at the same time supplemented, both as to doctrinal content and as to certainty, by being included (with the general results of other sciences and inferences from other established values) in one comprehensive metaphysical synthesis, or theory of reality. In this connection there will be ample opportunity for recognition, among other contributions of the Indian religious consciousness to universal religion, of the emphasis upon the religious value of philosophy, and the fruitful suggestion of the universal immanence of God, a suggestion which however, to come into its own most fully, must needs be held in such a way as to make room for both the Platonic identification of the Divine with the ideal element in general and the Kantian recognition of the Divine in the moral element in particular. But this doctrine of degrees of immanence, the fuller presence of the divine being found in the more fully moral and ideal, while not always recognized by Hindu thinkers and teachers, would seem, as we have already noted, to be not uncongenial to the Hindu religious mind.\*

Thus it would seem that the direct and positive contributions which religion is in a position to make toward a right understanding of reality and of the meaning of life fall under four principal heads. First, there is the supreme value of self-dedication to the highest well-being of humanity, of devotion to the ideals of truth, or rationality, of the beauty which is a joy for ever, of moral goodness and rightness, and of true and unselfish love, all evaluated as of eternal significance, as holy or divine, and sought on behalf of all humanity, and not simply for one's self or for the elect few. Secondly, there are the beliefs about reality which may be logically inferred from the validity of moral optimism, with its presupposition of the validity of the consciousness of moral obligation. In the third place, there are the discoveries or revelations which result from persisting in a right or scientific, that is, a dependably successful religious adjustment. And finally, there is the fruitful idea, rooted in the soil of mysticism and cultivated by metaphysical theology, of the immanence of God in the world but particularly in the spiritual life of man. Moral optimism

\* Cf. Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life*, pp. 70, 71.

seems to be a contribution rather distinctive of the dynamic West. The immanence of God is the characteristic offering of the thoughtful East. East may be East, and West, West, but the twain *shall* meet. And they will meet the sooner, the more they both strive to realize the right religious adjustment and ideal of unselfish social service. Only by so doing shall we succeed in our quest for unity in the practice and experience of universal religion. It will be unity without uniformity, no doubt, but it may be true and essential unity none the less.

I cannot make this too emphatic. It is true that you are of the East and I am of the West; but are we not all here together as seekers of the Universal and the Eternal? In conclusion, then, and by way of a summing-up which will necessarily involve some repetition of things already said, let me attempt a connected statement of what seem to be the characteristic features of universal, that is, universally valid, religion.

\*In the first place, universal religion must appreciate and be instrumental to universally valid values. Universally valid values are those which all persons ought to appreciate, values worthy of being sought always, everywhere, and by all. They are eternal values as well as universal; ends always, and not mere means. Such values are those which have to do with the life of the spirit; they are the values characteristic of spirit when it is what it is desirable that it should be. In other words, the ideal spiritual values are those which fulfil the conditions of being universal and eternal.

The ideal spiritual values are of several kinds. There is the value of truth, or rationality, as appreciated and cultivated by the scientific investigator, for example. The motto of all genuine science, as of all worthy philosophy is, Buy the truth at whatever cost, and sell it not at any price, however tempting. Other eternal, absolute, or universally valid values are the value of true or ideal beauty, particularly in the realm of personality, of spirit, and the value of moral goodness, or rightness, the conscientiousness and integrity of character which find expression in the deli-

berate doing of one's duty, so far as one has true information as to what one's duty is.

These three, truth, beauty, and goodness, are the generally recognized absolute or eternally and universally valid values. But it is a fair question whether we ought not to recognize one or two other types of universal value. There is the value discovered by the social interest in the narrower and more specific sense of the term "social," the value, namely, of true friendship and love, of universal friendliness and ideal social relations in general. Again, while we have said that universal religion must be friendly to all universally valid values, that is, to truth, beauty, morality, and love, the further question arises as to whether the religious value itself ought not also to be recognized as an ultimate end, instead of being regarded as merely instrumental to other spiritual values. This is a question which can be answered in the affirmative with a high degree of assurance, just as soon as we become assured of the existence of a religious Object, or God, of ideal character. Fellowship with such a divine Being would obviously have the social value of love on the one hand and the spiritual values involved in experience of the ideal on the other; but in addition to all this it would seem to have the distinctively religious value which belongs to experience of the "numinous," that is, the holy, or divine, as such. From the point of view of even a moderately and sanely mystical development of religion, it becomes very certain, subjectively at least, that this distinctively religious value of fellowship or union with God is of ultimate and absolute validity.

This then is our first point: universal religion, religion which is to be qualified to hold the future permanently, must appreciate and be instrumental to universally valid values, to truth or rationality, to true and spiritual beauty, to moral goodness, to true, unselfish love, and to the value which is its own distinctive characteristic, namely that of holiness and conscious fellowship with God. Moreover, universal religion must seek to promote these values in the lives of others, in humanity generally and not in one's own experience alone. Universal religion must be a

religion of unselfish social service, aiming at such a development of humanity, individually and socially, as shall mean the domination of human activity by the appreciation and pursuit of these universal spiritual values, all such other values as those of physical health and efficiency, of economic well-being, of political freedom together with security and adequate governmental control, being regarded as important but distinctly subsidiary and instrumental.

Our second point is that universal religion must be scientific, and must work in scientific ways to promote universally valid values. There is valid scientific knowledge of the world and of man, and religion has no right to contradict it. Universal religion will not do so. But more than this is involved in the idea of scientific religion. The religious man in entering into relation to the specifically religious Object with a view to the promotion of universally valid values, must be guided by knowledge of the right religious adjustment, by which is meant scientific religious adjustment, an adjustment which can be depended upon to produce the desired effects. Furthermore, in gaining through experience—the “trial-and-error method”—a knowledge of the right religious adjustment, the religious man will gain at the same time scientific knowledge of a Factor in reality which can be depended upon to assist in the promotion of true values when right religious adjustment is made thereto. Such a dependably responding Factor is, or would be, as we have seen, the religious Object in the more specific sense, in other words, the God of experimental religion. Moreover, as we have also seen, on this experimental basis there emerge facts which, when handled with scientific logic from the point of view of the religious consciousness, yield not only empirical demonstration that God is, but also some first-hand information as to what God is. We can know *something* of what the religious Factor is from what, under certain conditions, it does.

In the third place, besides providing thus for a nucleus of scientific religious knowledge, universal religion must and eventually will find place for certain assurances which are the natural and logical expression of normal, spiritual living. By “normal”

here we do not mean the average, but rather the standard, that which life tends to be when it is at its best. Normal spiritual life, in the sense in which we are using the term, is, on the one hand, moral, and on the other hand, within moral and rational limits, optimistic. What this involves for religious belief we have already set forth, as a really creative and thus responsible freedom of man, the eternal conservation of all that is of eternal value in human personality (and that must include the individual good will and true friendship and love), and finally, the existence of a spiritual cosmic God, at once great enough and good enough to meet fully our imperative religious need.

Our fourth point is this: universal religion must develop a rational and universally valid religious philosophy. We need metaphysics in religion when we try to think out how the values of religion can be retained consistently with adequately established scientific facts and other critically established values besides those of religion. Moreover, we are led straight into metaphysics even within the realm of religious ideas themselves, as for instance when we raise the question whether the God of spiritual salvation, of whom we can have scientific knowledge, is the same Being, essentially, as the cosmic God of moral optimism. We need this metaphysical development of religious thought for the sake of new truth in answer to questions which inevitably arise, and for the sake of the reassurance which comes when we begin to see how the elements of our religious knowledge and belief can be combined with other knowledge and reasonable belief in a comprehensive and harmonious theory of reality as a whole.

The particular problem to which we have referred, the problem namely as to the relation between the God of spiritual salvation and the God of moral optimism, seems to find the promise of a solution in the metaphysical development of the idea of the immanence of God. Indian thought has made much of the idea of the immanence of God in nature and in man, and for this contribution we should be duly grateful; but unless great care is taken to distinguish between different degrees of the immanence of the divine in the various phases of the actual, there is the greatest

danger that the ideal character of God, in which practical religion is so fundamentally interested, will be obscured. A God who was manifested equally in matter and in mind, in evil and in good, would be neither the God to whom adjustment can well be made with a view to the experience of moral salvation nor the absolutely trustworthy God whose existence is involved in the validity of moral optimism. We must not forget the identification of the divine with the Ideal. Making use of this identification we can hold to different degrees of immanence of the divine in the actual, according to the degree in which the actual participates in the Ideal. From this point of view God can be thought of as having put more of himself into spirit than into matter, and as more fully manifested in the good than in the neutral or the evil.

The final point is this: in order to maintain itself at the highest possible point of vitality and efficiency, universal religion must, within the limits of what is theoretically permissible, make instrumental use of such further ideas as are at once consonant with its essential doctrine and psychologically dynamic because of their appeal to the imagination and to the heart. Especially should universal religion look to historic religion for concrete and appealing symbols of its universally valid values, its moral optimism, its right religious adjustment, and the consequences of this adjustment for the greater immanence of God in human life. And in this connection we shall find most valuable of all, I believe, the picture of the historic Jesus, as representing an actual concrete embodiment of all that is most fundamental in universal religion. It is not, I feel sure, too much to say that in the Jesus of history we find, in principle but concretely exemplified in a particular historical situation, the true social and moral example, especially in his unselfish love and service to humanity, culminating in his sacrificial death; the true religious example, both in his hope, or moral optimism, with its included belief in immortality and in the existence of a God perfectly adapted to our need, and in his faith, or right religious adjustment, by means of which he was saved from sin—by prevention, characteristically, it would seem, rather than by cure; and finally, as a consequence principally of

the foregoing, the true revelation of the acme of divine immanence in a truly human life, or, in the sense in which we have used the term, a divine incarnation.

It may be, of course, that there is some room for difference of opinion as to the extent to which the Jesus of history actually realized the moral and religious ideal and exemplified the immanence of God in human life; but no such possible theoretical doubt need greatly disturb us. The fundamental elements of universal religion remain unchanged in any case. They are logically valid; the uncertainty, if it exists, is with reference to the historical roots of certain ideas that have proved effective psychologically in impressing upon the human imagination and heart that which can be shown to be valid in any case and without them. And even at the worst it would still be true that we owe to the historic Jesus and to the impression he made upon those who knew him best those ideas which have proved so influential and saving throughout the history of vital Christianity. As a matter of fact we can reasonably be as sure as we need to be of the kind of person Jesus must have been. We have the genuine letters of Paul, and we learn from them that Paul was well acquainted personally with Peter and John, who had been with Jesus throughout his public ministry, and with James the brother of Jesus himself; and no doubt he learned much from them of the Master whom they had known so well. Now the impression which Paul had of the character of Jesus, an impression which must have coincided with what he had learned from these intimate friends of Jesus, was that he "knew no sin"; his life was one of habitual moral triumph. Essentially the same characterization of the moral, religious, and social personality of Jesus is found in the other two practically independent and almost contemporary sources, the Marcan gospel and the "second source" material of Matthew and Luke. Furthermore, we know much of what Jesus must have been from the moral and religious revolution which contact with him caused in the lives of his followers. As for these later generations to which we belong, it remains true that it is especially through the historic Jesus and the effects of his impact upon



humanity that we find it psychologically and logically possible to come with confidence to God as the gracious Father and to think of him, with Paul, as the spiritual Power that was immanent and at work "in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself."

The principal contributions of the historic Jesus to humanity, then, as I read the facts are these: he has given us the true social ideal for humanity—that of a universal human brotherhood on the highest possible moral and religious basis; he has given us in his own conduct and character the true moral example—that of loyalty to the ideal of duty, believed as the will of God, and to the highest well-being of humanity, a loyalty which chose to die rather than to compromise with the powers of evil; he has given us the true religious example, both in his moral optimism with its faith in freedom, God, and immortality, and in his right and effective religious adjustment, his moral self-surrender to God and obedient trust, enabling him to maintain a steady moral triumph; and finally he has given us, not a speculative philosophy of the immanence of God, but something far better, namely, our best illustration of that immanence. In him we have not only a true revelation, but our highest individual revelation of God.

This statement about Jesus is no mere speculative dogma; it is primarily and principally an appreciation. He who will candidly consider the spirit of the historic Jesus, his character and his attitude toward humanity, must come to feel, I believe, the divine value of what is there revealed. Moreover, in the religious experience of moral deliverance which follows a faithful response to the spiritual appeal of that same historic Jesus, there is an experience of his divine function; for there is no function more divine than that of delivering man from moral evil. On the basis of this divine and worshipful or God-like quality and function of the historic Jesus, then, we may assert his divineness—in the sense of Godlikeness. But there is a *cosmic* reference in the term "God" as ordinarily employed, and to say that Christ was God-like would ordinarily mean that the supreme Power in the universe is Christlike. This is what the modern religious mind wants to be able to believe, and this, as we have seen, is what is involved

in the validity of moral optimism as a life-attitude. From the point of view of moral optimism we can say, without equivocation, that if Christ was Godlike, God is Christlike. But if God is like Christ, he must needs express that essentially Christlike character and attitude in Christlike activity for humanity, and if God is and has been doing a Christlike work for humanity within the sphere of our observation at all, he must have been doing it in and through the historic Jesus and in the Christlike everywhere; or, in other words, as already suggested, God must have been "in Christ reconciling the world unto himself"—and, we may add, reconciling the too much estranged members of the human family to each other.

This reconciliation, it may be remarked, whether it be between man and God or between man and man, is the establishing or re-establishing of spiritual fellowship. It involves mutual trust; and where either man or God has been sinned against—and all sin against man is sin against God, the Friend of man—it involves also a sincere repentance, a change of heart and turning away, from that sin. It is sometimes said that before there can be reconciliation of sinful man with the God of perfect righteousness, there must be not only repentance on the part of man, but complete satisfaction of divine righteousness with reference to the sin of man, and it is sometimes claimed that this complete satisfaction of divine righteousness was accomplished by the vicarious suffering and death of Jesus on the cross, as a substitutionary bearing of the righteous penalty due to human sin. But this conception is full of difficulties, ethical and religious. We may indeed recognize the vicariousness of unselfish love in what Jesus did and in what he suffered on behalf of humanity; but complete satisfaction of divine righteousness with respect to human sin is an ideal which can only be progressively realized in the future, as sin and its evil consequences are progressively overcome. In such progressive future satisfaction of divine righteousness, moreover, there will be the consummation of reconciliation, and indeed of revelation. •

The one most surely needed further revelation of God, be-

yond what we find in the spirit of the historic individual, Jesus, is the revelation of the meaning of the divine that would come to us if the quality of spirit we see individually in that great exemplar were embodied in human lives generally and in the processes and institutions of human society. That would be, indeed, the Kingdom of God on earth and the consummation of divine revelation

It will be understood, I hope, that in speaking thus of the revelation of God in Christ, I have no desire to ignore or to minimize other historic revelations of the divine attitude and character. If it is true that God is revealed in the unselfish self-dedication of Jesus Christ to human well-being, it must be true that he is also revealed in the unselfish self-dedication of other great spiritual personalities to human well-being—in that of Gautama Buddha, for instance, even though Gautama's ideal may have been defined too much in negative terms and though he himself may have remained agnostic with reference to the being and nature of God. I would say to you, therefore, Continue to appreciate and revere all that is of divine value and significance in your own great religious leaders; but consider also this other historic figure; try to understand him and whatever significance he may have for the individual and for the world to-day. To those of you whose religious traditions are those of Hinduism, I should like to say. Retain all of your traditional Indian religion that is in accord with the universal ideals of rationality, of beauty, of righteousness, and of truly spiritual love, but do not fail to adopt and incorporate into your faith all the additional values that are accessible in this new age. Test all things and hold fast that which is good. Furthermore, in taking over and incorporating into your faith what is good and vital in the religion which grew up in response to the spiritual appeal of the historic Jesus, you will doubtless wish to combine with it your sense of the religious values of philosophy and all that is of abiding value in your idea of the immanence of God. This you may seek to do, working out the consequences as best you can, being careful always to remember, let it be hoped, that these must be worked out in life as well as in thought.

Thus let your religion, in this new age upon which we are all entering, be (whether you call it a new Hinduism, a new Christianity, or simply Universal Religion), the flower and fruitage of what we may perhaps take the liberty of calling a new *jnana-marga*, a new *bhakti-marga* and a new *karma-marga*. By a new *karma-marga* I should mean the way of right action in the broadest possible sense of the word. scientific adjustment to the natural world; a just and kindly attitude toward other persons and social groups, of whatever class, race or nation—the putting into practice, I take it, of a scientific practical sociology; and in relation to God, taking up what we have called the right or scientific religious adjustment, and cultivating this relationship with the use of whatever ritual may be most effective and to as mystical a degree as may be rational and right. Nothing less than this can fulfil the ideal of the *karma-marga*, once it is understood that science is to be substituted for magic. And by the new *bhakti-marga* I should mean this same cultivation of a right and scientific religious adjustment, and at the same time, in view of what we need to have done for us by a super-human cosmic Factor, dependence upon a God who is great enough and good enough to conserve all absolute values of human life and personality, whatever may be the fate of our earthly lives or our material possessions. In spiritual religion this is what *bhakti-marga* must be; it can never be satisfied to think of God as being in character and attitude like any cruel or immoral mythological figure, no matter what traditional authority may be cited in favor of such a view. And by the new *jnana-marga* I should mean in the first instance an immediate assurance of the reality, presence, and activity of God, based upon present religious experience, a practical deliverance from moral evil here and now and a more or less mystical experience of fellowship with the God of our deliverance. And in addition to this I should include under the new *jnana-marga* a rational and empirically founded philosophy of religion and religious philosophy, in which the idea of the immanence of God would have due influence, and due weight be given the results of the scientific investigation of nature, of human life, and of the

nature and history of religion itself. All this I should mean by the new *jnana-marga*. As you will have noticed, from the point of view here taken, not only are *jnana-marga*, *bhakti-marga* and *karma-marga* by no means naturally exclusive, by whatever name they might be called, they would be, in essence, universal religion.

Much of what I have been trying to say may be put somewhat differently, and perhaps more simply. Essentially considered, *jnana-marga* is knowledge of God; *bhakti-marga* is love to God; *karma-marga* is gifts to God. Rightly understood these are three phases of true religion. In ideal religion to know God is to love God, and to love God is to give to God all that we have to give—our possessions and above all ourselves. Rightly to know God is to know Him as the Being who is progressively immanent in the progressive revelation of the Ideal Incarnation of God, the acme of Divine Immanence, would require an ideal man. More than that, the acme of Incarnation, of Divine Immanence, would mean an ideal society. Conversely, an ideal society, in the home, in the local community, in the nation, and internationally, would be the incarnation of God. Now if God is the Being of whom an Ideal Person and still more an Ideal Society would be the Incarnation, and if we become adequately assured of this, and through meditation duly impressed with its tremendous significance, how can we help but love God with all our heart and soul and mind and strength, and how shall we do otherwise than give ourselves to him, all that we are and all that we have, in faith and hope and love? But truly to dedicate to the God of holy, unselfish love all that we have and are and hope to be, cannot possibly mean anything less than to dedicate our lives and possessions to the well-being of the humanity which is the object of God's love. Such a dedication to God and to ideal humanity can never mean withdrawal from social relations and contacts, except as it may be temporarily, to gain the vision of God, that, knowing Him, we may love Him, and loving Him, give ourselves to Him in that life of filial devotion which can find adequate expression only in unselfish service to our brothers of the human family of God. In this way of unselfish social service, this true *karma-marga*, and

not without it, will true *jnana-marga* and *bhakti-marga* find their true expression.

It is sometimes suggested from the Hindu point of view that for a true synthesis of Christianity and Hinduism all that is needed is to recognize the incarnation of God in Christ as one of the many incarnations of the Absolute Being. From the point of view of popular religion this would mean adding Christ to the Hindu pantheon. To this suggestion the Christian reply is something to the effect that in Christ we have the only genuine incarnation of God. What I would rather say is that nothing should be held concerning God that is incompatible with the view that the character and attitude of God, the Ultimate Factor with which we have to do, are truly revealed in the moral purity and unselfish love of the Jesus of history. What matters is neither the adding of Christ to the Hindu pantheon nor uncritical subscription to the Nicene Creed with its glib use of such terms as "very God of very God." What really matters is that, whether as Hindus or as Christians, we respond adequately to the spiritual appeal which that historic figure makes to our hearts, when we consider him fairly and his meaning for our lives. If we take him as our *guru*, as in some very important respects your own Mahatma Gandhi seems to have done, we shall find that we are led into an attitude of unselfish love toward our fellow-men, with all that this will mean for social service and human betterment; into an attitude of earnest moral aspiration and of moral optimism, with all that this will mean for faith in God, freedom and immortality; and into what we have called the right religious adjustment, with all that this will mean for spiritual power, moral development and religious assurance.

There are many who have long since cast off the shackles of traditionalism but who are more firmly convinced than ever that in the essential characteristics of the mind and life and spirit of the historic Jesus we have the true social ideal, the true moral example, the true religious example, and the true revelation of God. The true social ideal, in that he aimed at the unity of humanity in the bonds of righteousness and brotherhood; the true moral exam-

ple, in that he was faithful unto death in his unselfish devotion to this ideal of the true well-being of mankind; the true religious example, both in his persistence in the right religious adjustment and in his morally optimistic assurance of the moral freedom of man, the existence of the perfect fatherly God, and the immortality of the human soul; and finally, as at once the acme and the norm of the divine in its immanence in the life of man, the true revelation of God, as the God of moral redemption, reconciling the world unto Himself

You will recognize in what has been said the strong conviction that Christianity has something of the utmost value to offer to the world. But you will have gathered this also, that I am very far from regarding the entire traditional content of Christianity, Catholic or Protestant, as worthy of your favourable consideration. There is a vital and essential kernel, but there is also a non-essential husk which may as well be thrown away. Essential Christianity is simply that in actual historical and present-day Christianity which it is essential to retain or adopt, if the true ideal in religion and in life generally is to be realized as fully and as rapidly as possible. Such Christianity must be thoroughly moral, it must not be irrational, and it must aim to retain the vitality of historic religion at its best.

In idea at least, Christianity already is essentially moral. It is, however, one of the outstanding problems of the hour whether essential Christianity, as moral religion, can be made thoroughly rational and remain as vital as ever. And then, assuming the affirmative answer to this question, two further problems emerge which have special reference to the situation in India : Can a rational, vital Christianity be Indianized to such an extent that the Indian Christian will not be in danger of being a foreigner in his native land? and, Can Hinduism be so far Christianized as to absorb and assimilate all the essential values of Christianity at its best? \*

\* K. T. Paul, in *The British Connection with India*, 1927, p. 148, tells of "an eminent Brahman lawyer" in Madras who expressed the opinion that "Christ is the hope of Hinduism."

These are far-reaching questions, not to be dealt with adequately in the closing minutes of a final lecture. Rather are they such questions as might well occupy Hindu and Christian religious leaders, met together repeatedly in friendly conference with a view to promoting the development of whatever is of universal validity in religious faith and life. In this closing word, therefore, I will content myself with a single suggestion designed to meet what seems to be a need of the present crucial situation in the life-history of religion. In order to facilitate the development of the great religions of the world in the direction of universally valid and final religion, without waiting for the elimination of all differences between these religions, might it not be well for them, on the basis of such unity as already exists, to come into closer fellowship with one another than has yet been realized? We have had our world parliaments of religion. Lectureships have been established, to be an aid to mutual understanding and good will. One is interested to learn of various recent movements in connection with which representatives of different races and religions have met to worship together, to discuss their differences and agreements in friendly spirit, and to plan for concerted action for human welfare along lines in which agreement is possible.

But are there not two steps forward in the general direction of these movements, and yet beyond any of them, which we shall soon be ready to take? I mean, first, an international, inter-religious association—an organized "League of Religions"—such as might utilize the spiritual dynamic of religion in the interests of human brotherhood in international, inter-racial, and inter-religious relations, and between the various social, economic, and industrial groups \*. And by the second step I mean the formation of some permanent international and inter-religious organization for the promotion of mutual understanding and fellowship in worship among those who already believe in God as a loving Intelligent Will, transcending the world and the life

*Cf. A League of Religions, by J. Tyssul Davis, 3rd Edition, London, 1926.*



of Man, and yet immanent in the universe and in the inmost heart of each individual as "the Light which lighteth every man."

In endorsing to this extent the suggestion of a League of Religions I would not be understood as expecting or desiring that all competition between the religions of the world be set aside. On the contrary it is only when the religions of the world are thus brought into close co-operative contact with each other that their relative strengths and weaknesses will be made fully apparent. Moreover, nothing but the best that is or can be in religion will ultimately satisfy the human heart; the good is at once the friend and the enemy of the best, and perhaps it will be only what might have been anticipated if in the universal religion of the future there will be found to be a predominance of the characteristic marks of some one historic religion.

In religion as in other phases of life there is an evolutionary process, and the universal religion of the future, when it comes, will come, we may believe, as a result of the survival of the fittest in man's struggle for a *better* existence.

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